Nuclear Disarmament

The story line adopted by many NGOs in the immediate wake of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was one of “empty promises.”[i] But now, with broad expressions of disappointment out of the way, observers increasingly point to the achievements.

A primary accomplishment was avoiding the disaster of the 2005 Conference – no small thing. But there were others.

The final document,[ii] agreed to by consensus, is divided into two parts, with the first being the Conference President’s report on the discussions. It notes issues of general agreement and other issues favored, if not by all, then by a majority of states. This overview is followed by a set of conclusions and recommendations (referred to as the Action Plan) with 64 actions. States Parties accepted both parts as the official final document. The President’s overview is taken to accurately reflect the sense of the meeting, but the proposals and measures included there are not politically, and certainly not legally, binding. Action Plan (AP) measures, on the other hand, represent firm commitments made by all States parties.

Much of the disarmament language in both parts of the final document is familiar and aspirational. The pledge to “achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (AP, Section I.A.i) may raise suspicions of “empty promises,” but, on the other hand, it was the complete absence of such pledges that earned the 2005 Review Conference the label of “disaster.”  And this time, the final document reaches beyond platitudes.

A Nuclear Weapons Convention

As already noted here (May 31), the most prominent and far-reaching action is in support of “the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.” But another notable breakthrough is the final document’s clear affirmation of a nuclear weapons convention. Some might put this in the category of aspirational statements, but the fact that it got any mention at all is significant.

While the idea of a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) has wide public appeal, some governments which support the idea in principle, including Canada, argue that now is not the time. They say that more of the specifics of nuclear disarmament – e.g. a test ban and a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes – need to be in place before a convention is doable. But others argue that the convention is precisely what is needed to guide the disarmament yet to come.

It is the latter view that prevailed at the Review Conference. In “noting” Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s disarmament  proposals, the Conference drew special attention to his call to “consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreed framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification” (para 82). In that context the final document concludes that “the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines” (para 83).

The Action Plan itself includes an indirect reference to a convention: “The Conference calls on all Nuclear Weapons States to undertake concrete disarmament efforts and affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.” The reference to a framework is immediately followed by another reference to the Secretary General’s support for negotiations toward a convention or a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments (AP, Section B.iii).

As a result, there is now an informal mandate for supportive governments and civil society to convene consultations to thoroughly explore the focus, scope, verification, and other elements relevant to a nuclear weapons convention.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i]Thalif Deen, “UN Nuke Meet Ends with Good Intentions and Empty Promises,” Inter Press Service, 29 May 2010. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51634.

[ii] The final document as approved (NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

Canada has for some time led efforts to expand and reshape the institutional infrastructure of the NPT, and thus to also improve its review and decision-making processes. The proposals this time were modest, though eminently worthwhile, and the results even more modest.

A working paper,[i] initiated by Canada but with a broad group of co-sponsors,[ii] proposed three specific and fairly far-reaching changes.

The first proposal was to change the present arrangement in which a Treaty conference occurs only every five years, supported by three Preparatory Committee meetings. The proposal was for every five-year review cycle to include three annual decision-making conferences, plus the Review Conference supported by one Preparatory Committee meeting. This proposal was ultimately rejected and received no mention in the final document.[iii]

The second proposal was for a “Chairs’ Circle” comprised of the past, incumbent, and incoming chairs or presidents of the annual preparatory committee meetings and the Review Conference. This group would meet as required to share best practices, provide advice, and transfer knowledge for the benefit of a more effective review process. This proposal was well received, and though it was not part of the Action Plan, the review part of the document reported that “the Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring optimal coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. In this context, the Conference encourages the past and incumbent Chairs to be available for consultations by the incoming Chair, if necessary, regarding practical matters relating to their responsibilities. Participation in these meetings will be voluntary and without affecting the costs assessed to States parties” (para 111).

Though not a fully mandated action, the incoming chairs obviously would have the support of Treaty States Parties to implement the proposal.

The third recommendation in the Canadian working paper was to establish a Treaty support unit, comprising initially of one officer to support the Chair and the Chairs’ Circle by providing administrative and logistical support, as well as background documentation and analysis. This proposal was endorsed by the Review Conference, again, not as a mandated action, but as a general recommendation for a dedicated staff officer to support the Treaty’s review cycle from within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (para 112).

Cost implications of the review process are a particularly sensitive matter for NPT, but the working paper offered a detailed assessment of the costs of all the recommended changes, including for a three-person support unit, and showed enough potential savings from a reduction in overall meeting days to more than cover the added costs. It would have been a constructive trade-off – a support unit would lead to better prepared meetings that would not be as long but arguably more productive. But the recommendation to change the pattern of meetings was not accepted; hence the savings will not be realized and the support unit, if pursued, will have to be financed through special contributions.

There was a specific call to further consider institutional changes during the next review cycle (para 113). Change doesn’t hurry when it comes to the NPT’s consensus driven review process – even when the proposed change is clearly modest and, though worth pursuing, marginal to the central nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “Further strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4.

[ii] Australia, Austria, Chile, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, Sweded, Switzerland, Thailand and Ukraine.

[iii] The final document as approved (NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

The following commentary by Douglas Roche and Ernie Regehr appeared in today’s Embassy, available at: http://www.embassymag.ca.

There are two ways of looking at the outcome of the month-long Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which wrapped up last Friday at the United Nations in New York with a standing ovation for its president, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines.

Was it a minor diplomatic triumph or was it yet another delay on the long and tortuous road to the elimination of nuclear weapons?

Undoubtedly, nuclear disarmament activists will be deeply disappointed that the final document does not contain a commitment to immediate negotiations on a time-bound program for comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament. We are in that camp.

Yet we recognize that the political divisions in the world are so deep that only minor steps can be taken in a 190-nation forum where consensus is required. Thus progress is agonizingly slow, far too slow considering “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences,” as the conference put it rhetorically, of any detonation of the 23,000 nuclear weapons still in existence.

The fact that the review conference put a Nuclear Weapons Convention on the international political agenda for the first time was definitely a progressive step. So was the commitment to convene a conference of all Middle East states in 2012 “on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.”

Those two steps were enough to mark the review conference a success compared to the debacle at the last meeting in 2005 when American intransigence and Egyptian ire collided, producing paralysis. Thus Egypt proclaimed this conference a “historic success.” The US said the final document “reflects President Obama’s vision.” France said, “It relaunched momentum.” The UK: “A breakthrough after a decade of failure.” Canada: “A modest product,” but containing “seeds of hope.” The best characterization of the conference came from Mexico: “While not bringing us to heaven, it does distance us from hell, the hell of nuclear war.”

There are 64 actions listed in the 28-page final document, covering an array of measures connected to the NPT’s three pillars: nuclear disarmament, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and furthering peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

But the passage that will be focused on intensely over the next five-year cycle says: “The Conference notes the Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes inter alia consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”

Translated to plain English, this means a verifiable global treaty to ban all nuclear weapons is now possible.

This passage is supported by another section, which says: “The Conference affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process…should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines.”

Unfortunately, neither of these references is contained within the action steps, leaving the nuclear weapons states with the ploy that they are not committed to specific action.

Moreover, when an earlier draft stated that a Nuclear Weapons Convention “contributes towards the goal,” of a nuclear-weapons-free world, even this soft affirmation was removed as the result of a frontal attack by the US, Russia, the UK and France, all of whom united in gutting earlier drafts of decisive action steps.

The nuclear weapons states stoutly stood together in removing a condemnation of nuclear weapons modernization and a call for the closing of all nuclear test sites.

Nuclear weapons states have through the years resisted the “good faith” negotiations on disarmament that are required of them under the NPT’s Article VI. So it is legitimate to question their “good faith” regarding the basic pledge coming out of the 2010 conference: “to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” That may be the Obama agenda, but one would never know it by watching his officials in action.

The nuclear weapons states will, of course, be central players in the 2012 Middle East conference and it doubtless would not have even been agreed upon without the approval of President Obama.

Israel will have a hard time maintaining credibility if it refuses to participate in the 2012 conference, the terms of reference of which are the NPT’s 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which calls for a zone free of nuclear weapons as a way to strengthen the Middle East peace process.

For its part, Iran set out an 11-point plan at the conference for “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timetable.” The Israel-Iran showdown on the possession of nuclear weapons looms.

Since India, Pakistan and Israel, which all possess nuclear weapons, shun the NPT, a new legal framework that is truly global is desperately needed to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That, in fact, is where the Middle East question and a Nuclear Weapons Convention are linked.

A successful Middle East conference may pave the way to global action beyond the NPT. The situation is urgent, but the process torpid.

Canada made a modest effort to strengthen the institutional machinery of the NPT, a worthy goal considering that there is not even a home office for the world’s most important arms control and disarmament treaty. But the biggest opponent of this reform was the US. The end result was the approval of a dedicated staff officer to organize NPT meetings.

A significant Canadian contribution was the presentation to Ambassador Cabactulan, the conference president, of the signatures of 515 members of the Order of Canada calling for work to begin on a Nuclear weapons Convention. Ambassador Cabactulan called this action “meaningful input.”

Former senator and Canadian ambassador for disarmament Douglas Roche’s forthcoming book is How We Stopped Loving the Bomb. Ernie Regehr is co-founder of Project Ploughshares.  His blog, “Disarming Conflict,” is at http://www.cigionline.org/publications/blogs/disarmingconflict.

In his press conference statement at the conclusion of the Muskoka G8 meeting, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated mater-of-factly, but wrongly, that Iran has “chosen to acquire [nuclear] weapons to threaten its neighbours.[i]

Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor the UN Security Council claims that Iran has made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Nor did the G8 itself make that claim in its Muskoka communiqué.

It is a distinction worth emphasizing. Iran is in serious violation of its transparency and accountability obligations toward the IAEA. It is in violation of the UN Security Council’s directive that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. But neither the IAEA nor the UN has said directly that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.

There is evidence that points disturbingly to the possibility that Iran is pursuing a weapons capability, rather than a weapon itself, but that is still a matter of suspicion, not knowledge. What both the IAEA and the UN say is that in all of Iran’s known nuclear activity it can be confirmed that there has been no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. The problem is that Iran has not been transparent enough to allow IAEA inspectors to go beyond officially declared sites to confirm that there are no longer any clandestine nuclear programs in place.

Both the IAEA and the Security Council therefore call on Iran to meet its transparency obligations, including implementation of the IAEA “Additional Protocol” which provides for a much more extensive inspection operation. The call to suspend uranium enrichment is a call for a temporary suspension as a confidence building measure – it is not a requirement that Iran permanently forego uranium because it is acknowledge that enrichment itself is not a violation of either IAEA safeguards or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran, like other states in the NPT, has the acknowledged right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment, but in the context of openness and verifiability of its entire nuclear program.

Iran’s current enrichment is taking place under the watchful eye of the IAEA. But the IAEA lists a number of other actions taken and not taken by Iran that fall short of its transparency obligations and in some cases point toward possible military interest or involvement.

So all the international statements are careful to make the distinction – they do not say Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon; they say instead that Iran is not sufficiently open to confirm conclusively that it is not.

Hence the most recent UN Security Council resolution calls for transparency and the “clarification” of particular activities in order “to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme.”[ii]

The most recent IAEA report puts it this way: “While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”[iii]

The G8 Communiqué itself does not claim or charge that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability.[iv] In paragraphs 32 and 33 of the communiqué, G8 leaders voice high concern about Iran’s lack of transparency and then “call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.[v]

It is the formulation that the Prime Minister should follow in his public statements on Iran.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Prime Minister Stephen Harper, speaking at his closing press conference of the G8, 26 June 2010, said the leaders “…discussed a further range of global challenges: nuclear proliferation, Iran, the implementation of sanctions foreseen by UN Resolution 1929…. The Governments of Iran and North Korea have chosen to acquire weapons to threaten their neighbors. The world must see to it that what they spend on these weapons will not be the only costs that they incur.”http://www.cbc.ca/video/#/Embedded-Only/News/G8-G20_Video/ID=1530937893.

[ii] Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on 9 June 2010. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement.

[iii] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General (International Atomic Energy Agency: GOV/2010/28), 31 May 2010.  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-28.pdf

[iv]G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010 http://www.cbc.ca/politics/insidepolitics/2010/06/2010-g8-communique-released.html.

[v] G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010.

Para 32. “The adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1929 reflects the concerns of the international community on the Iranian nuclear issue, and we call on all states to implement it fully. While recognizing Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, we note that this right comes with international obligations that all states, including Iran, must comply with.  We are profoundly concerned by Iran’s continued lack of transparency regarding its nuclear activities and its stated intention to continue and expand enriching uranium, including to nearly 20 percent, contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. We call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Our goal is to persuade Iran’s leaders to engage in a transparent dialogue about its nuclear activities and to meet Iran’s international obligations. We strongly support the ongoing efforts in this regard by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative, and we welcome their commitment to the resolution of all outstanding issues through negotiation. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in this regard, including those made recently by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor.”

Para 33. “Recalling the concerns we expressed at the 2009 L’Aquila Summit, we urge the Government of Iran to respect the rule of law and freedom of expression, as outlined in the international treaties to which Iran is a party.”

The wisdom and benefits of strongly improved Canadian trade and political relations with India are obvious. But if civilian nuclear cooperation[i] is to be a primary fixture and symbol of the cordialization of Indo-Canadian relations, it should be built on the most robust of nonproliferation conditions.

Basic nonproliferation standards will be met by the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) signed in Toronto on Sunday by the Prime Ministers of Canada and India.[ii] As the Government of Canada noted in its backgrounder, “NCAs provide international treaty level assurances that nuclear material, equipment and technology originating in Canada will only be used for civilian, peaceful and non-explosive purposes by partner countries.”[iii]

In the likely event of Canadian uranium sales to India, for example, Canadians can be assured that uranium from this country will not find its way into Indian bombs. But if Prime Minister Harper were asked to also assure Canadians that the sale of Canadian uranium to India would not in any way make it possible for India to accelerate its production of fissile material for weapons purposes, he could not credibly do so.

India must now rely on its own limited domestic uranium for both its civilian and military programs, but once it is able to import uranium for its civilian needs it will be in a position to use more and perhaps all of its domestic uranium for military purposes.

India is still producing fissile material explicitly for weapons purposes. The five officially recognized nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have all put a moratorium on such production, but India and Pakistan (and probably Israel) have not.[iv] India has agreed to support talks toward a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, but negotiations have yet to begin, and in the meantime India is taking the opportunity to expand its already substantial stockpile.

But India’s rate of production is constrained by its limited supply of domestic uranium. Thus, in a complicated set of technical calculations, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, housed at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, concluded in a 2006 report that by placing more of its reactors under safeguards and importing uranium for its safeguarded facilities, India could acquire “a growing excess [domestic] uranium production capacity that could be used for weapons purpose.”[v]

Pakistan, of course, understands all this only too well, so it too is bent on producing as much as possible[vi] – in other words, India and Pakistan are engaged in a regional nuclear arms race.[vii] Again, if Prime Minister Harper were asked to assure Canadians that our uranium exports to India would in no away affect or contribute to such a race, he could not give such an assurance.

The remedy – that is, to move from standard to robust nonproliferation safeguards – is actually quite simple. If India and Pakistan were to obey the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), the problem would be solved.

Resolution 1172 calls on Indian and Pakistan, among other things, “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes,…and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”[viii] Of course, the most notable, notorious, thing about Resolution 1172 is that it has gone totally and utterly unheeded, but as the Security Council rightly keeps reminding Iran, the world cannot allow stringent nonproliferation standards to be ignored.

That said, the simple remedy of actually complying with a key Security Council Resolution is not (12 years later) in the offing. That leaves only one option, and that is for India to join other nuclear weapon states and voluntarily end its production of fissile material for weapons purposes – both to rein in regional nuclear competition and to give bilateral assurances to potential suppliers like Canada that the foreign supply of uranium will not facilitate expanded production of fissile material. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials also points out, India has already produced more than enough fissile material to support the warheads needed for its “minimum deterrence” nuclear doctrine.[ix]

A robust nuclear nonproliferation provision for Canada-India nuclear cooperation should include two minimum standards – an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and an end to nuclear testing by India. And to show good faith, India could join Canada in giving diplomatic energy to getting negotiations on a fissile materials production ban started and in signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Mike Blanchfield, “Harper says nuclear cooperation deal marks new era in Canada-India relations,” Canadian Press, CanadianBusinees.Com, 27 June 2010.http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/headline_news/article.jsp?content=b3790596.

[ii] Joint Statement by Canada and India on the occasion of the visit to Canada of Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 27 June 2010, Toronto, Ontario. http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3502.

[iii] Government of Canada, Backgrounder, Canada-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 27 June 2010.http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3500.

[iv] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[v] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 18). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

[vi] Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fourth annual report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, pp. 9 and 87. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf

[vii] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as New Threat Is Seen,” New York Times, 11 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/12nuke.html?hp.

[viii] Security Council Resolution 1172,  6 June 1998. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement.

[ix] Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Research Report No. 1: International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 (p. 27). http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr01.pdf

The just concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference not only avoided the disaster of the 2005 Conference, it managed a major achievement – agreement to finally act on a 1995 promise to pursue the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Much of the disarmament language in the agreed final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is familiar and aspirational – pledging to “achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but on at least one topic the States Parties to the Treaty got down to some specifics.

The action plan for “the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction” is the signal achievement of the 2010 Review Conference. And that is good news for those with a primary focus on disarmament by nuclear weapon states.

In 1995, when the NPT was transformed into a permanent Treaty, the Middle East was a central point of contention. Arab States were unprepared to commit to permanently disavowing nuclear weapons  when one State in their midst, Israel, was not Party to the Treaty, would not make the same commitment, would not deny that it was in possession of nuclear weapons, and would not open all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To bridge that commitment gap, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation put forward a resolution, agreed to by all Parties to the Treaty, in support of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.

Article VII of the Treaty provides for the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones, and in 1995 it was clear that the Treaty would not become permanent without the promise of action on such a zone in the Middle East. And the promise states made was pretty straightforward. The States Parties “noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,” by which they meant Israel (which has pursued unsafeguarded nuclear programs since the 1950s), and called on all states in the region “to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The nuclear weapon states promised to “exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”[i]

The actions taken since then to fulfill those promises have also been straightforward – that is to say, straightforward avoidance of action.

So now, in 2010, the NPT States made another set of promises – with two core elements:[ii]

First, they promise to convene a conference in 2012, “to be attended by all States of the Middle East.” As of now, Israel says it will not attend.[iii] The conference is to be convened by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East (the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation). In addition, the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant international organizations are tasked to prepare appropriate background documentation.

Second, the UN Secretary-General and the 1995 co-sponsors, in consultation with the States of the region, are to appoint a “Facilitator” with the general mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution, to support the preparations for the 2012 conference, to carry out post-conference follow-on activities, and then to report to the 2015 Review Conference.

This time the consequences of inaction will go beyond a simple delay. Even another five years of broken promises will end credible hope of effective nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the Middle East. Iran’s determined pursuit of technologies with weapons applications could by then have made the leap to the weapons themselves, and that, along with Israel’s undeclared arsenal, would trigger a potential proliferation stampede in the region – initially focused on civilian programs, but ones that privilege weapons related technologies and create the capacity to move to the weapons themselves on relatively short notice.

And the consequences would extend far beyond that region, effectively halting action, and much of the rhetoric, in support of zero nuclear weapons in the rest of the nuclear-armed world.

So, the action proposed for the Middle East must be understood as a core disarmament action. The failure to act on the new promise would persuasively add to the suspicion that the nuclear non-proliferation system is simply not up to the challenge of dealing with deep-seated proliferation threats. In other words, if Iran, Israel, and North Korea are not dealt with effectively, and if the other two states with nuclear weapon that are outside the Treaty, India and Pakistan, are not drawn into the disarmament and non-proliferation system, then much of the political constituency in support of disarmament in the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, particularly the US and Russia, can be expected to steadily abandon its support for major cuts and progress toward the agreed goal of zero.

There is obviously no short route to a Middle East that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, but the pursuit of that goal is integral to pursuing disarmament in all its dimensions. The decision of NPT States to give it some serious attention is an important development.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The full resolution is available on the Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html.

[ii] The final document as approved ( NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

[iii] Amy Teibel, “Israel rejects UN call to come clean on nuclear program,” The Globe and Mail, 30 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/israel-rejects-un-call-to-come-clean-on-nuclear-program/article1585886/.

The fuel swap proposal put forward jointly by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran will likely turn out to be much less consequential than either its critics or supporters contend.

The proposal to exchange Iranian enriched uranium for reactor fuel certainly does not have the potential “to settle an ongoing dispute over Iran’s enrichment program,” as the Organization of the Islamic Conference characterized it,[i] but neither will failure to implement it irredeemably damage the international community’s already troubled nonproliferation diplomacy with regard to Iran. The proposal has been met with less enthusiasm than its authors hoped, but the US Administration did not reject it as categorically as some reports have suggested.[ii]

As the critics have pointed out, the Turkey/Brazil version of the fuel swap loses one important dimension of the IAEA proposal of October 2009. The new version no longer removes the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium for storage outside the country, simply because Iran is enriching uranium, even to 20 percent, at too fast a rate. That means the fuel swap at the level proposed is no longer a defence against breakout – that is, it could not ensure that Iran will not be able to accumulate enough enriched uranium to further enrich it to weapons grade to build at least one warhead, should it decide to pull out of the NPT and do so. As Jeffrey Lewis put it, now “Iran can enrich uranium quicker than [the international community] can arrange for it to be sent out of the country.”[iii]

But that’s not a reason not to accept the fuel swap for what it is – a modest gesture of cooperation between Iran and the international community, in which Iran gets fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Call it a goodwill humanitarian gesture inasmuch as it would facilitate continued production of medical isotopes.

But the fuel swap proposal doesn’t begin to address the Iran “problem.” At best the swap could improve the political climate within which real problem solving is pursued – no small thing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called it a good proposal that could be “a precursor to full-scope negotiations with world powers.”[iv]

Remember what the Iran problem is that requires those negotiations. It is a rather long list of outstanding issues and unanswered questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the course of trying to bring Iran back, following the 2003 discovery of its clandestine nuclear program, into full compliance with its disclosure and safeguards obligations. The most recent IAEA report (18 February 2010), issued under the guidance of the new Director General, Yukiya Amano, identifies the issues that need clarification and resolution, including:[v]

1. Operations at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Nantaz are now under IAEA safeguards, but “additional measures need to be put in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear materials at [the plant].”

2. The IAEA is able to confirm that reprocessing and related activities are not taking place at identified facilities, but without the benefit of inspection measures under the Additional Protocol the Agency is not able to confirm that there are no such activities at other, undisclosed, sites in Iran.

3. The IAEA’s request for access to Iran’s heavy water production plant continues to be rejected.

4. Iran has suspended implementation of a modified Code 3.1 provision of the Safeguards agreement by which Iran is required to provide to the Agency design information for any new facility as soon as there is a decision to construct such a facility. The IAEA says Iran cannot unilaterally suspend implementation of the Code 3.1 provision, and also says Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which is not following that provision.

5. The IAEA has an outstanding request for further information on “pyroprocessing R&D activities” at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory.”

6. The IAEA also has an outstanding request for access to additional locations, including those engaged in “manufacturing centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium mining and milling.”

7. The IAEA has additional outstanding requests related to further clarification of activities with possible military dimensions (see Note).[vi]

Of course, the merits of these issues or requirements are disputed by Iran; but the point is that these are outstanding issues that merit attention and mutual resolution.

Unfortunately, the bulk of public and diplomatic attention has been on the Security Council demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Essentially, such a suspension would be no more helpful in addressing the list of outstanding issues than would the fuel swap – each would help to build confidence, to be sure, but neither would directly address the questions and requirements identified by the IAEA.

Uranium enrichment, which is now carried out under the watchful eye of the IAEA, is, as Iran repeatedly and correctly notes, a perfectly legal activity. Suspension of safeguarded enrichment will do nothing to help the IAEA discover any clandestine enrichment. Again, Jeffrey Lewis makes the point succinctly: “…the problem isnot Iran’s enrichment at Natanz, not even to 20 percent. The problem is Iran’s history of clandestine enrichment. Iran wants to change the narrative to focus on the West’s objection to its arguably legitimate activities. Why we keep helping them do that is beyond me.”

To become reasonably and reliably assured that Iran is no longer operating undeclared nuclear programs requires a fully applied Additional Protocol. To be reasonably assured that Iran is not pursuing military applications (i.e. the bomb) for its fuel cycle activity, requires not only the Additional Protocol but also that the IAEA’s outstanding issues and questions be resolved. Suspending enrichment advances neither of those requirements.

In the meantime, the US response to the Turkey/Brazil/Iran proposal has actually been rather measured:[vii]

-the White House response did not reject the deal, instead it said the transfer of LEU off of Iranian soil would be a positive step, if…;

-it then raised concern about Iran’s intention to continue enriching to 20 percent (the possibly significant point here being that the comment wasn’t about enrichment period);

-the White House statement complained about the Turkey/Brazil/Iran declaration being “vague” about Iran’s willingness to address outstanding issues (the three-state declaration did refer to the fuel exchange as “a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations” – which certainly seems rather “vague”); and

-the US then referred to continuing efforts to get Iran to comply with its obligations (such obligations being attention to the IAEA’s long list of unresolved issues).

The fuel swap, as proposed in October and now, was never intended as an alternative to addressing the outstanding issues at the IAEA. Again, the best that can be said of a fuel swap is that it could help create a climate conducive to progress on those outstanding items. More likely, the fuel swap will have little impact – which is why not only the US, but also Russia and China are considering a new round of sanctions.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the proposed sanctions will be any more effective than the fuel swap in creating a climate for constructive attention to the outstanding IAEA issues,[viii] although the Arms Control Association does point out that Iran’s willingness to enter into a joint proposal with Turkey and Brazil can be seen in part as the result of the pressure brought by Russian and Chinese support for a tougher line on Iran at the Security Council.[ix]

One important step toward more constructive attention to the Iran issue would be to recognize it as a “problem” rather than a “crisis.” “Somehow,” Mr. ElBaradei said last September, “many people are talking about how Iran’s nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world… In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped. Yes, there’s concern about Iran’s future intentions and Iran needs to be more transparent with the IAEA and the international community … But the idea that we’ll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn’t supported by the facts as we have seen them so far.”[x] It’s a matter of persistent diplomacy and pressure that gathers growing support, not crisis management that alienates potential supporters.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “OIC backs Iran nuclear declaration,” Press TV, 20 May 2010. http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=127095&sectionid=351020104.

[ii] Paul Koring, “Iran drives wedge into UN Security Council,” The Globe and Mail , 17 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/iran-drives-wedge-into-un-security-council/article1572359/.

[iii] Jeffrey Lewis, “Zombie Fuel Swap, Back from Dead, Again,” Arms Control Wonk, 17 May 2010.http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2731/zombie-fuel-swap-back-from-the-dead-again.

[iv] “El Baradei: Iran nuclear swap ‘a good agreement’,” International News 24/7. 21 May 2010.http://www.france24.com/en/20100518-iran-nuclear-agreement-turkey-el-baradei-interview–sanctions.

[v] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions…in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010).  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf.

[vi] -alleged studies relating to warhead development; acquisition of a document regarding uranium metal; R&D activities of military related institutes and companies; production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies in the defence industry; activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the green salt project”; clarification as to whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes, and whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; clarification on whether the engineering design and computer modeling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment; the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons.

[vii] Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Iran, 17 May 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-iran

[viii] Robert Burns, “UN sanctions unlikely to stop Iran,” Associate Press, 20 May 2010.http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ibaOsIYbmjGtQ_VvMBzKEYKdeSMQD9FQ5EL80.

[ix] Peter Crail, “Iran-Turkey-Brazil Fuel Deal Has Potential if Iran Provides Follow-Up Steps,” ACA Issue Brief – Volume 1, Number 5, May 17, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/IranTurkeyBrazilFuelDeal.

[x] “U.N. Official: Iran Nuke Program ‘Hyped’,” Associated Press, 2 September 2010.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/02/world/main5281632.shtml.

After omitting any reference to disarmament in the Foreign Affairs Minister’s opening statement to the current NPT Review Conference, Canada’s statement to the Conference’s disarmament committee (Main Committee I) addresses the key themes.

The disarmament statement was presented by Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, Marius Grinius, to Main Committee I of the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 7.[i]

As noted in the May 4 posting here,[ii] Canada’s formal policy commitment to the key and urgent elements of the disarmament agenda was not put in doubt by the Minister’s speech, but it did leave considerable doubt as to the level of enthusiasm with which the current Canadian political leadership is willing to push it. This latter doubt is not erased by the Ambassador’s speech, but the statement certainly offers a mostly-welcome reassurance of continuity in Canada’s formal policy commitments.

The opening sentence identifies Canada with broad articulations in the international community regarding the pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.” The second sentence addresses the central issue of balance which was absent from the Minister’s speech, by affirming the growing interdependence of the “three pillars” of the NPT – peaceful uses, disarmament, nonproliferation.

Welcoming the US/Russia achievement of a “New START” agreement, as well as the US Nuclear Posture Review and the results of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Canadian statement expresses the hope that “these recent achievements [will] breed further success as transparent nuclear disarmament actions by all nuclear weapon states are necessary in order to further commitments made under Article VI of the Treaty.”

The Ambassador indicated that Canada has been active in encouraging hold-out states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and made a strong appeal for action on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Echoing his speech at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), in which he suggested that alternative means will have to be found if the CD remains in its current state of deadlock and inaction,[iii] Amb. Grinius pointed out that “the CD no longer holds a monopoly on disarmament negotiations.” He suggested alternative avenues can be found and suggested that Canada “will help foster…political will” toward those ends.

The statement said that action on key issues on the agenda (CTBT, FMCT, others of the “13 practical disarmament steps” approved in 2000) “are within our grasp,” and commended proposal put forward by Australia and Japan,[iv] and the New Agenda Coalition.[v]

Canada’s disarmament commitments, the statement noted, are “carried out with careful consideration of our membership in NATO.” This is another example of political continuity in Canadian policy and another kind of familiar nuclear balance – a balance which, when it gets down to it, tips in favor of “common [NATO] positions on such issues as Alliance nuclear posture and sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the Strategic Concept Review.” As a result, the Ambassador notes that “Canada will actively engage in those discussions mindful of our collective security requirements and the long-term goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.” The collective security caveat is neither new nor entirely welcome; all the more reason to press for genuine changes in the current NATO review of its Strategic Concept.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Available to the Reaching Critical Website:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/7May_Canada.pdf.

[ii] http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/5/canada%E2%80%99s-opening-statement-npt-promoting-nonproliferation-while-ignoring-disarmament

[iii] Discussed here: http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/4/canada-proposes-action-cd%E2%80%99s-agenda-%E2%80%93-outside-cd.

[iv] “New package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/Conf.2010/WP.9, 24 March 2010. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9.

[v] “Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition,” NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8, 23 March 2010.http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8.

Canada has managed the extraordinary feat of presenting its opening statement to the NPT Review Conference without any substantive reference to “disarmament” – one of the three foundational pillars of the Treaty.

Actually, the statement by Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon did make one, and only one, mention of disarmament – a reference to the DPRK’s “complete disregard for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.”

It is fair to describe Canada’s opening speech to the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as extraordinary in the sense of it being starkly out of the ordinary – out of sync with the focus and urgency with which other speeches of the opening day (May 3) spoke of disarmament and of the opportunities now before the international community.

For example, the European Union Statement[i] began by pointing out that the NPT is “based on the three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Canada’s 10 paragraph speech devoted 3 paragraphs to pillar one (nonproliferation), one paragraph to pillar three (peaceful uses), and none to pillar two (disarmament). There was one paragraph on North Korea, two on Iran, one on universality (urging the three states outside of the Treaty – India, Israel, and Pakistan – to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, but linking that to the resolution of regional security issues). There was one paragraph on Canada’s important NPT institutional reform proposals, and a final paragraph noting that this is a time of challenge and opportunity. To Mr. Cannon’s credit he added a spoken phrase, not included in the written and distributed document, linking challenge and opportunity to “support of the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

But on the substance of disarmament there was nothing.

The European Union welcomed the new US/Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and called for “its swift ratification.” The EU also “encouraged both States concerned to work towards new agreements for further, comprehensive reductions of their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic weapons.”

The Indonesian Foreign Minister spoke on behalf of NAM states and called for “full implementation of the Treaty in a balanced [all three pillars] manner.” The Minister acknowledged the new START agreement but said that the obligations of nuclear weapon states under the NPT required further “reductions applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability at a significantly faster pace.”

The Dutch Foreign Minister raised the issue of US nuclear weapons in Europe and said “American sub strategic nuclear arms in Europe are going to be subject of arms reduction talks between the United States and Russia.[ii] Nonproliferation and disarmament,” he said, “are mutually reinforcing.”

Brazil’s Minister of External Relations said that “Brazil is convinced that the best guarantee for non-proliferation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As long as some states possess nuclear arms, other states will be tempted to acquire or develop them. We may deplore this perverse logic, but we cannot deny it.”

Ireland, through its Foreign Minister, addressed the urgency of nuclear disarmament: “The horrors which nuclear weaponry can unleash on mankind and on the planet we inhabit defy description. In addition to death and destruction on a massive scale, the environmental costs are profound and long-lasting. Scientists tell us about the effects on the Earth’s stratosphere of the detonation of nuclear weapons. A ‘nuclear winter’ caused by sunlight being blocked out for months or even years is a nightmare scenario which we must all work to prevent.”

Then he made the key point that perfectly illustrates the failure of vision on the part of the Canadian political leadership: “Selective approaches which stress the urgency of non-proliferation while downplaying the need for progress in relation to disarmament serve merely to weaken the Treaty. The NPT’s enduring role as the foundation of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime requires that it be implemented inall its aspects.”

All of these and other speeches also spoke urgently about nonproliferation, in much the same vein as Canada, but what they managed to convey was the importance of balance – that disarmament and nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing; that the retention of nuclear weapons by some is not irrelevant to efforts of others to acquire them.

To be fair to Canada, the opening statement to the Review Conference is only a brief summary statement. Officials will make additional statements of substance as the three pillars are addressed in greater detail. Canada has submitted a report[iii] to the Review Conference on its actions in support of implementing the NPT, which includes an extensive account of Canada’s support for Article VI (the disarmament Article) and the 13 practical disarmament steps agreed to in 2000. So Canada’s policy commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons is not in doubt, and it is confirmed, as the Canadian report points out, by virtue of Canada’s co-sponsorship of, and vote in favour of, the General Assembly resolution on “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 64/47).

What is in considerable doubt is the level of enthusiasm within the political leadership of the current Government of Canada for any determined push on nuclear weapons states to accelerate their implementation of the disarmament pillar, while also pressing, of course, for strict implementation of the nonproliferation pillar.

Unfortunately, the statement by Foreign Minister Cannon continues the Harper Government’s unsoiled record of silence in the public and political arenas on the subject of nuclear disarmament. If the objective was to sorely annoy non-nuclear-weapon states in the non-aligned movement, whose support is absolutely essential to any strong action on nonproliferation, then this must be judged a successful speech.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] All statements are available on the UN’s Website at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/ and the Website of the NGO Reaching Critical Will at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements.html.

[ii] The Minister failed to note, unfortunately, that on April 22 his own Parliament passed a resolution (tabled by the Socialist and Green Parties) requesting the Netherlands government to inform the US that the Netherlands does not regard the presence of American nuclear weapons as essential to the protection of Europe and regards the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons as desirable. Information provided by email by Socialist Party Researcher Karel Koster.

[iii] “Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons,” Report submitted by Canada, 18 March 2010 (NPT/Conf.2010/9). http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/279/58/PDF/N1027958.pdf?OpenElement.

The report includes, in an Annex, the summary of the Project Ploughshares report on NPT Reporting: “Transparency and Accountability.” The full report on reporting is available at  http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Abolish/NPTreporting02-09.pdf.

“This disclosure is a monumental step toward greater nuclear transparency that breaks with outdated Cold War nuclear secrecy and will put significant pressure on other weapon states to reciprocate.” Hans M. Kristensen (Federation of American Scientists)

As noted here yesterday,[i] based on a New York Times report, the US Government has issued a fact sheet disclosing for the first time the number of warheads in its stockpile – a total of 5,113 strategic and non-strategic warheads.[ii] The disclosure and its implications are thoroughly examined by Hans Kristensen on the Federation of American Scientists site,[iii] showing, among other things, just how close FAS and NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) estimates have been to the official numbers.

The following table summarizes current estimates of total (22,500) nuclear warheads – go to FAS, NDRC, and the DOD Fact Sheet for the numbers and explanations by the officials and experts.

Warhead Categories	US	Russia	China	France	UK	India	Israel	Pakistan	N. Korea
Operational (Strategic)	1,968	2,600	180	300	160	80	80	90	<10
Operational (non-strategic)	500	2,050	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-deployed	2,641	4,450	60	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Stockpile	5,113	9,000	240	300	160	80	80	90	<10
Awaiting Dismantlement	4,500	3,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Warheads	9.613	12,000	240	300	160	80	80	90	<10

The DOD fact sheet also provides an interesting schedule of warhead dismantlements by th Department of Energy from 1994 to 2009. The average rate is of about 550 warheads dismantled per year, although the rate in recent years is well down from that of the mid-1990s

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

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[i] “The Global Nuclear Arsenal and the NPT Conference,” DisarmingConflict, 3 May 2010.http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/5/global-nuclear-arsenal-and-npt-conference.

[ii] Available at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf

[iii] Hans M. Kristensen, “United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” 3 May 2010.http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/stockpilenumber.php.