Posts Tagged ‘nuclear non-proliferation’

The wisdom and benefits of strongly improved Canadian trade and political relations with India are obvious. But if civilian nuclear cooperation[i] is to be a primary fixture and symbol of the cordialization of Indo-Canadian relations, it should be built on the most robust of nonproliferation conditions.

Basic nonproliferation standards will be met by the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) signed in Toronto on Sunday by the Prime Ministers of Canada and India.[ii] As the Government of Canada noted in its backgrounder, “NCAs provide international treaty level assurances that nuclear material, equipment and technology originating in Canada will only be used for civilian, peaceful and non-explosive purposes by partner countries.”[iii]

In the likely event of Canadian uranium sales to India, for example, Canadians can be assured that uranium from this country will not find its way into Indian bombs. But if Prime Minister Harper were asked to also assure Canadians that the sale of Canadian uranium to India would not in any way make it possible for India to accelerate its production of fissile material for weapons purposes, he could not credibly do so.

India must now rely on its own limited domestic uranium for both its civilian and military programs, but once it is able to import uranium for its civilian needs it will be in a position to use more and perhaps all of its domestic uranium for military purposes.

India is still producing fissile material explicitly for weapons purposes. The five officially recognized nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have all put a moratorium on such production, but India and Pakistan (and probably Israel) have not.[iv] India has agreed to support talks toward a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, but negotiations have yet to begin, and in the meantime India is taking the opportunity to expand its already substantial stockpile.

But India’s rate of production is constrained by its limited supply of domestic uranium. Thus, in a complicated set of technical calculations, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, housed at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, concluded in a 2006 report that by placing more of its reactors under safeguards and importing uranium for its safeguarded facilities, India could acquire “a growing excess [domestic] uranium production capacity that could be used for weapons purpose.”[v]

Pakistan, of course, understands all this only too well, so it too is bent on producing as much as possible[vi] – in other words, India and Pakistan are engaged in a regional nuclear arms race.[vii] Again, if Prime Minister Harper were asked to assure Canadians that our uranium exports to India would in no away affect or contribute to such a race, he could not give such an assurance.

The remedy – that is, to move from standard to robust nonproliferation safeguards – is actually quite simple. If India and Pakistan were to obey the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), the problem would be solved.

Resolution 1172 calls on Indian and Pakistan, among other things, “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes,…and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”[viii] Of course, the most notable, notorious, thing about Resolution 1172 is that it has gone totally and utterly unheeded, but as the Security Council rightly keeps reminding Iran, the world cannot allow stringent nonproliferation standards to be ignored.

That said, the simple remedy of actually complying with a key Security Council Resolution is not (12 years later) in the offing. That leaves only one option, and that is for India to join other nuclear weapon states and voluntarily end its production of fissile material for weapons purposes – both to rein in regional nuclear competition and to give bilateral assurances to potential suppliers like Canada that the foreign supply of uranium will not facilitate expanded production of fissile material. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials also points out, India has already produced more than enough fissile material to support the warheads needed for its “minimum deterrence” nuclear doctrine.[ix]

A robust nuclear nonproliferation provision for Canada-India nuclear cooperation should include two minimum standards – an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and an end to nuclear testing by India. And to show good faith, India could join Canada in giving diplomatic energy to getting negotiations on a fissile materials production ban started and in signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Mike Blanchfield, “Harper says nuclear cooperation deal marks new era in Canada-India relations,” Canadian Press, CanadianBusinees.Com, 27 June 2010.http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/headline_news/article.jsp?content=b3790596.

[ii] Joint Statement by Canada and India on the occasion of the visit to Canada of Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 27 June 2010, Toronto, Ontario. http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3502.

[iii] Government of Canada, Backgrounder, Canada-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 27 June 2010.http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3500.

[iv] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[v] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 18). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

[vi] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, pp. 9 and 87. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[vii] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as New Threat Is Seen,” New York Times, 11 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/12nuke.html?hp.

[viii] Security Council Resolution 1172,  6 June 1998. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement.

[ix] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 27). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

The following commentary by Douglas Roche and Ernie Regehr appeared in today’s Embassy, available at: http://www.embassymag.ca.

There are two ways of looking at the outcome of the month-long Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which wrapped up last Friday at the United Nations in New York with a standing ovation for its president, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines.

Was it a minor diplomatic triumph or was it yet another delay on the long and tortuous road to the elimination of nuclear weapons?

Undoubtedly, nuclear disarmament activists will be deeply disappointed that the final document does not contain a commitment to immediate negotiations on a time-bound program for comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament. We are in that camp.

Yet we recognize that the political divisions in the world are so deep that only minor steps can be taken in a 190-nation forum where consensus is required. Thus progress is agonizingly slow, far too slow considering “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences,” as the conference put it rhetorically, of any detonation of the 23,000 nuclear weapons still in existence.

The fact that the review conference put a Nuclear Weapons Convention on the international political agenda for the first time was definitely a progressive step. So was the commitment to convene a conference of all Middle East states in 2012 “on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.”

Those two steps were enough to mark the review conference a success compared to the debacle at the last meeting in 2005 when American intransigence and Egyptian ire collided, producing paralysis. Thus Egypt proclaimed this conference a “historic success.” The US said the final document “reflects President Obama’s vision.” France said, “It relaunched momentum.” The UK: “A breakthrough after a decade of failure.” Canada: “A modest product,” but containing “seeds of hope.” The best characterization of the conference came from Mexico: “While not bringing us to heaven, it does distance us from hell, the hell of nuclear war.”

There are 64 actions listed in the 28-page final document, covering an array of measures connected to the NPT’s three pillars: nuclear disarmament, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and furthering peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

But the passage that will be focused on intensely over the next five-year cycle says: “The Conference notes the Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes inter alia consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”

Translated to plain English, this means a verifiable global treaty to ban all nuclear weapons is now possible.

This passage is supported by another section, which says: “The Conference affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process…should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines.”

Unfortunately, neither of these references is contained within the action steps, leaving the nuclear weapons states with the ploy that they are not committed to specific action.

Moreover, when an earlier draft stated that a Nuclear Weapons Convention “contributes towards the goal,” of a nuclear-weapons-free world, even this soft affirmation was removed as the result of a frontal attack by the US, Russia, the UK and France, all of whom united in gutting earlier drafts of decisive action steps.

The nuclear weapons states stoutly stood together in removing a condemnation of nuclear weapons modernization and a call for the closing of all nuclear test sites.

Nuclear weapons states have through the years resisted the “good faith” negotiations on disarmament that are required of them under the NPT’s Article VI. So it is legitimate to question their “good faith” regarding the basic pledge coming out of the 2010 conference: “to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” That may be the Obama agenda, but one would never know it by watching his officials in action.

The nuclear weapons states will, of course, be central players in the 2012 Middle East conference and it doubtless would not have even been agreed upon without the approval of President Obama.

Israel will have a hard time maintaining credibility if it refuses to participate in the 2012 conference, the terms of reference of which are the NPT’s 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which calls for a zone free of nuclear weapons as a way to strengthen the Middle East peace process.

For its part, Iran set out an 11-point plan at the conference for “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timetable.” The Israel-Iran showdown on the possession of nuclear weapons looms.

Since India, Pakistan and Israel, which all possess nuclear weapons, shun the NPT, a new legal framework that is truly global is desperately needed to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That, in fact, is where the Middle East question and a Nuclear Weapons Convention are linked.

A successful Middle East conference may pave the way to global action beyond the NPT. The situation is urgent, but the process torpid.

Canada made a modest effort to strengthen the institutional machinery of the NPT, a worthy goal considering that there is not even a home office for the world’s most important arms control and disarmament treaty. But the biggest opponent of this reform was the US. The end result was the approval of a dedicated staff officer to organize NPT meetings.

A significant Canadian contribution was the presentation to Ambassador Cabactulan, the conference president, of the signatures of 515 members of the Order of Canada calling for work to begin on a Nuclear weapons Convention. Ambassador Cabactulan called this action “meaningful input.”

Former senator and Canadian ambassador for disarmament Douglas Roche’s forthcoming book is How We Stopped Loving the Bomb. Ernie Regehr is co-founder of Project Ploughshares.  His blog, “Disarming Conflict,” is at http://www.cigionline.org/publications/blogs/disarmingconflict.

In his press conference statement at the conclusion of the Muskoka G8 meeting, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated mater-of-factly, but wrongly, that Iran has “chosen to acquire [nuclear] weapons to threaten its neighbours.[i]

Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor the UN Security Council claims that Iran has made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Nor did the G8 itself make that claim in its Muskoka communiqué.

It is a distinction worth emphasizing. Iran is in serious violation of its transparency and accountability obligations toward the IAEA. It is in violation of the UN Security Council’s directive that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. But neither the IAEA nor the UN has said directly that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.

There is evidence that points disturbingly to the possibility that Iran is pursuing a weapons capability, rather than a weapon itself, but that is still a matter of suspicion, not knowledge. What both the IAEA and the UN say is that in all of Iran’s known nuclear activity it can be confirmed that there has been no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. The problem is that Iran has not been transparent enough to allow IAEA inspectors to go beyond officially declared sites to confirm that there are no longer any clandestine nuclear programs in place.

Both the IAEA and the Security Council therefore call on Iran to meet its transparency obligations, including implementation of the IAEA “Additional Protocol” which provides for a much more extensive inspection operation. The call to suspend uranium enrichment is a call for a temporary suspension as a confidence building measure – it is not a requirement that Iran permanently forego uranium because it is acknowledge that enrichment itself is not a violation of either IAEA safeguards or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran, like other states in the NPT, has the acknowledged right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment, but in the context of openness and verifiability of its entire nuclear program.

Iran’s current enrichment is taking place under the watchful eye of the IAEA. But the IAEA lists a number of other actions taken and not taken by Iran that fall short of its transparency obligations and in some cases point toward possible military interest or involvement.

So all the international statements are careful to make the distinction – they do not say Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon; they say instead that Iran is not sufficiently open to confirm conclusively that it is not.

Hence the most recent UN Security Council resolution calls for transparency and the “clarification” of particular activities in order “to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme.”[ii]

The most recent IAEA report puts it this way: “While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”[iii]

The G8 Communiqué itself does not claim or charge that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability.[iv] In paragraphs 32 and 33 of the communiqué, G8 leaders voice high concern about Iran’s lack of transparency and then “call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.[v]

It is the formulation that the Prime Minister should follow in his public statements on Iran.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Prime Minister Stephen Harper, speaking at his closing press conference of the G8, 26 June 2010, said the leaders “…discussed a further range of global challenges: nuclear proliferation, Iran, the implementation of sanctions foreseen by UN Resolution 1929…. The Governments of Iran and North Korea have chosen to acquire weapons to threaten their neighbors. The world must see to it that what they spend on these weapons will not be the only costs that they incur.”http://www.cbc.ca/video/#/Embedded-Only/News/G8-G20_Video/ID=1530937893.

[ii] Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on 9 June 2010. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement.

[iii] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General (International Atomic Energy Agency: GOV/2010/28), 31 May 2010.  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-28.pdf

[iv]G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010 http://www.cbc.ca/politics/insidepolitics/2010/06/2010-g8-communique-released.html.

[v] G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010.

Para 32. “The adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1929 reflects the concerns of the international community on the Iranian nuclear issue, and we call on all states to implement it fully. While recognizing Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, we note that this right comes with international obligations that all states, including Iran, must comply with.  We are profoundly concerned by Iran’s continued lack of transparency regarding its nuclear activities and its stated intention to continue and expand enriching uranium, including to nearly 20 percent, contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. We call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Our goal is to persuade Iran’s leaders to engage in a transparent dialogue about its nuclear activities and to meet Iran’s international obligations. We strongly support the ongoing efforts in this regard by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative, and we welcome their commitment to the resolution of all outstanding issues through negotiation. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in this regard, including those made recently by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor.”

Para 33. “Recalling the concerns we expressed at the 2009 L’Aquila Summit, we urge the Government of Iran to respect the rule of law and freedom of expression, as outlined in the international treaties to which Iran is a party.”

The wisdom and benefits of strongly improved Canadian trade and political relations with India are obvious. But if civilian nuclear cooperation[i] is to be a primary fixture and symbol of the cordialization of Indo-Canadian relations, it should be built on the most robust of nonproliferation conditions.

Basic nonproliferation standards will be met by the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) signed in Toronto on Sunday by the Prime Ministers of Canada and India.[ii] As the Government of Canada noted in its backgrounder, “NCAs provide international treaty level assurances that nuclear material, equipment and technology originating in Canada will only be used for civilian, peaceful and non-explosive purposes by partner countries.”[iii]

In the likely event of Canadian uranium sales to India, for example, Canadians can be assured that uranium from this country will not find its way into Indian bombs. But if Prime Minister Harper were asked to also assure Canadians that the sale of Canadian uranium to India would not in any way make it possible for India to accelerate its production of fissile material for weapons purposes, he could not credibly do so.

India must now rely on its own limited domestic uranium for both its civilian and military programs, but once it is able to import uranium for its civilian needs it will be in a position to use more and perhaps all of its domestic uranium for military purposes.

India is still producing fissile material explicitly for weapons purposes. The five officially recognized nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have all put a moratorium on such production, but India and Pakistan (and probably Israel) have not.[iv] India has agreed to support talks toward a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, but negotiations have yet to begin, and in the meantime India is taking the opportunity to expand its already substantial stockpile.

But India’s rate of production is constrained by its limited supply of domestic uranium. Thus, in a complicated set of technical calculations, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, housed at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, concluded in a 2006 report that by placing more of its reactors under safeguards and importing uranium for its safeguarded facilities, India could acquire “a growing excess [domestic] uranium production capacity that could be used for weapons purpose.”[v]

Pakistan, of course, understands all this only too well, so it too is bent on producing as much as possible[vi] – in other words, India and Pakistan are engaged in a regional nuclear arms race.[vii] Again, if Prime Minister Harper were asked to assure Canadians that our uranium exports to India would in no away affect or contribute to such a race, he could not give such an assurance.

The remedy – that is, to move from standard to robust nonproliferation safeguards – is actually quite simple. If India and Pakistan were to obey the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), the problem would be solved.

Resolution 1172 calls on Indian and Pakistan, among other things, “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes,…and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”[viii] Of course, the most notable, notorious, thing about Resolution 1172 is that it has gone totally and utterly unheeded, but as the Security Council rightly keeps reminding Iran, the world cannot allow stringent nonproliferation standards to be ignored.

That said, the simple remedy of actually complying with a key Security Council Resolution is not (12 years later) in the offing. That leaves only one option, and that is for India to join other nuclear weapon states and voluntarily end its production of fissile material for weapons purposes – both to rein in regional nuclear competition and to give bilateral assurances to potential suppliers like Canada that the foreign supply of uranium will not facilitate expanded production of fissile material. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials also points out, India has already produced more than enough fissile material to support the warheads needed for its “minimum deterrence” nuclear doctrine.[ix]

A robust nuclear nonproliferation provision for Canada-India nuclear cooperation should include two minimum standards – an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and an end to nuclear testing by India. And to show good faith, India could join Canada in giving diplomatic energy to getting negotiations on a fissile materials production ban started and in signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Mike Blanchfield, “Harper says nuclear cooperation deal marks new era in Canada-India relations,” Canadian Press, CanadianBusinees.Com, 27 June 2010.http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/headline_news/article.jsp?content=b3790596.

[ii] Joint Statement by Canada and India on the occasion of the visit to Canada of Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 27 June 2010, Toronto, Ontario. http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3502.

[iii] Government of Canada, Backgrounder, Canada-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 27 June 2010.http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3500.

[iv] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[v] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 18). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

[vi] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, pp. 9 and 87. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[vii] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as New Threat Is Seen,” New York Times, 11 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/12nuke.html?hp.

[viii] Security Council Resolution 1172,  6 June 1998. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement.

[ix] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 27). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

The just concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference not only avoided the disaster of the 2005 Conference, it managed a major achievement – agreement to finally act on a 1995 promise to pursue the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Much of the disarmament language in the agreed final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is familiar and aspirational – pledging to “achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but on at least one topic the States Parties to the Treaty got down to some specifics.

The action plan for “the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction” is the signal achievement of the 2010 Review Conference. And that is good news for those with a primary focus on disarmament by nuclear weapon states.

In 1995, when the NPT was transformed into a permanent Treaty, the Middle East was a central point of contention. Arab States were unprepared to commit to permanently disavowing nuclear weapons  when one State in their midst, Israel, was not Party to the Treaty, would not make the same commitment, would not deny that it was in possession of nuclear weapons, and would not open all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To bridge that commitment gap, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation put forward a resolution, agreed to by all Parties to the Treaty, in support of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.

Article VII of the Treaty provides for the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones, and in 1995 it was clear that the Treaty would not become permanent without the promise of action on such a zone in the Middle East. And the promise states made was pretty straightforward. The States Parties “noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,” by which they meant Israel (which has pursued unsafeguarded nuclear programs since the 1950s), and called on all states in the region “to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The nuclear weapon states promised to “exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”[i]

The actions taken since then to fulfill those promises have also been straightforward – that is to say, straightforward avoidance of action.

So now, in 2010, the NPT States made another set of promises – with two core elements:[ii]

First, they promise to convene a conference in 2012, “to be attended by all States of the Middle East.” As of now, Israel says it will not attend.[iii] The conference is to be convened by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East (the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation). In addition, the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant international organizations are tasked to prepare appropriate background documentation.

Second, the UN Secretary-General and the 1995 co-sponsors, in consultation with the States of the region, are to appoint a “Facilitator” with the general mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution, to support the preparations for the 2012 conference, to carry out post-conference follow-on activities, and then to report to the 2015 Review Conference.

This time the consequences of inaction will go beyond a simple delay. Even another five years of broken promises will end credible hope of effective nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the Middle East. Iran’s determined pursuit of technologies with weapons applications could by then have made the leap to the weapons themselves, and that, along with Israel’s undeclared arsenal, would trigger a potential proliferation stampede in the region – initially focused on civilian programs, but ones that privilege weapons related technologies and create the capacity to move to the weapons themselves on relatively short notice.

And the consequences would extend far beyond that region, effectively halting action, and much of the rhetoric, in support of zero nuclear weapons in the rest of the nuclear-armed world.

So, the action proposed for the Middle East must be understood as a core disarmament action. The failure to act on the new promise would persuasively add to the suspicion that the nuclear non-proliferation system is simply not up to the challenge of dealing with deep-seated proliferation threats. In other words, if Iran, Israel, and North Korea are not dealt with effectively, and if the other two states with nuclear weapon that are outside the Treaty, India and Pakistan, are not drawn into the disarmament and non-proliferation system, then much of the political constituency in support of disarmament in the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, particularly the US and Russia, can be expected to steadily abandon its support for major cuts and progress toward the agreed goal of zero.

There is obviously no short route to a Middle East that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, but the pursuit of that goal is integral to pursuing disarmament in all its dimensions. The decision of NPT States to give it some serious attention is an important development.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The full resolution is available on the Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html.

[ii] The final document as approved ( NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

[iii] Amy Teibel, “Israel rejects UN call to come clean on nuclear program,” The Globe and Mail, 30 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/israel-rejects-un-call-to-come-clean-on-nuclear-program/article1585886/.

The fuel swap proposal put forward jointly by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran will likely turn out to be much less consequential than either its critics or supporters contend.

The proposal to exchange Iranian enriched uranium for reactor fuel certainly does not have the potential “to settle an ongoing dispute over Iran’s enrichment program,” as the Organization of the Islamic Conference characterized it,[i] but neither will failure to implement it irredeemably damage the international community’s already troubled nonproliferation diplomacy with regard to Iran. The proposal has been met with less enthusiasm than its authors hoped, but the US Administration did not reject it as categorically as some reports have suggested.[ii]

As the critics have pointed out, the Turkey/Brazil version of the fuel swap loses one important dimension of the IAEA proposal of October 2009. The new version no longer removes the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium for storage outside the country, simply because Iran is enriching uranium, even to 20 percent, at too fast a rate. That means the fuel swap at the level proposed is no longer a defence against breakout – that is, it could not ensure that Iran will not be able to accumulate enough enriched uranium to further enrich it to weapons grade to build at least one warhead, should it decide to pull out of the NPT and do so. As Jeffrey Lewis put it, now “Iran can enrich uranium quicker than [the international community] can arrange for it to be sent out of the country.”[iii]

But that’s not a reason not to accept the fuel swap for what it is – a modest gesture of cooperation between Iran and the international community, in which Iran gets fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Call it a goodwill humanitarian gesture inasmuch as it would facilitate continued production of medical isotopes.

But the fuel swap proposal doesn’t begin to address the Iran “problem.” At best the swap could improve the political climate within which real problem solving is pursued – no small thing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called it a good proposal that could be “a precursor to full-scope negotiations with world powers.”[iv]

Remember what the Iran problem is that requires those negotiations. It is a rather long list of outstanding issues and unanswered questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the course of trying to bring Iran back, following the 2003 discovery of its clandestine nuclear program, into full compliance with its disclosure and safeguards obligations. The most recent IAEA report (18 February 2010), issued under the guidance of the new Director General, Yukiya Amano, identifies the issues that need clarification and resolution, including:[v]

1. Operations at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Nantaz are now under IAEA safeguards, but “additional measures need to be put in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear materials at [the plant].”

2. The IAEA is able to confirm that reprocessing and related activities are not taking place at identified facilities, but without the benefit of inspection measures under the Additional Protocol the Agency is not able to confirm that there are no such activities at other, undisclosed, sites in Iran.

3. The IAEA’s request for access to Iran’s heavy water production plant continues to be rejected.

4. Iran has suspended implementation of a modified Code 3.1 provision of the Safeguards agreement by which Iran is required to provide to the Agency design information for any new facility as soon as there is a decision to construct such a facility. The IAEA says Iran cannot unilaterally suspend implementation of the Code 3.1 provision, and also says Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which is not following that provision.

5. The IAEA has an outstanding request for further information on “pyroprocessing R&D activities” at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory.”

6. The IAEA also has an outstanding request for access to additional locations, including those engaged in “manufacturing centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium mining and milling.”

7. The IAEA has additional outstanding requests related to further clarification of activities with possible military dimensions (see Note).[vi]

Of course, the merits of these issues or requirements are disputed by Iran; but the point is that these are outstanding issues that merit attention and mutual resolution.

Unfortunately, the bulk of public and diplomatic attention has been on the Security Council demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Essentially, such a suspension would be no more helpful in addressing the list of outstanding issues than would the fuel swap – each would help to build confidence, to be sure, but neither would directly address the questions and requirements identified by the IAEA.

Uranium enrichment, which is now carried out under the watchful eye of the IAEA, is, as Iran repeatedly and correctly notes, a perfectly legal activity. Suspension of safeguarded enrichment will do nothing to help the IAEA discover any clandestine enrichment. Again, Jeffrey Lewis makes the point succinctly: “…the problem isnot Iran’s enrichment at Natanz, not even to 20 percent. The problem is Iran’s history of clandestine enrichment. Iran wants to change the narrative to focus on the West’s objection to its arguably legitimate activities. Why we keep helping them do that is beyond me.”

To become reasonably and reliably assured that Iran is no longer operating undeclared nuclear programs requires a fully applied Additional Protocol. To be reasonably assured that Iran is not pursuing military applications (i.e. the bomb) for its fuel cycle activity, requires not only the Additional Protocol but also that the IAEA’s outstanding issues and questions be resolved. Suspending enrichment advances neither of those requirements.

In the meantime, the US response to the Turkey/Brazil/Iran proposal has actually been rather measured:[vii]

-the White House response did not reject the deal, instead it said the transfer of LEU off of Iranian soil would be a positive step, if…;

-it then raised concern about Iran’s intention to continue enriching to 20 percent (the possibly significant point here being that the comment wasn’t about enrichment period);

-the White House statement complained about the Turkey/Brazil/Iran declaration being “vague” about Iran’s willingness to address outstanding issues (the three-state declaration did refer to the fuel exchange as “a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations” – which certainly seems rather “vague”); and

-the US then referred to continuing efforts to get Iran to comply with its obligations (such obligations being attention to the IAEA’s long list of unresolved issues).

The fuel swap, as proposed in October and now, was never intended as an alternative to addressing the outstanding issues at the IAEA. Again, the best that can be said of a fuel swap is that it could help create a climate conducive to progress on those outstanding items. More likely, the fuel swap will have little impact – which is why not only the US, but also Russia and China are considering a new round of sanctions.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the proposed sanctions will be any more effective than the fuel swap in creating a climate for constructive attention to the outstanding IAEA issues,[viii] although the Arms Control Association does point out that Iran’s willingness to enter into a joint proposal with Turkey and Brazil can be seen in part as the result of the pressure brought by Russian and Chinese support for a tougher line on Iran at the Security Council.[ix]

One important step toward more constructive attention to the Iran issue would be to recognize it as a “problem” rather than a “crisis.” “Somehow,” Mr. ElBaradei said last September, “many people are talking about how Iran’s nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world… In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped. Yes, there’s concern about Iran’s future intentions and Iran needs to be more transparent with the IAEA and the international community … But the idea that we’ll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn’t supported by the facts as we have seen them so far.”[x] It’s a matter of persistent diplomacy and pressure that gathers growing support, not crisis management that alienates potential supporters.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “OIC backs Iran nuclear declaration,” Press TV, 20 May 2010. http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=127095&sectionid=351020104.

[ii] Paul Koring, “Iran drives wedge into UN Security Council,” The Globe and Mail , 17 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/iran-drives-wedge-into-un-security-council/article1572359/.

[iii] Jeffrey Lewis, “Zombie Fuel Swap, Back from Dead, Again,” Arms Control Wonk, 17 May 2010.http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2731/zombie-fuel-swap-back-from-the-dead-again.

[iv] “El Baradei: Iran nuclear swap ‘a good agreement’,” International News 24/7. 21 May 2010.http://www.france24.com/en/20100518-iran-nuclear-agreement-turkey-el-baradei-interview–sanctions.

[v] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions…in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010).  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf.

[vi] -alleged studies relating to warhead development; acquisition of a document regarding uranium metal; R&D activities of military related institutes and companies; production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies in the defence industry; activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the green salt project”; clarification as to whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes, and whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; clarification on whether the engineering design and computer modeling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment; the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons.

[vii] Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Iran, 17 May 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-iran

[viii] Robert Burns, “UN sanctions unlikely to stop Iran,” Associate Press, 20 May 2010.http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ibaOsIYbmjGtQ_VvMBzKEYKdeSMQD9FQ5EL80.

[ix] Peter Crail, “Iran-Turkey-Brazil Fuel Deal Has Potential if Iran Provides Follow-Up Steps,” ACA Issue Brief – Volume 1, Number 5, May 17, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/IranTurkeyBrazilFuelDeal.

[x] “U.N. Official: Iran Nuke Program ‘Hyped’,” Associated Press, 2 September 2010.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/02/world/main5281632.shtml.