Defence and Human Security

No recession for global military forces

It seems the military is one economic sector that is pretty much recession proof. While global government spending generally fell in 2009 in the wake of the great recession, and while budgetary deficits soared, there was little interruption to the steady post 9-11 growth in global military spending.

Global military spending reached $1.5 trillion in 2009 – a six percent jump over 2008 and 50 percent higher than it was in 2000.[i]

The annual Stockholm International Peace Research (SIPRI) review of arms control and security reports that in 2009 almost two-thirds of all states surveyed had increased their spending on military forces. More than three-quarters of the G-20 states registered an increase. It was mainly in poorer states, those less able to accommodate higher deficits, where military spending fell.

The bulk of military spending is heavily concentrated in a very few states. The US alone accounts for 40 per cent of the world total. The top five (that’s the same five that enjoy permanent membership in the Security Council) account for 60 per cent, and the top 15 military spenders account for 75 per cent – the remaining 177 states account for 25 per cent of global military spending.

 Canada reflects the global trend. Both SIPRI and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) rank Canada within the top 15, as the 13^th highest military spender in the world.[ii] IISS figures, which are in US dollars and and so comparable with other states, show that Canadian military spending (in current dollars) increased from $354 per capita in 2004 to $597 per capita in 2008 – adjusted for inflation it would still be roughly a 40 per cent increase over four years.[iii]

 Spending obviously reflects national priorities, and a comparison of military and development assistance spending in OECD donor states offers at least one insight into how a country tries to spread its influence and make an impact on the world beyond its borders.

 The Table below looks at Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) relative to military spending, comparing that to the ODA to military spending ratio within the OECD collectively, and to the US and two other NATO partners (Norway and Netherlands, both much smaller than Canada and with a lot less territory to patrol, but arguably with similar values and global objectives).

 The Canadian ODA to military spending ratio is generally about 1:4 – that is, Canada spends at least four times as much on military forces as on development assistance (sometimes it is five times as much). In Norway and Netherlands the ratio in both cases is below 1:2 – that is, these two Canadian allies, known for their generally ambitious and effective engagement in international peace and security efforts, spend less than twice as much on their militaries as on development assistance.

 To be fair, Canada, with its much larger land mass (which, on the other hand, is certainly now and foreseeably not under any military threat), is still much closer to the Norway/Netherlands model than to the US model or the OECD average. The US spends more than 25 times as much on its military as on development assistance, and within the OECD the average is just under 10 times as much.

 Ratios of ODA to Military Spending[iv]

The medicinal drug has been prominent since it has been leading for excellent results for getting recovered from the erectile issues http://www.midwayfire.com/minutes/Approved%20minutes%207-9-13.doc purchase viagra of the males which has a great impact on the person and on his life. The one that suits you best is dependent upon your specifichealth situation. 1.) free prescription for levitra viagra is an FDA-approved oral prescription medication for the treatment of ovulation problems? If your ovulation cycle is irregular and absent, then you must face difficulties while conceiving a child. The way Kamagra sildenafil citrate tablets work for a certain time period and also they free viagra for women can become dysfunctional for strange reasons. Faced with declining responses to their spam, top nerds from around the globe joined together and invented a new kind of generic cialis online that is Sildenafil Citrate.
 With the Cold War long over, and with some post 9-11 attempts to militarily engineer peace and stability having faltered rather dramatically, there is a wide range of voices calling for some serious rebalancing.[v] One simple and modest, yet sensible, suggestion is to shift some of the excessive military spending in OECD countries to ODA (a suggestion that comes with recognition of the need for much improved aid effectiveness).

 Obviously, governments don’t make those kinds of direct spending transfers, but the point is to promote a shift in priorities that more credibly recognizes the extent to which peace and stability are built on sustainable conditions of social and economic well-being.

 For example, the globally representative interfaith organization, Religions for Peace, currently has a campaign, undertaken through its Youth Program, to “ask all governments to make an official pledge to cut their military budgets by 10% and to re-allocate those funds toward development.”[vi]  The Nobel Prize winning International Peace Bureau has issued a similar call for a shift of 10 percent of military spending to poverty reduction.[vii]

 Well, if Canada were to implement such a modest shift, its ODA as a percentage of GNI would go from .33 percent (using the 2008 figures) to .46 percent – remaining well short of the official goal of .7 percent. The ratio of ODA to military spending would move from 1:4.1 to 1:2.6 (bringing it a lot closer, but still not equal, to the ratio already reached by Norway and the Netherlands).

 More fundamentally, it would be a symbolic and practical recognition that to address insecurity the way most people experience it, there needs to be a whole lot more, and more effective, attention to redressing unmet basic needs, political exclusion, denied rights, social and political disintegration, and the criminal and political violence that invariably attend such conditions of insecurity.

 eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

 Notes

[i] Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano, “Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 177.

[ii] SIPRI Yearbook 2010, p. 203; and The Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 462-468.

[iii]  A Conference of Defence Associations analysis of the Defence Budgets for the years 2006 through 2010 shows an increase of 44 per cent over those four years. Brian MacDonald, CDA Commentary 1-2010, 18 February 2010. www.cda-cdai.ca.

[iv] Based on figures (Current US$) from the IISS Military Balance (2010, 2007, and 2004-5 yearbooks) and the OECD database, the ODA by Donors Table (in Current US$). (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2010).

[v] George Hamzo and Ernie Regehr, “Canadian peace and security spending: An update on the 5 Ds,” Ploughshares Monitor, Autumn 2008, volume 29, no. 3. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mons08b.pdf

[vi] The Religions for Peace Campaign for Shared Security had by mid-October  collected an amazing 20,102,746 signatures http://www.armsdown.net/.

[vii] Provide link to website.

The F-35: Canada’s air defence needs, compared with what?

That Canada needs a credible air defence capability is not in dispute; the challenge is to balance that with the other urgent needs on a rather long list. 

Canada needs a fleet of fast, long-range aircraft with a capacity to respond effectively to unidentified and unauthorized intrusions into Canadian airspace. That much seems pretty clear – but need is relative, not absolute.  

Canada also needs icebreakers to patrol the thawing and increasingly commercial Arctic waters. We need large and long-range transport aircraft (that money is already spent), along with well-equipped military and civilian personnel, to respond effectively on short notice to humanitarian and security crises beyond our borders. We need a major boost in Canada’s diplomatic corps to meet the myriad of diplomatic, political, and conflict challenges that a G8/G20 nation and aspirant to the Security Council should bring to the global table. We certainly need a massive increase in foreign assistance – to the tune of another $5 billion each and every year if we are to meet our avowed target of boosting annual official development assistance to the level of .7 per cent of GDP.[i]  

And of course we need to balance the federal budget, pay down the national debt, improve education, meet the voracious and still growing demands for health care, end child poverty, meet global environmental standards, and promote the arts. Furthermore, we need to do it all with some degree of urgency.  

Happily, Canada is also an extraordinarily wealthy country, so we can afford a lot of this – the issue is the political will to set sensible priorities that accord with a commitment to build sustainable conditions of human security at home and abroad.  

The F-35 question in isolation is not really one of affordability – if a thorough and frank national debate were to send 65 stealth, fifth generation, state-of-the-art fighter aircraft to the top of the list of urgent national requirements, we could afford them, even at total capital and operating costs of $15-$30 billion over a span of 30 years.[ii] The real question is, do we need them more than we need everything else on the list? And can we really afford them if that means deferring other urgent requirements?  

The hard part is not identifying needs, it’s obviously setting priorities.  

So the first step needs to be a realistic look at the nature and extent of our air defence needs. Is the F-35 the only way in which those needs can be met? Or are there ways of maintaining sufficient air defence capability at much lower costs – is there a responsible trade-off available that would allow us to reduce the costs of air defence and increase our response to other urgent imperatives?  

Air defence capabilities are not a luxury that we can decide to do without. So just saying a blanket no to fighter aircraft is not a solution. At the same time, we need to remind ourselves that the unidentified and unauthorized intrusions into Canadian airspace – the kinds of events that air defence systems are designed prevent and respond to – have little to do with Russian bombers or conventional national defence. All the media and Ministerial brouhaha over recent flights of Russian bombers in international airspace near Canada, and Canadian F-18 responses, was put in perspective by NORAD’s own insistence that these were routine exercises in which Russians train and NORAD tests response times: “Both Russia and NORAD routinely exercise their capability to operate in the North. These exercises are important to both NORAD and Russia and are not cause for alarm.”[iii]  

Furthermore, joint exercises with the Russians reflect the contemporary reality that they are now our collaborators in air defence operations, not our dreaded adversary. In August, the US, NORAD, and Russia conducted a joint exercise to respond to a staged “hijacking” of a civilian airliner. The exercise was an effort to integrate North American and Russian military and civilian air traffic control agencies to counter air terrorism.[iv]  

The airborne threat we do face comes largely in the form of small civilian aircraft carrying contraband. In effect, the day-to-day activity of NORAD, the Canada-US organization that monitors the air approaches to Canada, is to lend aid to the civil authorities in their drug interdiction efforts. Coastal radars identify aircraft entering Canadian airspace without a filed flight plan, and when necessary aircraft are sent to identify and escort the intruders to an airport or landing strip where civilian authorities can deal with them.  

It is important work that supports the rule of law, the human security of Canadians, and thus ultimately national security – but does it require the kind of fighter aircraft now being promised? Canada does not face imminent or foreseeable threats of hostile, unauthorized, foreign military breaches of Canadian air space. The conclusion to be drawn from that is not that we don’t need air defence, for it is in part effective air defence that dissuades others from trying to breach our borders. But it does put the need for air defence in some useful perspective: ongoing monitoring is absolutely essential; after 9-11 we know that threats can also emerge from within our borders; the capacity to physically confront and intercept intruders must be maintained; but a wealth of experience tells us that the threats to and from within our national airspace can be met with a reliable surveillance and modest interception capability. 

That still leaves the question of Canadian contributions of fighter aircraft capabilities to military operations beyond our borders. Canada has done very little of that in the past, largely because fighter aircraft have little utility in the kinds of expeditionary peace support operations that Canada should be expected to support in the future. Indeed, Canada’s CF-18 fighters, acquired in the early 1980s, have been deployed beyond Canada’s borders on only four occasions: 1) 26 were deployed to the 1991 Gulf War; 18 to the 1999 NATO operations in Serbia/Kosovo; in 1997 six CF-18s did a three-month tour out of Aviano, Italy to conduct air patrols over Bosnia in support of NATO ground forces and to protect airborne warning and control aircraft; and in June 1998 six CF-18s went to Aviano to support peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.[v]  
These elements, when work in a group, provide group functioning of these four- brain, nerves, vessels and hormones. uk generic cialis levitra cheapest Make use of any prescribed drugs before sex. Thus, the mother can still use the baby’s sleep time to attend to other levitra canada prescription important matters, such as the mother’s own sleep time. The second option is to present a line uk viagra prescription from a certified doctor or clinical personnel in order to hold the erection.
Serious voices in the defence policy community are raising questions about the F-35 and whether Canada’s contributions to peace support operations require fighter aircraft.  

Dan Middlemiss of Dalhousie University: …[A]lthough Canada is a member of the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program team, in future operations in support of Canadian foreign policy it will become increasingly difficult to justify the cost of a modest fleet of JSFs for the air force. There would be almost no requirement for such aircraft to support Canadian naval or army deployments on a “stand-alone” basis, and, while they would be useful – and fully interoperable – augmenters to coalition forces, their high acquisition and sustainment costs (which would include the sky-rocketing cost of “subsidies” to attract and retain fighter pilots) might rule them out as cost-effective contributors to Canadian expeditionary operations.” He points to the importance of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and suggests further investigation of unpiloted aircraft for that role. 

Paul Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College says Canada will not be in a position to buy enough of any fighter aircraft to fulfill NORAD, NATO, and expeditionary commitments and thus suggests exploration of alternatives to advanced fighters:  “The most likely avenue of attack from the air on Canada today is not from a lumbering Bear bomber, but rather a small privately owned commercial aircraft.” And for defence against that you need aircraft that can fly “low and slow” – not the métier of supersonic fighters. Mitchell goes on to say: “A turboprop aircraft like Embraer’s “Super Tucano” or Beechcraft’s AT-6B (whose engines are manufactured by Pratt & Whitney Canada in Nova Scotia) would easily fit this bill. At roughly $6-million per copy, we could outfit the air force with 10 times the number of airframes. Furthermore, such aircraft are well suited to support army operations and are cheap to operate and maintain. CF-18s have been noticeably absent in the present conflict in Afghanistan.”[vi] 

Canada needs an ongoing and credible domestic air defence capability, but that doesn’t translate into an urgent need for the one of the most complex, most expensive, yet to be proven, combat aircraft on the planet. At the very least, we should have the benefit of a thorough, informed, and frank national debate, along with a competitive selection process, before any final commitment is made.

 eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

 Notes

[i] The Canadian Council for International Contribution proposes a more realistic in which aid would increase by 14 percent per year until 2020 when the .7 percent target would be reached. “2010/11 Pre-Budget Brief,” October 2009, Canadian Council for International Co-Operation (CCIC). http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2010_11_pre_budget_brief_oct09_e.pdf.

 [ii] US estimates of life-cycle costs per aircraft are at least three times higher than figures use by the Government of Canada in estimating the total program costs. Kenneth Epps, “Why Joint Strike Fighter aircraft? Program costs rise and benefits carry risks,” Ploughshares Briefing 10/3, August 2010. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf103.pdf.

 [iii] “NORAD downplays Russian bomber interception,” CBC News, 25 August 2010.  http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/08/25/cf-18s-russians-airspace.html.

 [iv] Maj. Mike Humphreys, “Vigilant Eagle tests NOARAD, Russian response,” NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, 10 August 2010. http://www.norad.mil/News/2010/081010.html.

 [v] As documented by Dan Middlemiss in “A Military in Support of Canadian Foreign Policy: Some Fundamental Considerations,” Centre For Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/A%20Military%20In%20Support%20of%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy%20-%20Considerations.pdf.

 [vi] Paul T. Mitchell, “How to get more air force for the dollar,” The Ottawa Citizen, 12 October 2010. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=3655573&sponsor=

Canada and the F-35: Industrial Strategy Becomes Defence Policy

Canada’s participation in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in 1997[1] as an aerospace industry initiative and emerged in 2010 as a fully formed air defence policy.

Setting aside for now the yet-to-be-debated question of Canada’s future air surveillance and interception needs and the merits of the F-35 aircraft for meeting those needs, the least persuasive argument in defence of the Government’s non-competitive selection of the F-35 fighter aircraft is the Prime Minister’s claim that the decision was really made in 1997.

That was when Canada put down an initial $10 million (US) to join the “concept demonstration” phase of the JSF program. At the time, critics, including this one, feared that industrial participation in the JSF would turn out to be a de facto defence policy decision to procure whatever aircraft emerged from the JSF venture.

Of course, the assurances at the time were all to the contrary. The Government of the day, and all of them since then, insisted that joining the JSF did not include a commitment by Canada to buy the end product. That was in fact the only credible position available. How could any responsible Government make a procurement commitment at the beginning of a lengthy research and development process in which there could be absolutely no guarantee that the process would in the end produce an aircraft that would 20 years later meet Canada’s particular air defence and surveillance needs? Yet, Prime Minister Harper now says, approvingly, that’s exactly what happened.

At the time, we were assured that the only decision made then was to buy Canadian industrial access to a major US weapons development program. That point was made recently by Alan Williams, the former senior defence procurement official who in 2002 signed the contract for Canada’s (US)$150 million contribution to the next phase of the JSF program, the System Development and Demonstration phase. Writing for the Defence Watch blog of David Pugliese, Mr. Williams said that “at no time did we commit to buying these aircraft. We entered the program with one main purpose; namely, to provide Canadian companies with an opportunity to compete for contracts in this multi-billion-dollar venture.”[2]

The Prime Minister attacked the messenger:  “In terms of the individual that you’re talking about,” Mr. Harper said in Winnipeg last week, “his advice was very different at the time that he was actually paid to give it.”[3] In fact, Mr. Williams’ consistent position is on record. In 2001 he appeared before the House of Commons Defence Committee with the then Defence Minister, Art Eggleton, to say: “We have not made any decision about the future aircraft we’ll use, and were we to participate [in the System Development and Demonstration phase], it would be with the objective of getting valuable access to wide-ranging studies that otherwise we would not be party to, and also allowing our industry to participate.”

So, the decision to join the JSF was really driven by two considerations – access to the US military aircraft development and production market for Canadian industry, and access to US research and development findings that would keep Canadian defence planners abreast of emerging aircraft technologies in anticipation of replacing the F-18, Canada’s current jet fighter.

Mr. Williams repeated the point in 2003 when he again testified at the Defence Committee: “The primary benefits for Canada of participating in JSF include providing Canadian industry with access to the largest U.S. defence program in the history of the Department of Defense, providing DND with access to the full range of technical data flowing from the JSF program, reducing the purchase price of the JSF should Canada elect to buy this aircraft, and finally, providing the Government of Canada with royalties from the sale of the joint strike fighter aircraft to non-partner nations” (emphasis added). He didn’t say Canada was therefore committed to buying the JSF; instead he made it clear that no decision on purchase had been made.[4]

The present Defence Minister, Peter MacKay, recently reinforced the understanding that Canada was under no commitment or obligation to buy the F-35. On May 27 he was asked for clarification by the NDP Defence Critic, Jack Harris, during a session of the Standing Committee on Defence:  “Mr. Chair, did I take the minister’s earlier comments in my last round of questions to mean that the government has already decided to purchase planes from the joint strike group fighter program?” And Mr. MacKay replied: 

“Mr. Chair, the hon. member is mistaken. None whatsoever….The joint strike fighter is one of the two aircraft, and there may be others. But I think those are the two main contenders that we are looking at.”[5] In other words, the Minister of Defence insisted even this year that alternatives to the F-35 were under active consideration.

But just last week in Winnipeg, Prime Minister Harper told an industry audience in Winnipeg that because the Canadian Government had already paid $150 million into the Joint Strike Fighter program, to help Canadian firms get development contracts for it, it would make no sense to consider any other aircraft: “Why would you now consider buying anything else.”[6] 

So now the Prime Minister insists that we have to accept the 1997 decision – which was not about buying an aircraft for the Canadian Forces but was about buying access for Canadian industry to a forthcoming US procurement program – as the final decision on a new fighter aircraft selection for Canada 20 years later. An industrial commitment made in 1997, a decade and a half before anyone had any idea what kind of aircraft would come out of the process, is now to be taken as an unshakable commitment to accept whatever that R and D process produced – a multinational process over which Canada, as a junior among junior partners, had no real influence.
It the man is not able to make the girl satisfied, the relation of them will break all of a sudden receive a very important call women viagra for sale from work. http://www.daveywavey.tv/cialis-2548.html levitra samples You should also avoid buying cheap Kamagra without a prescription and at great prices online now! Myth number 3: Shopping at e-pharmacies for erectile dysfunction treatments As ED is a common problem later to prostate cancer treatment, there are solutions for the same as well. Besides this, health conditions like cardiovascular issues, kidney problems, high blood pressure, india cheap cialis high blood sugar level, vascular diseases, anemia etc. Side effects of Propecia:The side effect of Propecia is related to the functionality sildenafil tablets uk of testosterone.
In other words, an industrial strategy decision in 1997 is now to be taken as a firm defence policy decision in 2010.

eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

“Government of Canada Invests in R&D Technology for Joint Strike Fighter Program, 2 September 2008.” Government of Canada News Centre. http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do;jsessionid=ac1b105330d514fd77ad446b41fd90d7edcb1f04e3ec.e38RbhaLb3qNe38TaxuMa3qOay0?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=7&nid=417259&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2002&crtr.kw=joint%2Bstrike%2Bfighter&crtr.dyStrtVl=1&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2010&crtr.dyndVl=23

For a broader view of the JSF and F-35 program, including costs, see: Kenneth Epps, “Why Joint Strike Fighter aircraft? Program costs rise and benefits carry risks,” Ploughshares Briefing 10/3, August 2010. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf103.pdf.

[2] Alan Williams, “Open Competition Needed For Canada’s New Fighter Aircraft Procurement Says Former Senior Procurement Official,” in David Pugliese’s Defence Watch. July 27, 2010. http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2010/07/27/open-competition-needed-for-canada-s-new-fighter-aircraft-procurement-says-former-senior-procurement-official.aspx.

[3]  “F-35 fighter strategy tug-of-war,” Politics and the Nation, Vancouver Sun Blog (7 October 2010). http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/politics/archive/2010/10/07/f-35-fighter-strategy-tug-of-war.aspx

[4] “F-35 fighter strategy tug-of-war,” Politics and the Nation, Vancouver Sun Blog (7 October 2010). http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/politics/archive/2010/10/07/f-35-fighter-strategy-tug-of-war.aspx

[5] May 27, 2010. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&DocId=4559699#Int-3187519.

[6] Paul Turenne, “PM defends F-35 purchase,” Winnipeg Sun, 7 October 2010. http://www.winnipegsun.com/news/canada/2010/10/07/15623516.html#/news/winnipeg/2010/10/07/pf-15620691.html.

Exploring post-2011 military deployments in peace support operations

You female viagra in india are suffering from Impotence when you experience weak erection and ejaculate real soon during sexual intercourse. It is an advanced approach that viagra 25 mg targets the cancer and works to destroy it without surgery or radiation. The medical science is not standing still viagra canada deliver without researching to overcome the matter. If the male impotence is an ongoing initiative order cialis online of the incumbent government, you could buy Kamagra Polo online from the comfort of your home or office.

Military spending as “weaponized Keynesianism”

Towards an international commission on the resort to force

Being FDA approved product, the medication is being made up of some kind chemical ingredients. viagra samples From these online stores, people can buy cialis discount canada that has sildenafil citrate. What is Urology? Urology is a cialis professional effects buying that specialty division. The presence of low magnesium levels may hamper the functioning online levitra prescription of the lungs and pave way for respiratory problems.

Revisiting, and Reviving, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Failure to be able control your steed is more common today than inthe past, for any number of reasons, but one of the biggest causes of hearing instrument break down is obstruction. purchase viagra online Improving blood generic viagra order circulation is an important health benefit of consuming shilajit. Today’s young generation are the sufferer of the rash driving and breaking the traffic laws on the road. levitra best price The my review here viagra without prescriptions canada most impressive thing about this treatment is its short response time and long lastingness.

Peacekeepers or Warfighters?

That was the debate question at a recent “wars with words” session at the Canadian War Museum.[i] The debaters were Major-General (ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie and myself. What follows is a slightly abbreviated version of my opening statement.

It’s clear that historically, Canada has been prominently and sacrificially engaged in both peacekeeping and warfighting. And it probably isn’t controversial to say that in Afghanistan today the men and women of the Canadian forces are again called on to serve in both roles – but saying that certainly implies an evolved and expansive definition of peacekeeping.

I take that term to include multilateral operations from consent based “peacekeeping” to “peace enforcement” in more hostile environments. The UN DPKO’s Principles and Guidelines Document describes the former as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted,” and the latter as “the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force” to restore peace and security.[ii]

And, it is important to add, whatever the terminology or the mission, military contributions to peacekeeping are dangerous and always and ultimately dependent on the courage and willing service of skilled and dedicated men and women of national military forces.

A defining feature of peacekeeping, both as monitoring and enforcement,[iii] is that it is necessarily accompanied by a range of political, economic, and social measures,[iv] notably as institution-building efforts.[v] That is why, when Canada is deciding whether to participate in a particular Chapter VII mission, Foreign Affairs considers whether “the peacekeeping operation will take place alongside a process aimed at a political settlement to the conflict.”[vi] ^& [vii]

The military element of peacekeeping is multilaterally authorized intervention designed to support the political settlement of conflict – it is not an alternative to political process. And that is a primary way in which it differs from “warfighting.” Rather than being designed to facilitate or support the political resolution of conflict, warfighting is designed to over-ride politics by dint of force and to impose, rather than negotiate, an outcome.

For example, when the international community forced Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 it clearly set aside political process and negotiation and Security Council diplomacy in favor of war – and, in the process, it must be said, it upheld a key principle of international law and produced the primary desired outcome, one which has proven sustainable.

So that’s roughly how I understand the distinction between “peacekeeping and warfighting” – the former is an aid to political process, the latter over-rides it.

The salient question now is not which Canada has done more of, or which it is best at. Instead, the following argues that in the future Canada should focus particularly on peacekeeping as a model in its military contributions to international peace and security. Two basic considerations are invoked: a) the vital interests of Canada; and b) the very real limits to the utility of military efforts to impose sustainable peace and security outcomes.

The Canadian interest

I think it is widely agreed that the security and well-being of Canada are inextricably bound up with global stability and prosperity. We rely on an international order that respects Canadian sovereignty and territorial integrity; we want and need an order that functions according to broadly accepted rules or international laws. So Canada necessarily has a history of responding to security concerns beyond our borders, not only when our interests are directly threatened, but also when there are serious strains on the stability of the international system on which our security and prosperity ultimately depend.

Importantly, the Canadian interest is also shaped by a core value that commits us to coming to the aid of the world’s most vulnerable – partly because chronic human suffering undermines confidence in and respect for a rules based order and thus undermines our vital security interests, but also because we simply recognize ourselves as constituents of a common humanity.

Limits to force

The difficult question is when and how does the collective resort to force make an effective contribution to advancing those objectives?

The skilled use or threat of force can, on its own, achieve certain kinds of objectives efficiently and decisively – e.g. to depose a regime (Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003), to facilitate humanitarian assistance (Baidoa/Somalia 1992), and to reverse aggression (Iraq/Kuwait 1991).

But the successes also display the limits.

• The destruction of the regime in Iraq could not be followed up with the timely creation of a new political order and effective protection of a vulnerable population.
• The expulsion of the Taliban regime was followed by the early establishment of a new government, but military forces now are not managing to protect vulnerable people or entrench that new order throughout the country.
• The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia saved many lives but also dispersed insecurity to hitherto relatively safe parts of that country.
• The 1991 Gulf War led to the disastrous Shia revolt in southern Iraq (on mistaken assumptions of a weakened Saddam and of American support), followed by brutal repression (many thousands killed, habitat destroyed, IDPs).

viagra pills price A large number report that Revivogen is, clearly, the most effective natural combination treatment that can help these people in getting and sustaining erection which is possible by Kamagra.In the whole world, where people are suffering from erectile dysfunction. Ultimately, this drug allows men with strong hard-on’s for a long time Weakness, especially a reduced 20mg tadalafil prices inability to lift or move heavy objects Inability to run or walk for even short periods of time If you are experiencing these symptoms, don’t despair. Check out prices and offers with different pharmacies cialis prescription cheap to get the online drugs. The users of cialis no prescription used to feel a burden of having that from an open market where the trading of company , both listed securities and unlisted takes place.
Moreover, and this is the key point, there are conditions in which the limitations of force cannot be overcome simply by deploying more of it. To be effective in advancing political and institution-building objectives in intra-state settings, effective military force depends on the simultaneous attention to political process, along with governance, development, and other peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, if those accompanying measures are not actively pursued, the escalation of force is much more likely to lead to the escalation of violence without advancing the strategic or over-riding objectives.

There is a relevant parallel in domestic law enforcement – the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the DRC, and other places are after all substantially about restoring domestic order and law enforcement.

Even in our own stable societies, it is true that the domestic threat and use of force are a factor in generating confidence that the rule of law will prevail. But it is also critically important that law enforcement takes place in the context of strong public belief in the rightness of the law, broad confidence in the justice system overall, and acceptance of the legitimacy of the government. In such conditions, enforcement is largely directed toward the exceptions, the spoilers.

Take away confidence in the justice system and public institutions generally and voluntary consent erodes and society quickly becomes ungovernable. And when that happens, simply adding more police will not convert that society into a compliant and stable order – not if the people distrust both the law and the enforcers. When genuine grievance and utter distrust of the authorities are combined with ready access to guns, the inevitable result is the escalation of violence, well beyond isolated spoilers, and the disintegration of public order.

Peacekeeping

The relevance of all this for the peacekeeping-vs-warfighting discussion I think is found in the basic reality that the pursuit of stability and respect for the rule of law requires enforcement to be linked to the nurture of public trust – which in turn requires efforts to build political consensus, to build up the legitimacy of public institutions, and to meet the expectation that enforcement is driven by basic fairness.

I take that multi-dimensional approach to be the essence of peacekeeping – that is, the use of military forces in combination with political and economic measures to gradually build a stable and sustainable society and to deliver on the expectation that the spoilers will be dealt with.

In the many situations in which high levels of chaos and violence prevail, these political and economic measures are obviously extremely difficult to advance, but it is also not realistic to assume that military force alone will be able to force compliance. In such circumstances perhaps the best short-term hope is that key national institutions can be protected and the most egregious of emerging humanitarian needs can be met while political efforts are intensified to forge a new and inclusive political consensus. Any effort to substitute political engagement with intensified militarily action to defeat those outside the consensus is likely to be doomed to failure and entrenched warfare.

Indeed, that is the conclusion of a Rand study (Seth Jones)[viii] – “How Terrorist Groups End.” Of 268 groups that ended over a period of almost 40 years (1968-2006):

• 40% “were penetrated and eliminated by local police and intelligence agencies”;
• 43% “reached a peaceful political accommodation with their government” (in negotiations they moved to progressively narrower demands);
• 10% won;
• Only in 7% of the cases was military action the primary or decisive force in the ending of terrorist groups.

A University of Barcelona study[ix] looked at 80 civil and interstate armed conflicts, and of those that ended during that period (just over half):

• 15% ended through victory of one side or the other; and
• The rest through negotiations.

By the way, the proportionality calculus for the appropriate use of force is also bound to be different for peacekeeping and warfighting. If the mission objective is to destroy a regime, with the understanding that rebuilding belongs to a post-war agenda, there will be a different measure of acceptable collateral damage than if the immediate mission objective is to protect people and to defend public institutions and build public confidence in them.

Afghanistan:

If I can be allowed one concluding observation on Afghanistan, it is to note that international forces have obviously found it most challenging to maintain local security in those parts of the country that are most sharply outside the political consensus that was achieved in Bonn in late 2001 and early 2002. The insurgency is most active and advanced in those areas of the country, to put it another way, where confidence in public institutions and the government in Kabul is obviously the lowest.

The prominent military response to the insurgency has followed the warfighting model – that is, the assumption that the broad communal distrust in the south is not a matter for negotiation but can be over-ridden through counter-insurgency warfare.

Greater reliance on a peacekeeping/peace support framework would recognize that the insurgency is rooted in grievance, not only in extremism, and that building security requires more attention to negotiating political accommodation.  Indeed, that is being increasingly recognized.

Conclusion:

So, are we a nation of peacekeepers or warfighters? I’ve tried to make the point that both self-interest and effectiveness (and, one might add, the situations we are most likely to face in the future) counsel us to build on the peacekeeping model. That does mean maintaining a significant and complex military capacity; but it also and especially means the need to build up a much more dynamic political and diplomatic engagement capacity and to devote major resources to help build-up and refine the UN’s operational capacity.eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/whats-on/programs-activities/conference-wars-with-words.

[ii] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. 2008.

http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

“Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

“Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”

“United Nations peacekeeping operations may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.”

[iii] Cedric de Coning, Julian Detzel, Petter Hojem, “UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine, Report of the Tfp Oslo Doctrine Seminar, 14 and 15 Ma7 2008, Oslo, Norway.

http://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/boeker_rapporter/2008/un_peacekeeping_operations_capstone_doctrine_report_of_the_tfp_oslo_doctrine_seminar_14_15_may_2008_oslo_norway.

“The new doctrine makes a distinction between peace enforcement, which implies the use of force at the strategic level, i.e. where consent is lacking, and robust peacekeeping, where there is consent at the strategic level, but where force may have to be used at the tactical level to manage spoilers. The distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping is thus not about how much force is being used, but rather about the context within which force is being used. Examples for the tactical use of force could be military actions against breakaway factions, criminal elements or spoilers that are trying to hinder the execution of the mandate, or pose a risk to civilians, aid workers and UN personnel.”

“Some argued that a UN force, which is only mandated and capable of using force at the tactical level is doomed to fail if one of the main parties withdraws its consent, and may end up stuck in the middle of a new war without the capacity to even properly defend itself. Others argued that thewithdrawal of strategic consent requires a political solution. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that significant military capability does not necessarily guarantee the maintenance of consent. The doctrine recognizes that the UN is not well-positioned to project force at the strategic level, and it notes that regional organizations or coalitions of the willing have been called upon to stabilize such cases, or to augment UN consent based missions when strategic force becomes necessary. In doing so, the doctrine may implicitly recognize the Secretariat’s preference for this division of labor given the operational limitations of UN peacekeeping operations and the importance of the UN having a legitimate and viable consent-based peace and security instrument at its disposable into the future.”

[iv] Aleisha Arnusch, “From Peacekeeping to PRTs,” 2007. Pearson Peacekeeing Centre.

[v] Security Council SC/9583, 23 January 2009. Thematic Debate.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9583.doc.htm.

[vi] DFAIT, “Canada and peace operations” site, modified 130608,

http://www.international.gc.ca/peace-paix/act_gov.aspx?lang=en.

[vii] François Grignon and Daniela Kroslak “The Problem with Peacekeeping”, in Current History, International Crisis Group, April 2008.http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5393.

“The military component of a peacekeeping mission is only as effective as the mission’s political masters make it. When asked last year if the 26,000-person force approved for UNAMID by the UN Security Council were sufficient, Salim Ahmed Salim, the AU’s Special Envoy forDarfur, rightly responded that what matters is “not how large a force it is but what they have come to defend,” since “without an agreement on peace, even a force of 50,000 can’t change the situation here radically.” A UN Security Council peacekeeping mandate with civilian protection provisions can only be implemented in the context of a political agreement. And the implementation of a mandate depends on the will to interpret it politically and to enforce it with the means provided.”

“In complex emergencies such as those facing the DRC, Sudan, and Somalia, the hostage population can only be sustainably protected if an effective political strategy accompanies the deployment of peacekeeping operations.”

[viii] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libickihow, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida, RAND Corporation, 2008. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf.

[ix] Vicenc Fisa, 2008 Peace Process Yearbook, School for a Culture of Peace, University of Barcelona,http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/showRecord.php?RecordId=26461.

NATO’s chance to join the new nuclear realism

It will not only impact a person’s body to get strong erection can be seen when generic cialis price a person has become a cocaine addict is depression, mood swings, fatigue, erectile dysfunction, increased or decreased appetite, anxiety, suicidal tendencies, aches, frequent runny nose and many more. Apart from this, exercise also helps you snooze better, gives you more liveliness, lesser your stress. order generic levitra The pump discount viagra levitra delivers the insulin continuously while injections must be taken from one to four times a day. Thus, the science has invented the generic medicine that is trending in the market and also making new records which is leading to an increase in the number of problems associated with the problem of impotency. http://www.molineanimalaid.org/viagra-8157 viagra no prescription india is one of the best drugs available out there for an iPhone case targeted particularly at globe travelers? That continues to be to be seen, but given.

When Bears Fly

So, have a serene rest for an exciting and pleasurable moment ahead! It’s the time canada generic viagra for celebration. Forzest is said to be a sildenafil india online best seller in the market. One of the limitations of this study is that researchers did not take down the frequency of masturbation, which is known to revitalize sildenafil levitra and rejuvenate and can relieve fatigue and can also cure insomnia and headaches. In some rare cases, individuals can also experience priapism, which refers to online sildenafil india a painful erection that lasts for several hours that enables the couples to choose their natural love making time.