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Nuclear Disarmament

Gorbachev’s Legacy of Peace

Posted on: November 28th, 2011 by admin

Craig and Marc Kielburger of Free the Children go on The Huffington Post to urge a new generation to take up the challenge of ending the nuclear threat.

Excerpt: “…So how do we end the threat? [Ernie] Regehr says there is little public pressure to move quickly on disarmament. ‘The political process responds to pressure.
Populations support nuclear disarmament, but they are not creating pressure,’
he says.”

The authors go on to say: “Our generation has to create that pressure. As Gorbachev himself told us, ‘Every generation must be ready to take the relay from the previous generation and move forward’.”

For the full Post, go to http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/craig-and-marc-kielburger/mikhail-gorbachev_b_1105143.html?ref=impact&ir=Impact.

 

Uncertainty made certainty in responses to the IAEA on Iran

Posted on: November 23rd, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

While Iran is clearly ignoring the Security Council’s demand that it suspend uranium enrichment, and while it also fails to satisfactorily address the outstanding questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the true nature and objective of Iran’s nuclear activity is much less certain than some reporting and commentary suggests.

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Reviving Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament

Posted on: September 9th, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

The world is not wanting for well-crafted, well-intentioned, and resolutely ignored blueprints for ridding the planet of nuclear weapons. So it is not at all clear that the re-emergence of yet another detailed formula is any reason to rejoice, but when the source is India, a state still energetically acquisitive when it comes to nuclear weapons, it may be worth a closer look.

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The Mumbai attacks, South Asia’s nuclear confrontation, and the “Ottawa Dialogue”

Posted on: July 15th, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

Just two weeks after nuclear-armed India and Pakistan agreed to further
talks on reducing tensions between them,[i] renewed terror attacks in Mumbai threaten to unravel the gains made. But, contrary to the
Globe and Mail’s alarmist headline, “Enraged Indians blame Pakistan,”[ii] the Indian government is actually showing restraint[iii] – a welcome approach encouraged by a remarkable Canadian-led dialogue process involving senior Indians and Pakistanis.

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Towards a nuclear spring in the Middle East

Posted on: June 1st, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

It is potentially one of the most far-reaching recent nuclear disarmament developments – in 2010 the NPT Review Conference renewed the international commitment to pursue “a Middle East zone free of nuclear
weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.” Of course, it will turn out to be one of the biggest impediments to broader disarmament progress if that commitment is once again ignored.

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On CIGI’s “Inside the Issues”

Posted on: May 23rd, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

A conversation with David A. Welch, CIGI Chair of Global Security and Interim Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs, on civil society and peace advocacy.

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Of nuclear and conventional deterrence

Posted on: April 30th, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

On April 11-12 a group of Canadian civil society organizations hosted a workshop in Ottawa on the theme: “Towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention: A Role for Canada.” Panels focused on legal, verification, and security imperatives for world without nuclear weapons and on possible Canadian policies and initiatives. All the presentations and other details are available  here. The following is excerpted from Ernie Regehr’s paper on “Alternative Security Arrangements.”

In their most recent joint article on nuclear disarmament, Henry Kissinger and his gang of four colleagues concluded that a “world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today’s world minus nuclear weapons.” [i]

They are right. There is no denying that for a world without nuclear weapons to be secure and stable it will have to be different in some fundamental ways from a world with many nuclear weapons – that latter itself obviously being an insecure and unstable world.

But let’s not forget that today’s international security environment is already fundamentally different from what it was when nuclear arsenals were at their peak. The Cold War is over. A greater awareness of the proliferation incentives generated by existing arsenals along with heightened concerns about non-state groups getting their hands on the bomb[ii] have helped to galvanize a new constituency of support for nuclear abolition.

So the world security environment can and does change, even for the better.

Nuclear disarmament presages a major change in that it proposes to take nuclear deterrence off the table but that in turn raises the obvious question: does nuclear deterrence need to be replaced by conventional deterrence? Without nuclear deterrence, will we need the threat of devastation by other means? Destruction by conventional arms could never approach the scale of nuclear destruction, so removing the latter is a fundamental step toward a much safer world, but a post-nuclear world will not be more stable if it is heavily militarized through competing, offence-oriented, national and alliance military postures.

The new US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)[iii] unfortunately anticipates such a world organized around heightened conventional deterrence. While it articulates a welcome reduction in US reliance on nuclear weapons, it proposes to gradually replace nuclear deterrence with what it calls “the growth of unrivalled U.S. conventional military capabilities” (p. vi). 

While it cites other factors as facilitating reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence, notably the easing of Cold War tensions and the development of missile defences (p. vii), it assumes “US conventional military pre-eminence” (p. ix) and “the prospect of a devastating conventional military response” (p. ix) must be the alternative to nuclear deterrence. The NPR repeatedly links declining reliance on nuclear weapons with the pledge to “continue to strengthen conventional capabilities” (p. ix). In other words, it proposes that deterrence by weapons of mass destruction be replaced with deterrence by weapons that are massively destructive.

One particularly provocative emblem of the continuing US quest to maintain unrivalled conventional military pre-eminence is the “conventional prompt global strike capability” (CPGS)[iv] that is now coveted by US military planners. The NPR asserts a commitment to “preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in conventional roles” (p. x). A conventionally-armed strategic-range missile is, of course, generally regarded as extremely destabilizing since it could easily be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack. Furthermore, in a crisis, CPGS attacks would be militarily most effective in pre-emptive strikes, attacking an adversary’s military assets before they are operationally deployed – and any state fearing such pre-emption could itself try to escape such an attack by deploying early and thus escalating a crisis situation. 

High levels of competing offensive conventional military forces are now and will continue to be a primary source of nuclear proliferation pressure. Those pressures will not vanish with nuclear disarmament. Nuclear materials and technology will continue to exist and spread through civilian programs, and states that feel an existential threat from militarily superior powers will be no less tempted to acquire a nuclear weapons capability (even as a virtual deterrent) than are some states now, even though they have made unqualified and solemn political and legal commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Long before the US and Russia get close to zero nuclear weapons, the NATO-Russia conventional imbalance will become an impediment to further progress. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty – suspended by Russia in 2007 in response to European missile defence plans – is one attempt to address the imbalance. Russia has the added concern about Chinese conventional capabilities. Indeed, comparative Chinese and American conventional capabilities will also come into play – as will, of course, Indian and Pakistani imbalances.

The point is that conventional arms restraint and reductions, not escalation, are essential to continuing progress in nuclear disarmament and to reducing the demand for nuclear weapons.

eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

[i] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation: The doctrine of mutual assured destruction is obsolete in the post-Cold War era..,” the Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html.

[ii] In fact, in the current security environment, as pointed out by Mohamed ElBaradei some time ago, the only actors on the international stage that could “rationally” use (that is, actually detonate) a nuclear weapon to their perceived advantage would be a non-state extremist group. Mohamed ElBaradei, “In Search of Security: Finding an Alternative to Nuclear Deterrence,” 4 Novmber 2004, Speech to the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2004/ebsp2004n012.html.

[iii] Nuclear Posture Review Report, US Department of Defense, April 2010. http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.

[iv] Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, Congressional Research Service, 1 March 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.

The Vancouver Declaration: the “absolute prohibition of an absolute evil”

Posted on: March 30th, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

The international community has long understood nuclear disarmament as a daunting security and political challenge, but it has been unforgivably slow in fully facing the profound legal questions raised by the possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons. Now, a new “Vancouver Declaration” brings clarity and urgency to the issue through a succinct articulation of the legal principles and laws that make nuclear disarmament not only an urgent political objective and moral imperative, but also an unambiguous legal requirement.  

The Vancouver Declaration,[i] the joint initiative of The Simons Foundation of Vancouver and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, provides the kinds of detail and specifics that bring both clarity and urgency to our understanding of the ways in which nuclear weapons violate fundamental and well-established global legal principles. In the process, the declaration helps the international disarmament community to understand that “the law has a pivotal role to play in their elimination.”

The Vancouver Declaration has been endorsed by some of the most distinguished global experts in international law, notably: Christopher G. Weeramantry, former Vice President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and current President of IALANA; Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was ICJ President in 1996 when it handed down its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons; Louise Doswald-Beck, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and co-author of a major International Committee of the Red Cross study of international humanitarian law; Ved Nanda, Evans University Professor, Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.

Noted disarmament experts to sign the declaration include Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; and Gareth Evans, QC, former Foreign Minister of Australia who recently served as Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.[ii]

The statement confirms that all weapons of mass destruction “are, by definition, contrary to the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law forbidding the infliction of indiscriminate harm and unnecessary suffering.” That judgement, it goes on to say, applies especially to nuclear weapons because of “their uncontrollable blast, heat, and radiation effects.”

The statement concludes: “An ‘absolute evil,’ as the President of the ICJ called nuclear weapons, requires an absolute prohibition.”

The declaration includes an especially helpful annex that reviews “the law of nuclear weapons.” The declaration and annex are available here. Some excerpts from the Annex and Declaration follow:

From the Annex:

“Use of nuclear weapons in response to a prior nuclear attack cannot be justified as a reprisal. The immunity of non-combatants to attack in all circumstances is codified in widely ratified Geneva treaty law and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which provides inter alia that an attack directed against a civilian population is a crime against humanity.

“That nuclear weapons have not been detonated in war since World War II contributes to the formation of a customary prohibition on use. Further to this end, in 2010 the United States declared that “it is in the US interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever,” and Presidents Obama and Singh also jointly stated their support for “strengthening the six decade-old international norm of non-use of nuclear weapons.”

“Threat as well as use of nuclear weapons is barred by law. As the ICJ made clear, it is unlawful to threaten an attack if the attack itself would be unlawful. This rule renders unlawful two types of threat: specific signals of intent to use nuclear weapons if demands, whether lawful or not, are not met; and general policies (“deterrence”) declaring a readiness to resort to nuclear weapons when vital interests are at stake. The two types come together in standing doctrines and capabilities of nuclear attack, pre-emptive or responsive, in rapid reaction to an imminent or actual nuclear attack.

“The unlawfulness of threat and use of nuclear weapons reinforces the norm of non-possession. The NPT prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by the vast majority of states, and there is a universal obligation, declared by the ICJ and based in the NPT and other law, of achieving their elimination through good-faith negotiation. It cannot be lawful to continue indefinitely to possess weapons which are unlawful to use or threaten to use, are already banned for most states, and are subject to an obligation of elimination.

“Ongoing possession by a few countries of weapons whose threat or use is contrary to humanitarian law undermines that law, which is essential to limiting the effects of armed conflicts, large and small, around the world. Together with the two-tier systems of the NPT and the UN Security Council, such a discriminatory approach erodes international law more generally; its rules should apply equally to all states. And reliance on “deterrence” as an international security mechanism is far removed from the world envisaged by the UN Charter in which threat or use of force is the exception, not the rule.”

Back to the Declaration

“The ICJ’s declaration that nuclear weapons are subject to international humanitarian law was affirmed by the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. In its Final Document approved by all participating states, including the nuclear-weapon states, the Conference ‘expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.’

eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

[i] Available on the website of The Simons Foundation: http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/highlights/experts-declare-nuclear-weapons-contrary-international-humanitarian-law.

[ii] The full list of initial signatories can be viewed at: http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/resources/vancouver-declaration-law%E2%80%99s-imperative-urgent-achievement-nuclear-weapon-free-world.

The Gang of Four on Nuclear Deterrence

Posted on: March 12th, 2011 by Ernie Regehr

Having written several times in support of efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons, four once prominent leaders in US security affairs – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn – have now turned their attention to deterrence.

This “gang of four,” as they’ve become known, first appeared together in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in January 2007, where they shocked the world, but in a good way, with a strong message in support of the basic goal of a world without nuclear weapons: 

“Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.”[i]

Over the years they have repeated and elaborated on that message, and this week they focused in on the need to maintain nuclear deterrence while the international community reshapes security relationships and paradigms and while it pursues the final elimination of nuclear weapons:

“[A]s long as nuclear weapons exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter a nuclear attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence. There is an inherent limit to U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions if other nuclear weapon states build up their inventories or if new nuclear powers emerge.”[ii]

This straightforward affirmation of deterrence is a serious disappointment to many who had celebrated the conversion of these four security potentates into nuclear abolitionists, and rightly so. It surely is an acute form of political and imaginative bankruptcy when, having concluded that absolutely no use of a nuclear weapon could ever be justified, we still find it necessary to assert that global stability requires us to threaten to do what must never be done.

Furthermore, the term “reliable nuclear stockpile” is now the preferred euphemism in American security discourse for the “modernization” of nuclear weapons – so it seems as if Messers Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn have taken rather a giant step backwards.

But that is not an entirely fair charge. Their assertion that as long as anyone else has nuclear weapons the US is likely to retain them is, like it or not, a basic reality – and will so unless there is a rather dramatic change in the US political/security environment. Some Republicans already descry President Obama’s current nuclear disarmament initiatives as the emasculation of America. If other states, like India and Pakistan, continue to increase their arsenals, or if new nuclear weapon powers emerge, say Iran, we can expect that virtually all mainstream political support for continued reductions to the American arsenal, never mind its elimination, will disappear.

 Nuclear deterrence, in all its contradictions and absurdities, will finally disappear as a policy when nuclear weapons disappear. That is a tough reality, and to their credit, Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn continue to press for the latter. In their latest missive they call for more effective measures to prevent both the spread of nuclear materials and the accidental use of nuclear weapons. They acknowledge once again that the continued reliance on nuclear weapons creates proliferation pressures, and they call for redoubled efforts to resolve regional conflicts where nuclear weapons have become part of the dynamic.

They also call for the development of positive security assurances among states:

“Progress must be made through a joint enterprise among nations, recognizing the need for greater cooperation, transparency and verification to create the global political environment for stability and enhanced mutual security.”

In fact, the transformation of the international security order is a powerful theme for them: “A world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today’s world minus nuclear weapons.” Nuclear deterrence thus will remain, not a necessary presence, but an unfortunate and likely presence until that transformation becomes into clearer focus.

 eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

[i] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/336.

[ii] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation: The doctrine of mutual assured destruction is obsolete in the post-Cold War era..,” the Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html.