Posts Tagged ‘nuclear non-proliferation’

When the six party talks[i] finally produced an agreement to reaffirm the common goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula , along with setting out specific measures to be taken toward that end, there were two primary reactions to the deal. Some welcomed it, saying it was far too long in coming and was a deal that could have been won already in 2002. Others disparaged it, saying it rewarded North Korea ‘s bad behavior.

It is certainly true that with the cooperation of the United States the current deal could have been reached much earlier. The basic elements of the deal go back, not only to 2002, but to 1994 and are really a slightly altered version of the 1994 Framework Agreement reached by the Clinton Administration. And what the deal actually rewards is not bad behavior but an end to bad behavior. This time the deal is linked specifically to behavior and refers to the principle of “action for action” – that is, neither side takes action on the basis of a declaration by the other, but each party acts on the basis of concrete action by the other.

That means in the next 60 days there will need to be verified evidence of action. North Korea, or the DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea), must shut down production in the one declared facility it has that is capable of producing fissile materials and must allow it to be placed under the seal and verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency.[ii] That is really the main and essential requirement of Pyonyang. It is a clear and unambiguous action and it is intended to produce another pretty clear action, an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

The February 13, 2007 agreement is partly new and mostly old because it is intended to implement the September 19, 2005 agreement, which in turn more or less updated the 1994 deal.[iii] As the BBC put it: “Prominent members of the US President George W. Bush’s administration make no secret of their contempt for [the Clinton deal, but] now, after years of confrontation, they have signed up to something that looks suspiciously similar – a nuclear freeze in return for economic and diplomatic incentives.”[iv]

A primary difference between 1994 and 2007 is that in 1994 it was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the DPRK, while in 2007 it is a six-party agreement, giving key neighbors, China, South Korea, and Japan, a stake in assuring success this time round.

Success is far from guaranteed. DPRK is required to produce “a list of all its nuclear programs” (Feb. 13/07) and that will prove a challenge. In 2002 the United States accused the DPRK of a clandestine uranium enrichment program. The DPRK at first seemed to admit such a program, but then denied it and has steadfastly denied it since. Washington has never presented public evidence to back up its accusations, which in turn have become increasingly vague over time. The DPRK is unlikely to list what it says does not exist, to which Washington and other skeptics are likely to reply that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”

Things could go on in that vain at some length. In the end, to build confidence that an enrichment program truly does not exist will require extensive with cooperation with IAEA inspectors. Public discussion of the matter now suggests that the North Koreans did try to acquire enrichment equipment, contrary to the provisions of the 1994 deal, but there is no evidence of the extent to which they were successful and Pyongyang continues to deny the program.

The Globe and Mail carried an op-ed by John O’Sullivan[v] of Washington’s Hudson Institute that typified the claim that the downfall of earlier deals was simple matter of North Korea ‘s cheating and that the new deal rewards bad behavior. In 2002, however, it was the Bush Administration that cut off the energy assistance element of the 1994 agreement amidst Washington ‘s aggressive accusations of another advanced but hidden weapons program (uranium enrichment). Kim Jong-il responded predictably, expelling the international inspectors and pulling out of the NPT.

O’Sullivan also reflected the views of other critics when he wrote that the 1994 Clinton Framework Agreement with North Korea is the reason Kim Jong-il now has “more nuclear weapons.” In fact, the Clinton deal shut down North Korea ‘s plutonium operation, and throughout the deal’s eight-year run not an ounce of weapons material was produced there. That all ended in 2002 with the Bush Administration’s dispute with Pyongyang. It was under the Bush Administration that Pyongyang resumed production of fissile material and successfully (at least partly so) weaponized it.

A number of elements of the agreement involve bilateral issues – between the DPRK and the United States and the DPRK and Japan. Others require unspecified levels of economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.

The regime that Washington had labeled part of an Axis of Evil is now to enter into bilateral talks and normalized relations with the US: “The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.”

This welcome turnaround by Washington is seen by some as a deliberate decision to go easy on the DPRK and focus the heavy hand on Iran. On the other hand, the new approach to North Korea could also become a model for dealing with Iran – or would that be too much to expect.

[i] The six are, DPRK, ROK, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States .

[ii] The facility in question is the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and accompanying reprocessing facility. The six-party Joint Statement of February 13, 2007 says this facility will be “shut down and seal[ed] for the purpose of eventual abandonment.” The joint statement is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm.

[iii] See Ploughshares Briefing 06/6, Ernie Regehr, “Responding to the North Korean bomb” (October 2006).

[iv] Charles Scanlon, “The end of a long confrontation,” BBC News, Feb 13, 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6357853.stm).

[v]”No question, this is a bad deal,” Feb. 21/07.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has surprised observers by failing to mark the anniversary of the Islamic revolution with a further escalation of nuclear tension. He was widely expected, over the past weekend, to claim breakthroughs in Iran ‘s nuclear, especially uranium enrichment, program. Instead his tone was conciliatory. He promised to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and declared Iran ready for a new set of talks.[i]

Somewhat more predictably, Ahmadinejad did not agree to remove the central obstacle to such talks, that is Iran’s continuing experimentation in uranium enrichment – a technology for making civilian reactor fuel, but also applicable to making nuclear weapons if the enrichment is taken to high enough levels.

But if a crack in the consensus within the non-proliferation community on how to deal with Iran were to develop, it would probably be over the question of whether a suspension of enrichment activity should continue to be a prerequisite to fulsome engagement with Iran. While the Security Council is now of a single mind on the issue, no small achievement, the expert and advocacy non-proliferation community, while largely supporting that view, is not unanimous.

In the past, Tehran has put forward compromise suggestions that would allow it to enrich a small amount of uranium for research purposes, while agreeing to forgo industrial-level enrichment and to rely on foreign sources, notably Russia , for reactor fuel.[ii]

German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung last year also expressed the view that Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium if it remained at the experimental level and if it was under the reliable scrutiny of the IAEA. “One cannot forbid Iran from doing what other countries in the world are doing in accordance with international law. The key point is whether a step toward nuclear weapons is taken. This cannot happen,” Jung said. According to the Inter Press Service, he insisted that close IAEA oversight could confirm whether Tehran ‘s nuclear program was actually peaceful. “IAEA inspections can provide those assurances through monitoring,” he was quoted as saying. “That is not a problem.”[iii]

By confining itself to research on uranium enrichment, it would be following a much more restrictive path than other states, notably Japan , that are in full compliance with IAEA inspection requirements. Japan is fully engaged in industrial level uranium enrichment, but of course the big difference is that Japan has been open and transparent, whereas Iran has been clandestine and deceitful. But even that distinction suggests that the real objective regarding Iran ought to be transparency and compliance with IAEA safeguards, not a ban on non-weapons enrichment.

Even if Ahmadinejad’s conciliatory demeanor were to hold, he and his country are a long way from winning back the trust of the international community – an essential requirement for any scheme to normalize relations with Iran. One measure of the depth of the mistrust is the unprecedented level of consensus at the UN Security Council. Despite Russia’s strong nuclear links to Iran and the intense suspicion of both Russia and China regarding American motives and actions, the permanent five members of the Security Council (the P5) have come together in a unanimous demand that Iran end all enrichment activity or face escalating sanctions and other unspecified consequences.

That in turn has set up the conditions for a “hurting stalemate”[iv] – that is, a stalemate that is contrary to the interests of all the parties, even if the resort to American/Israeli military force is kept out, as it surely must be, of the equation.

Under this hurting stalemate non-proliferation advocates, notably the three European Union states (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) heading negotiations with Iran, must watch while Iran continues to refuse full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and edges slowly closer to a nuclear weapons capability, although not necessarily toward a clear intention to acquire such a weapon. Iran , on the other hand faces escalating sanctions and continuing exclusion from beneficial international economic institutions and from cooperation in civilian nuclear power generation that could, by its own account at least, be a welcome diversification of its energy source.

Timothy Garton Ash, a respected analyst frequently turned to by the Globe and Mail, looks for a compelling mixture of carrots and sticks to end this hurting stalemate and to persuade Iran to meet its IAEA obligations and verifiably forgo pursuit of nuclear weapons. He rightly, and thankfully, insists that the threat of military attack be excluded from the array of available sticks,[v] but then more or less concludes there are few prospects that other measures will succeed.

He does, however, hint that it may be time to think again about a compromise on the matter of research-level enrichment. He says “the White House should open direct, bilateral talks with Iran, without conditions,” and that ultimately the US should seek full diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran, “provided Iran desists from developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorists.”

Does entering talks “without conditions” mean that negotiations should begin even though Iran continues experimental enrichment activity? And is limited experimental uranium enrichment compatible with a verifiable assurance that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons?

Most observers are reluctant to answer in the affirmative on either question, but it may yet turn out that a “yes” on both counts will be the most effective way to call Iran ‘s bluff.

[i] Doug Saunders, ” Iran warms to nuclear talks,” The Globe and Mail, February 12, 2007.

[ii] US, Russia reject Iran Compromise,” BBC News, March 7, 2006 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4784262.stm].

[iii] Garth Porter, “German Official Urges Compromise on Iran Enrichment,” Inter Press Service, July 4, 2006 (http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=9238).

[iv] Bruno Dupre, “Iran Nuclear Crisis: The Right Approach,” The Carnegie Endowmen for International Peace, February 2007 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19002].

[v] Timothy Garton Ash, “Don’t bomb Iran – don’t let Iran get the bomb,” The Globe and Mail, February 9, 2007.

In Geneva the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) has begun what some will call yet another year of living pointlessly. For 10 years now, the world’s only multilateral forum dedicated to negotiating disarmament agreements has failed to agree even on what they should talk about, much less actually negotiating.

That doesn’t mean there are any doubts about the urgency of the CD’s nuclear agenda. Indeed, the urgency is growing given that in less than three months the signatory states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet in a Preparatory Committee to begin planning for its 2010 Review Conference, and given that this new review cycle must be regarded as a make or break time for the NPT.

The last Review Conference, in 2005, ended in complete failure and cast a pall over the entire disarmament enterprise. The failure to make any headway in implementing the NPT’s objectives – that is, to bring all states under its discipline and thus require the elimination of all current nuclear arsenals and prevent the spread of weapons – leaves many states increasingly doubtful that the international community is serious about nuclear disarmament and wondering whether they too should prepare to join the expanding nuclear club.

To turn these doubts around means facing some rather serious challenges:

• In the North Asia region the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests of the DPRK threaten to destabilize the region and to undermine the agreed international objective of nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
• In the Middle East, Iran’s failure to satisfy the international community that its civilian nuclear programs are not a cover for developing a nucler weapons capability, combined with Israel’s refusal to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections, threatens a cascade of nuclear proliferation and obviously frustrates the international community’s agreed pursuit of the Middle East as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.
• In South Asia, the unilateral initiative by the United States to accept India as a nuclear weapon state threatens an ongoing nuclear arms race with Pakistan and with China, with severe implications beyond the region, and entrenches a nuclear double standard that threatens all other non-proliferation efforts.
• The ongoing nuclear modernization programs of the nuclear weapon states, along with stalled efforts to pursue arsenal reductions, exacerbates that double standard and generates further global skepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of the NPT as an instrument for the pursuit of nuclear abolition.
• The dangers of the unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons are heightened by practices in the United States and Russia that keep nuclear weapons on high alert and available for firing within minutes of an alarm (or false alarm) and by the dangers that insufficiently secured weapons or weapons materials will fall into the hands of non-state groups committed to acts of terror.

The challenges are daunting, but there are signs, or at least slivers, of hope still present. A group of lapsed Cold Warriors, including former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other former custodians of US nuclear expansion and deterrence strategies, has declared the world to be “on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear war” and thus issued a call to “leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.”

Their statement calls for a recommitment to the NPT’s objective of nuclear disarmament and challenges the United States in particular to work toward “a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”[i]

A recent article by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev descries the arrogance of military power and calls for reliance on “dialogue and cooperation rather than force.”[ii]

Another source of continuing hope, or at least a basis for staving off utter despair, is the fact that the core cause for hope is that the core agenda is not in dispute. The stalemate in the CD is not based on any uncertainty about the work that needs to be done – the quarrel is really over priorities. The core disarmament agenda is widely agreed. It was articulated and affirmed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, labeled there as the “13 practical steps.”

And within those steps, even the items for priority action are generally agreed:

• Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – a Treaty that was negotiated within the CD (its last piece of substantive work) but now awaits ratification by the United States and other key states – would be one of the most effective means of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons capability and of curtailing the growth of arsenals in the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan.
• Within the CD itself, the most likely route to it resuming its primary function of negotiating disarmament measures would be through a program of work that simultaneously involves negotiations on a treaty to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (the FMCT), formal discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space, and discussion of nuclear disarmament imperatives more broadly, including the formalization of security assurances given by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.[iii]

An early signal toward action on these two fronts would have a salutary effect on the disarmament environment and on the tone of the forthcoming NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

Additional measures to build confidence in a revived nuclear disarmament agenda include:

• The control and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, facilitated by the immediate removal of such weapons from the soil of non-nuclear-weapon states of NATO; and
• Further measures to reduce nuclear dangers by taking all weapons of high alert and redoubling efforts to bring all nuclear weapons and materials under effective security protection to prevent them from getting into the hands of non-state groups.

And for those with a surfeit of ambition, it could be turned toward:

• The commencement of discussions, in the context of requiring Iran to meet its obligations toward the IAEA, of ways and means of pursuing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (in the context of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction); and
• The continued exploration of placing the weapon sensitive elements of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel – under international controls.

A Canadian agenda for action should grow out of this list of policy imperatives:

• A clear reaffirmation by the Harper Government of Canada’s long-standing commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, a commitment that is more urgent than ever and eminently achievable;
• A challenge to the United States and China in particular – the two states at the centre of the CD stalemate – to accept Ambassador Paul Meyer’s formula for moving forward with negotiations on an FMCT and discussions of PAROS, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances;
• Yet another call to the United States, India and Pakistan in particular to show global leadership by beginning steps toward their respective ratification of the CTBT; and
• A renewed call to remove all nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states of NATO and to challenge NATO to end its doctrine of nuclear reliance.

[i] The statement, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” was written by Mr. Kissinger along with former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, and was endorsed by a number of former officials and diplomats. It was published in the Washington Post, January 4, 2007.

[ii] Mikhail Gorbachev, “History is not preordained: A new cold war can be averted,” The Guardian, January 18, 2007.

[iii] The formula put forward by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Paul Meyer, “The Conference on Disarmament: Getting Back to Business,” Arms Control Today, December 2006.

The UN Security Council continues to insist that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment activity even though such activity does not violate any provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor is enrichment in itself contrary to safeguards requirements under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is not illegal for Iran to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.

But it is illegal to try to do it in secret – that is, outside of IAEA safeguards arrangements – which is what Iran in fact did for an extended period. The clandestine operation of any civilian nuclear facility, including civilian enrichment, without safeguards is illegal, so when Iran was caught doing just that it obviously raised suspicions that Iran ‘s real interest is in developing the capacity to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Hence, the Security Council made the eminently reasonable decision to require Iran to suspend all enrichment activity until such time as the IAEA has sufficient access to Iranian nuclear facilities to develop full confidence that all clandestine activities have ended and that enrichment is and will remain for civilian purposes only.

Iran has been notorious about dragging its feet on compliance with IAEA requirements, complaining that it is being asked to terminate just the kind of peaceful nuclear activity that is specifically allowed and even promoted under the NPT. In the standoff Iran continues to pursue enrichment and little progress is being made in clearing up outstanding questions related to the earlier secret operations.

In other words, the Security Council strategy – which seeks to isolate Iran by refusing all talks until enrichment is suspended – isn’t working, and calls for a new approach are growing.

Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group recently told a Harvard University conference that the world will finally have to accept Iran’s civilian enrichment program and take a principled position that is consistent with the Treaty – namely, insist on a safeguards arrangement that can verify that Iran never weaponizes its enrichment capability, and promise “all hell – including in an extreme case military action – if that line is crossed.”[i]

A similar approach has been argued here.[ii] If suspension of enrichment was taken off the table and replaced by a requirement that enrichment be confined to research levels until such time as all outstanding IAEA questions are resolved, the international community would be in a position to call Iran’s bluff‚Äîto see whether Iran, with the challenge to its right to enrichment technology removed, would indeed honour its obligation of full disclosure and unfettered IAEA access. Then, future industrial enrichment would be carried out under full IAEA safeguards. At the moment, however, the focus on a suspension of all enrichment activity provides Iran a cover under which it both accelerates enrichment activity and refuses full cooperation with the IAEA – and. as a consequence, frustrates the international community’s right to unambiguous confirmation that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

The current Security Council strategy is driven by the US, but it is increasingly questioned at home. Three contenders to be the Democratic Party’s nominee for president – Hilary Clinton, Bill Richardson, and Barak Obama – have recently called for a new round of intensified diplomacy, including direct talks without preconditions.[iii]

With the IAEA’s Director, Mohamed ElBaradei, calling for the defusing of tension to prepare the way for a political solution, the US/Security Council approach is losing credibility. There is no doubt that American pressure for strengthened economic sanctions against Iran is having an impact, but it is the move toward talks to resolve the crisis, rather than talks as a reward for Iran agreeing to all demands in advance, that is now opening up new possibilities. Last week Iran and the IAEA agreed to “develop an action plan for resolving outstanding issues.”[iv]

One new pledge to talk does not qualify as a major breakthrough, but combined with the growing criticism of the current no negotiations stance from Washington , we may be seeing a new opportunity. It is an opportunity that needs to be developed into a three-pronged approach: a new commitment to talking and sustained diplomacy; recognition that countries like Iran cannot be prevented from developing civilian nuclear technology; and the strengthening of the IAEA, backed by tough international resolve, to give it the technical tools and the political backing it needs to apply the kinds of comprehensive safeguards needed to assure that there is no diversion of civilian technology to weapons purposes.

[i] Gareth Evans, “Hypocrisy, Democracy, War and Peace,” speech to Harvard University Wetherhead Center for International Affairs, June 16, 2007 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4906).

[ii]“Iran: Is it time for a new consensus on uranium enrichment?” March 4/07 (iranisit).

[iii] The Associated Press reports on the Clinton and Richardson comments: “Clinton, Richardson urge Bush administration to continue talking to Iran,” Associated Press, June 27/07 (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/27/america/NA-POL-US-Democrats-Foreign-Policy.php); Barak Obama writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that “our first measure must be sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy – the kind that the Bush administration has been unable and unwilling to use,” Barak Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html).

[iv] ” Iran , IAEA to Discuss Better Nuclear Cooperation,: Global Security Newswire, June 26, 2007 (http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007/6/26/ADE5FA01-715B-4BA6-AE9B-1453E164C409.html).

Like the proverbial bad dream that it is, missile defence once again has a lot of people losing a lot of sleep. The finger of blame swings naturally to Washington , but this time let’s not overlook Russian President Vladimir Putin. His energetic Russia-as-victim positioning not only tries to return nuclear competition to the core of Russian-US relations, it misses the perfect opportunity to expose the US ballistic missile plan (BMD) for the minor irritant and major fraud that it really is.

The US missile defence system is and will remain powerless to prevent Russia from launching a nuclear attack on the United States if that is what it really wants to do. Indeed, David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that “because the system is vulnerable to decoys, it also wouldn’t stop a missile attack from the Middle East. If Iran or other states in the region develop long-range missiles and deliverable nuclear warheads, they would certainly equip those missiles with countermeasures that could render U.S. defenses ineffective.”[i]

American officials, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have themselves been claiming that the Poland-based GBIs would be ineffective against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), not because they have finally admitted that the system doesn’t work, but because of the physics of missiles and the geography of Poland.[ii]For once they are right.

Even if the system worked as intended, the only Russian ICBMs which the Poland-based GBIs would have a chance of intercepting would be those launched from western or European Russian. The trajectory of west Russian missiles headed for the US would not pass directly over Poland, but close to it, while the trajectory of central and east Russian missiles would be far to the north of Poland and impossible to catch (interceptors have to be directed at a target warhead coming toward them, not one they are trying to overtake).

But if the system was intended to intercept warheads launched from western Russia, the US Arms Control Association confirms, Poland would be a poor location for the GBIs.[iii] Some Russian commentators insist they could work against west Russian launches, but they are tentative at best.[iv] Others say definitely that GBIs in Poland would not have the capacity to reach the Russian warhead flight path in time.[v]The Americans have said that if the focus was Russian ICBMs, England and further west would be a far the better location ( Baffin Island !?).

On the other hand, if the American focus is Iran (remember, we’re still pretending the system actually works), then Poland is a logical location inasmuch as the flight path of an Iranian missile headed for Washington, were such a thing to actually exist, would take it directly over Poland with enough time for the interceptors to be fired into the path of the Iranian warhead (or at least one of the decoys).

In any event, the audience for Mr. Putin’s protestations is his domestic constituency, not the White House. For him to be dismissive of this faux American threat he would have to forgo the opportunity to foster an image of Russian toughness in the face of an irresponsible and reckless US Administration.[vi]

And speaking of President George W. Bush, he is almost too easy a target. But he remains diligent in earning the world’s opprobrium – not so much for his dogged pursuit of missile defence in the face of overwhelming expert testimony that it will never be made effective (that makes it is a colossal waste of money, but given their current war-spending and annual deficits, Americans seem fully inured to waste), but for doing it in a unilateral, arms-control-destroying, and political-cooperation-defying way.

And it is not only Russia to which Mr. Bush gives offence and an excuse to avoid disarmament commitments. The United States says it wants China to agree to negotiate a treaty banning further production of fissile materials, but does Mr. Bush really think he can persuade China to take action to cap its stocks of fissile material through a legally binding treaty if it believes that America is committed to perfecting its strategic first-strike capability and link it to an upscalable missile defence system that could theoretically defang China’s nuclear forces? As long as the US continues to modernize its nuclear forces while pursuing missile defence, China will have little incentive to cooperate.

Had Mr. Bush genuinely wanted a BMD system as a hedge against rogue states far into the future, he would have done long ago what he has now, at the German G8 meeting, agreed to – and that is present missile defence as an instrument of cooperation with Russia, and China , rather than as a tension escalator.[vii] Even supporters of missile defence make this point: “If the President wants to make creating a third missile defense site part of his legacy, he can still contribute – by setting up a formal NATO process to study the idea and give our allies a greater voice in the debate. We should also involve Russia in the discussion, especially as good diplomacy might be able to turn it into a supporter rather than an opponent of the plan.”[viii]

Instead, while Mr. Bush gave Mr. Putin an opportunity to work the polls at home,[ix]he also managed to push nuclear disarmament even further down his To Do list.

While sharing the blame, we should also not forget the Republican Presidential hopefuls who turn out to be almost unanimous in their declared willingness to use nuclear weapons against Iran if it persists in pursuing a nuclear weapon capability.[x]In concert with the Administration in Washington , the Republicans believe that it is possible to threaten states into disarming. All the while, of course, Iran sees that the US does not make the same threat against states that actually do acquire nuclear weapons, e.g. North Korea and India , but reserves its threats for those it accuses of trying.

The lesson is clear, and President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad of Iran has been diligent in learning it. Iran could obviously undercut the US rationale for missile defence in a flash if it would simply agree to full and unfettered cooperation with the IAEA. Of course it doesn’t, and so the cycle of threat and counter-threat is fed, derailing nuclear disarmament and a host of genuine opportunities to pursue real world problems in both the Middle East and Russia .

Putin, Bush, the Republican aspirants to global leadership, and Ahmadinejad are in full cooperation mode to keep threat and counter-threat alive and to position themselves as the heroic defenders of the threatened rights and security of their respective publics.

The late news flash that the US and Russia will now seek to cooperate on missile defence brings to mind the oft-quoted African proverb: be careful when two elephants get together, because whether they decide to fight or make love, a lot of grass is bound to get trampled. It is almost twenty years since the Berlin Wall was dismantled, but with Russia and the US still placing nuclear arsenals at the core of their relationship, whether to balance them or defend against them, a lot of political, economic, and security grass continues to get the life trampled out of it.

[i] David Wright, ” President Putin Needn’t Worry About a U.S. Missile Defense System: It Won’t Work, Says Leading U.S. Science Group ,” June 6/07, Union of Concerned Scientists

(http://www.ucsusa.org/news/commentary/president-putin-neednt-worry-0036.html).

[ii] Donna Miles, “Putin Baffles Gates With Missiles in Eastern Europe ,” American Forces Press Service (http://www.sitemason.com/newspub/dtWzug?id=46198&mode=print).

[iii] William Matthews, “As U.S., Russia Spar Over Missile Defense, Congress Cuts Funding”:”The missiles would, indeed, “be incapable of intercepting Russian missiles aimed at the United States ,” said Boese. “Russian missiles would be fired over the North Pole to reach the United States. Anti-ballistic missiles fired from Poland would be chasing them and could not catch up. Besides, 10 interceptors would be no match for a barrage of Russian missiles.” http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2797079&C=europe

[iv] “Missile defense interceptors in Poland” – “Although it is true that Poland is not exactly on the flight path of Russian missiles, it is close enough to give interceptors deployed there a chance to reach SS-19/UR-100NUTTH ICBMs launched from the Koselsk or Tatishchevo bases. SS-27 Topol-M missiles based in Tatishchevo, as well as SS-25 Topol in Vypolzovo and Teykovo also may be within the interceptors reach.” http://russianforces.org/

[v] Vladimir Belous, “The Missile-Defense Flap ,” RIA Novosti, Moscow , April 11, 2007 (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html).”But the snag for the United States is that the strategic missiles deployed in European Russia — mobile and silo-based Topol-M (NATO reporting name SS-27) missiles and Stilet missiles — make too quick a getaway to be intercepted by U.S. anti-missiles. Solid-fueled Topols (SS-25 Sickle) have a launch speed of 5 km/sec, and liquid-fueled Stilets, 4.5 km/sec, compared with the 3.5 km/sec of ground-based interceptors. GBIs cannot catch up with Russian strategic missiles because they are too slow and too far from where the missiles would be launched. And the trick could never be pulled off outside the atmosphere, because Topol and Stilet warheads have even faster speeds there.” http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html

[vi] ABC News, “Leaders spar in war of words over missile defense system at summit”: “Putin rightly understands that the U.S. is weak and discredited around the world, and therefore he can make points on the world stage” (http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=nation_world&id=5373927).

[vii] Jennifer Loven, “Putin tells Bush to put missile shield in Azerbaijan ,” Associated Press, Winnipege Free Press, June 7, 2007(http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/world/story/3983664p-4599862c.html).

[viii] Michael O’Hanlon, “A Defense We Just Don’t Need (Yet),” The New York Times, May 17, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/17/opinion/17ohanlon.html?ex=1337054400&en=e45e98aa13d55c3a&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss).

[ix] Tom Miles, “‚ÄòCold War’ talk sets the scene for polls in Russia ,” 7 June, 2007 (http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=153621&version=1&template_id=46&parent_id=26). Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman at the end of the Cold War, sees a clever game by Putin. “It’s all about psychology. It’s not really serious. It’s not a Cold War, no,” said Gerasimov, who is now retired from government service. “He wants the West to take him seriously.” Putin had an interest in making a fuss over missile defence even if it presented no threat, Gerasimov said. “This helps him to take the position of the defender of Russia , which is a victim of American aggression. If you take into account anti-Americanism all over the world, you can also interpret this as something which plays in Putin’s hands.
“It helps him to stay in power and to increase his power.” Andrei Illarionov, once Putin’s top economic aide, agreed. “Russia is pursuing a deliberate policy aimed at putting a strain on relations with G7,” Interfax quoted him as saying. The outspoken economist said Putin’s strategy was “to provoke (G8 leaders) to make harsh statements or even take steps that could be interpreted as interference in domestic affairs.”
This would allow the Kremlin to “declare the West an enemy and to mobilise the electorate”, he added. – Reuters

[x] William Arkin, “Nuking Iran : The Republican Agenda?” The Washington Post, June 6/07 (http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/06/nuking_iran_the_republican_age_1.html#more).

It takes few prophetic powers to predict that the UN Security Council’s new demands and sanctions on Iran will not have the desired effect.

Progress in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program conforms to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the monitoring and inspection requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is frustrated by seriously compromised non-proliferation norms, an unexpectedly emboldened Iran , and an ambiguous case.

A persistent double standard in nuclear non-proliferation means that what is being required of Iran – the immediate termination of all uranium enrichment and nuclear reactor fuel reprocessing – is not required of other non-nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT. Furthermore, India, which is not an NPT signatory but which has used enrichment and reprocessing technologies to produce nuclear warheads, is in the process of being offered full civilian nuclear cooperation by the United States. From Tehran ‘s vantage, the issue seems to be not what you do but who’s friend you are.

In the meantime Iran has clearly become bolder and more influential. Even though President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s intemperate rhetoric on the state of Israel and his audacious anti-Semitism should strip his Government of all international credibility, the country’s oil wealth,[i] its influence in Iraq (in the context of growing American desperation and dependence on Iran’s help to quell the civil war now raging), and its proxy role in the Middle East via Hezbollah and Hamas forces, have given the Iranian regime unexpected, and unwelcome in most of the world, confidence as a regional player – and a disinclination to be compliant.

Added to that, the international community’s case against Iran is genuinely ambiguous. The only hard charge is a lack of transparency. The secrecy charge is a very serious one and there is no ambiguity about Iran being in violation of its safeguard obligations. The fact that for many years it kept nuclear programs hidden from the IAEA, along with a continuing refusal to cooperate fully in answering the IAEA investigators’ questions, means it cannot expect the international community to adopt a business-as-usual approach to its civilian nuclear efforts. But ambiguity does enter inasmuch as there is no direct evidence that Iran is in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and Iran cites some credible reasons why its special circumstances prevent it from meeting the international community’s legitimate transparency demands at this time.

First, when Iran is asked why it initially conducted its nuclear enrichment program in secret if its only interest is the perfectly legal pursuit of nuclear power, it replies that it in fact tried to acquire the relevant technology in the open market but was persistently frustrated by US interference and pressure on other states not to cooperate with Iran. So, for Iran to acquire technology to which it should have been given open access, it had to turn to clandestine efforts to get around US obstruction.

Second, Iran is asked why it continues to refuse full disclose all of its nuclear activities and open all its relevant facilities for IAEA inspection if it has only peaceful purposes in mind? Iran replies that as long as the United States is still drawing up plans to attack and bomb its nuclear facilities it cannot disclose the location and depth of its facilities – for any disclosure to the IAEA will end up being known by the US. So disclosure now, it says, would only help the US refine its war plans.

And finally, in addition to the transparency question, Iran is legitimately challenged to explain why, if it is truly only interested in electricity generation by nuclear means, it cannot accept the offer from international negotiators of guarantees of all the enriched nuclear fuel it needs (removing the need for domestic uranium enrichment). Virtually no country just beginning to acquire nuclear power reactors relies on domestic fuel production, so why does Iran require its own production rather than rely on imports. Iran answers, with much less credibility since it has to rely on imports to build its domestic capacity, that as long as the US vendetta against Iran continues, e.g. its listing of Iran as part of the axis of evil, how can Iran be sure that pledges of access to fuel will be honored?

And so the stalemate will continue. It is likely that the international community will ultimately have to bend on two counts. On the matter of uranium enrichment, it may finally be necessary to accept Iran ‘s current level of enrichment (still at an experimental or research level, but with steadily growing capacity)[ii] under strict IAEA safeguards while the IAEA completes its work of confirming the legitimacy of the rest of the program.

The preferred option of course is that Iran suspends all enrichment activity, cooperates fully with the IAEA in clearing up all outstanding questions about Iran ‘s earlier clandestine efforts and current operations, and then resumes enrichment only under full inspections and in accordance with its rights under the NPT. But, despite some slim hopes that the indirect reproach that Iranian voters in local elections handed to Ahmadinejad and the extremists could yield a change of approach,[iii] there are few indications that Iran is in a mood to be cooperative and to give up uranium enrichment as a gesture of goodwill.

The complete termination of Iranian enrichment and reprocessing efforts will ultimately have to be linked to a wider international agreement to internationalize control over the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – and the success of the latter will be critical to the success of long term non-proliferation.

The international community, in this case primarily the United States, will also have to bend to provide Iran with a set of credible security assurances. Getting Iran into full compliance with IAEA safeguards will require the United States to make it demonstrably clear that regime change is off the table and that its sole objective is unambiguous compliance with non-proliferation standards (i.e. fullscope inspections and implementation of the additional protocol – an enhanced set of inspection arrangements with the IAEA). George Perkovich, a prominent US non-proliferation analyst, argues that the US has in fact largely abandoned regime change as a policy objective but that it will have to be diplomatically creative and persistent to persuade Iran and the rest of the world.[iv]

It is hard to believe that the United States, given the rate of its current descent into the Iraq quagmire and its spectacular failures in the rest of the Middle East, would actually contemplate adding to its failures with a military attack on Iran, but the depth of Washington’s folly has been underestimated before. Not only Iran, but many of America ‘s allies will have to see credible proof of the Bush Administration’s full commitment to non-proliferation diplomacy before they energetically promote the Security Council’s new formula.

[i] Iran’s oil revenue is expected to go into sharp decline over the next several years, due in part to growing (and subsidized) domestic consumption and a deteriorating oil industry infrastructure – a development that gives credence to Iran’s claim that it needs civilian nuclear power production to meet growing energy demand and that in turn suggests Iran’s current sense of invulnerability could be short-lived – perhaps making it more inclined to cooperate on non-proliferation standards. [“Iranian Oil Revenue Quickly Drying Up, Analysis Says,” WashingtonPost, Dec. 26/06.]

[ii]A recent report suggests that its uranium enrichment capacity has grown from two 164-centrifuge units to a total of 3,000 centrifuges (keeping in mind that industrial level production of low enriched uranium to fuel a reactor would require a complicated and integrated system of 54,000 centrifuges, but 3,000 such centrifuges clandestinely dedicated to producing highly enriched uranium could within a few years generate enough weapons grade uranium for one or two bombs per year). [“Iran may declare major enrichment feat,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, Dec. 26/06, www.jpost.com. David Albright, “When could Iran get the Bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006.]

[iii]” Opponents of Iran’s ultra-conservative president won nationwide elections for local councils, final results confirmed Thursday, an embarrassing outcome for the hard-line leader that could force him to change his anti-Western tone and focus more on problems at home. Moderate conservatives critical of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won a majority of seats in last week’s elections, followed by reformists who were suppressed by hard-liners two years ago. Analysts said the President’s allies won less than 20 per cent of local council seats across the country. The vote was widely seen as a sign of public discontent with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s stances, which have fuelled fights with the West and led Iran closer to UN sanctions. [Ali Akbar Dareini, “Local elections a blow to Iran ‘s Ahmadinejad,” GlobeandMail.com, Dec. 21/06 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061221.wiranelect12…).][iv] George Perkovich, Five Scenarios for the Iranian Crisis, Winter 2006 (Ifri: Paris and Brussels , 2006), p. 29.

While nuclear weapon states, including their non-nuclear weapon state allies (see last posting, Dec. 12) continue to plan for the long-term retention of nuclear weapons, despite their Treaty commitment to disarm,[i] a group of Nobel Peace Laureates warns that “a world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented and unstable.”

The declaration goes on to remind us that “The NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) is a bargain in which nonproliferation is obtained based on a promise by nuclear weapons states to negotiate nuclear weapons elimination and offer peaceful uses of nuclear technology.” But, they say, “nuclear weapons states want to keep their weapons indefinitely and at the same time condemn others who would attempt to acquire them.”

That of course is an apt description of NATO’s insistence on its long-term need for nuclear weapons and the UK’s modernization plans. “Such flaunting of disarmament obligations,” they say, “is not sustainable.”

The Nobel Laureates also say they “are gravely concerned regarding several current developments such as NPT stakeholders enabling rather than constraining proliferation” – an equally apt description of the US initiative for civilian nuclear cooperation with India and accepting India as a de facto nuclear weapon state.

Those taking part in the Summit were: Frederik Willem De Klerk, Mairead Corrigan Maguire, Lech Walesa, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Peace Bureau, United Nations Organization, United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund, International Labour Organization, Médecins sans Frontières, American Friends Service Committee, Red Cross, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Pugwash Conference. Guests of honour were: Mayor of Hiroshima and President of the World’s Mayors for Peace Tadatoshi Akiba, Nobel Laureate for Medicine Rita Levi Montalcini, Man of Peace 2006 Peter Gabriel, Representative of the Weapons of Mass Distruction Commission Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends and Greenhouse Crisis Foundation Jeremy Rifkin,

Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Nobuaki Tanaka and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Jose Antonio Ocampo.

The 7th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates took place in Rome from November 17 to 19 and was held, as were previous Summits, on the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni.[ii]

[i] Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[ii] The Declaration is available at http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Rome_Declaration_2006.pdf.

While the United Nations Security Council struggles to achieve the verifiable disavowal of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea, Europe and North America are busy championing nuclear weapons as the ultimate security trump card and the preeminent emblem of political gravitas, thereby building a political/security context that is increasingly hostile to non-proliferation.

At the end of November in Riga, though NATO leaders may have quarreled over Afghanistan , they were of a single mind in reaffirming the political and security advantages of nuclear weapons.[i] The leaders declared the continuing relevance of, and their full satisfaction with, the alliance’s 1999 strategic doctrine,[ii] which declares that “the Alliance ‘s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”

It is an assertion that begs a question almost too obvious to repeat? If NATO, with its collective command of some two-thirds of global conventional military capacity, feels unacceptably vulnerable without a nuclear back-up, what are North Korea and Iran likely to conclude? It is true that North Korea and Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and solemnly pledged to permanently disavow nuclear weapons, but so did most of the NATO states, including Canada, that have just proclaimed their enduring commitment to nuclear weapons. Five non-nuclear weapon states (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey )[iii] even host nuclear weapons on their territories.

The United Kingdom followed the NATO paean to nuclear weapons with its own unilateral version. In its just released Defence White Paper, the Blair Government promises a new generation of submarine-based nuclear weapons, albeit reduced by 20 percent from its current arsenal of about 200 warheads.[iv] As the Leader in the Guardian put it, “the words ‚Äònuclear deterrent’ occur more than any other in the defence white paper published [December 4], but at no point is the document clear about who or what a new generation of British nuclear weapons is intended to deter.”[v]

Whitehall, of course, denies that its nuclear modernization program is in violation of Article VI of the NPT, which commits all nuclear weapon states to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, or a betrayal of its pledge, made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference along with other nuclear weapon states, of “an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”[vi] But it is hard to deny what the UK action says about the spirit of its nuclear disarmament commitments and what it does to the political climate in which nuclear non-proliferation is pursued.

To top it off, the US Administration and Congress then joined up to reward India for its nuclear weapons tests in violation of non-proliferation norms. The US-India nuclear cooperation agreement accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapons state and irgnores, even rewards, its continuing violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”[vii]

In addition to rewarding defiance of the Security Council, implement of full civilian nuclear cooperation with India will arguably put the United States in violation of Article I of the NPT which prohibits nuclear weapon states from assisting, encouraging, or inducing other states to acquire nuclear weapons. Providing India with civilian nuclear fuel assists its nuclear weapons development by freeing up limited domestic supplies for the production of fissile material for its expanding arsenal. And as to encouragement, there is little doubt that India takes encouragement from its new found favour in Washington and the equanimity with which its violations of the Security Council are met.

For North Korea and Iran the lessons are unmistakable. Western non-proliferation policy is not about eliminating nuclear arsenals or even stopping their spread. Instead, it is an art of selection – states within, or being wooed into, a US-defined orbit of friendliness are permitted to violate global non-proliferation norms, while states outside this axis of strategic convenience are to be punished to the full for their, in the case of Iran, much lesser violations.

Hans Blix and his Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission warned against this kind of selective non-proliferation, rejecting “the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy.”[viii]

If it is the intention of European and North American governments to build a political climate that is hostile to non-proliferation, then they will be well-pleased with their work of the last few weeks.

[i] “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, Riga, Latvia (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm).

[ii] “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington. D.C. on 23 rd and 24 th April 1999 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).

[iii] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs are, 2006,” NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(November/December, 2006, vol. 62, no. 6), pp. 57-58.

[iv] By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ” British nuclear forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,NRDC: Nuclear Notebook (November/December 2005, vol. 61, no. 06), pp. 77-79.

[v] “Why? And why now?” The Guardian, December 5, 2006.

[vi]2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Volume I, Part I: Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Improving the effectiveness of thestrengthened review process for the Treaty (Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs), para 15(6).

[vii] Security Council, Resolution 1172, June 6, 1998, operative paragraph 7.

[viii] Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006, Stockholm ), p. 60.

India and Pakistan have in recent days both carried out tests of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.[1] The tests are in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172.

Following the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan, an indignant Security Council reflected the global mood when it unanimously passed Resolution 1172 (June 6, 1998) condemning the tests, demanding “that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests” and called upon “India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons [emphasis added] and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”

The resolution also “requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution.” The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Security Council on the matter, and it would be correct to conclude that no implementation steps have been taken.

Coincidentally, while the Indians and Pakistanis were testing their ballistic missiles in definace of the Security Council, the US Senate voted to support proposals by the Bush Administration to enter into civilian nuclear cooperation arrangements with India – arrangements that accept and actually welcome India as a de facto nuclear weapons state, facilitate the further production within India of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and ignore India’s refusal to sign, much less ratify, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In contrast, Washington and the Security Council have been following Iran ‘s civilian uranium enrichment program with unwavering vigilance. While India’s actual acquisition of nuclear weapons has the White House in search of ways to accommodate it, Iran ‘s uncertain and future pursuit of a weapons capability is met with a full-court press of diplomacy and Pentagon planning for pre-emptive attack. It would be wrong to treat Iran’s uranium enrichment capability as fully benign, but it is also worth remembering that to date there is no conclusive evidence that a nuclear weapons program is Iran ‘s real goal.[2]

What drives Washington these days is selective non-proliferation – the issue isn’t the spread of nuclear weapons, but who is getting them. In the hands of the friends of the United States, and currently Israel, India, and Pakistan all fit into that category, nuclear weapons are not seen as a danger. Not all agree, however – notably, Hans Blix and his commission on weapons of mass destruction urge the world to hold fast to non-proliferation principles and “reject the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy.”[3] (p. 60)

[1] Archana Mishra, “India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile,” The Associated Press, Nov. 19, 2006 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/19/AR2006111900156].

[2] Seymour M. Hersh, “Is a damaged Administration less likely6 to attack Iran , or more?, New Yorker, Nov. 27, 2006 [http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061127fa_fact].

[3] Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm . http://www.wmdcommission.org (p. 60).

The main elements of a satisfactory end to the North Korean nuclear crisis have been in place for more than a decade.

North Korea receives economic assistance, especially energy assistance such as fuel oil or electricity. Nuclear supplier states promise to explore assisting it in building a light water nuclear power plant. North Korea’s sovereignty is clearly acknowledged and security assurances that take regime change off the table are provided.

In return, North Korea commits to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, terminates all military nuclear programs, places all its nuclear programs and facilities under full international inspections to confirm that none support military objectives, and returns to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

That was essentially the arrangement under the 1994 “framework agreement” between Pyongyang and the Clinton Administration. [1] Its core elements held until 2002 when the Bush Administration imposed unilateral sanctions in response to North Korea’s currency abuses, included North Korea in the famous “axis of evil,” and used the Pentagon’s nuclear posture review to issue thinly veiled nuclear threats against North Korea, Iran, and other states in Washington’s bad books. TheUSalso accused North Korea of mounting a uranium enrichment effort with help from Pakistan’s famous nuclear smuggler A.Q. Khan, but the Koreans denied it and to date no public evidence of the program has been presented.[2]

Former President Jimmy Carter, who has served as an informal envoy to North Korea during the Clinton Administration and beyond, found North Korea’s precipitous response – expulsion of the inspectors, resumption of the production of nuclear bomb materials, and withdrawal from the NPT – fully predictable. [3] The North, he says, has always responded more favorably to positive inducements, especially those that are understood to take regime-change strategies off the table.

The same deal of positive inducements and commitment to a denuclearized Korean peninsula was again agreed to by North Korea in the September 2005 Joint Statement by the parties to the Six-Nation talks. [4] The 1994 and 2005 agreements stated the deal in terms of the positive commitments made by all the parties. The UN Security Council Resolution No. 1718, unanimously adopted October 14, 2006 following North Korea’s October 9 nuclear warhead test, repeats the deal but focuses on the negative consequences that are to be visited on North Korea until it meets the central demand to end all military programs and return to the NPT under safeguard inspections. Until that time, it will be denied economic cooperation and a broad range of punitive economic measures will be imposed. [5]

What could be simpler? It is really only a matter of managing the appropriate mix of threats and incentives. But that’s where it gets complicated. The North Korean regime regards itself as largely immune to military attack – not because of its elementary nuclear weapons capability, but because of its million-strong conventional army. That army would not save it in any war, but it would guarantee a level of such extraordinary devastation that its neighbors continue to conclude that any militarily forced end to the regime would be much worse than the status quo.

Kim Jong-il’s fierce resistance to threats is not evidence of his presumed invulnerability, but of his view that threats and punitive sanctions show that the US, and now also the Security Council, is reneging on those elements of the September agreement that call for security assurances and normalization of relations. In the Joint Statement the US affirmed that it “has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons,” and agreed that the two countries would “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.”

For Resolution 1718 to be implemented, the United States will once again have to provide North Korea clear security assurances and evidence of progress towards the normalization of relations, including a relaxation of unilateral sanctions which effectively block North Korea from all access to international financial institutions.

But nuclear weapon states will also have to make some changes – perhaps not to get the current deal outlined in Resolution 1718, but certainly if non-proliferation is to be honored in the long run.

You can’t persuasively preach temperance from a bar stool, but that is exactly what the UN Security Council is trying to do. All five permanent members of the Council (P5) are recognized as nuclear weapon states under the NPT and as such are obliged to dismantle their nuclear arsenals according to Article VI of the Treaty and as confirmed in the 1996 World Court opinion. [6] In 2000 they reaffirmed their rhetorical commitment to abolish nuclear weapons – through their “unequivocal undertaking,” at the NPT Review Conference, “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament” [7] – but the P5 remain determined nuclear retentionists.

China and the United States refuse to ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, even though they obviously want North Korea and all other states to abide by it. They refuse to negotiate an agreement to cut-off the production of fissile materials from weapons purposes, even though they obviously want North Korea and all others states to end all production of such fissile materials. All five continue to modernize their arsenals, elaborate nuclear use doctrines, and pursue selective non-proliferation (e.g. accepting nuclear testing in some cases, such as India and Pakistan, while opposing even the development of civilian nuclear fuel technologies in others).

Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel Peace Laureate and Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, agrees that a roll back of North Korea’s bomb is both essential and eminently achievable. He emphasizes dialogue and security assurances and is wary of punitive sanctions: “Once you start applying penalties, it brings hardliners into the driver’s seat.” [8]

We can also add that it wouldn’t hurt if the advocates of nuclear temperance in North Korea would begin to address their own addictions.

[1] Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 1994. October 21.http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.

[2] “Little is known about North Korea’s alleged uranium enrichment program–where it might be located, its state of development, or how many centrifuges might be operational. The United States has not provided any public information that substantiates its existence. Following the U.S. manipulation and distortion of intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, some countries and analysts are now skeptical of any U.S. allegations regarding other nations’ nuclear programs. [8] A March 20 Washington Post report that the White House misrepresented intelligence on the supposed transfer of nuclear material from North Korea to Libya may have further undermined the Bush administration’s credibility, even though the White House denied the report.”

“North Korea’s nuclear program, 2005,By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen
May/June 2005 pp. 64-67 (vol. 61, no. 03) © 2005 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

( http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=mj05norris)

[3] Carter, Jimmy. 2006. Solving the Korean stalemate, one step at a time, The New York Times, October 11.http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/opinion/11carter.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

[4] Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005. 2005.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.

[5] United Nations Security Council. 2006. Resolution 1718. October 14. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenE….

[6] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion. Found at The Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy.http://www.lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm.

[7] NPT. 2000. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document.http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000FD.pdf.

[8] “ElBaradei warns on sanctions on N. Korea, Iran,” Reuters, October 23, 2006.