Defence and Human Security

The UN General Assembly will take up the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” next week, reviewing the Secretary-General’s 2009 report[i] on implementation and launching a general debate. It may only be more words, but this is an issue on which words can really be a matter of life and death.

Since it was formally adopted at the 2005 Summit meeting of the General Assembly, R2P has been a doctrine honored rather more in principle than in practice. The victims of that continuing abstraction are well known. Today they live and die especially in Afghanistan, the Congo (Kinshasa), Iraq, Somali, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – these being among the locations where people are still prominently targets of at least one of the four key crimes from which the people of the world were promised protection through R2P – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity.

In each case the national Government is manifestly failing to protect its own people, often for myriad reasons that are certainly not all of their own doing or not doing, and in each case the international community is having only spotty, if any, success in effectively protecting people in extraordinary peril.

Those who bear the brunt of those crimes are unlikely to be heartened by the prospect of another debate at the United Nations, but without debate, without some concerted diplomatic, political, and intellectual push to forge new ways of, and commitments to, responding, their particular crises will only deepen and others will be added.

A core suspicion that still attends R2P debates is the worry that the noble objective of protecting vulnerable people will simply be appropriated by the big powers as one more justification for their interference in the affairs of smaller and weaker states. But, at the same time, the main impediment to operationalizing R2P with some measure of consistency is the reluctance of those same big powers to accept any binding obligation to intervene on behalf of vulnerable people outside their own jurisdiction.

One positive consequence of this mutual wariness of intervention is that the doctrine’s attention to non-military remedies has been strengthened. The 2005 UN Summit, which formalized the R2P principle or doctrine, places the primary responsibility for protecting people on national governments, the sovereignty as responsibility principle. When states “manifestly” fail in meeting that responsibility, the international community then has the responsibility to use “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII [regional multilateral organizations] of the [UN] Charter,”[ii] to come to the aid of those threatened with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity.

And only when those peaceful means are clearly failing does the R2P doctrine allow for (it does not require it), with Security Council approval according to the Charter, more coercive measures under Chapter VII – and even in those cases the debate centres increasingly on the imposition of nonmilitary coercion through measures like diplomatic and economic sanctions and arms embargoes before accepting, as the Secretary General puts it, “the application of coercive force in extreme situations” that relate specifically to any of the four crimes covered by the R2P doctrine.

The R2P principles are by now well established, thus, as the Secretary General (SG) points out in his report, “the task ahead is not to interpret or renegotiate” this doctrine, but it is “to find ways of implementing [it] in a fully faithful and consistent manner” (para 2).

But faithful and consistent implementation of the responsibility to protect is impeded by a “paucity of will” (para 63) that is rooted in part in that extreme reluctance of the major powers to allow themselves to be formally bound to act in response to unforeseeable external circumstances. That reluctance has resulted in a refusal to clearly define the conditions, the warning signs, that should trigger specific actions in a process of gradually escalating responses to escalating conflict and growing vulnerability. In fact, the SG’s report, probably anticipating the resistance, specifically rejects the pursuit of “a rigidly sequenced strategy or tightly defined ‘triggers’ for action” (para 50).

At the same time, the SG’s report makes an important case for undertaking investigations and fact-finding missions “early in a crisis” (para 53) as part of an early warning and response process. But for that to happen early on and consistently in an environment that generally lacks the political will to act, there is a need for some way to trigger such investigations that is not dependent on a heavily politicized decision-making process. The Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council, for example, all have investigative powers, but there is not a process that automatically triggers or mandates investigations when certain conditions obtain. In the absence of such triggers to launch investigations, responses remain subject to highly politicized decisions on a case-by-case basis. As a result the international community will continue to avoid acting in too many cases – to the extraordinary peril of vulnerable people in the affected countries or regions.

The need for certain kinds of reasonably objective triggers for action is reinforced by a study reported in the Washington Post which indicates a general tendency for individuals and the public to react much more strongly and to show greater concern for small-scale suffering than large-scale suffering. The more victims, it seems, the easier it is to look the other way. It is a phenomenon similar to the impact of changes brought by a small amount of light – the difference between darkness and a five watt bulb is dramatic; the difference between a 90 watt bulb and a 100 watt bulb is hardly noticeable, even though the latter change is twice the watts of the former.[iii]

The coming General Assembly debate will not be decisive for the millions who still face threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. It will nevertheless be an opportunity for states to reaffirm the basic principle of sovereignty as responsibility and to reaffirm the international community’s obligations toward vulnerable people. Above all, it should mark a transition from abstract principle to efforts to carefully track abuses and to delineate avenues of concrete, consistent action – in short, the words should ultimately lead to saved lives.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] United Nations. “Implementing the responsibility to protect,” Report of the Secretary-General. 12 January 2009. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit (A/63/677).http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F63%2F677&Submit=Search&Lang=E.

[ii] Repeated in para 1 of the Secretary General’s report (2009).

[iii] Shakar Vedantum, “Mass Suffering and Why We Look the Other Way,” Washington Post, 5 January 2009.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/04/AR2009010401307.html

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As anticipated,[i] the just concluded 60thAnniversary NATO Summit in France and Germany launched a process to review the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, including its nuclear weapons doctrine, with a view to adopting a new strategy at the next Summit.

The final paragraph of the declaration on Alliance Security[ii] speaks of “renovating the Alliance,” which begs the obvious question of why further renovate a house whose original design has long given way to a series of unwieldy lean-tos and whose function has little relevance to a dramatically changed neighborhood. But in the meantime and until that basic questioned is addressed, NATO’s nuclear chamber certainly needs some serious attention.

“A broad-based group of qualified experts” is to assist the Secretary-General who, in turn and in consultations with NATO states, is to develop the new Strategic Concept for approval at the Portugal summit a year from now.

The much longer Summit Declaration,[iii] which also promises a new Strategic Concept, devotes only one of its 62 paragraphs (para 55) to nuclear issues, but it does include a welcome repetition of earlier declarations that “arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability” (para 54). The nuclear paragraph reaffirms the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and calls on NATO members to work constructively toward a successful outcome for the 2010 Review Conference. The NATO leaders point out that the arsenals of member states have been “dramatically reduced” and they promise an ongoing commitment “to all objectives enshrined in the Treaty.” They also call for universal adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Additional Protocol” – an agreement to allow more intrusive and effective inspections of nuclear facilities. Both Iran and North Korea are called on to adhere to all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

A re-reading of the current Strategic Concept, adopted by the Washington NATO Summit in 1999,[iv] leaves little doubt of the need for major nuclear renovation. Eight of its paragraphs include substantive references to nuclear weapons, all reflecting an architectural style firmly rooted in the 1980s.

The 1999 document argues (para 46) that, due to “the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options.” It then goes on to say, “the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”

Deterrence is presented as a broad, essentially open-ended, threat to use nuclear weapons against any aggressor – including, by implication, non-nuclear weapon states. The ultimate deterrent, i.e., “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” is described as being “provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States” (para 62) – which, in the context of NATO expansion to the east, means the post-Cold War era has been one of the steady geographic expansion of the American nuclear “umbrella.”

The 1999 Strategic Concept sets out a commitment to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons in Europe (para 46): “To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level.”[v]

Current NATO strategy also holds that “nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe” (para 63).

The recent Obama-Medvedev statement[vi] is a measure of the extent to which NATO’s current retentionist nuclear doctrine is a serious security anachronism – out of date and out of place in the new security environment. Among other things, the American and Russian leaders declared the commitment of their “two countries to achieving a nuclear free world.” They also emphasized their support for the NPT, and called for negotiations toward “a verifiable[vii] treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” They emphasized the importance of the entry into force of the nuclear test ban treaty and US President Obama promised to work for American ratification.[viii] They also agreed to begin negotiations on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with a view to reaching record low levels of legally binding limits on strategic nuclear weapons.

Language for a new NATO approach to nuclear weapons is available in the Obama-Medvedev statement, in the burgeoning anthology of nuclear abolition statements, and the logic on which the NPT itself was originally constructed – namely, that nuclear weapons, far from being “essential to preserve peace”, are ultimately an unacceptable risk to humanity, and that their elimination, not their retention, is essential to security.

Rather than asserting that the “strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance” are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” NATO’s new Strategic Concept would do well to reflect the new reality articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s warning that “with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.”[ix] Indeed, a new NATO statement could borrow from the 2008 statement by Henry Kissinger and his colleagues[x] and thus also acknowledge that “without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral” toward greater insecurity.

Over the course of the next year NATO states will have the opportunity to restate the vision and to make major efforts towards its realization.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “NATO summit: a chance to kick the nuclear habit,” Disarmingconflict post, 18 February 2009. http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009_02_01_archive.html [ii] Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm [iii] Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm [iv] NATO. 1999. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. [v] There are currently estimated to be between 150 and 240 nuclear weapons, all US B61 gravity bombs, held in five countries in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. All of the European countries hosting US nuclear weapons are non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [vi] Available at CBS News “Political Hotsheet.” 1 April 2009. http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/01/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4909175.shtml [vii] Obama’s support for a “verifiable” treaty is a reversal of the Bush policy. [viii] Also a reversal of Bush policy. [ix] Gorbachev, Mikhail. 2007. The nuclear threat. The Wall Street Journal, January 31. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.html#. [x] Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. 2008. Toward a nuclear-free world. The Wall Street Journal, January 15. http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

Whatever the real point of Ottawa’s mini-tiff with Moscow last week, one can’t help but conclude that Ottawa will regularly be turning to the Russian Bear to help get Canadians bullish on a new fleet of fighter aircraft.

The last time Canada went shopping for fighter aircraft it settled on the CF-18 from McDonald Douglas of the US in the largest single military purchase in Canadian history. The Air Force is now gearing up to replace the CF-18s, and given a price tag that could go to $10 billion, the new fighter aircraft could once again be the largest single Canadian military purchase ever.

Russia’s Bears – long-range, four-engine, propeller driven aircraft built to deliver nuclear weapons to North America – were bolstered by the generally threatening ambience of the Cold War to figure prominently in the rationale for acquiring the CF-18 fighter/interceptor. The Cold War is no more, but the Bears are still with us and they remain ready and willing to serve as the theatrical foil to Ottawa’s manufactured bravado about defending our sovereignty.

“We will defend our airspace,” said Prime Minister Harper, noting his “deep concern” about the “increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and into our airspace.”[i] Not content this time with conventional political hyperbole, the Prime Minister elaborated: “We also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations to defend our continental airspace, and we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.”[ii]

Of course the Russian bombers specifically did not enter Canadian airspace – indeed, they never have. There was no “intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.” They did what they have done for decades and that is fly in international airspace near Canadian and American airspace to train their pilots and test North American reactions; and the Canadians and Americans, grateful for the opportunity to test their own reaction times and routines, dutifully “scramble” their fighter aircraft and go out to greet the Russians.[iii]

For the Russians the point presumably is to continue to announce themselves as a continuing presence on the global stage. For Canada the point is certainly to keep a prudent eye on events near our borders, but when a routine event is elevated into an international incident the point is also to announce a continuing requirement for fighter aircraft and to lay the political foundation for the announcement of a brand new fleet.

The Government has set 2012 as roughly the date for a decision on the CF-18 replacement, although the basic intention was signaled a decade ago when Canada began its participation, initially in the Concept Development Phase, in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter program (JSF).

The aircraft in question in the JSF program – a consortium of nine countries[iv] – is the F-35 from the Lockheed-Martin company in the US, a new design not yet in production. There will be other aircraft in the running, but given Canada’s investment of more than $150 million in its development phase,[v] the F-35 will be a chief contender. The JSF is described in Canadian background notes as “the biggest and most expensive combat aircraft project in history.[vi]

Ottawa’s currently stated requirement is for 65 aircraft; this is down from an earlier ask of 80 (indeed, as the estimated costs rise the number required tends to decline).[vii] Current estimates have hit on about $50 million per aircraft, but some analysts think that number could yet double, depending on the overall production run. The additional program costs – namely, training, infrastructure, follow-on development, and so on – could double that figure and bring the overall bill into the $10 billion range.

Of course, part of the calculation is that both participation in the JSF development program and the purchase of the F-35 will yield major benefits to Canadian industry.[viii] The Government press release said the participation gave Canada “access to up to $8 billion in industrial participation opportunities.”[ix] Like the cost of the aircraft itself, estimates of the industrial benefits also enjoy a measure of inflation. To date, the development phase is reported to have yielded $212 million in contracts for more than 70 Canadian companies, and a more recent statement of potential sales claims $9 billion by 2035.[x]

Any decision on new fighter aircraft will obviously have to be preceded by a thoroughgoing public debate on the need.

The primary role for Canadian fighter interceptors is obviously to patrol approaches to Canadian airspace, but the question begging to be asked is just how many and what kind of aircraft does that really take. The Russian Bears are real, of course, but they are a real symbol of a threat – the real nuclear threat to North America obviously comes from intercontinental ballistic missiles, against which there is no defence possible or contemplated.

The more serious air threat that Canadian interceptors must address is not a military threat but a law enforcement threat in the form of small aircraft that illegally intrude into Canadian airspace and territory, most often laden with illegal drugs. Are large, state-of-the-art, fighter aircraft the best means of tracking the piper cubs of drug runners?

New fighter aircraft would also be available to support Canadian participation in overseas military missions – but here too there is an obvious question about the relevance of fighter aircraft in peace support operations.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] David Ljunggren, “Russian bomber neared Canada before Obama visit,” Reuters, 27 February 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE51Q2W220090227?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
[ii] “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iii] The only real dispute was whether Russia told Canada, as it routinely does, about the flight in advance. The Russian Embassy in Ottawa said “the adjacent countries were informed of the flight in good time,” but Ottawa said it was not informed. “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iv] In addition to the US and Canada, coalition members are the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Australia.
[v] “Canada’s military eyeing futuristic fighter jets,” Canwest News Service. 26 june 2007. http://www.canada.com/topics/technology/story.html?id=7a365ab7-22b5-4d06-9de7-7a6177af4b62.
[vi] Michel Rossignol, “The Joint Strike Fighter Project,” 19 February 2003, Library of Parliament. Government of Canada. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0207-e.pdf.
[vii] David Pugliese, “Canada Weighs Fighter Options,” DefenseNews, 14 July 2008. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3637165.
[viii] “US, Canada sign agreement on Joint Strike Fighter.” US DOD News Release No. 060-02, 07 February 02. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3232.
[ix] “Canada’s New Government Signs on to Phase III of Joint Strike Fighter Program….” Industry Canada, 12 December 2006. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/02150.html.
[x] Allison Lampert, “Joint Strike Fighter program boosts aerospace industry,” 02 August 08, Canwest New Service. http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html?id=659a65d6-2ae0-48e3-99d8-4aab98a5d103.

This being February, Canadians have once again been treated to the annual paean to the Avro Arrow. It is a memorial that leaves a question: Why has the Avro Jetliner never received the same attention?

A CBC web report had some Canadians in “mourning” this week over the demise of the Avro Arrow fifty years ago.[i] The Toronto Star had an A.V. Roe company worker who worked on the Arrow in the 1950s “gazing in adoration” at a replica of the experimental but highly advanced fighter aircraft now on display at the new Canadian Air and Space Museum.[ii]

The Ottawa Citizen carried an interesting and informative survey of Canadian aviation history which characterized the Avro Arrow episode as a “tragedy.”[iii] The Avro Jetliner made it into the story, but its demise is recorded only as a “disappointment.” Both planes represented advances in aviation that were unmatched at the time, both showed the extraordinary acumen of Canadian industry, and both were cancelled by government order and destroyed.

The Avro Arrow story is well known. A Canadian designed fighter aircraft, the Avro Arrow was tested and refined over a number of years, at great and growing expense. It could fly at almost twice the speed of sound, at very high altitudes and in all weather, and was highly maneuverable – ideal for intercepting Soviet bombers in Canada’s north.

On February 20, 1959 it was abruptly cancelled and all of the test planes destroyed and cut into pieces. Thousands of workers were laid off. Costs had been escalating and it was clear that it would be far too expensive to put into production if it had to rely on Canadian orders alone. The United States, the most likely customer, was not about to buy a centre piece of its military arsenal, an advanced fighter aircraft, from Canada and thus, the argument in Washington went, make its national security vulnerable to imports.

The story of the Avro Jetliner follows the same basic plotline.[iv]

The Avro Jetliner was not the first civilian passenger jet to fly; the British Comet beat it by two weeks in 1949. But it was the Avro Jetliner that set the standard. Designed to carry up to 40 passengers, it took its first flight on August 10, 1949. It continued to be tested and refined and by 1950 it had reached a speed of 500 miles per hour and an altitude of more than 39,000 feet.

The single Jetliner flew for seven years – used in various roles, including as a VIP transport and an aerial photo platform, it carried the world’s first jet airmail from Toronto to New York. It caught the attention of Howard Hughes who wanted to start a US production line under license and deliver the plane to his TWA airline.

On December 10, 1956 the Jetliner was abruptly cancelled and cut into pieces, with only the cockpit left intact.

Like the Arrow, the Jetliner involves a complicated story behind the simple facts. It was in particular a victim of the Korean War, during which all Canadian aircraft production facilities were pressed into service turning out aircraft for the war effort. The same pressure is also what prevented Howard Hughes from putting it into production in the US. In Canada the government decided to focus on producing the CF100 fighter aircraft.

A question endures. Why does December 10, 1956 not enjoy the same infamy as February 20, 1959?

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Emily Chung, “Remembering the death of the Avro Arrow,” 20 February 2009.

http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/02/20/f-avro-arrow.html.

[ii] Jason Miller, “Avro Arrow to spread wings in new museum,” 21 February 2009.

http://www.thestar.com/News/GTA/article/591011.

[iii] Peter Pigott, “How 100 years of flight transformed a nation,” 23 February 2009.

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/years+flight+transformed+nation/1319042/story.html.

[iv] Websites the tell the story include:

Avroland – http://www.avroland.ca/al-c102.html

Arrow Recovery Canada – http://www.avroarrow.org/Jetliner/JetlinerIntro.html

Wikipedia — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avro_Canada_Jetliner.

While Afghanistan will certainly dominate the talk at the 60th Anniversary NATO Summit in April, leaders are also scheduled to launch a process to review the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, a key element of which is a controversial and outdated nuclear doctrine.[i]

The Strategic Concept – the current version of which was adopted in 1999 – is the Alliance’s official statement of purpose and outlines its force posture and approach to collective security. Nine of its 65 paragraphs refer to nuclear weapons, the central claim being that the nuclear arsenals of the United States in particular, but also of the United Kingdom and France, are “essential to preserve peace” and are “an essential political and military link between the European and North American members They are supposed to keep your sexual life intact! viagra sales in india jealt.mx treats erectile dysfunction effectively, which is a condition characterized by the inability to achieve or maintain an erection for intercourse. This is because they normally have uncontrolled sugar in their blood system, which slows down the symptom of erectile dysfunction by inhibiting http://www.jealt.mx/servicios-dictamenes.html generic viagra discount PDE 5 enzymes and supporting cyclic GMP. This means there should be some form of sexual stimulation, whether it jealt.mx viagra without side effects is thinking about having great sex, or lightly stroking one another. Regular use of NF Cure capsule with Shilajit capsule improves vitality, cialis 5 mg vigor and energy levels. of the Alliance.”[ii]

Firmly rooted in east-west deterrence and nuclear war-fighting assumptions, NATO doctrine is markedly out of sync with the new anti-nuclear counsel from such Cold War stalwarts as Henry Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt, Richard Burt and a host of other government leaders and security professionals now calling for accelerated nuclear disarmament.

In his recent speech to the 45th Munich Security Conference, Mr. Kissinger reaffirmed his earlier call for the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons, pointing out that “any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign policy objectives.”

Richard Burt, the senior arms control official in the Administration of the first President Bush, now works through the Global Zero initiative, supported by The Simons Foundation of Canada and a broad range of public figures, for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The group is pledged to work “for a legally binding verifiable agreement, including all nations, to eliminate nuclear weapons by a date certain.”

Even the Alliance leader is now committed, as the Obama White House website puts it, to pursuing the “goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

All of these statements represent a rather a large shift away from NATO’s claim that nuclear weapons are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”

This recent wave of nuclear abolition statements by mainstream security professionals is rooted in two linked concerns.

First, the 20,000-plus nuclear warheads remaining in current arsenals, several thousand of them poised on missiles ready for firing at a moment’s notice, represent an ongoing threat of mass indiscriminate destruction to the point of global annihilation.

Second, that threat is heightened by the growing risk that nuclear weapons, as well as weapons-friendly technologies and nuclear materials, will spread to more states, and even to non-state groups.

NATO thus has the opportunity to fashion a new strategic doctrine that, on the one hand, takes full account of the threats posed by nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, takes full advantage of the political momentum that is now finally available to allow states to get serious about doing something about that threat. Rather than continuing to insist, for example, that nuclear weapons “preserve peace,” NATO doctrine would do well to follow the new realism of former Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s assessment that “with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.”

Inasmuch as all NATO members are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a good place to start would be for the new Strategic Concept to welcome the groundswell of calls for the world without nuclear weapons that the NPT envisions. Responding to those calls NATO should then reaffirm its commitment to implementing the disarmament and nonproliferation priorities and procedures elaborated through the NPT review process.

One important measure of NATO’s sincerity will be its handling of the 150-250 US tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Europe. If it were to take up the proposal of former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that those now in Germany be removed, and then also remove those in the four other European states that currently host them, NATO would earn important disarmament bona fides and give a major boost of confidence to a seriously flagging non-proliferation regime. It would also honor the longstanding international call that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

Non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT that are not part of NATO rightly regard the removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of European non-nuclear weapon states as essential for full compliance with Article I of the Treaty. The NPT requires that “each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”

The nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime is currently under severe stress. The failure of nuclear weapon states to fully implement the disarmament provisions of Article VI of the NPT, along with NATO’s ongoing claim that it plans to rely on nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, has entrenched the double standard of nuclear “have” and “have not” countries. In the long run, that double standard is not sustainable. NATO cannot credibly claim that the security of NATO states sheltered within a peaceful Europe requires nuclear weapons, while at the same time calling on all other states, including those in conflict zones such as South Asia or the Middle East, to fully and unconditionally reject nuclear weapons.

At the coming Summit NATO has an opportunity to begin the process of reinventing its security doctrine, to take new initiatives to end its reliance on nuclear weapons, and to engage other states with nuclear weapons in the serious pursuit of reciprocal disarmament, and in the process revitalize the NPT.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] This article appeared in the February 18, 2009 issue of Embassy. http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/nato_summit-2-18-2009.

[ii] Detailed references for all quotes and sources are available in Ploughshares Briefing 09-1: Ernie Regehr, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Nuclear Abolition Imperative. February 2009. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf091.pdf.

Some critics of Israel’s military action in Gaza charge that its extensive use of American-origin weapons violates US arms transfer laws. Whatever the merits of that particular charge, it is the type of issue that an arms trade treaty would regularly be called on to settle.

The proposed arms trade treaty (ATT), on which negotiations are about to begin at the UN,[i] is intended to ensure that international arms transfers are guided by obligations of States under the UN Charter and international law more broadly. The NGO Steering Committee that promotes an ATT articulates a foundational principle built on key elements of international law with direct relevance for arms transfers: “States shall not authorize international transfers of arms or ammunition where they will be used or are likely to be used for violations of international law, including: breaches of the UN Charter and customary law rules relating to the use of force; gross violations of international human rights law; serious violations of international humanitarian law; acts of genocide or crimes against humanity.”[ii]

The national arms transfer regulations of many countries already reflect that basic principle, as does the US Arms Export Control Act[iii] which provides that “Defense articles and defense services” can be provided to another country “solely for internal security (including for antiterrorism and nonproliferation purposes), for legitimate self-defense,” and to assist the recipient country’s participation in UN operations and related actions.[iv]

The US Foreign Assistance Act provides that, “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-nationally recognized human rights.” [v]

In the course of current Israeli attacks in Gaza, as well as previous Israeli military operations in Palestine and Lebanon, commentators[vi] and critics have argued that Israel’s actions violate self-defence and international humanitarian law requirements and thus its use of US-origin weapons violates American export conditions. Canadian foreign affairs analyst Eric Margolis says “Israel’s use of American weapons against Gaza violates the U.S. Arms Export Control and Foreign Assistance Acts.”[vii] William Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation and an expert on US arms transfers, wrote in 2002, for example that, “the use of U.S. weapons in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian authority appears to be a clear violation of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act prohibiting U.S. weapons from being used for non-defensive purposes.”[viii] In an extensive 2008 report Hartung documents Israeli use of US-supplied cluster bombs in Lebanon, also in possible violation of US export laws.[ix]

In 2007 US State Department officials sent a preliminary report to Congress citing “likely violations” of US-Israeli arms transfer agreements linked to Israel’s use of cluster bombs among villages in the 2006 attacks on Lebanon.[x]

Other reports from human rights organizations and the US State Department cite similar violations of international obligations – for example, the latter’s report on Israel for 2001 accused the Israeli Defense Force of “excessive use of force” and of deliberate attacks on Palestinian civilian institutions and civilian areas.[xi] A 2008 UN report refers to Israel’s failure to meet the obligations under international law of an occupying power.[xii]

Israel makes the opposite claims. In the case of cluster bombs in Lebanon, Israel says civilians were not targeted and were warned by leaflets dropped from aircraft in advance of any attacks. Israel describes its military actions in Gaza as entirely about self-defense – to halt rocket attacks on Israeli civilians and to prevent other kinds of terror attacks on Israel. Civilian casualties occur, they point out, not because of direct attacks, but as a consequence of direct attacks on legitimate targets that are in close proximity to civilians.

Current commentary and analysis cover the full range of interpretations, from Frank Gaffney’s insistence that “by any reasonable definition, Israel’s operations in Gaza are defensive,”[xiii] to Robert Fisk’s descriptions of specific attacks as “war crimes.”[xiv]

The legal questions at the heart of this heated debate centre on interpretations of basic, but not necessarily precise, concepts such as legitimacy and proportionality, self-defense and aggression, the thresholds that define “gross” violations of human rights or “deliberate” attacks on civilians, the definition of “excessive” use of force, and the severity and frequency of alleged violations of internationally recognized humanitarian law and human rights standards.

These are questions that are necessarily politicized and are unlikely, to understate the point, to yield to consensus in the context of current Israeli action in Gaza – the United States certainly will not charge Israel with violating US arms export conditions. But, difficult as such questions are, the proposed ATT will necessarily and regularly force them onto the public agenda. In fact, had such a treaty been in place now, it would at least have offered procedures and mechanism for examining possible infractions of international law, including the culpability of the supplier when arms are supplied to a State in which it could be reasonably predicted that those arms would be used unlawfully (possible US culpability is also relevant for Canada inasmuch as there are Canadian-built components in many US weapons systems).

A detailed and useful report on implementing an ATT, prepared by the UK NGO Saferworld,[xv] makes it clear that under any foreseeable arms trade treaty, arms transfer decisions will remain national. Even though the focus is international law, an arms trade treaty is unlikely to submit national export decisions to international adjudication.

Furthermore, compliance with such a treaty will be pursued largely through political and diplomatic dialogue, debate, and censure. Authoritative external legal judgments on compliance or noncompliance will not be the norm. Instead, treaty provisions for enhanced transparency and reporting, for consultation and mechanisms for raising formal complaints, and for monitoring transfers and weapons use will be put in place to generate close public scrutiny and thus create strong political incentives to comply.

Gradually, and with obvious difficulty, international consensus will have to build on the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate transfers.

For now, a definitive answer on the legality or legitimacy of arms transfers destined to be used in operations like the action in Gaza will continue to elude consensus in the international community. But the fact that the role of arms suppliers is being raised, including the clandestine deliveries to Hamas, reinforces the importance of establishing a treaty which can provide institutional mechanisms through which to help determine facts, facilitate the debate, and thereby hold arms suppliers and recipients more accountable.

Notes

[i] The General Assembly, First Committee, resolution established an “open-ended working group” to pursue a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” based on the principles of the UN Charter and other existing international obligations – available at Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/res/L39.pdf

[ii] Compilation of Global Principles for Arms Transfers, the NGO Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, Amnest International, 2006, available at: http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/documents/Global_Principles_for_Arms_Transfers_2007.pdf. [iii] Sec. 502.Utilization of Defense Articles and Services. TITLE 22, CHAPTER 39, SUBCHAPTER I, §2754 Purposes for which military sales or leases by the United States are authorized; http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002754—-000-.html.

[iv] US export laws are compared to proposed global arms transfer principles in greater detail in: Rachel Stohl, US Small Arms and Global Transfer Principles (Annex B), Ploughshares Working Paper 06-1, 2006.

[v] Sec. 502B, (US) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), p. 230, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf.

[vi] Joe Parko, “Israel is illegally using U.S. weapons in its attack on Gaza,” OpEdNews.com, 28 December 2008, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Israel-is-illegally-using-by-Joe-Parko-081228-823.html.

[vii] Eric Margolis, “Israel Strikes at Obama,” 4 January 2009, Toronto Sun, http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/eric_margolis/2009/01/04/7912556-sun.html.

[viii] William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Arms Transafer and Security Assistace to Israel,” Arms Trade Resource Center, 6 May 2002, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/israel050602.html.

[ix] William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Weapons at War: Beyond the Bush Legacy,” December 2008, New America Foundation, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/u_s_weapons_war_2008_0.

[x] “Israel may have broken US arms export laws: official,” Muzi.Com, 29 January 2007, http://lateline.muzi.net/news/ll/english/10034372.shtml?cc=35606.

[xi] “Israel and the occupied territories: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001,” Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 4, 2002, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8262.htm.

[xii] “Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967,” report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, General Assembly, 25 August 2008.

[xiii] Frank Gaffney, “Defensive action,” Commentary, The Washington Times, 6 January 2009, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/06/defensive-action/.

[xiv] Robert Fisk, “Why do they hate the West so much, we will ask,” The Independent, 7 January 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-do-they-hate-the-west-so-much-we-will-ask-1230046.html.

[xv] Making it work: Monitoring and verifying implementation of an Arms Trade Treaty, Saferworld, May 2008, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/312/making_it_work.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Despite widespread complaints about the sorry state of Canadian military spending, Canadian contributions to international peace and security are more heavily weighted toward the military than they are in key European middle power countries.

Given the UN Security Council’s recent attention to Article 26 of the UN Charter,[i] it is worth asking whether the world’s 33 million military personnel (plus 54 million reservists) and the $1.3 trillion it spends annually on military forces are what the framers of that Article had in mind when they called on states to maintain international peace and security “with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.”[ii]

As a general proposition, many will certainly agree that this human and material treasure could be put to more productive use, but in most particular cases the point is likely be disputed.

Take Canada, for example. Canada is the world’s 14th highest military spender[iii] and might logically be regarded as among those states guilty of the excessive diversion of economic resources to military purposes – but it’s obvious that many disagree. Indeed, the prominent, if not prevailing, view among those interested in these matters is that Canadian forces are seriously understaffed and underfunded.

During recent discussions of the formation of a Liberal-NDP Coalition, to be supported on confidence votes by the Bloc, the Canadian historian and military affairs analyst J.L. Granatstein warned that “ideological and anti-military concerns of the coalition partners” could not be relied on to “restore” Canadian forces as the national interest requires.[iv]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies lists Canada as the 6th highest military spender in NATO, in addition to being the 14th highest in the world, yet Douglas Bland of the Queens University Defence Studies Program says “many billions more” will be needed to rebuild the Canadian Forces after the current Afghanistan mission.[v]

Canada’s ranking in the top 10 or 20 percent of the world’s military powers (the 14th highest in absolute military spending, and 26th from the top in per capita military spending) doesn’t deter another military analyst from declaring that “Canada has been a defence laggard for so long that it hardly warrants as news that we remain one today”[vi] – did we mention that Canada has the 6th highest defence budget in NATO?

There is another way of measuring the level of resources devoted to armaments or development and that is obviously to look at the defence to development spending ratio of a number of like-minded states.[vii] In 2004 that ratio in Canada was 3.8:1 – that is, military spending was at just under four times the level of development assistance spending, putting Canada roughly in the middle of the OECD rankings.[viii] The most balanced ratio was held by Luxembourg (1.2:1), while the most disproportionate ratio belonged to the United States (24.8:1). While those are both examples outside the mainstream, ratios in selected like-minded countries ranged from 5.9:1 for Germany to 1.6:1 for Denmark, 2.2:1 for Netherlands, 2:1 for Sweden, 2:1 for Norway, and 1.8:1 for Ireland. In other words, Canadian peace and human security spending was weighted more heavily toward the military than in most of these like-minded states.

In 2006 (the most recent year for which such figures are available) the Canadian ratio of defence to development spending had climbed to 4:1. The ratio in Germany had dropped to 3.6:1, and in Denmark it was 1.7:1, Ireland 1:1, Netherlands 1.8:1, Norway 1.7:1, and Sweden 1.5:1. In all of these states the spread between military and ODA spending had narrowed; in Canada it had widened.

Notably, if Canadian development spending had reached the declared target of .7% of GDP by 2006 (with defence spending maintaining its rate of growth), the Canadian defence to development ratio would of have been roughly the same as Sweden at about 1.5:1 and generally comparable to the ratios in the Nordic and some other like-minded European countries.

For now, however, Canadian contributions to international peace and security do remain more heavily weighted toward military spending than they are in key European countries – and that doesn’t seem to be quite in the spirit of Article 26.

(eregehr@ploughshares.ca)

[i] See the December 16 posting here.

[ii] These numbers are for 2006, taken from The Military Balance 2008 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press).

[iii] The Military Balance 2008 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press).

[iv] J.L. Granatstein, “The Coalition, the Obama Administration, and the Canadian Forces,” The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (http://www.cdfai.org/granatsteinarticles/The%20Coalition,%20the%20Obama%20Administration,%20and%20the%20Canadian%20Forces.pdf).

[v] Douglas Bland, “The Afghan mission has taught our politicians a lesson,” The Globe and Mail, 27 November 2008, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081126.wcoafghan27/BNStory/politics/?page=rss&id=RTGAM.20081126.wcoafghan27.

[vi] Andrew Richter, “What Happened to the Promise of Large Defence Spending Increases?” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Summer 2007 Newsletter (http://www.cdfai.org/newslettersummer2007.htm).

[vii] See the 5 September 2008 posting in this space, “How Canada Spends its Peace Dividend,” https://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/howcanadas.

[viii] Military spending data is drawn from The Military Balance 2003-2004 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press); and data on ODA is drawn from OECD statistics, Table 4: “Net Official Development Assistance from DAC countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Organizations,” at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/26/1894401.

One of the more wrongheaded, but still ubiquitous, complaints voiced in the current Canadian debate over Afghanistan is that the Germans and others with forces in the north are not doing any “heavy lifting” and thus are both undermining the fight against the Taliban and – which some seem to find even more disturbing – putting the future of NATO in question. Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier echoed the point when he told CTV News on February 1 that within military circles the question is regularly asked: “Can you move troops from the rest of the country into the south where the need is most definite?”[i]

It is a Kandahar-centric question that fails to recognize that international forces in the north are in fact mounting credible and essential operations that could well turn out to be key to the long-term viability of development and good governance in Afghanistan. To cut back forces in the north (“north” being shorthand for those parts of the country generally onside with the Government and not heavily challenged by insurgent forces) and to redeploy them to the counterinsurgency war in the south (the parts of country plagued by a growing insurgency and where suspicion of the Kabul Government runs highest) would not necessarily or not even likely improve the chances of suppressing the insurgency, but would definitely put the stability of the north in further jeopardy.

In November 2007, for example, the BBC reported that in the north the always present violent crime is now being exacerbated by growing political attacks: “Fighters loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar‚Äîa former mujahideen leader who is battling the Kabul government independently from the Taleban ‚Äîare known to be active in Baghlan.”[ii]Another November example, a report from Radio Free Europe, describes northern militia leaders as “exploiting Kabul’s preoccupation with the violence-ridden south and east in order to stake claims to their old fiefdoms.” Some are rearming to prepare for what they fear may be another war with a resurgent Taliban.[iii]A new Oxfam International (2008) report on development and humanitarian priorities for Afghanistan also warns that the focus on the south is leading to neglect of the north and increasing the danger of spreading insecurity.[iv]

To preserve stability and advance human security in the north, stabilization forces must continue to contribute to conditions that are conducive to peacebuilding, that is, to reconstruction, disarmament, security sector reform, and accountable governance. The Manley Panel (p. 32) says that “there is not yet a peace to keep in Afghanistan,” but in fact there is a peace to keep and build in the north. It is a fragile peace, to be sure, but it is one that must be nurtured and built up or it will be lost.

It is primarily in the north where there is currently a realistic prospect of gradually shifting security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan forces, but only with increased attention to training local police who will be trusted and to building the kind of economic and social conditions on the ground that are conducive to political stability. In the “clear, hold, and develop” framework, the 2001 invasion by US and northern Alliance forces was able to “clear” the north of the Taliban because the latter had few roots there. Since then the north has been “held” by a combination of Afghan (Government and militias) and ISAF troops. However, the “develop” phase (reconstruction and governance, in particular) has been chronically under-resourced. Governance reform has been resisted by both the central government and local officials and politicians (and militia leaders) in attempts to preserve their own advantages in a still corrupt system.

Much of the current debate is about whether or not Canadian forces should be engaged in combat operations. The real choice, however, is between counter-insurgency combat and a genuine post-conflict peace support and security assistance operation designed to stabilize the regions already largely under Government control. Both counterinsurgency clearing operations in Taliban-held regions and security patrols in government-held areas are UN Chapter VII (use of force) operations involving the resort to lethal force. The former, however, takes the fight to the Taliban without, as experience is showing (see the Feb 16 posting here), effectively suppressing the insurgency, while the latter focuses on providing security protection in communities where the insurgents are not present in the same way—even though the presence of spoilers is and will continue to be a challenge.

The explicit rejection of a combat role in Kandahar province should be understood as a rejection of counterinsurgency combat in favour of security patrols consistent with peace support operations in post-conflict areas of the country. In Afghanistan peace support operations are not carried out by Blue Helmets with binoculars and radios, but an armed security force with a mandate to protect people in their homes, communities, schools and places of work.

So, the general priority should now be to focus on the “hold” and “develop” tasks to ensure a stable future for Afghans in locations where the Government is basically in control and the insurgency is not present.

A British Humanitarian worker and researcher writes the following after recent visits to Afghanistan:^[v]

“Almost everyone I spoke to on my recent visit thinks that this strategy, which essentially consists of trying to capture territory held by the insurgents and then to “love-bomb” local residents with aid projects is crazy. It is a terrible way of distributing aid, it is not buying hearts and minds and it is actually creating an incentive for people in peaceful areas to stage “incidents” so that they can get “more, more, more” attention as well.

“Western strategy within Afghanistan should concentrate on securing the areas of the country that are currently under the nominal control of the government, strengthening the institutions of the state and tackling corruption and impunity. That will require a significant reorientation of existing policy – and real political courage – but until the institutions of government begin to command the respect of ordinary Afghans there is no hope achieving a durable political settlement.

“That does not mean the withdrawal of international military forces, but it should mean winding down aggressive military operations in the south and east. There is absolutely no point in asking British soldiers to risk their lives to capture territory during the day that the Taliban will simply reoccupy the next night. No amount of ill-thought-out aid is going to win the hearts and minds of a village whose children then get killed by an air strike.”

International military forces are needed to help “hold” the fragile peace in the north through stabilization or peace support operations that can be appropriately called Chapter VII peacekeeping. Efforts to “develop” that fragile peace into a sustainable peace are obviously what we know as post-conflict peacebuilding. Now is definitely not the time to shift forces from that vital peace support role in the north to join the unsuccessful counterinsurgency war in the south.

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[i] “German troops to stay in Afghan north despite pleas,” The Associated Press, February 1, 2008 (http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080201/germany_afghanistan_080201).

[ii] “Afghan suicide blast ‘kills 40’,” BBC News, November 6, 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7081012.stm).

[iii] Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Armed Northern Militias Complicate Security,” RFE/Rl, November 4, 2007 (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/11/ffca5de1-b96c-4cdf-810b-831bec1b5a6c.html).

[iv] “Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian Priorities,” Oxfam International, January 2008 (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RMOI-7BE2T6/$File/full_report.pdf).

[v] Conor Foley, “Who is Right on Afghanistan?” February 15, 2008, Guardian Unlimited (http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/conor_foley/2008/02/who_is_right_on_afghanistan_1.html).

Warnings of the disaster that would come of an American attack on Iran are plentiful, increasingly urgent, and persuasive[i] – but it is not at all clear that they are working on the one vote that matters. The NewsHour on PBS television ran a short feature on the growing irrelevance of George Bush, but on security matters he’s still very much in charge, and when it comes to Iran he still likes to say that all options remain on the table.

Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, Pentagon planners and presidential advisors seem to have an inexplicable capacity to infuse their attack scenarios with an irrepressible optimism. In their computerized simulations, otherwise intractable problems, like Iran’s nuclear programs, are swept aside like so much hi tech chaff once the missiles start flying. The Christian Science Monitor recently observed that “perhaps the most egregious error policy planners make is their assumption that once wars are started, their outcome is predictable.”[ii]

It is true that some outcomes are predictable enough. No one could have doubted that the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq would lead to the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Nor could anyone doubt that if the United States attacked Iran it could manage to destroy, at least for a time, its nuclear programs, set its economic infrastructure back a generation, or overthrow its government. Regime destruction can be accomplished with dispatch – but after that all bets are off.

Paul Rogers of the University of Bradford has offered a careful and cautious account[iii] of the consequences of a concentrated air attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities and defence infrastructure. He rules out a ground offensive and a regime overthrow by the United states as unfeasible given American commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He says “an air attack would involve the systematic destruction of research, development, support and training centres for nuclear and missile programmes and the killing of as many technically competent people as possible.” In addition, the attack would “involve comprehensive destruction of Iranian air defence capabilities and attacks designed to pre-empt Iranian retaliation. This would require destruction of Iranian Revolutionary Guard facilities close to Iraq and of regular or irregular naval forces that could disrupt Gulf oil transit routes.”

Civilian and military casualties would be difficult to monitor, but would be in the many thousands, given that much of the technical infrastructure in support of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs is located in urban areas.

After the attack, he says, “Iran would have many methods of responding in the months and years that followed.” He includes disruption of Gulf oil supplies and support for insurgents and anti-Israel forces in the region. Rather than end Iranian nuclear programs, an attack would ignite Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. Iran would emerge united and determined to build a bomb and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That would presumably occasion further attacks and propel long-term and widening confrontation in the region.

After that come the unpredictable consequences, including the environmental impact of exploding nuclear facilities – at this point with limited quantities of nuclear materials present – and various political fallout possibilities. President Bush and his army of upbeat advisors and analysts obviously did not anticipate that their 2003 attack on Iraq would be a major boon to Iran. But, says the former Ambassador and current Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control, Peter W. Galbraith, “of all the unintended consequences of the Iraq war, Iran’s strategic victory is the most far-reaching.”[iv] Similar unintended consequences would also ensue from an attack on Iran.

Mr. Bush seems rather more aware of folly when the issue is the military action of others. It is almost touching to hear his kindly reprimand of Turkey for having the temerity to threaten attacks on northern Iraq in an effort to deny rebel Turkish Kurds sanctuary there. “There is a lot of dialogue going on,” he explained to reporters at the White House, “and that is positive.”[v]

To measure his own actions he uses a different calculus. There may, after all, be a lot of dialogue going on with Iran as well, but in this case he finds nothing positive in it. Talking to Iran, whether it is the Russians or the International Atomic Energy Agency, only emboldens it in its wicked ways.

Left to his own devices, and bolstered by the authors of triumphalist attack scenarios, President Bush is eminently capable of crowning his disastrous presidency with another military misadventure – this time in Iran. In other words, he shouldn’t be left to his own devices.

The Parliament of Canada would perform a worthy service in support of international stability through a unanimous and two-fold call: for the United States to unequivocally reject military action against Iran and for Iran to unambiguously resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA and provide it ongoing and unencumbered access to all Iranian nuclear facilities and programs.

As an emergency statement onIranby a group of concerned Canadians puts it, “an aerial assault on Iran would be an environmental and human catastrophe that our already damaged world cannot afford.”[vi]

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[i] Dan Plesch and Martin Butcher, “Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East,” The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, September 2007 (http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/IranStudy082807a.pdf).

Barnett Rubin, “Thesis on Policy toward Iran,” Informed Comment: Global Affairs, September 5, 2007 (http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/theses-on-policy-toward-iran.html).

Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?” The New Yorker, April 17, 2007 (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/17/060417fa_fact).

[ii] Walter Rodgers, “The folly of war with Iran,” The Christian Science Monitor,” October 16, 2007 ()

[iii] Paul Rogers, Iran: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper, Oxford Research Group, February 2006 (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/IranConsequences.pdf), 16 pp.

[iv]Peter W. Galbraith, “The Victor?,” The New York Review of Books, October 11, 2007 Volume 54, Number 15 (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20651).

[v]By Paula Wolfson, “Bush Urges Turkey to Refrain From Cross-Border Operations in Iraq,” Voice of America, October 17, 2007 (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-17-voa49.cfm).

[vi] From an “emergency statement” of concerned Canadians. The statement remains open for signature through Jillian Skeet of Vancouver who can be reached at jillianskeet@telus.net.