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The international security community is undergoing a remarkable shift in professional judgment on the merits and possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon took up that theme with a new directness when he told a New York audience of academics and diplomats in October 2008 that “a world free of nuclear weapons would be a global public good of the highest order.” He spoke of a nuclear “taboo,” recalled that the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly was a call for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, challenged nuclear weapon states to meet their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and urged them to finally negotiate a global convention prohibiting all nuclear weapons.

In many ways more noteworthy was the statement in January 2007 (followed up in 2008) by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Shultz 2007), joined by three other senior American leaders in diplomacy and security affairs, to “endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.” Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in turn endorsed their commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons: “It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security.” Although he did not name NATO, Gorbachev directly contradicted its claims with the further assertion that “in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious.”

A group of recently retired British generals has also rejected the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons as “completely useless as a deterrent to the threats and scale of violence we currently, or are likely to, face.” The UK is in fact already engaged in examining the verification mechanisms needed to support the reliable elimination of nuclear weapons and Prime Minister Gordon Brown has promised UK leadership in an “international campaign to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons” (Brown, 2008). And in February the UK Foreign Secretary set out a six-point plan to rid the world of nuclear weapons (Guardian 2009).

Despite NATO’s formal doctrine that nuclear weapons are “essential” to “preserve peace,” most of its member states are non-nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT and thus have already disavowed nuclear weapons for themselves. They still, according to current strategy, formally seek cover under Washington’s nuclear umbrella, but now even the US is led by an Administration committed, as the Obama White House website puts it, to pursuing the “goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” Indeed, the Obama Administration is preparing for talks to extend or replace the 1991 US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December. Reports suggest that “President Obama will convene the most ambitious arms reduction talks with Russia for a generation, aiming to verifiably slash each country’s stockpile of nuclear weapons by 80 per cent” (Reid 2009).

Political and military figures in Germany, including former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the United Kingdom, including three former Foreign Secretaries, Norway, Italy, and others, have all called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. So too has a former NATO Secretary-General, George Robertson, along with groups of Nobel Laureates and security and foreign policy professionals from many countries.

A recent global appeal, under the banner of Global Zero, supported by The Simons Foundation of Canada, declares that “to protect our children, our grandchildren and our civilization from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, we must eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. We therefore commit to working for a legally binding verifiable agreement, including all nations, to eliminate nuclear weapons by a date certain.” This is not only the sentiment of traditional disarmament advocates; rather it is the initiative of Richard Burt, chief arms negotiator for the first President Bush. He is joined by a diverse group, including, US SenatorChuck Hagel, former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, former US President Jimmy Carter, US author and academic Jonathan Schell, former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and dozens of others. A significant added feature of the Global Zero appeal is its call for a strict and accountable timeline.

Publics around the world, long alert to the nuclear danger, are by all accounts eager to support efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. A survey of 21 key states found that 76 per cent of people questioned favour a global agreement that “all countries with nuclear weapons would be required to eliminate them according to a timetable,” while “all other countries would be required not to develop them” (World Public Opinion.Org 2008). Public support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is higher than the global average in China, France, the UK, and the US, but lower than average in Russia and India (although still 69 per cent and 62 per cent respectively). In Pakistan support is only at 46 per cent, but even there more favour total nuclear disarmament than oppose it (World Public Opinion.Org 2008).

This global nuclear weapons taboo is buttressed by an international movement that involves national and municipal governments and a global civil society that includes nongovernmental organizations, faith communities, professional and service groups, researchers, and academics. Mayors for Peace, led by the Mayor of Hiroshima, has mobilized the leaders of 2,635 cities in 134 countries and regions around the world to endorse a campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2020.

It is a community that shares the inescapable conviction that the almost limitless destructive power of nuclear weapons can never be a source of human safety or the foundation for durable peace.

Recent statements and declarations in support of the abolition of nuclear weapons (a sampling, rather than an exhaustive list):

Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General. 2008. The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Address to the East-West Institute, October 24.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=351.

Beckett, Margaret. 2007. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Speech to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington. June 25.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1004&&prog=zgp&proj=znpp&zoom_highlight=Margaret+Beckett.

Bramall, Field Marshal Lord, General Lord Ramsbotham and General Sir Hugh Beach. 2009. UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent. The Times, January 16.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5525682.ece.

D’Alema, Massimo, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi, and Francesco Calogero. 2008. For a Nuclear Free World. July 2008. http://2020visioncampaign.org/pages/446.

Global Zero Declaration. 2008. http://www.globalzero.org/.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. 2007. The Nuclear Threat. Wall Street Journal, January 31.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.html.

Hurd, Douglas, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson. 2008. Stop worrying and learn to ditch the bomb. The Times, June 30.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece.

Kroto. Sir Harold. 2009. Open Letter to the President of the United States of America Barack Obama. International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (signed by 12 additional Nobel Laureates). January 20.

http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/OpenLetterPresidentObama.pdf.

Schmidt, Helmut, Richard von Weizsacker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 2009. Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view. International Herald Tribune, January 9.

http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=19226604.

Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn. 2007. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Wall Street Journal, January 4.

http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item_print.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54.

———. 2008. Toward a Nuclear-Free World. Wall Street Journal, January 15.

http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

Store, Jonas Gahr. 2008. Envisioning a World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Foreign Minister of Norway, June 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/Store.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2009. Lifting the nuclear shadow: Creating the conditions for abolishing nuclear weapons. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-paper/.

The Whitehouse Website. 2009. The Agenda: Foreign Policy.http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Defining the security assistance force in Afghanistan as a “NATO” mission misrepresents NATO’s role and has unwelcome implications for how security operations are conducted.

In an op-ed in today’s Globe and Mail, retired General Lewis Mackenzie,[i] among the best known of Canadian Peacekeeping commanders, referred to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as “NATO’s,” implying it somehow belongs to NATO or is mandated by NATO, and insisted that NATO member countries have “obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents.” His main point was to complain that most NATO members were unwilling to “honor” those obligations.

ISAF is not in fact a “NATO mission.” The American led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) force, still present and active there, is arguably much closer to being a NATO mission. Mounted in response to the 9-11 attacks, the US claimed the right to self-defence under the UN Charter (Article 51) when it attacked Afghanistan in response and NATO in turn invoked its Article V on grounds that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on them all. The US was not particularly looking for NATO back-up at the time, but some members, including Canada, provided military support to the OEF operation.

ISAF was and remains an entirely different operation with a different purpose. It was authorized by the Security Council (Res 1386) at the request of the 2001 Bonn Conference and given the specific task of assisting the Afghan government in maintaining security, initially only in Kabul and environs. The foreign troops of ISAF, including Canadians, are thus there at the request of the Security Council; they are not there under NATO Article V, and NATO members certainly do not, as Gen. Mackenzie claims, have “obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat Afghan insurgents.”

The obligations on NATO members are the same as those of any UN member – to consider how best to respond to the Security Council request. ISAF command was initially with the UK and then rotated to others, including Turkey and Germany, until August 2003 when NATO took over that role (currently more than a third of countries contributing troops to ISAF are non-NATO – although a large majority of actual troops come from NATO members).

ISAF was not a “UK mission” when it served in the command role, and it did not become a “NATO mission” when NATO took over.

In 2003 the Security Council “Authorize[d]expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.”

One problem with describing ISAF as NATO’s mission is that it encourages the redefinition of the ISAF mandate to fit a NATO model. The Security Council defines the mandate as helping the Afghan government to maintain security so that the Government, the UN and other civilians can do their work, “in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts,” to implement the Bonn agreement. But Gen. Mackenzie defines the mission as putting “adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents.”

It is widely recognized that the insurgency will not end through military defeat of the insurgents. Indeed, security assistance to enable Afghan and UN authorities and NGOs to carry out the myriad of programs and measures needed to end the insurgency and thus establish some measure of peace now entails a broad range of military, diplomatic/reconciliation, humanitarian, and reconstruction/development activities. Countries in ISAF have a duty to pursue all those measures, not just put “boots on the ground.”

Another problem with reinventing ISAF as a NATO mission is that the focus inevitably turns to the interests and well-being of NATO rather than the interests and well-being of the people of Afghanistan – and only a serious excess of hubris could suggest those interests are one and the same.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “Has Uncle Sam run out of patience,” The Globe and Mail, 3 February 2009,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090202.wcoafghan03/BNStory/specialComment/home.

Canada’s failure to push for key non-proliferation conditions in its moves toward resuming civilian nuclear cooperation with India aided the undermining of global standards, but it’s not too late for some corrective measures.

Bruce Cheadle of the Canadian Press reported over the weekend that International Trade Minister Stockwell Day has just wrapped up his four-day trade mission to India and the two countries are very close to a formal deal on nuclear transfers.

The report includes a good account of the non-proliferation worries and reservations linked to such a deal — sections excerpted below (for the full article go to note[i] for the link). Following the excerpts is an elaboration of four key non-proliferation measures that should be part of any civilian nuclear deal with India.[ii]

OTTAWA — The Conservative government has tarnished Canada’s long-standing stature as a non-proliferation advocate in its pursuit of the rich commercial possibilities of nuclear trade, say critics.

…

“Given that Canada is going to pursue nuclear co-operation with India — and that’s now inevitable — there are some very basic non-proliferation conditions that I think should still be put on those arrangements,” Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares said Friday.

…

Mr. Day, who served as public safety minister in the Conservative government until Oct. 30, said he put “safety and security first” in the trade negotiations. But activists argue that no matter what safeguards Canada puts in place, civilian nuclear aid to India, by definition, frees up domestic Indian capacity for its military program.

“That’s the battle that we lost when the (Nuclear Suppliers Group) agreed to the exemption,” said Mr. Regehr, echoing sentiments expressed by governments from New Zealand to Sweden. ”And it’s a very serious loss.”

Mr. Regehr would like to see a written commitment that India won’t test another nuclear bomb, verifiable limits on India stockpiling uranium and airtight, forward-looking bans on enrichment technology transfers [elaborated below].

“There’s no implication that Canada’s uranium would go to the weapons program,” said the non-proliferation expert. “It would go only to safe-guarded facilities. But there’s nobody monitoring where the domestic (Indian uranium) goes.”

Under the international moratorium, India had to choose between feeding civilian energy or military programs. “Now it’s in a position to do both without restraint,” said Mr. Regehr.

…

“Canada has abdicated its historic leadership role in the establishment and maintenance of the global nuclear non-proliferation norm,” Douglas Shaw, an international affairs expert at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., said in an e-mail.

“As the first state to choose not to build an independent nuclear arsenal, Canada’s behaviour plays an essential role in defining this standard of globally responsible sovereignty.” Shaw maintained that any India-Canada deal on peaceful nuclear co-operation erodes “both Canada’s global leadership role and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

Mr. Regehr said he can’t fault the Conservatives for looking out for Canada’s commercial interests. “I don’t blame Canada for, in the end, going with the consensus that emerged at the Nuclear Supplier Group,” he said. “I think where Canada was a huge disappointment is that it withdrew itself entirely from the debate . . . . It communicated volumes to other states: Here we have a staunch non-proliferation advocate being quiet on the question.”

Mr. Day doesn’t dispute that Canada’s low-profile support of the NSG decision was internationally significant.

The conditions that Canada should put on civilian nuclear trade with India are at least fourfold:

The first is the very basic expectation that India will not test another nuclear device and that if it does all cooperation will cease.

In a political pledge linked to the NSG action, India said it remained committed to “a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,” but it refused all efforts to make a permanent end to testing part of the deal. And given India’s clear commitment to continued nuclear warhead production, internal Indian demands for more testing could at some point become irresistible. US legislation requires any American nuclear cooperation to be halted in the event of another Indian test. Other suppliers were also adamant on the point, and Canada should certainly write into any nuclear cooperation agreement that a test would end it.

Indeed, we should go further and join other states in mounting renewed pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – it is India’s refusal to do so that is one of the central obstacles to the Treaty’s entry into force, a treaty that is repeatedly declared by the international community as one of the most urgently required measures to prevent further vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation.

Second, suppliers are rightly wary of supplying India with uranium at levels that would permit stockpiling. If India is able to build up a large reserve of imported fuel for its civilian reactors it would in effect build up immunity to any sanctions that would almost certainly follow another weapons test. With a large stockpile of fuel at hand, India could be emboldened to ignore the wrath of the international community and conduct further tests in support of its still growing weapons arsenal.

A third caution raised by suppliers is that nuclear cooperation not include the supply of nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology – technologies that can be used to produce fuel for civilian reactors and nuclear weapons alike. US domestic law prohibits the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to any state outside the NPT and the nuclear suppliers group is considering making a similar restriction part of its own supplier guidelines – a condition that Canada supports.

Fourth, it must be remembered that the new willingness to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with India was ostensibly designed to win nonproliferation gains. India was to be brought into the nonproliferation club. As it turned out, India managed to avoid any new and binding commitments, but it did make a number of important and welcome political commitments.

Besides agreeing to continue its testing moratorium and to separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs, placing the former under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, India promised, among other things, to adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, allowing more intrusive inspections of civilian nuclear facilities, to support negotiations toward a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, and to support the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the negotiation of a convention toward that end. These are political commitments, and while India rejected all efforts to make the NSG waiver conditional on any of them, paragraph 3 of the NSG decision nevertheless insists that it is “based on” these and other commitments.

The question now is, what will Canada and the international community do to monitor the extent to which India actually makes good on its solemn promises. It is now the responsibility of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and any states entering into new civilian nuclear cooperation arrangements with India to ensure – logically through an annual review – that India acts on those commitments in support of global nonproliferation efforts.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] January 23, 2009 at 5:06 PM EST, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090123.wcanind0123/EmailBNStory/International/.

[ii] They were set out in this space on November 18, 2008 (https://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/conditioni) and in Embassy, January 7, 2009 (http://www.embassymag.ca/page/printpage/regehr-1-7-2009).N

As work finally gets underway at the UN on a treaty to govern international arms transfers, Amnesty International’s call for an arms embargo on all parties to the Gaza conflict points to principles and processes by which such a treaty will have to be implemented.

The pursuit of an effective arms trade treaty deserves to be revisited,[i] given that this is the week negotiations finally begin. On January 23rd the newly-established United Nations open-ended working group on arms transfers[ii] will meet to organize a series of one-week negotiating sessions focused on producing a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.”

The intended treaty is to be based, as the mandating resolution puts it,[iii] on “the principles of the Charter of the UN and other existing obligations.” And the relevance of those principles and obligations to arms transfers is summarized by the International Law Commission in its articulation of the basic principle that “a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”[iv]

In the context of the proposed arms trade treaty, the act of aiding or assisting “another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act” involves providing weapons to another state when there is a known and credible risk that those weapons will be used by the recipient state in the commission of a wrongful act.

Canadian military export regulations embody the same principle, namely that arms are not to be provided to any States “whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.”[v] In other words, arms should not be provided if there is a credible risk that they might be used against civilians, and the onus is on the exporter to demonstrate that there is no serious risk.

The effective monitoring and application of that principle through a treaty requires several kinds of detailed information. There is a requirement for information to confirm instances of the use of imported arms for unlawful purposes. There is also a requirement for full disclosure of the sources or suppliers of the particular arms that were used for unlawful purposes. And then there is especially a requirement for detailed advance information on intended transfers along with credible evidence that there is no significant risk that the proposed recipient will use them for unlawful purposes.

Amnesty International, publicly calling for that principle to be honoured in the context of the Gaza conflict, sets out its charge of instances of actions that violate either the UN Charter or international humanitarian law (and calls for a full investigation of these instances):

“Israeli forces have carried out air strikes (bombardments with F16 fighter jets and missile strikes with Apache and similar helicopters and unmanned drones), artillery shelling (with MRLS – multi rockets launch system) and shelling from tanks and gunboats off Gaza’s coast) and other attacks which are directed at civilians or civilian buildings, or are indiscriminate or disproportionate, and have already killed hundreds of unarmed civilians and injured thousands in Gaza, including more than 150 children since 27 December 2008.”

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have fired indiscriminate rockets into southern Israel, which have killed three Israeli civilians and injured scores of others since 27 December 2008.”

Amnesty then goes on to preliminarily point to the foreign sources of such weapons:

“Since 2001, the USA has been by far the major supplier of conventional arms to Israel based on the value of export deliveries of all conventional arms including government to government as well as private commercial sales….Other major arms exporting states such as Germany, France and the UK have exported far less to Israel but nevertheless significant amounts. As a result of political pressure in some European Union countries concerned about the ongoing conflict in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, states such as Germany and the UK have tended to reduce their exports of conventional arms overall. Nonetheless export data show that such states have exported infantry weapons, military vehicles and components for arms sent to Israel. Other significant suppliers of military equipment to Israel since 2001 have been Spain, the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Canada, Slovenia, Australia, Romania, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzogovina. The Netherlands has been a major transit country for military equipment sent to Israel.”

The US Congressional Research Service, in its most recent military exports report, shows Israel’s imports from all sources to be $5.8 billion (US dollars) for the four years 2004-2007, with $5.7 billion of that coming from the US.[vi]

Amnesty also lists Canada as a significant supplier and a report from Ken Epps, who manages the Project Ploughshares Military Industry Database, shows Canadian military exports to Israel of $9.7 million (Canadian dollars) for the years 2000-2005. These figures are based on Government of Canada reports which, while showing broad categories of goods, do not list specific items. The two primary categories of exports to Israel (about two-thirds) are ‘armoured buses & ambulances” and “electronic equipment.” That level of information does not allow any clear assessment of whether any Canadian-origin equipment might have been used for unlawful purposes, indicating in turn that for an arms trade treaty to be effectively monitored and implemented countries like Canada will have to provide more details on the specifics of military goods exported.

Amnesty also reports on possible sources of military equipment used by Hamas:

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have smuggled small arms, light weapons, rockets and rocket components into Gaza, using tunnels from Egypt into Gaza; this weaponry has been acquired from clandestine sources. “Katyusha” rockets are originally Russian-made, but those being used by Palestinian fighters are unlikely to have been acquired directly from Russia.”

Assuming that further investigation would confirm that imported weapons were used unlawfully and that the United States provided those weapons (in the case of Israel), it would then be necessary to make a judgement as to whether the United States, when supplying those arms, should have known that the weapons supplied were likely to be unlawfully used. For that to be the case it would likely be necessary to demonstrate a pre-existing pattern of unlawful uses of arms by Israel.[vii]

The formal operation of the arms trade treaty will have to go beyond relying on such non-governmental organizations to raise instances of possible noncompliance. Instead, key provisions of the arms trade treaty will have to include clear transparency standards that ensure the disclosure of sufficient information, as well as appropriate consultation, investigation, and adjudication mechanisms.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] See the posting in this space of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

[ii] The working group was established by a UN General Assembly vote on December 24/08 (Resolution A/Res/63/240, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/485/19/PDF/N0848519.pdf?OpenElement).

[iii] Operational Paragraph 5, A/Res/63/240.

[iv] Article 16 of the ILC Articles which were commended by the General Assembly, A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. Amnesty International, “Israel-Gaza: Call for an Arms Embargo,” 12 January 2009 (press release).

[v] Report on Export of Military Goods From Canada, 2003-2005, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007. http://www.international.gc.ca/eicb/military/miliexport07-en.asp.

[vi] Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, CRS Report for Congress (Order Code RL34723), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 23 October 2008, pp. 53-54, http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34723.pdf.

[vii] Posting of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

Whatever the real point of Ottawa’s mini-tiff with Moscow last week, one can’t help but conclude that Ottawa will regularly be turning to the Russian Bear to help get Canadians bullish on a new fleet of fighter aircraft.

The last time Canada went shopping for fighter aircraft it settled on the CF-18 from McDonald Douglas of the US in the largest single military purchase in Canadian history. The Air Force is now gearing up to replace the CF-18s, and given a price tag that could go to $10 billion, the new fighter aircraft could once again be the largest single Canadian military purchase ever.

Russia’s Bears – long-range, four-engine, propeller driven aircraft built to deliver nuclear weapons to North America – were bolstered by the generally threatening ambience of the Cold War to figure prominently in the rationale for acquiring the CF-18 fighter/interceptor. The Cold War is no more, but the Bears are still with us and they remain ready and willing to serve as the theatrical foil to Ottawa’s manufactured bravado about defending our sovereignty.

“We will defend our airspace,” said Prime Minister Harper, noting his “deep concern” about the “increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and into our airspace.”[i] Not content this time with conventional political hyperbole, the Prime Minister elaborated: “We also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations to defend our continental airspace, and we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.”[ii]

Of course the Russian bombers specifically did not enter Canadian airspace – indeed, they never have. There was no “intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.” They did what they have done for decades and that is fly in international airspace near Canadian and American airspace to train their pilots and test North American reactions; and the Canadians and Americans, grateful for the opportunity to test their own reaction times and routines, dutifully “scramble” their fighter aircraft and go out to greet the Russians.[iii]

For the Russians the point presumably is to continue to announce themselves as a continuing presence on the global stage. For Canada the point is certainly to keep a prudent eye on events near our borders, but when a routine event is elevated into an international incident the point is also to announce a continuing requirement for fighter aircraft and to lay the political foundation for the announcement of a brand new fleet.

The Government has set 2012 as roughly the date for a decision on the CF-18 replacement, although the basic intention was signaled a decade ago when Canada began its participation, initially in the Concept Development Phase, in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter program (JSF).

The aircraft in question in the JSF program – a consortium of nine countries[iv] – is the F-35 from the Lockheed-Martin company in the US, a new design not yet in production. There will be other aircraft in the running, but given Canada’s investment of more than $150 million in its development phase,[v] the F-35 will be a chief contender. The JSF is described in Canadian background notes as “the biggest and most expensive combat aircraft project in history.[vi]

Ottawa’s currently stated requirement is for 65 aircraft; this is down from an earlier ask of 80 (indeed, as the estimated costs rise the number required tends to decline).[vii] Current estimates have hit on about $50 million per aircraft, but some analysts think that number could yet double, depending on the overall production run. The additional program costs – namely, training, infrastructure, follow-on development, and so on – could double that figure and bring the overall bill into the $10 billion range.

Of course, part of the calculation is that both participation in the JSF development program and the purchase of the F-35 will yield major benefits to Canadian industry.[viii] The Government press release said the participation gave Canada “access to up to $8 billion in industrial participation opportunities.”[ix] Like the cost of the aircraft itself, estimates of the industrial benefits also enjoy a measure of inflation. To date, the development phase is reported to have yielded $212 million in contracts for more than 70 Canadian companies, and a more recent statement of potential sales claims $9 billion by 2035.[x]

Any decision on new fighter aircraft will obviously have to be preceded by a thoroughgoing public debate on the need.

The primary role for Canadian fighter interceptors is obviously to patrol approaches to Canadian airspace, but the question begging to be asked is just how many and what kind of aircraft does that really take. The Russian Bears are real, of course, but they are a real symbol of a threat – the real nuclear threat to North America obviously comes from intercontinental ballistic missiles, against which there is no defence possible or contemplated.

The more serious air threat that Canadian interceptors must address is not a military threat but a law enforcement threat in the form of small aircraft that illegally intrude into Canadian airspace and territory, most often laden with illegal drugs. Are large, state-of-the-art, fighter aircraft the best means of tracking the piper cubs of drug runners?

New fighter aircraft would also be available to support Canadian participation in overseas military missions – but here too there is an obvious question about the relevance of fighter aircraft in peace support operations.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] David Ljunggren, “Russian bomber neared Canada before Obama visit,” Reuters, 27 February 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE51Q2W220090227?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
[ii] “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iii] The only real dispute was whether Russia told Canada, as it routinely does, about the flight in advance. The Russian Embassy in Ottawa said “the adjacent countries were informed of the flight in good time,” but Ottawa said it was not informed. “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iv] In addition to the US and Canada, coalition members are the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Australia.
[v] “Canada’s military eyeing futuristic fighter jets,” Canwest News Service. 26 june 2007. http://www.canada.com/topics/technology/story.html?id=7a365ab7-22b5-4d06-9de7-7a6177af4b62.
[vi] Michel Rossignol, “The Joint Strike Fighter Project,” 19 February 2003, Library of Parliament. Government of Canada. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0207-e.pdf.
[vii] David Pugliese, “Canada Weighs Fighter Options,” DefenseNews, 14 July 2008. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3637165.
[viii] “US, Canada sign agreement on Joint Strike Fighter.” US DOD News Release No. 060-02, 07 February 02. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3232.
[ix] “Canada’s New Government Signs on to Phase III of Joint Strike Fighter Program….” Industry Canada, 12 December 2006. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/02150.html.
[x] Allison Lampert, “Joint Strike Fighter program boosts aerospace industry,” 02 August 08, Canwest New Service. http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html?id=659a65d6-2ae0-48e3-99d8-4aab98a5d103.

This being February, Canadians have once again been treated to the annual paean to the Avro Arrow. It is a memorial that leaves a question: Why has the Avro Jetliner never received the same attention?

A CBC web report had some Canadians in “mourning” this week over the demise of the Avro Arrow fifty years ago.[i] The Toronto Star had an A.V. Roe company worker who worked on the Arrow in the 1950s “gazing in adoration” at a replica of the experimental but highly advanced fighter aircraft now on display at the new Canadian Air and Space Museum.[ii]

The Ottawa Citizen carried an interesting and informative survey of Canadian aviation history which characterized the Avro Arrow episode as a “tragedy.”[iii] The Avro Jetliner made it into the story, but its demise is recorded only as a “disappointment.” Both planes represented advances in aviation that were unmatched at the time, both showed the extraordinary acumen of Canadian industry, and both were cancelled by government order and destroyed.

The Avro Arrow story is well known. A Canadian designed fighter aircraft, the Avro Arrow was tested and refined over a number of years, at great and growing expense. It could fly at almost twice the speed of sound, at very high altitudes and in all weather, and was highly maneuverable – ideal for intercepting Soviet bombers in Canada’s north.

On February 20, 1959 it was abruptly cancelled and all of the test planes destroyed and cut into pieces. Thousands of workers were laid off. Costs had been escalating and it was clear that it would be far too expensive to put into production if it had to rely on Canadian orders alone. The United States, the most likely customer, was not about to buy a centre piece of its military arsenal, an advanced fighter aircraft, from Canada and thus, the argument in Washington went, make its national security vulnerable to imports.

The story of the Avro Jetliner follows the same basic plotline.[iv]

The Avro Jetliner was not the first civilian passenger jet to fly; the British Comet beat it by two weeks in 1949. But it was the Avro Jetliner that set the standard. Designed to carry up to 40 passengers, it took its first flight on August 10, 1949. It continued to be tested and refined and by 1950 it had reached a speed of 500 miles per hour and an altitude of more than 39,000 feet.

The single Jetliner flew for seven years – used in various roles, including as a VIP transport and an aerial photo platform, it carried the world’s first jet airmail from Toronto to New York. It caught the attention of Howard Hughes who wanted to start a US production line under license and deliver the plane to his TWA airline.

On December 10, 1956 the Jetliner was abruptly cancelled and cut into pieces, with only the cockpit left intact.

Like the Arrow, the Jetliner involves a complicated story behind the simple facts. It was in particular a victim of the Korean War, during which all Canadian aircraft production facilities were pressed into service turning out aircraft for the war effort. The same pressure is also what prevented Howard Hughes from putting it into production in the US. In Canada the government decided to focus on producing the CF100 fighter aircraft.

A question endures. Why does December 10, 1956 not enjoy the same infamy as February 20, 1959?

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Emily Chung, “Remembering the death of the Avro Arrow,” 20 February 2009.

http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/02/20/f-avro-arrow.html.

[ii] Jason Miller, “Avro Arrow to spread wings in new museum,” 21 February 2009.

http://www.thestar.com/News/GTA/article/591011.

[iii] Peter Pigott, “How 100 years of flight transformed a nation,” 23 February 2009.

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/years+flight+transformed+nation/1319042/story.html.

[iv] Websites the tell the story include:

Avroland – http://www.avroland.ca/al-c102.html

Arrow Recovery Canada – http://www.avroarrow.org/Jetliner/JetlinerIntro.html

Wikipedia — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avro_Canada_Jetliner.

While Afghanistan will certainly dominate the talk at the 60th Anniversary NATO Summit in April, leaders are also scheduled to launch a process to review the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, a key element of which is a controversial and outdated nuclear doctrine.[i]

The Strategic Concept – the current version of which was adopted in 1999 – is the Alliance’s official statement of purpose and outlines its force posture and approach to collective security. Nine of its 65 paragraphs refer to nuclear weapons, the central claim being that the nuclear arsenals of the United States in particular, but also of the United Kingdom and France, are “essential to preserve peace” and are “an essential political and military link between the European and North American members They are supposed to keep your sexual life intact! viagra sales in india jealt.mx treats erectile dysfunction effectively, which is a condition characterized by the inability to achieve or maintain an erection for intercourse. This is because they normally have uncontrolled sugar in their blood system, which slows down the symptom of erectile dysfunction by inhibiting http://www.jealt.mx/servicios-dictamenes.html generic viagra discount PDE 5 enzymes and supporting cyclic GMP. This means there should be some form of sexual stimulation, whether it jealt.mx viagra without side effects is thinking about having great sex, or lightly stroking one another. Regular use of NF Cure capsule with Shilajit capsule improves vitality, cialis 5 mg vigor and energy levels. of the Alliance.”[ii]

Firmly rooted in east-west deterrence and nuclear war-fighting assumptions, NATO doctrine is markedly out of sync with the new anti-nuclear counsel from such Cold War stalwarts as Henry Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt, Richard Burt and a host of other government leaders and security professionals now calling for accelerated nuclear disarmament.

In his recent speech to the 45th Munich Security Conference, Mr. Kissinger reaffirmed his earlier call for the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons, pointing out that “any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign policy objectives.”

Richard Burt, the senior arms control official in the Administration of the first President Bush, now works through the Global Zero initiative, supported by The Simons Foundation of Canada and a broad range of public figures, for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The group is pledged to work “for a legally binding verifiable agreement, including all nations, to eliminate nuclear weapons by a date certain.”

Even the Alliance leader is now committed, as the Obama White House website puts it, to pursuing the “goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

All of these statements represent a rather a large shift away from NATO’s claim that nuclear weapons are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”

This recent wave of nuclear abolition statements by mainstream security professionals is rooted in two linked concerns.

First, the 20,000-plus nuclear warheads remaining in current arsenals, several thousand of them poised on missiles ready for firing at a moment’s notice, represent an ongoing threat of mass indiscriminate destruction to the point of global annihilation.

Second, that threat is heightened by the growing risk that nuclear weapons, as well as weapons-friendly technologies and nuclear materials, will spread to more states, and even to non-state groups.

NATO thus has the opportunity to fashion a new strategic doctrine that, on the one hand, takes full account of the threats posed by nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, takes full advantage of the political momentum that is now finally available to allow states to get serious about doing something about that threat. Rather than continuing to insist, for example, that nuclear weapons “preserve peace,” NATO doctrine would do well to follow the new realism of former Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s assessment that “with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.”

Inasmuch as all NATO members are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a good place to start would be for the new Strategic Concept to welcome the groundswell of calls for the world without nuclear weapons that the NPT envisions. Responding to those calls NATO should then reaffirm its commitment to implementing the disarmament and nonproliferation priorities and procedures elaborated through the NPT review process.

One important measure of NATO’s sincerity will be its handling of the 150-250 US tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Europe. If it were to take up the proposal of former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that those now in Germany be removed, and then also remove those in the four other European states that currently host them, NATO would earn important disarmament bona fides and give a major boost of confidence to a seriously flagging non-proliferation regime. It would also honor the longstanding international call that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

Non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT that are not part of NATO rightly regard the removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of European non-nuclear weapon states as essential for full compliance with Article I of the Treaty. The NPT requires that “each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”

The nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime is currently under severe stress. The failure of nuclear weapon states to fully implement the disarmament provisions of Article VI of the NPT, along with NATO’s ongoing claim that it plans to rely on nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, has entrenched the double standard of nuclear “have” and “have not” countries. In the long run, that double standard is not sustainable. NATO cannot credibly claim that the security of NATO states sheltered within a peaceful Europe requires nuclear weapons, while at the same time calling on all other states, including those in conflict zones such as South Asia or the Middle East, to fully and unconditionally reject nuclear weapons.

At the coming Summit NATO has an opportunity to begin the process of reinventing its security doctrine, to take new initiatives to end its reliance on nuclear weapons, and to engage other states with nuclear weapons in the serious pursuit of reciprocal disarmament, and in the process revitalize the NPT.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] This article appeared in the February 18, 2009 issue of Embassy. http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/nato_summit-2-18-2009.

[ii] Detailed references for all quotes and sources are available in Ploughshares Briefing 09-1: Ernie Regehr, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Nuclear Abolition Imperative. February 2009. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf091.pdf.

By testimony of the Department of National Defence (DND), Canada has taken significant care in the transfer of 2,500 C7 automatic rifles from the Canadian Forces to the Afghan National Army. At the same time, a new US study shows that the security system into which those rifles have now gone is seriously deficient in its ability to ensure that guns intended for the Afghan Army will not join the millions of other weapons that get diverted to illicit users and uses.

The Canadian weapons were provided a year ago under a program of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A).[i] The CSTC-A focuses on the training and development of Afghan security forces and one objective has been to switch Afghanistan from the 7.62 calibre AK-47 to 5.56 calibre automatic weapons, the NATO standard.

The US has transferred over 242,000 small arms and light weapons (SALW) under the program to the Afghan forces (army and police) – in addition to machine guns they include grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. Other countries have provided another 135,000 weapons, of which 2,500 are the Canadian C7 automatic rifles or machine guns.

An investigation by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO)[ii] concludes that the program has failed to meet basic inventory control standards in the supply of these weapons – both because the US forces failed to monitor weapons effectively during the transfers, and because there continued to be a serious risk of theft and loss once the Afghan forces took custody of the weapons. Mark Sedra of the Centre for International Governance Innovation has written extensively about small arms circulation in Afghanistan and the importance of developing a reliable procurement process.[iii]

Whatever the merits of delivering still more arms to a country already awash with as many as 10 million small arms,[iv] the transfers raise important questions about the process by which weapons are delivered to Afghan security forces, and about the capacity of Afghan forces to prevent them leaking away to illicit users.

The Canadian process is considered below, but first a brief look at the GAO report.[v] More than a third of the weapons supplied by the US were not effectively accounted for even by the US at the time of the transfer. Of 242,000 weapons transferred, serial numbers were not recorded for 46,000. Another 41,000, for which serial numbers were recorded, were not registered or documented in any way when they were transferred to Afghan forces and there is no way of knowing where they are now (p. 14).

Furthermore, the GAO says, “CSTC-A did not record the serial numbers for the weapons it received from international donors and stored in the central depots in Kabul for eventual distribution to the [Afghan security forces]” – this did not include the Canadian rifles which were transferred directly to Afghan National Army (ANA) units. The CSTC-A “could not verify the delivery and subsequent control of weapons in Afghanistan” (p. 15). Weapons received from international donors at Kabul’s International Airport were, without documentation, loaded into the custody of the ANA “for unescorted transport from the airport to the central depots in Kabul.” As the GAO report puts it, rather mildly given the evidence, the “CSTC-A had limited ability to ensure that weapons were not lost or stolen in transit to the depots.” (p. 16)

Canada, according to DND’s own account in written response to a series of questions,[vi] put in place a much more effective process for managing the initial transfer to the ANA of the 2,500 C7s.

Issues of diversion are not directly addressed in Canadian export control laws, but the Export and Import Permits Act [Section 7.1.(a)] does require that the transfer not compromise “the safety or interests of the [recipient] State.” If the weapons were transferred into a system of obviously lax inventory control, where there would be a high likelihood that many of those weapons would get diverted to illicit users and uses, it could certainly be taken as a violation of export regulations.

In addition, Canada has signed on to the 2001 UN Program of Action on small arms, an international political agreement which calls on armed forces and other bodies authorized to possess small arms to “establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons.” Such standards and procedures are to include “appropriate location for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanction in the event of thefts or loss.”[vii]

The Canadian C7s appear not to have gone through the central depot in Kabul where much of the control failed. Indeed, the transfer process itself seems to have largely followed the UN protocol and involved, as DND says, “a number of strict measures, including the marking of weapons, the establishment of a register of weapons, and the appropriate training of Afghan forces.”

The DND spokesperson explains further that

“the transfer of weapons is done on an incremental basis, prior to each kandak (unit) resuming operations after a two-month training period. This allows JTF-Afghanistan[viii] to mentor and train Afghans on the usage and maintenance of the weapon, as well as on storage procedures (weapons and ammunition), control measures (weapons and ammunition), human rights, second and third line maintenance, and developing trainers. All recipients also undergo basic security screening.

“Weapons are maintained under control of JTF-Afghanistan until the Commander is satisfied that the necessary control mechanisms are in place. Once the transfer has occurred, the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) works to ensure that the Afghan National Army (ANA) enforce the standards that were taught to them.

“To facilitate training, mentoring and monitoring, weapons are slowly integrated as they are issued to one kandak (unit) at a time. For each block of donations, the Commander of the OMLT submits a detailed written report to Commander JTF-Afghanistan stating whether or not the recipients meet the stated requirements.”

While independent verification of these processes is not possible, DND’s account indicates a significant measure of care to prevent diversion of these weapons to unauthorized users and to promote responsible use – unlike the process followed by the CSTC-A.

There is a separate concern regarding the capacity of the ANA to continue to maintain control of the weapons once they have been transferred into the custody of Afghan security forces.

The CSTC-A has itself been lax in assessing the “equipment accountability capabilities” of the Afghan Forces (p. 19). Even so, the GAO reports that CSTC-A contractors “have documented significant weaknesses in the capacity of [Afghan forces] to safeguard and account for weapons. As a result, the weapons CSTC-A has provided are at serious risk of theft or loss.” The significance for Canada obviously is that despite its training and mentoring provisions, the risks of diversion remain considerable due to the overall level of accountability within Afghan forces – recognizing that control standards within the Afghan Army are reported to be much better than within the Afghan National Police.

A third issue in any transfer is the need to prevent the diversion of the AK-47s which the new guns replace. The danger of the old AK-47s drifting into the small arms supermarket that flourishes in Afghanistan is particularly real. There have even been reports of warlords linked to the pro-Government Northern Alliance selling some of their current surpluses to the Taliban.[ix]

The 2001 UN small arms Program of Action that Canada signed on to includes a provision that whenever new arms are provided, suppliers have an obligation to ensure that the old arms which become surplus are responsibly disposed of, “preferably through destruction.”[x] In this case the weapons which the C7s replace have not been declared as surplus by the ANA and thus will not be destroyed. Rather, they will stay in the ANA inventory – not a reassuring disposal plan.

DND’s response to a question about the ultimate disposal of any weapons replaced by the C7s implies that Canada also has no serious capacity, or intention, to assess the Afghan forces’ ability to maintain control over the weapons. DND explains that “the AK-47s that the ANA were originally issued are the property of the Government of Afghanistan through their various line Ministries (Defence, Interior, etc…).” Hence, “the AK-47 rifles replaced by Canadian participation in the NATO 5.56 program (the C7 donation) are retained by the ANA and warehoused. The C7 donation is not a ‘one for one’ exchange.”

The failure to either assure the destruction of any weapons replaced by the C7s, or to verify the ANA’s effective inventory control over them, must be taken as a failure to fulfill the full intent of the Program of Action.

Of course, the US failure is much more egregious – tens of thousands of weapons unaccounted for, no confidence that the weapons that actually reached the ANA and ANP are neither diverted nor used for unlawful purposes, and no attempt made to destroy or control the arms replaced by the CSTC-A program of conversion to NATO calibre weapons. The GAO reports that CSTC-A is in the process of introducing improved monitoring, but the GAO also reports that the CSTC-A “noted it did not have sufficient staff or mentors to conduct the monitoring envisioned” (p. 25).

International forces in Afghanistan, and particularly weapons suppliers, should at a minimum make sure that transfers are taken as an occasion to actually implement the practices and procedures for effective small arms and light weapons inventory control prescribed in the UN Program of Action that all of them have adopted. That program includes commitments to assist states seeking to develop the necessary infrastructure and overall capacity for full compliance, and thus Canada should surely commit to assisting Afghanistan, not only in the management of the weapons received from Canada, but in the responsible management and use of all of the weapons held by Afghan security forces.

Whatever the true number and legal status of most of the millions of small arms in Afghanistan, they not only deny peace for now, they threaten to defer it for a long time to come. Any supplier that decides to add still more weapons to that super-saturated small arms environment had better be in a strong and confident position to ensure that none of those arms will be diverted to exacerbate the extraordinary challenge that the small arms already there present to a country not short on challenges.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The CSTC-A works with the Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force to train and develop Afghan security forces in order to “achieve security and stability in Afghanistan.” http://www.cstc-a.com/Mission.html.

[ii] Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces. GAO (GAO-09-267), January 2009. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09267.pdf.

[iii] Sedra, Mark. 2008. “Small arms and security sector reform.” Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament and security in post-ar society. Routledge, pp. 158-180.

[iv] The call for arms control: voices from Afghanistan. Oxfam Briefing Note, January 2006. Available at Oxfam, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_afghanistan.pdf,

or through the Council of Foreign Relations,

http://www.cfr.org/project/1294/council_special_report_on_small_arms_and_light_weapons.html

[v] Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces. GAO (GAO-09-267), January 2009. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09267.pdf.

[vi] See Regehr, Ernie. 2009. Canada’s Automatic Weapons Gift to Afghanistan: Were Canadian Military Export Regulations Followed? Ploughshares Briefing 09-2, February. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf092.pdf.

[vii] “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2001, UN Document A/CONF.192/15, Section II, Para 18

(http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html).

[viii] The Canadian Joint Task Force Afghanistan.

[ix] Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, IWPR staff reporter in Mazar-e-Sharif , “The Northern Alliance may supply arms to Taliban, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 12, 2006 (http://www.rawa.org/arm-taliban.htm).

[x] “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2001, UN Document A/CONF.192/15, Section II, Para 18

(http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html).

Obama has promised it, his Defense Secretary isn’t convinced, but now you can vote on it. At Change.org you can help construct a list of priorities for the new American Administration that includes US leadership to abolish nuclear weapons in the top 10 (the direct link is below).

Last fall President-elect Barack Obama told the Arms Control Association that “as president, I will set a new direction in nuclear weapons policy and show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.”[i]

But his Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, shows some reluctance. Not only does he have doubts about ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,[ii] but Gates told a Carnegie Endowment gathering last fall that “as long as other states have or seek nuclear weapons – and can potentially threaten us, our allies and friends – then we must have a deterrent capacity that makes it clear that challenging the United States in the nuclear arena – or with other weapons of mass destruction – could result in an overwhelming, catastrophic response.”[iii]

President-elect Obama’s responses to the Arms Control Association also paid homage to deterrence: “as long as states retain nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent that is strong, safe, secure, and reliable.”

All of which means that if nuclear abolition is to become an American priority, Washington thinking still needs to undergo some major changes.

With the new Administration coming in nuclear disarmament prospects will be better than they have been for a long time, but it will still take some doing to overcome the unconstructive formulations and assumptions that apparently remain in the thinking of Secretary Gates.

Gates says, for example, that as long as others “seek” nuclear weapons the US must retain a nuclear deterrent. That is a formula for the indefinite perpetuation of nuclear weapons, for as long as the US and other states retain nuclear weapons, there will always be some hitherto non-nuclear states that will seek them.

Gates also says that the possible possession by other states of “other weapons of mass destruction” is a reason for America to retain nuclear weapons. But the potential for some states to acquire chemical or biological weapons will never be eliminated once and for all; the question is how to deal with that ongoing possibility. It is not to threaten nuclear annihilation but to work through established and upgraded mechanisms for verification and for the implementation of the two treaties that already ban chemical and biological weapons.

What Mr. Gates says on behalf of the US, that nuclear weapons must be retained to deter those of others and to shield the US from unacceptable threat, could be as legitimately said by virtually every other country. Indeed, many countries without nuclear weapons could make a much more urgent claim that they are threatened by nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, as well as by countries with vastly superior conventional forces, and thus make the case for acquiring nuclear weapons so that they too can assure any state that challenges them with “an overwhelming, catastrophic response.”

The US has the capacity to fundamentally alter this self-defeating formula. And the alternative, the push for the elimination of nuclear weapons that Mr. Obama has promised, will be pursued only through the engagement of an informed public. The US and the international community are well served by a highly informed and expert disarmament and non-proliferation community that has for decades been setting out a credible policy road map. The work of that community is now being supported and legitimized by a growing chorus of mainstream or “establishment” figures – personalities as diverse as Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and Mikhail Gorbachev, together with others like Shaharyar Khan, a former Pakistani foreign minister, retired Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi of India, and former British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind. The recent appeal by the Global Zero group adds the critically important demand for a clear timeline for reaching the goal of total elimination.

And after the leadership declaration has been made, the policies formulated, and the endorsements added, it is the global public voice that is needed to make nuclear abolition a serious political priority.

That is where initiatives like the Change.Org appeal to the public for “Ideas for Change in American” come in. The hope that nuclear weapons abolition will become a priority of the new US Administration can be given voice by going to

http://www.change.org/ideas/view/us_leadership_to_abolish_nuclear_weapons_globally and then voting for “US leadership to abolish nuclear weapons globally.”

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] President-elect Obama’s views on nuclear arms control are perhaps most clearly and succinctly presented in his response to a series of questions posed by the Washington-based Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q & A: President-Elect Barack Obama, Special Section, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Obama_Q-A_FINAL_Dec10_2008.pdf.

[ii] See DisarmingConflict post of 5 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/complication-and-compromise-on-obamas.html.

[iii] Elaine M. Grossman, “Gates Sees Stark Choice on Nuke Tests, Modernization,” Global Security Newswire, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 29 October 2008, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20081029_2822.php.

Some critics of Israel’s military action in Gaza charge that its extensive use of American-origin weapons violates US arms transfer laws. Whatever the merits of that particular charge, it is the type of issue that an arms trade treaty would regularly be called on to settle.

The proposed arms trade treaty (ATT), on which negotiations are about to begin at the UN,[i] is intended to ensure that international arms transfers are guided by obligations of States under the UN Charter and international law more broadly. The NGO Steering Committee that promotes an ATT articulates a foundational principle built on key elements of international law with direct relevance for arms transfers: “States shall not authorize international transfers of arms or ammunition where they will be used or are likely to be used for violations of international law, including: breaches of the UN Charter and customary law rules relating to the use of force; gross violations of international human rights law; serious violations of international humanitarian law; acts of genocide or crimes against humanity.”[ii]

The national arms transfer regulations of many countries already reflect that basic principle, as does the US Arms Export Control Act[iii] which provides that “Defense articles and defense services” can be provided to another country “solely for internal security (including for antiterrorism and nonproliferation purposes), for legitimate self-defense,” and to assist the recipient country’s participation in UN operations and related actions.[iv]

The US Foreign Assistance Act provides that, “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-nationally recognized human rights.” [v]

In the course of current Israeli attacks in Gaza, as well as previous Israeli military operations in Palestine and Lebanon, commentators[vi] and critics have argued that Israel’s actions violate self-defence and international humanitarian law requirements and thus its use of US-origin weapons violates American export conditions. Canadian foreign affairs analyst Eric Margolis says “Israel’s use of American weapons against Gaza violates the U.S. Arms Export Control and Foreign Assistance Acts.”[vii] William Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation and an expert on US arms transfers, wrote in 2002, for example that, “the use of U.S. weapons in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian authority appears to be a clear violation of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act prohibiting U.S. weapons from being used for non-defensive purposes.”[viii] In an extensive 2008 report Hartung documents Israeli use of US-supplied cluster bombs in Lebanon, also in possible violation of US export laws.[ix]

In 2007 US State Department officials sent a preliminary report to Congress citing “likely violations” of US-Israeli arms transfer agreements linked to Israel’s use of cluster bombs among villages in the 2006 attacks on Lebanon.[x]

Other reports from human rights organizations and the US State Department cite similar violations of international obligations – for example, the latter’s report on Israel for 2001 accused the Israeli Defense Force of “excessive use of force” and of deliberate attacks on Palestinian civilian institutions and civilian areas.[xi] A 2008 UN report refers to Israel’s failure to meet the obligations under international law of an occupying power.[xii]

Israel makes the opposite claims. In the case of cluster bombs in Lebanon, Israel says civilians were not targeted and were warned by leaflets dropped from aircraft in advance of any attacks. Israel describes its military actions in Gaza as entirely about self-defense – to halt rocket attacks on Israeli civilians and to prevent other kinds of terror attacks on Israel. Civilian casualties occur, they point out, not because of direct attacks, but as a consequence of direct attacks on legitimate targets that are in close proximity to civilians.

Current commentary and analysis cover the full range of interpretations, from Frank Gaffney’s insistence that “by any reasonable definition, Israel’s operations in Gaza are defensive,”[xiii] to Robert Fisk’s descriptions of specific attacks as “war crimes.”[xiv]

The legal questions at the heart of this heated debate centre on interpretations of basic, but not necessarily precise, concepts such as legitimacy and proportionality, self-defense and aggression, the thresholds that define “gross” violations of human rights or “deliberate” attacks on civilians, the definition of “excessive” use of force, and the severity and frequency of alleged violations of internationally recognized humanitarian law and human rights standards.

These are questions that are necessarily politicized and are unlikely, to understate the point, to yield to consensus in the context of current Israeli action in Gaza – the United States certainly will not charge Israel with violating US arms export conditions. But, difficult as such questions are, the proposed ATT will necessarily and regularly force them onto the public agenda. In fact, had such a treaty been in place now, it would at least have offered procedures and mechanism for examining possible infractions of international law, including the culpability of the supplier when arms are supplied to a State in which it could be reasonably predicted that those arms would be used unlawfully (possible US culpability is also relevant for Canada inasmuch as there are Canadian-built components in many US weapons systems).

A detailed and useful report on implementing an ATT, prepared by the UK NGO Saferworld,[xv] makes it clear that under any foreseeable arms trade treaty, arms transfer decisions will remain national. Even though the focus is international law, an arms trade treaty is unlikely to submit national export decisions to international adjudication.

Furthermore, compliance with such a treaty will be pursued largely through political and diplomatic dialogue, debate, and censure. Authoritative external legal judgments on compliance or noncompliance will not be the norm. Instead, treaty provisions for enhanced transparency and reporting, for consultation and mechanisms for raising formal complaints, and for monitoring transfers and weapons use will be put in place to generate close public scrutiny and thus create strong political incentives to comply.

Gradually, and with obvious difficulty, international consensus will have to build on the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate transfers.

For now, a definitive answer on the legality or legitimacy of arms transfers destined to be used in operations like the action in Gaza will continue to elude consensus in the international community. But the fact that the role of arms suppliers is being raised, including the clandestine deliveries to Hamas, reinforces the importance of establishing a treaty which can provide institutional mechanisms through which to help determine facts, facilitate the debate, and thereby hold arms suppliers and recipients more accountable.

Notes

[i] The General Assembly, First Committee, resolution established an “open-ended working group” to pursue a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” based on the principles of the UN Charter and other existing international obligations – available at Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/res/L39.pdf

[ii] Compilation of Global Principles for Arms Transfers, the NGO Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, Amnest International, 2006, available at: http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/documents/Global_Principles_for_Arms_Transfers_2007.pdf. [iii] Sec. 502.Utilization of Defense Articles and Services. TITLE 22, CHAPTER 39, SUBCHAPTER I, §2754 Purposes for which military sales or leases by the United States are authorized; http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002754—-000-.html.

[iv] US export laws are compared to proposed global arms transfer principles in greater detail in: Rachel Stohl, US Small Arms and Global Transfer Principles (Annex B), Ploughshares Working Paper 06-1, 2006.

[v] Sec. 502B, (US) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), p. 230, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf.

[vi] Joe Parko, “Israel is illegally using U.S. weapons in its attack on Gaza,” OpEdNews.com, 28 December 2008, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Israel-is-illegally-using-by-Joe-Parko-081228-823.html.

[vii] Eric Margolis, “Israel Strikes at Obama,” 4 January 2009, Toronto Sun, http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/eric_margolis/2009/01/04/7912556-sun.html.

[viii] William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Arms Transafer and Security Assistace to Israel,” Arms Trade Resource Center, 6 May 2002, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/israel050602.html.

[ix] William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Weapons at War: Beyond the Bush Legacy,” December 2008, New America Foundation, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/u_s_weapons_war_2008_0.

[x] “Israel may have broken US arms export laws: official,” Muzi.Com, 29 January 2007, http://lateline.muzi.net/news/ll/english/10034372.shtml?cc=35606.

[xi] “Israel and the occupied territories: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001,” Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 4, 2002, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8262.htm.

[xii] “Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967,” report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, General Assembly, 25 August 2008.

[xiii] Frank Gaffney, “Defensive action,” Commentary, The Washington Times, 6 January 2009, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/06/defensive-action/.

[xiv] Robert Fisk, “Why do they hate the West so much, we will ask,” The Independent, 7 January 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-do-they-hate-the-west-so-much-we-will-ask-1230046.html.

[xv] Making it work: Monitoring and verifying implementation of an Arms Trade Treaty, Saferworld, May 2008, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/312/making_it_work.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca