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I began reading Barack Obama’s current best-selling book mainly because of its cover – notably the wonderful phrase of its title: “the audacity of hope.” Obama says he first heard the phrase in a sermon in his home church in Chicago , and now he uses it to advance his own political agenda and ambitions – and that is perfectly fine with me. He talks a lot about “the American spirit” and the need to transcend political discord and focus on a new and compelling common vision. The hope for this kind of renewed sense of common purpose, he says, is embedded in “the audacity to believe despite all the evidence to the contrary.”

I haven’t finished reading the book – but I will. I want to hear more from an American politician who seems to reject cynicism and instead nurtures a sense of what is or could be possible.

As I was getting caught up in Obama’s mood of “can do” optimism, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announced that, on the advice of an impressive gathering of world-renowned analysts and scientists, the Bulletin’s famous doomsday clock was to be moved two minutes closer to midnight. It was 7 minutes, and now is five – and the midnight hour is what you don’t want to reach.[i]

These eminent contemporary prophets go beyond the nuclear peril to also include dramatic changes in the planet’s environmental and climatic conditions. Here is what they say about the nuclear peril: “Not since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has the world faced such perilous choices. North Korea’s recent test of a nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a renewed U.S. emphasis on the military utility of nuclear weapons, the failure to adequately secure nuclear materials, and the continued presence of some 26,000 nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia are symptomatic of a larger failure to solve the problems posed by the most destructive technology on Earth.”

One could elaborate at length, but the message is clear. And then the scientists turn to climate change.

The effects of climate change, they say, may be less dramatic in the short term, but there is no denying that in the coming decades we will face environmental change that will lead to “drastic harm to the habitats upon which human societies depend for survival.” The concerns of the Atomic Scientists were, of course, subsequently validated by the report of the International Panel on Climate Change.

Obama seems to have it right – hope, that is our collective hope about our collective future, does seem rather audacious in the face of these doomsday scenarios.

And, of course, there are many facing much more immediate doomsday realities. They don’t read the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and don’t have the luxury of debating changes to a symbolic doomsday clock. In the lives of the world’s marginalized, the hour of midnight has already struck and the bells of alarm ring out to a world that remains steadfastly deaf.

Darfur is the current public word for cries for help that go unheeded. But it is unfortunately a phenomenon that also has other place names. Just a couple of weeks ago, I was in a small room in Nairobi with a Kenyan friend and colleague and three Somali Imams, including Sh. Sariff Ahmed, who had just arrived from Somalia. For a decade and a half, as is by now well-known, Somalia has been without a central government, seemingly a land of perennial despair. The Imams had come to Nairobi to report to diplomats and NGOs and anyone who would listen on conditions in the wake of the latest rounds of Somali fighting – at the end of last year there was the takeover of the capital, Mogadishu, by a national movement of local Islamic Courts, and then a few weeks ago the same Islamic Courts group was driven from the capital with the aid of the armed forces of Ethiopia.[ii]

These three religious men vividly recounted some of the ongoing suffering and perils of Somalis, but what caught me off guard was how quickly they moved to talking about what could and should be done for Somalis to finally turn the corner to greater stability.

They did talk about external assistance, emphasizing the need for international peacekeeping forces (to replace the withdrawing Ethiopians), and especially the importance of getting foreign interests to stop making things worse. They talked in particular about ongoing arms shipments to the various groups and factions enmeshed in conflict – the ubiquitous war lords, of course, as well as what they described as Islamist extremists.

But they also talked about the new opportunities: a new transitional government might gradually come into place; the clan rivalry that helped to fuel much of the decades long fighting was giving way to an impatience with the pervasive chaos; schools were opening to meet the thirst for education. Above all, their demeanor and conversation reflected energy and expectation about the future.

I can think of no better definition of audacity than their assertion of hope in the face of their reality. Their’s was the kind of realism that distinguishes hope from fantasy.

A few weeks ago, there was another display of welcome realism when Henry Kissinger and several other similar luminaries, all of them now apparently lapsed Cold Warriors, issued a statement to insist that the United States must become a leader in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon free world.[iii]

It’s not that Mr. Kissinger has gone soft, I assumer he’s still a cold, hard realist, but I guess he’s finally getting a handle on what reality actually is – notably, the fact that you can’t dissuade, by argument or by bombs, others from pursuing nuclear weapons as long as you regard them as the foundation of your own security.

Obama makes a point of linking hope to compromise and accommodation – serious compromise, even of dearly held values. In a nice passage in the Epilogue of The Audacity of Hope, he recounts how a mentor and veteran civil rights worker had cautioned him about entering either law or politics.

“As a rule,” Obama was told, “both law and politics require compromise not just on issues, but on more fundamental things – your values and ideals.” Obama explains: “he wasn’t saying that to dissuade me. It was just a fact. It was because of his unwillingness to compromise that he had always declined [to enter politics]. ‚ÄòIt’s not that compromise is inherently wrong,’ he said to me. ‚ÄòI just don’t find it satisfying.'”

I must say I was hugely relieved and pleased, however, when Obama admits that “I am perhaps more tolerant of compromise on the issues than my friend was.” Sticking to your position through thick or thin may be more satisfying, but it’s not a formula to fuel hope for peace and social harmony. The other day I heard an interview with Drew Gilpin Faust, the president-elect of Harvard, and she used the phrase “the polarization of unchallengeable certainties.”[iv] Perhaps only a president of Harvard can get away with using a phrase like that in public, but she was making an effective case about public discourse that fails to genuinely engage differing views and perspectives with a view to finding common ground. Competition between “unchallengeable certainties” is not a good foundation for politics; rigid certainty does more to foreclose hope than to nurture it.

The Somalis I met in Nairobi know very well what happens when “unchallengeable certainties” clash. In fact, one of the fundamental conditions of peace, a fundamental requirement of a Community or of a State being at peace with itself, is the unsatisfying art of compromise. A successful State is one with a set of institutions that can successfully mediate – one that can manage compromise – among a broad range of conflicting interests, ambitions, and values. States need mediating institutions – formal ones like Parliaments and Courts, but also informal ones like NGOs, communities of worship, professional organizations, arts groups; institutions that help people focus less on their own very particular ambitions and interests and more on common objectives and shared values. States without those institutions are soon failed states, foundering in the grip of competing extremes.

I trust it is not simply a measure of the depth of one’s despair to cling to the likes of Mr. Kissinger or the travails of Mogadishu for signs of hope. Actually, I think we can take them as reminders that hope emerges in the strangest of places – from the lapsed Cold Warriors of Washington, to Somali Imams, to the writings of unproven politicians.

In collectively contemplating the full message of a doomsday clock edging closer to midnight, audacious hope can and should shape our response – hope that is built on sober assessments of reality, on unswerving commitments to action, and on persistence in the search for common ground.

[i] The January/February 2007 issue explains the decision to move the clock and carries an impressive collection of articles and reflections on the implications.

[ii] See the Jan. 5/07 posting here: “Somalia: Is Iraq or Uganda the Model?” (somaliat).

[iii] See the Jan. 30/07 posting here: “When Kissinger promotes nuclear weapons abolition” (whenkiss).

[iv] The News Hour, WNED, Feb. 12/07 (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/jan-june07/harvard_02-12.html).

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has surprised observers by failing to mark the anniversary of the Islamic revolution with a further escalation of nuclear tension. He was widely expected, over the past weekend, to claim breakthroughs in Iran ‘s nuclear, especially uranium enrichment, program. Instead his tone was conciliatory. He promised to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and declared Iran ready for a new set of talks.[i]

Somewhat more predictably, Ahmadinejad did not agree to remove the central obstacle to such talks, that is Iran’s continuing experimentation in uranium enrichment – a technology for making civilian reactor fuel, but also applicable to making nuclear weapons if the enrichment is taken to high enough levels.

But if a crack in the consensus within the non-proliferation community on how to deal with Iran were to develop, it would probably be over the question of whether a suspension of enrichment activity should continue to be a prerequisite to fulsome engagement with Iran. While the Security Council is now of a single mind on the issue, no small achievement, the expert and advocacy non-proliferation community, while largely supporting that view, is not unanimous.

In the past, Tehran has put forward compromise suggestions that would allow it to enrich a small amount of uranium for research purposes, while agreeing to forgo industrial-level enrichment and to rely on foreign sources, notably Russia , for reactor fuel.[ii]

German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung last year also expressed the view that Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium if it remained at the experimental level and if it was under the reliable scrutiny of the IAEA. “One cannot forbid Iran from doing what other countries in the world are doing in accordance with international law. The key point is whether a step toward nuclear weapons is taken. This cannot happen,” Jung said. According to the Inter Press Service, he insisted that close IAEA oversight could confirm whether Tehran ‘s nuclear program was actually peaceful. “IAEA inspections can provide those assurances through monitoring,” he was quoted as saying. “That is not a problem.”[iii]

By confining itself to research on uranium enrichment, it would be following a much more restrictive path than other states, notably Japan , that are in full compliance with IAEA inspection requirements. Japan is fully engaged in industrial level uranium enrichment, but of course the big difference is that Japan has been open and transparent, whereas Iran has been clandestine and deceitful. But even that distinction suggests that the real objective regarding Iran ought to be transparency and compliance with IAEA safeguards, not a ban on non-weapons enrichment.

Even if Ahmadinejad’s conciliatory demeanor were to hold, he and his country are a long way from winning back the trust of the international community – an essential requirement for any scheme to normalize relations with Iran. One measure of the depth of the mistrust is the unprecedented level of consensus at the UN Security Council. Despite Russia’s strong nuclear links to Iran and the intense suspicion of both Russia and China regarding American motives and actions, the permanent five members of the Security Council (the P5) have come together in a unanimous demand that Iran end all enrichment activity or face escalating sanctions and other unspecified consequences.

That in turn has set up the conditions for a “hurting stalemate”[iv] – that is, a stalemate that is contrary to the interests of all the parties, even if the resort to American/Israeli military force is kept out, as it surely must be, of the equation.

Under this hurting stalemate non-proliferation advocates, notably the three European Union states (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) heading negotiations with Iran, must watch while Iran continues to refuse full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and edges slowly closer to a nuclear weapons capability, although not necessarily toward a clear intention to acquire such a weapon. Iran , on the other hand faces escalating sanctions and continuing exclusion from beneficial international economic institutions and from cooperation in civilian nuclear power generation that could, by its own account at least, be a welcome diversification of its energy source.

Timothy Garton Ash, a respected analyst frequently turned to by the Globe and Mail, looks for a compelling mixture of carrots and sticks to end this hurting stalemate and to persuade Iran to meet its IAEA obligations and verifiably forgo pursuit of nuclear weapons. He rightly, and thankfully, insists that the threat of military attack be excluded from the array of available sticks,[v] but then more or less concludes there are few prospects that other measures will succeed.

He does, however, hint that it may be time to think again about a compromise on the matter of research-level enrichment. He says “the White House should open direct, bilateral talks with Iran, without conditions,” and that ultimately the US should seek full diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran, “provided Iran desists from developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorists.”

Does entering talks “without conditions” mean that negotiations should begin even though Iran continues experimental enrichment activity? And is limited experimental uranium enrichment compatible with a verifiable assurance that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons?

Most observers are reluctant to answer in the affirmative on either question, but it may yet turn out that a “yes” on both counts will be the most effective way to call Iran ‘s bluff.

[i] Doug Saunders, ” Iran warms to nuclear talks,” The Globe and Mail, February 12, 2007.

[ii] US, Russia reject Iran Compromise,” BBC News, March 7, 2006 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4784262.stm].

[iii] Garth Porter, “German Official Urges Compromise on Iran Enrichment,” Inter Press Service, July 4, 2006 (http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=9238).

[iv] Bruno Dupre, “Iran Nuclear Crisis: The Right Approach,” The Carnegie Endowmen for International Peace, February 2007 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19002].

[v] Timothy Garton Ash, “Don’t bomb Iran – don’t let Iran get the bomb,” The Globe and Mail, February 9, 2007.

In Geneva the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) has begun what some will call yet another year of living pointlessly. For 10 years now, the world’s only multilateral forum dedicated to negotiating disarmament agreements has failed to agree even on what they should talk about, much less actually negotiating.

That doesn’t mean there are any doubts about the urgency of the CD’s nuclear agenda. Indeed, the urgency is growing given that in less than three months the signatory states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet in a Preparatory Committee to begin planning for its 2010 Review Conference, and given that this new review cycle must be regarded as a make or break time for the NPT.

The last Review Conference, in 2005, ended in complete failure and cast a pall over the entire disarmament enterprise. The failure to make any headway in implementing the NPT’s objectives – that is, to bring all states under its discipline and thus require the elimination of all current nuclear arsenals and prevent the spread of weapons – leaves many states increasingly doubtful that the international community is serious about nuclear disarmament and wondering whether they too should prepare to join the expanding nuclear club.

To turn these doubts around means facing some rather serious challenges:

• In the North Asia region the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests of the DPRK threaten to destabilize the region and to undermine the agreed international objective of nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
• In the Middle East, Iran’s failure to satisfy the international community that its civilian nuclear programs are not a cover for developing a nucler weapons capability, combined with Israel’s refusal to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections, threatens a cascade of nuclear proliferation and obviously frustrates the international community’s agreed pursuit of the Middle East as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.
• In South Asia, the unilateral initiative by the United States to accept India as a nuclear weapon state threatens an ongoing nuclear arms race with Pakistan and with China, with severe implications beyond the region, and entrenches a nuclear double standard that threatens all other non-proliferation efforts.
• The ongoing nuclear modernization programs of the nuclear weapon states, along with stalled efforts to pursue arsenal reductions, exacerbates that double standard and generates further global skepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of the NPT as an instrument for the pursuit of nuclear abolition.
• The dangers of the unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons are heightened by practices in the United States and Russia that keep nuclear weapons on high alert and available for firing within minutes of an alarm (or false alarm) and by the dangers that insufficiently secured weapons or weapons materials will fall into the hands of non-state groups committed to acts of terror.

The challenges are daunting, but there are signs, or at least slivers, of hope still present. A group of lapsed Cold Warriors, including former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other former custodians of US nuclear expansion and deterrence strategies, has declared the world to be “on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear war” and thus issued a call to “leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.”

Their statement calls for a recommitment to the NPT’s objective of nuclear disarmament and challenges the United States in particular to work toward “a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”[i]

A recent article by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev descries the arrogance of military power and calls for reliance on “dialogue and cooperation rather than force.”[ii]

Another source of continuing hope, or at least a basis for staving off utter despair, is the fact that the core cause for hope is that the core agenda is not in dispute. The stalemate in the CD is not based on any uncertainty about the work that needs to be done – the quarrel is really over priorities. The core disarmament agenda is widely agreed. It was articulated and affirmed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, labeled there as the “13 practical steps.”

And within those steps, even the items for priority action are generally agreed:

• Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – a Treaty that was negotiated within the CD (its last piece of substantive work) but now awaits ratification by the United States and other key states – would be one of the most effective means of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons capability and of curtailing the growth of arsenals in the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan.
• Within the CD itself, the most likely route to it resuming its primary function of negotiating disarmament measures would be through a program of work that simultaneously involves negotiations on a treaty to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (the FMCT), formal discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space, and discussion of nuclear disarmament imperatives more broadly, including the formalization of security assurances given by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.[iii]

An early signal toward action on these two fronts would have a salutary effect on the disarmament environment and on the tone of the forthcoming NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

Additional measures to build confidence in a revived nuclear disarmament agenda include:

• The control and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, facilitated by the immediate removal of such weapons from the soil of non-nuclear-weapon states of NATO; and
• Further measures to reduce nuclear dangers by taking all weapons of high alert and redoubling efforts to bring all nuclear weapons and materials under effective security protection to prevent them from getting into the hands of non-state groups.

And for those with a surfeit of ambition, it could be turned toward:

• The commencement of discussions, in the context of requiring Iran to meet its obligations toward the IAEA, of ways and means of pursuing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (in the context of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction); and
• The continued exploration of placing the weapon sensitive elements of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel – under international controls.

A Canadian agenda for action should grow out of this list of policy imperatives:

• A clear reaffirmation by the Harper Government of Canada’s long-standing commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, a commitment that is more urgent than ever and eminently achievable;
• A challenge to the United States and China in particular – the two states at the centre of the CD stalemate – to accept Ambassador Paul Meyer’s formula for moving forward with negotiations on an FMCT and discussions of PAROS, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances;
• Yet another call to the United States, India and Pakistan in particular to show global leadership by beginning steps toward their respective ratification of the CTBT; and
• A renewed call to remove all nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states of NATO and to challenge NATO to end its doctrine of nuclear reliance.

[i] The statement, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” was written by Mr. Kissinger along with former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, and was endorsed by a number of former officials and diplomats. It was published in the Washington Post, January 4, 2007.

[ii] Mikhail Gorbachev, “History is not preordained: A new cold war can be averted,” The Guardian, January 18, 2007.

[iii] The formula put forward by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Paul Meyer, “The Conference on Disarmament: Getting Back to Business,” Arms Control Today, December 2006.

The UN Security Council continues to insist that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment activity even though such activity does not violate any provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor is enrichment in itself contrary to safeguards requirements under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is not illegal for Iran to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.

But it is illegal to try to do it in secret – that is, outside of IAEA safeguards arrangements – which is what Iran in fact did for an extended period. The clandestine operation of any civilian nuclear facility, including civilian enrichment, without safeguards is illegal, so when Iran was caught doing just that it obviously raised suspicions that Iran ‘s real interest is in developing the capacity to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Hence, the Security Council made the eminently reasonable decision to require Iran to suspend all enrichment activity until such time as the IAEA has sufficient access to Iranian nuclear facilities to develop full confidence that all clandestine activities have ended and that enrichment is and will remain for civilian purposes only.

Iran has been notorious about dragging its feet on compliance with IAEA requirements, complaining that it is being asked to terminate just the kind of peaceful nuclear activity that is specifically allowed and even promoted under the NPT. In the standoff Iran continues to pursue enrichment and little progress is being made in clearing up outstanding questions related to the earlier secret operations.

In other words, the Security Council strategy – which seeks to isolate Iran by refusing all talks until enrichment is suspended – isn’t working, and calls for a new approach are growing.

Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group recently told a Harvard University conference that the world will finally have to accept Iran’s civilian enrichment program and take a principled position that is consistent with the Treaty – namely, insist on a safeguards arrangement that can verify that Iran never weaponizes its enrichment capability, and promise “all hell – including in an extreme case military action – if that line is crossed.”[i]

A similar approach has been argued here.[ii] If suspension of enrichment was taken off the table and replaced by a requirement that enrichment be confined to research levels until such time as all outstanding IAEA questions are resolved, the international community would be in a position to call Iran’s bluff‚Äîto see whether Iran, with the challenge to its right to enrichment technology removed, would indeed honour its obligation of full disclosure and unfettered IAEA access. Then, future industrial enrichment would be carried out under full IAEA safeguards. At the moment, however, the focus on a suspension of all enrichment activity provides Iran a cover under which it both accelerates enrichment activity and refuses full cooperation with the IAEA – and. as a consequence, frustrates the international community’s right to unambiguous confirmation that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

The current Security Council strategy is driven by the US, but it is increasingly questioned at home. Three contenders to be the Democratic Party’s nominee for president – Hilary Clinton, Bill Richardson, and Barak Obama – have recently called for a new round of intensified diplomacy, including direct talks without preconditions.[iii]

With the IAEA’s Director, Mohamed ElBaradei, calling for the defusing of tension to prepare the way for a political solution, the US/Security Council approach is losing credibility. There is no doubt that American pressure for strengthened economic sanctions against Iran is having an impact, but it is the move toward talks to resolve the crisis, rather than talks as a reward for Iran agreeing to all demands in advance, that is now opening up new possibilities. Last week Iran and the IAEA agreed to “develop an action plan for resolving outstanding issues.”[iv]

One new pledge to talk does not qualify as a major breakthrough, but combined with the growing criticism of the current no negotiations stance from Washington , we may be seeing a new opportunity. It is an opportunity that needs to be developed into a three-pronged approach: a new commitment to talking and sustained diplomacy; recognition that countries like Iran cannot be prevented from developing civilian nuclear technology; and the strengthening of the IAEA, backed by tough international resolve, to give it the technical tools and the political backing it needs to apply the kinds of comprehensive safeguards needed to assure that there is no diversion of civilian technology to weapons purposes.

[i] Gareth Evans, “Hypocrisy, Democracy, War and Peace,” speech to Harvard University Wetherhead Center for International Affairs, June 16, 2007 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4906).

[ii]“Iran: Is it time for a new consensus on uranium enrichment?” March 4/07 (iranisit).

[iii] The Associated Press reports on the Clinton and Richardson comments: “Clinton, Richardson urge Bush administration to continue talking to Iran,” Associated Press, June 27/07 (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/27/america/NA-POL-US-Democrats-Foreign-Policy.php); Barak Obama writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that “our first measure must be sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy – the kind that the Bush administration has been unable and unwilling to use,” Barak Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html).

[iv] ” Iran , IAEA to Discuss Better Nuclear Cooperation,: Global Security Newswire, June 26, 2007 (http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007/6/26/ADE5FA01-715B-4BA6-AE9B-1453E164C409.html).

Any persistent and buoyant insurgency, still an entirely apt description of the Taliban rebellion that Canadians are trying to help quell in southern Afghanistan, must necessarily feed off multiple roots, but the multinational counter-insurgency effort is now increasingly focused on what it regards as the dual taproots of the armed resistance.

The first is the rest and re-supply haven that is available to first-tier or hard-line Taliban combatants and leaders across the border in Pakistan. The second is the ongoing supply of young Afghan men available for hire as second-tier Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan .

In a series of recent encounters with international security analysts, UN officials, and Canadian military and foreign affairs officials, key elements of the political agenda they have in mind when they say that success in Afghanistan will not be achieved by military means alone became more clearly focused.

They all now have Pakistan fully in their sights. Intensified public and quiet diplomacy is now underway to persuade Pakistan to address the border problem and thus to take steps to stop the free movement of insurgents and their supplies between the two countries.[i]

Strategists are also focused increasingly on the second-tier Taliban fighters – young men who do much of the movement’s fighting but who are generally thought not to be driven by the movement’s ideology. Instead, they are part of a broad Pashtun community that is sufficiently disaffected with Kabul to be susceptible to the Taliban’s offers of attractive pay envelopes. The main effort to get these young men to decline further service to the Taliban is therefore a second offensive – this one accelerates reconstruction in accessible areas of the south in an effort to win over villagers who now, in the face of Taliban intimidation and the absence of reliable services from the central government in Kabul, are drawn either to neutrality or to supporting the forces that reject the incompetence, corruption, and political exclusiveness widely associated with Kabul.[ii]

B oth strategies – to cut off the Taliban from their haven in Pakistan and from their foot soldiers in Afghanistan – are necessary, but at least some analysts add that success will remain elusive unless these strategies are accompanied by fundamental changes in the make-up and behavior of the Government in Kabul .

To win the cooperation of Pakistan it will be necessary to demonstrate to Islamabad that the Government in Kabul is not a threat to Pakistan ‘s interests. It will be necessary to demonstrate that a stable Afghanistan government will not be dominated by the pro-India Northern Alliance,[iii] but will include the full participation of the south that is historically more in tune with Pakistan. In further recognition of Pakistan’s interests and in further pursuit of Pakistan’s cooperation, Kabul is also asked to accept the current border and adopt a policy of careful neutrality with regard to both India and Pakistan .[iv]

Canadian military officials as well as UN representatives emphasize that reconstruction with tangible and immediate returns to villages in the south – returns that display the benefits of the central government – can be the only source of real evidence of a serious intention to meet local needs and earn loyalty to the new Afghanistan. And it is only a sense of this durable mutual commitment that will finally discourage young southerners from becoming tier 2 Taliban.

At the same time, however, one does not get the sense from these conversations that there is full recognition that the south is indeed fundamentally suspicious of the central government and that the government itself must take overt steps to convince southerners that it is striving to be representative of and sympathetic to the needs and interests of the people of the south.

If current reconstruction efforts are to have the desired political impact – that is, growing support for the government – Kabul will have to demonstrate that it is not in the hands of the traditional adversaries of the people of the south (i.e. that it is not dominated by the Northern Alliance at the expense of the Pashtun). Only then, say other analysts, will southerners be persuaded that short-term benefits will be converted into a long-term commitment to the well-being of the south. If the south continues to view the regime as untrustworthy and not inclusive, loyalty will not be bought with a few projects delivered by Canadian soldiers.

A government in Kabul that earns the durable confidence of the people of the south is essential to produce a political culture that actively discourages defection to the armed resistance of the Taliban. Barnet Rubin of New York University and the Council on Foreign Relations, a pre-eminent American observer of Afghan affairs, even contemplates inviting the Taliban into the political process: “if, as some sources claim, the Taliban are preparing to drop their maximalist demands and give guarantees against the reestablishment of the al Qaeda bases, the Afghan government could discuss their entry into the political system”[v] – a point the advocates of talking to the Taliban have been making for some time.

There are thus two political transformations in Afghanistan that are essential to undercutting the Taliban military threat and to building Pashtun confidence in the government and national institutions anchored in Kabul: a reorganization and re-orientation of the central government to demonstrate that it is not hostile to the interests of Pakistan, and a political process that is inclusive and serious about forming a government that is ultimately regarded by southerners as their own.

[i]Foreign Minister Peter MacKay told the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (November 22, 2006) that ” President Musharraf’s government can and must do more.” He said that “Canada, along with our allies, continues to encourage Pakistan to step up its efforts to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Specifically, we requested Pakistan’s efforts to seek out and arrest senior Taliban figures inside their country; improve border security; sign, ratify, and implement key United Nations conventions and resolutions against terrorism; legislate and enforce more robust anti-money laundering laws and counter-narcotics training; and work to prevent the exploitation by insurgents of refugee camps inside Pakistan .” In his January 2007 visit to Pakistan Mr. MacKay offered Canadian assistance to Pakistan , including aerial reconnaissance, training of border guards, and the provision of satellite telephones. [Sadaqat Jan, “Canada doesn’t back Pakistan ‘s land mine plan, MacKay says,” Associated Press, January 9, 2007 (www.theglobeandmail.com).

[ii] Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Unterstanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan ,” Orbis, Winter 2007, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (The Foreign Policy Research Institute), pp. 71-89.

[iii] The Karzai’s government is linked to India, according to Pakistan, through strong personal and political ties and Pakistan is concerned that a strategic alliance with India will not only undermine Pakistan’s traditional influence in Afghanistan but will give India a foothold from which to further threaten Pakistan. [“Musharraf’s Taliban Problem,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, September 11, 2006 (http://www.cfr.org/publication/11401/musharrafs_taliban_problem.html).

[iv] Barnet Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan ,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org).

[v] Rubin.

Like the proverbial bad dream that it is, missile defence once again has a lot of people losing a lot of sleep. The finger of blame swings naturally to Washington , but this time let’s not overlook Russian President Vladimir Putin. His energetic Russia-as-victim positioning not only tries to return nuclear competition to the core of Russian-US relations, it misses the perfect opportunity to expose the US ballistic missile plan (BMD) for the minor irritant and major fraud that it really is.

The US missile defence system is and will remain powerless to prevent Russia from launching a nuclear attack on the United States if that is what it really wants to do. Indeed, David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that “because the system is vulnerable to decoys, it also wouldn’t stop a missile attack from the Middle East. If Iran or other states in the region develop long-range missiles and deliverable nuclear warheads, they would certainly equip those missiles with countermeasures that could render U.S. defenses ineffective.”[i]

American officials, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have themselves been claiming that the Poland-based GBIs would be ineffective against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), not because they have finally admitted that the system doesn’t work, but because of the physics of missiles and the geography of Poland.[ii]For once they are right.

Even if the system worked as intended, the only Russian ICBMs which the Poland-based GBIs would have a chance of intercepting would be those launched from western or European Russian. The trajectory of west Russian missiles headed for the US would not pass directly over Poland, but close to it, while the trajectory of central and east Russian missiles would be far to the north of Poland and impossible to catch (interceptors have to be directed at a target warhead coming toward them, not one they are trying to overtake).

But if the system was intended to intercept warheads launched from western Russia, the US Arms Control Association confirms, Poland would be a poor location for the GBIs.[iii] Some Russian commentators insist they could work against west Russian launches, but they are tentative at best.[iv] Others say definitely that GBIs in Poland would not have the capacity to reach the Russian warhead flight path in time.[v]The Americans have said that if the focus was Russian ICBMs, England and further west would be a far the better location ( Baffin Island !?).

On the other hand, if the American focus is Iran (remember, we’re still pretending the system actually works), then Poland is a logical location inasmuch as the flight path of an Iranian missile headed for Washington, were such a thing to actually exist, would take it directly over Poland with enough time for the interceptors to be fired into the path of the Iranian warhead (or at least one of the decoys).

In any event, the audience for Mr. Putin’s protestations is his domestic constituency, not the White House. For him to be dismissive of this faux American threat he would have to forgo the opportunity to foster an image of Russian toughness in the face of an irresponsible and reckless US Administration.[vi]

And speaking of President George W. Bush, he is almost too easy a target. But he remains diligent in earning the world’s opprobrium – not so much for his dogged pursuit of missile defence in the face of overwhelming expert testimony that it will never be made effective (that makes it is a colossal waste of money, but given their current war-spending and annual deficits, Americans seem fully inured to waste), but for doing it in a unilateral, arms-control-destroying, and political-cooperation-defying way.

And it is not only Russia to which Mr. Bush gives offence and an excuse to avoid disarmament commitments. The United States says it wants China to agree to negotiate a treaty banning further production of fissile materials, but does Mr. Bush really think he can persuade China to take action to cap its stocks of fissile material through a legally binding treaty if it believes that America is committed to perfecting its strategic first-strike capability and link it to an upscalable missile defence system that could theoretically defang China’s nuclear forces? As long as the US continues to modernize its nuclear forces while pursuing missile defence, China will have little incentive to cooperate.

Had Mr. Bush genuinely wanted a BMD system as a hedge against rogue states far into the future, he would have done long ago what he has now, at the German G8 meeting, agreed to – and that is present missile defence as an instrument of cooperation with Russia, and China , rather than as a tension escalator.[vii] Even supporters of missile defence make this point: “If the President wants to make creating a third missile defense site part of his legacy, he can still contribute – by setting up a formal NATO process to study the idea and give our allies a greater voice in the debate. We should also involve Russia in the discussion, especially as good diplomacy might be able to turn it into a supporter rather than an opponent of the plan.”[viii]

Instead, while Mr. Bush gave Mr. Putin an opportunity to work the polls at home,[ix]he also managed to push nuclear disarmament even further down his To Do list.

While sharing the blame, we should also not forget the Republican Presidential hopefuls who turn out to be almost unanimous in their declared willingness to use nuclear weapons against Iran if it persists in pursuing a nuclear weapon capability.[x]In concert with the Administration in Washington , the Republicans believe that it is possible to threaten states into disarming. All the while, of course, Iran sees that the US does not make the same threat against states that actually do acquire nuclear weapons, e.g. North Korea and India , but reserves its threats for those it accuses of trying.

The lesson is clear, and President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad of Iran has been diligent in learning it. Iran could obviously undercut the US rationale for missile defence in a flash if it would simply agree to full and unfettered cooperation with the IAEA. Of course it doesn’t, and so the cycle of threat and counter-threat is fed, derailing nuclear disarmament and a host of genuine opportunities to pursue real world problems in both the Middle East and Russia .

Putin, Bush, the Republican aspirants to global leadership, and Ahmadinejad are in full cooperation mode to keep threat and counter-threat alive and to position themselves as the heroic defenders of the threatened rights and security of their respective publics.

The late news flash that the US and Russia will now seek to cooperate on missile defence brings to mind the oft-quoted African proverb: be careful when two elephants get together, because whether they decide to fight or make love, a lot of grass is bound to get trampled. It is almost twenty years since the Berlin Wall was dismantled, but with Russia and the US still placing nuclear arsenals at the core of their relationship, whether to balance them or defend against them, a lot of political, economic, and security grass continues to get the life trampled out of it.

[i] David Wright, ” President Putin Needn’t Worry About a U.S. Missile Defense System: It Won’t Work, Says Leading U.S. Science Group ,” June 6/07, Union of Concerned Scientists

(http://www.ucsusa.org/news/commentary/president-putin-neednt-worry-0036.html).

[ii] Donna Miles, “Putin Baffles Gates With Missiles in Eastern Europe ,” American Forces Press Service (http://www.sitemason.com/newspub/dtWzug?id=46198&mode=print).

[iii] William Matthews, “As U.S., Russia Spar Over Missile Defense, Congress Cuts Funding”:”The missiles would, indeed, “be incapable of intercepting Russian missiles aimed at the United States ,” said Boese. “Russian missiles would be fired over the North Pole to reach the United States. Anti-ballistic missiles fired from Poland would be chasing them and could not catch up. Besides, 10 interceptors would be no match for a barrage of Russian missiles.” http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2797079&C=europe

[iv] “Missile defense interceptors in Poland” – “Although it is true that Poland is not exactly on the flight path of Russian missiles, it is close enough to give interceptors deployed there a chance to reach SS-19/UR-100NUTTH ICBMs launched from the Koselsk or Tatishchevo bases. SS-27 Topol-M missiles based in Tatishchevo, as well as SS-25 Topol in Vypolzovo and Teykovo also may be within the interceptors reach.” http://russianforces.org/

[v] Vladimir Belous, “The Missile-Defense Flap ,” RIA Novosti, Moscow , April 11, 2007 (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html).”But the snag for the United States is that the strategic missiles deployed in European Russia — mobile and silo-based Topol-M (NATO reporting name SS-27) missiles and Stilet missiles — make too quick a getaway to be intercepted by U.S. anti-missiles. Solid-fueled Topols (SS-25 Sickle) have a launch speed of 5 km/sec, and liquid-fueled Stilets, 4.5 km/sec, compared with the 3.5 km/sec of ground-based interceptors. GBIs cannot catch up with Russian strategic missiles because they are too slow and too far from where the missiles would be launched. And the trick could never be pulled off outside the atmosphere, because Topol and Stilet warheads have even faster speeds there.” http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html

[vi] ABC News, “Leaders spar in war of words over missile defense system at summit”: “Putin rightly understands that the U.S. is weak and discredited around the world, and therefore he can make points on the world stage” (http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=nation_world&id=5373927).

[vii] Jennifer Loven, “Putin tells Bush to put missile shield in Azerbaijan ,” Associated Press, Winnipege Free Press, June 7, 2007(http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/world/story/3983664p-4599862c.html).

[viii] Michael O’Hanlon, “A Defense We Just Don’t Need (Yet),” The New York Times, May 17, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/17/opinion/17ohanlon.html?ex=1337054400&en=e45e98aa13d55c3a&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss).

[ix] Tom Miles, “‚ÄòCold War’ talk sets the scene for polls in Russia ,” 7 June, 2007 (http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=153621&version=1&template_id=46&parent_id=26). Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman at the end of the Cold War, sees a clever game by Putin. “It’s all about psychology. It’s not really serious. It’s not a Cold War, no,” said Gerasimov, who is now retired from government service. “He wants the West to take him seriously.” Putin had an interest in making a fuss over missile defence even if it presented no threat, Gerasimov said. “This helps him to take the position of the defender of Russia , which is a victim of American aggression. If you take into account anti-Americanism all over the world, you can also interpret this as something which plays in Putin’s hands.
“It helps him to stay in power and to increase his power.” Andrei Illarionov, once Putin’s top economic aide, agreed. “Russia is pursuing a deliberate policy aimed at putting a strain on relations with G7,” Interfax quoted him as saying. The outspoken economist said Putin’s strategy was “to provoke (G8 leaders) to make harsh statements or even take steps that could be interpreted as interference in domestic affairs.”
This would allow the Kremlin to “declare the West an enemy and to mobilise the electorate”, he added. – Reuters

[x] William Arkin, “Nuking Iran : The Republican Agenda?” The Washington Post, June 6/07 (http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/06/nuking_iran_the_republican_age_1.html#more).

Iraq and Uganda model the two primary narratives that dominate analysis of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The action to date has removed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from its short-lived control of the national capital, as well as from much of the rest of the country, and replaced it with the, till now, marginalized and ineffective Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The Iraq model for what happens next predominates among observers and is persuasively argued by author and columnist Gwynne Dyer. In this story line, the Ethiopian invasion and defeat of the UIC are the start of a new round of war. As in the American invasion of Iraq (the Iraq analogy is specifically drawn by a UIC official that Dyer quotes), regime destruction has been swift and efficient, but the Islamists, far from being defeated, have only melted away temporarily to regroup and organize for the struggle to come. Thus Dyer concludes: “this is just the start of a long guerilla war that will sap the strength of the Ethiopian army, a Christian-led force backing unpopular warlords in a Muslim country.”[i]

The Uganda model was put forward in the Times of London by Rosemary Righter, citing Tanzania’s 1979 invasion of neighboring Uganda which finally ended the brutal regime of Idi Amin and set the stage for Uganda’s slow and far from easy emergence out of the special hell that was the Uganda of the 1970s. While the Tanzanians were denounced at the time, Righter insists “they deserved praise and so do the Ethiopians.”[ii]

The Iraq analogy definitely has the feel of realism to it, but the fear that Somalia has just been driven to the threshold of another long, drawn-out guerilla war may well be underestimating the potential for the Transitional Federal Government and overestimating the ambitions of the Union of Islamic Courts.

The TFG was formed in October 2004 after a long, difficult, but inclusive negotiating process.[iii] The new Parliament and the new Government it supports could not move to Somalia until mid 2005, and into the capital Mogadishu only now under the wing of the Ethiopian military, but both were and are broadly representative of the country’s clans and also include many of the country’s surfeit of war lords and militia leaders. While the inclusion of war lords is reminiscent of the unholy alliances that the Kharzei Government in Afghanistan has pursued with war lords there, the hard reality of Somalia is that clan-based war lords excluded from the political process have the means of fighting their way back to attention and contention – hence, having them inside the proverbial tent was considered the prudent option.

Similarly, any Government of Somalia that does not have the support or at least toleration of its key neighbors cannot expect a stable future. Indeed, a major challenge in the peace process that established the TFG was to gain the support of Ethiopia to prevent it from acting as external spoiler right from the start. Ultimately, of course, Eritrea will also have to be brought on board (which should be part of the now essential reconciliation process involving its friends in the UIC).

At the same time, it is not necessarily the case that the mainstream of the UIC has ambitions to fight for central power and to convert Somalia into a fundamentalist Islamic state. The local order brought by the Islamic Courts was welcomed by Somalis desperate for some stability, and the UIC’s emergence as a national power also enjoyed wide support. While the US reacted predictably to support the war lords in their failed effort to prevent the rise of the UIC as a national force, Somalia ‘s neighbors have reason to be wary of the UIC.

In particular, the International Crisis Group reports that elements of the UIC have tolerated the use of Somali territory as “a staging ground and a haven for the perpetrators of Al Qaeda bombings against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,” as well as other attacks in Kenya.[iv]In addition, some of the less restrained members of the UIC have also given voice to old Somali irredentist ambitions for a greater Somalia[v] – not a comforting notion to Ethiopia with its large community of Ogaden Somalis.

The hope that Uganda of 1979 will yet be the model for the start of a slow Somali recovery from chaos is based at least partly on the fact that the TGF and UIC both enjoy a kind of legitimacy in Somalia. The TGF emerged out of an extensive and participatory consultative process and has the support of the Africa Union and IGAD. But it certainly lacks the legitimacy and confidence that finally comes only from effectiveness – from delivering the public good of human security. The UIC, on the other hand, has the legitimacy born of effectiveness. It delivered stability and improved security where all others have failed. But as a national force it lacks the legitimacy that must ultimately come from public engagement and approval.

Both have their respective backers internationally, but how much support does each enjoy at home? That is what Amb. Bethwell Kiplagat, the Kenyan diplomat who guided the peace process and the formation of the TFG, calls a theoretical question that can only be answered through elections: “The problem of Somalia can only be solved by the people and not by leaders alone. Let the people decide through free and fair elections which leaders and what government they want.”[vi]

Amb. Kiplagat does not assume that an election will solve all problems. The challenges are enormous and daunting, but elections are a basic source of governmental legitimacy, which in turn is an essential ingredient in the making of a new Somalia.

The European Union’s International Somalia Contact Group has called for a new reconciliation process that involves both the TFG and the UIC,[vii] but the worst case scenario now is that the TGF and UIC will not seek accommodation with each other and that neither will prevail on its own. The presence of Ethiopian forces will not be tolerated indefinitely, and without an alternative international force to provide basic security services, the resulting power vacuum will again be occupied, as it has for the last 15 years, by a potpourri of clan-based war lords whose specialty is primarily the delivery of persistent chaos and insecurity.

[i] Gwynne Dyer, “U.S. prods Ethiopian invasion of Somalia ,” The Record, December 30, 2006.

[ii] Rosemay Righter, “At last, a glimmer of hope for Somalia ,” The Times, January 4, 2007.

[iii] I happened to attend the first session of the new Parliament, held in Nairobi , as a guest of the Kenyan mediator who managed the peace process on behalf of the regional Horn of Africa organization IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

[iv] John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Getting it Wrong in Somalia Again,” the Boston Globe, November 29, 2006.

[v] ” Somalia Conflict Risk Alert,” International Crisis Group, November 27, 2006.

[vi] Bethwell Kiplagat, “Somalis must have the last word on who leads them,” Sunday Nation ( Nairobi, Kenya ), December 20, 2006.

[vii] ” Somalia : EU calls for reconciliation to achieve peace,” IRIN, January 4, 2007.

It takes few prophetic powers to predict that the UN Security Council’s new demands and sanctions on Iran will not have the desired effect.

Progress in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program conforms to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the monitoring and inspection requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is frustrated by seriously compromised non-proliferation norms, an unexpectedly emboldened Iran , and an ambiguous case.

A persistent double standard in nuclear non-proliferation means that what is being required of Iran – the immediate termination of all uranium enrichment and nuclear reactor fuel reprocessing – is not required of other non-nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT. Furthermore, India, which is not an NPT signatory but which has used enrichment and reprocessing technologies to produce nuclear warheads, is in the process of being offered full civilian nuclear cooperation by the United States. From Tehran ‘s vantage, the issue seems to be not what you do but who’s friend you are.

In the meantime Iran has clearly become bolder and more influential. Even though President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s intemperate rhetoric on the state of Israel and his audacious anti-Semitism should strip his Government of all international credibility, the country’s oil wealth,[i] its influence in Iraq (in the context of growing American desperation and dependence on Iran’s help to quell the civil war now raging), and its proxy role in the Middle East via Hezbollah and Hamas forces, have given the Iranian regime unexpected, and unwelcome in most of the world, confidence as a regional player – and a disinclination to be compliant.

Added to that, the international community’s case against Iran is genuinely ambiguous. The only hard charge is a lack of transparency. The secrecy charge is a very serious one and there is no ambiguity about Iran being in violation of its safeguard obligations. The fact that for many years it kept nuclear programs hidden from the IAEA, along with a continuing refusal to cooperate fully in answering the IAEA investigators’ questions, means it cannot expect the international community to adopt a business-as-usual approach to its civilian nuclear efforts. But ambiguity does enter inasmuch as there is no direct evidence that Iran is in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and Iran cites some credible reasons why its special circumstances prevent it from meeting the international community’s legitimate transparency demands at this time.

First, when Iran is asked why it initially conducted its nuclear enrichment program in secret if its only interest is the perfectly legal pursuit of nuclear power, it replies that it in fact tried to acquire the relevant technology in the open market but was persistently frustrated by US interference and pressure on other states not to cooperate with Iran. So, for Iran to acquire technology to which it should have been given open access, it had to turn to clandestine efforts to get around US obstruction.

Second, Iran is asked why it continues to refuse full disclose all of its nuclear activities and open all its relevant facilities for IAEA inspection if it has only peaceful purposes in mind? Iran replies that as long as the United States is still drawing up plans to attack and bomb its nuclear facilities it cannot disclose the location and depth of its facilities – for any disclosure to the IAEA will end up being known by the US. So disclosure now, it says, would only help the US refine its war plans.

And finally, in addition to the transparency question, Iran is legitimately challenged to explain why, if it is truly only interested in electricity generation by nuclear means, it cannot accept the offer from international negotiators of guarantees of all the enriched nuclear fuel it needs (removing the need for domestic uranium enrichment). Virtually no country just beginning to acquire nuclear power reactors relies on domestic fuel production, so why does Iran require its own production rather than rely on imports. Iran answers, with much less credibility since it has to rely on imports to build its domestic capacity, that as long as the US vendetta against Iran continues, e.g. its listing of Iran as part of the axis of evil, how can Iran be sure that pledges of access to fuel will be honored?

And so the stalemate will continue. It is likely that the international community will ultimately have to bend on two counts. On the matter of uranium enrichment, it may finally be necessary to accept Iran ‘s current level of enrichment (still at an experimental or research level, but with steadily growing capacity)[ii] under strict IAEA safeguards while the IAEA completes its work of confirming the legitimacy of the rest of the program.

The preferred option of course is that Iran suspends all enrichment activity, cooperates fully with the IAEA in clearing up all outstanding questions about Iran ‘s earlier clandestine efforts and current operations, and then resumes enrichment only under full inspections and in accordance with its rights under the NPT. But, despite some slim hopes that the indirect reproach that Iranian voters in local elections handed to Ahmadinejad and the extremists could yield a change of approach,[iii] there are few indications that Iran is in a mood to be cooperative and to give up uranium enrichment as a gesture of goodwill.

The complete termination of Iranian enrichment and reprocessing efforts will ultimately have to be linked to a wider international agreement to internationalize control over the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – and the success of the latter will be critical to the success of long term non-proliferation.

The international community, in this case primarily the United States, will also have to bend to provide Iran with a set of credible security assurances. Getting Iran into full compliance with IAEA safeguards will require the United States to make it demonstrably clear that regime change is off the table and that its sole objective is unambiguous compliance with non-proliferation standards (i.e. fullscope inspections and implementation of the additional protocol – an enhanced set of inspection arrangements with the IAEA). George Perkovich, a prominent US non-proliferation analyst, argues that the US has in fact largely abandoned regime change as a policy objective but that it will have to be diplomatically creative and persistent to persuade Iran and the rest of the world.[iv]

It is hard to believe that the United States, given the rate of its current descent into the Iraq quagmire and its spectacular failures in the rest of the Middle East, would actually contemplate adding to its failures with a military attack on Iran, but the depth of Washington’s folly has been underestimated before. Not only Iran, but many of America ‘s allies will have to see credible proof of the Bush Administration’s full commitment to non-proliferation diplomacy before they energetically promote the Security Council’s new formula.

[i] Iran’s oil revenue is expected to go into sharp decline over the next several years, due in part to growing (and subsidized) domestic consumption and a deteriorating oil industry infrastructure – a development that gives credence to Iran’s claim that it needs civilian nuclear power production to meet growing energy demand and that in turn suggests Iran’s current sense of invulnerability could be short-lived – perhaps making it more inclined to cooperate on non-proliferation standards. [“Iranian Oil Revenue Quickly Drying Up, Analysis Says,” WashingtonPost, Dec. 26/06.]

[ii]A recent report suggests that its uranium enrichment capacity has grown from two 164-centrifuge units to a total of 3,000 centrifuges (keeping in mind that industrial level production of low enriched uranium to fuel a reactor would require a complicated and integrated system of 54,000 centrifuges, but 3,000 such centrifuges clandestinely dedicated to producing highly enriched uranium could within a few years generate enough weapons grade uranium for one or two bombs per year). [“Iran may declare major enrichment feat,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, Dec. 26/06, www.jpost.com. David Albright, “When could Iran get the Bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006.]

[iii]” Opponents of Iran’s ultra-conservative president won nationwide elections for local councils, final results confirmed Thursday, an embarrassing outcome for the hard-line leader that could force him to change his anti-Western tone and focus more on problems at home. Moderate conservatives critical of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won a majority of seats in last week’s elections, followed by reformists who were suppressed by hard-liners two years ago. Analysts said the President’s allies won less than 20 per cent of local council seats across the country. The vote was widely seen as a sign of public discontent with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s stances, which have fuelled fights with the West and led Iran closer to UN sanctions. [Ali Akbar Dareini, “Local elections a blow to Iran ‘s Ahmadinejad,” GlobeandMail.com, Dec. 21/06 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061221.wiranelect12…).][iv] George Perkovich, Five Scenarios for the Iranian Crisis, Winter 2006 (Ifri: Paris and Brussels , 2006), p. 29.

While nuclear weapon states, including their non-nuclear weapon state allies (see last posting, Dec. 12) continue to plan for the long-term retention of nuclear weapons, despite their Treaty commitment to disarm,[i] a group of Nobel Peace Laureates warns that “a world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented and unstable.”

The declaration goes on to remind us that “The NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) is a bargain in which nonproliferation is obtained based on a promise by nuclear weapons states to negotiate nuclear weapons elimination and offer peaceful uses of nuclear technology.” But, they say, “nuclear weapons states want to keep their weapons indefinitely and at the same time condemn others who would attempt to acquire them.”

That of course is an apt description of NATO’s insistence on its long-term need for nuclear weapons and the UK’s modernization plans. “Such flaunting of disarmament obligations,” they say, “is not sustainable.”

The Nobel Laureates also say they “are gravely concerned regarding several current developments such as NPT stakeholders enabling rather than constraining proliferation” – an equally apt description of the US initiative for civilian nuclear cooperation with India and accepting India as a de facto nuclear weapon state.

Those taking part in the Summit were: Frederik Willem De Klerk, Mairead Corrigan Maguire, Lech Walesa, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Peace Bureau, United Nations Organization, United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund, International Labour Organization, Médecins sans Frontières, American Friends Service Committee, Red Cross, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Pugwash Conference. Guests of honour were: Mayor of Hiroshima and President of the World’s Mayors for Peace Tadatoshi Akiba, Nobel Laureate for Medicine Rita Levi Montalcini, Man of Peace 2006 Peter Gabriel, Representative of the Weapons of Mass Distruction Commission Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends and Greenhouse Crisis Foundation Jeremy Rifkin,

Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Nobuaki Tanaka and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Jose Antonio Ocampo.

The 7th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates took place in Rome from November 17 to 19 and was held, as were previous Summits, on the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni.[ii]

[i] Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[ii] The Declaration is available at http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Rome_Declaration_2006.pdf.

While the United Nations Security Council struggles to achieve the verifiable disavowal of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea, Europe and North America are busy championing nuclear weapons as the ultimate security trump card and the preeminent emblem of political gravitas, thereby building a political/security context that is increasingly hostile to non-proliferation.

At the end of November in Riga, though NATO leaders may have quarreled over Afghanistan , they were of a single mind in reaffirming the political and security advantages of nuclear weapons.[i] The leaders declared the continuing relevance of, and their full satisfaction with, the alliance’s 1999 strategic doctrine,[ii] which declares that “the Alliance ‘s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”

It is an assertion that begs a question almost too obvious to repeat? If NATO, with its collective command of some two-thirds of global conventional military capacity, feels unacceptably vulnerable without a nuclear back-up, what are North Korea and Iran likely to conclude? It is true that North Korea and Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and solemnly pledged to permanently disavow nuclear weapons, but so did most of the NATO states, including Canada, that have just proclaimed their enduring commitment to nuclear weapons. Five non-nuclear weapon states (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey )[iii] even host nuclear weapons on their territories.

The United Kingdom followed the NATO paean to nuclear weapons with its own unilateral version. In its just released Defence White Paper, the Blair Government promises a new generation of submarine-based nuclear weapons, albeit reduced by 20 percent from its current arsenal of about 200 warheads.[iv] As the Leader in the Guardian put it, “the words ‚Äònuclear deterrent’ occur more than any other in the defence white paper published [December 4], but at no point is the document clear about who or what a new generation of British nuclear weapons is intended to deter.”[v]

Whitehall, of course, denies that its nuclear modernization program is in violation of Article VI of the NPT, which commits all nuclear weapon states to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, or a betrayal of its pledge, made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference along with other nuclear weapon states, of “an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”[vi] But it is hard to deny what the UK action says about the spirit of its nuclear disarmament commitments and what it does to the political climate in which nuclear non-proliferation is pursued.

To top it off, the US Administration and Congress then joined up to reward India for its nuclear weapons tests in violation of non-proliferation norms. The US-India nuclear cooperation agreement accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapons state and irgnores, even rewards, its continuing violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”[vii]

In addition to rewarding defiance of the Security Council, implement of full civilian nuclear cooperation with India will arguably put the United States in violation of Article I of the NPT which prohibits nuclear weapon states from assisting, encouraging, or inducing other states to acquire nuclear weapons. Providing India with civilian nuclear fuel assists its nuclear weapons development by freeing up limited domestic supplies for the production of fissile material for its expanding arsenal. And as to encouragement, there is little doubt that India takes encouragement from its new found favour in Washington and the equanimity with which its violations of the Security Council are met.

For North Korea and Iran the lessons are unmistakable. Western non-proliferation policy is not about eliminating nuclear arsenals or even stopping their spread. Instead, it is an art of selection – states within, or being wooed into, a US-defined orbit of friendliness are permitted to violate global non-proliferation norms, while states outside this axis of strategic convenience are to be punished to the full for their, in the case of Iran, much lesser violations.

Hans Blix and his Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission warned against this kind of selective non-proliferation, rejecting “the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy.”[viii]

If it is the intention of European and North American governments to build a political climate that is hostile to non-proliferation, then they will be well-pleased with their work of the last few weeks.

[i] “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, Riga, Latvia (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm).

[ii] “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington. D.C. on 23 rd and 24 th April 1999 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).

[iii] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs are, 2006,” NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(November/December, 2006, vol. 62, no. 6), pp. 57-58.

[iv] By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ” British nuclear forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,NRDC: Nuclear Notebook (November/December 2005, vol. 61, no. 06), pp. 77-79.

[v] “Why? And why now?” The Guardian, December 5, 2006.

[vi]2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Volume I, Part I: Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Improving the effectiveness of thestrengthened review process for the Treaty (Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs), para 15(6).

[vii] Security Council, Resolution 1172, June 6, 1998, operative paragraph 7.

[viii] Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006, Stockholm ), p. 60.