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Nuclear Disarmament

Recalling the Trudeau “strategy of suffocation”

Posted on: March 18th, 2017 by Ernie Regehr

Paul Meyer (a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, he currently teaches international security at Simon Fraser University and is a Senior Fellow at The Simons Foundation, Vancouver) has done the arms control/disarmament community an important service by leading us through a detailed recounting of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s “strategy of suffocation” – an insufficiently recognized Canadian effort in Cold-War disarmament diplomacy (see: Paul Meyer, “Pierre Trudeau and the ‘Suffocation’ of the Nuclear Arms Race.” International Journal 71:3, 2016: pp. 393-408). The following, published at H-Diplo, reviews Meyer’s essay and recounts civil society engagements (notably by Canadian church leaders) with Trudeau subsequent to the “suffocation” initiative and leading up to the “peace initiative” he launched at the conclusion of his political service. Continue reading here.

Could Trump Close the Door on Canada and BMD?

Posted on: March 9th, 2017 by Ernie Regehr

For Canadians keen on joining the American strategic-range ballistic missile defence system, the Administration of Barack Obama seemed to present the perfect opportunity. Under a president much-admired by Canadians, opposition to signing on to a huge, expensive, and highly controversial Pentagon program would arguably have been considerably muted. Added to that, North Korea’s apparently inexorable progress towards mating a credible intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead might have been expected to spark more intense Canadian interest in protection efforts. But there has never been a groundswell of public support for Canadian involvement in ballistic missile defence, so the issue only got as far as the new Liberal Government asking Canadians, in the context of the Defence Policy Review, whether this might be the time for Canada to pursue a direct role in North American missile defence. And Canadians seem to have responded with continuing ambivalence, an ambivalence likely to turn into outright rejection with Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House. And if that is not enough to close the door on Canada and BMD, last year’s report by the American Union of Concerned Scientists on the still unproven strategic missile defence system should do it.

Read further at The Simons Foundation.

The Arctic and the Seaborne Nuclear Arms Race

Posted on: January 28th, 2017 by Ernie Regehr

Headlines tell of a burgeoning Russian/American naval nuclear arms race and already tens of billions of dollars are being promised and spent in both countries on “modernizing” seaborne strategic nuclear weapons systems. While tactical nuclear weapons have been kept off their attack and general purpose submarines for at least a generation, there are indications they may be finding their way back. In the meantime, there is not yet any international regime or treaty or political will in place or contemplated for the exercise of seaborne nuclear restraint.

Continue reading at The Simons Foundation.

Canadian Defence Policy and NATO’s Nuclear Weapons

Posted on: August 23rd, 2016 by Ernie Regehr

The current Canadian Defence Policy Review is not focused on questions of disarmament and arms control; Global Affairs Canada is the lead agency on those issues, and it would do well, by the way, to undertake a thorough review of related policies and priorities. Defence policies and postures do nevertheless help to either strengthen or undermine disarmament prospects. A case in point is NATO’s nuclear posture. Canada is involved as a NATO member and as a participant in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. And as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well, Canada has a responsibility to pursue alliance defence policies and practices that are conducive to full implementation of the NPT and ending NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence. That would in turn also advance the individual and collective security interests of NATO member states, including Canada, and all the states of the Euro-Atlantic.

Continue reading at The Simons Foundation defence review page.

Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five

Posted on: July 30th, 2016 by Ernie Regehr

This compilation of current military facilities in the circumpolar region  continues to be offered as an aid to addressing a key question posed by the Canadian Senate more than five years ago: “Is the [Arctic] region again becoming militarized?”  If anything, that question has become more interesting and relevant in the intervening years, with commentators divided on the meaning of the demonstrably accelerated military developments in the Arctic – some arguing that they are primarily a reflection of increasing military responsibilities in aiding civil authorities in surveillance and search and rescue, some noting that Russia’s increasing military presence is consistent with its need to respond to increased risks of things like illegal resource extraction, terrorism, and disasters along its frontier and the northern sea route, and others warning that the Arctic could indeed be headed once again for direct strategic confrontation.  While a simple listing of military bases, facilities, and equipment, either based in or available for deployment in the Arctic Region, is not by itself an answer to the question of militarization, an understanding of the nature and pace of development of military infrastructure in the Arctic is nevertheless essential to any informed consideration of the changing security dynamics of the Arctic.

Continue reading at The Simons Foundation

The “Rogue” Missile Threat: Getting from BMD to NPT

Posted on: December 18th, 2015 by Ernie Regehr

Canadians might soon be asking just where George W. Bush is when we really need him. He used to be a key antidote to Canadian temptations to embrace North American ballistic missile defence (BMD). Canada’s 2005 rejection of BMD was driven largely by anticipated public reaction to Canada signing on to a system championed by a Bush Administration that was, to understate it, little loved in Canada and that had especially offended disarmament advocates with its trashing of the ABM Treaty[i] and its hostility toward arms control generally. Now, however, with the Bush effect waning, the allure of a Canadian BMD role seems to be waxing. So, well into the final quarter of the still appreciated Administration of Barack Obama, and with a new and less polarizing but Washington friendly Government in Ottawa, BMD supporters in Canada see a new opportunity to pursue BMD involvement without generating a major backlash. What hasn’t changed, though, is the basic reality that, even if its technology improves, BMD won’t solve the rogue state missile problem. That’s because the North Korean missile threat is finally a non-proliferation, not a defence, challenge.  Continue reading at The Simons Foundation.

New terminology to help prevent accidental nuclear war

Posted on: September 30th, 2015 by admin

By Steven Starr, Robin Collins, Robert Green, and Ernie Regehr

Since the advent of US and Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and early warning systems,  the danger has always existed that a false warning of attack—believed to be true—could cause either nation to inadvertently launch a responsive “retaliatory” strike with its own nuclear forces. Fear of a disarming nuclear strike, especially during a crisis, creates immense pressure to use-or-lose nuclear forces if an attack is detected. Because launch-ready ballistic missiles allow either side to launch a counter-strike before nuclear detonations confirm whether or not the perceived “nuclear attack” is real, the launch of a retaliatory strike would in reality be a preemptive nuclear first-strike, should the warning prove to be false—resulting in accidental nuclear war. This pressure applies to any nation that might develop the ability to launch before detonation; as a result, what the United States and Russia decide to do could conceivably act as a role model for others—depending, of course, on the unique circumstances of each country….[E]scalating tensions between the United States and Russia have increased the need for both nations to address the dangers posed by their launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons. Continue reading at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Verifying the Iran Nuclear Deal

Posted on: July 24th, 2015 by Ernie Regehr

Verification has rightly become a key focus in assessments of the Iran nuclear deal – or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Thus, verification became the primary theme when US Administration officials defended the deal before primarily Republican critics at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[i] The central tactic of the critics is to focus on the exceptional provisions related to inspections of Iranian military sites (sites without any declared nuclear materials present), and then to imply that those provisions characterize the entire verification package.
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The Iran Deal Good for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Posted on: April 21st, 2015 by Ernie Regehr

Foreign Minister Rob Nicholson managed only a tepid response to the Iran nuclear deal. Canada is not encouraged by Iran’s track record, he said, and so “will continue to judge Iran by its actions not its words.” To the Government’s credit, it did promise an extra $3 million for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help it monitor the actions that must now follow Iran’s words, but one might have hoped for at least a hint of enthusiasm for a comprehensive framework for ensuring that Iran’s civilian nuclear program will not be used to acquire nuclear weapons. Commentators from across the political spectrum have called the deal’s provisions much better and more detailed than expected.  (more…)

Re-visiting Missile Defence Cooperation?

Posted on: January 14th, 2015 by Ernie Regehr

Recent reporting on Russia’s new military doctrine accorded banner coverage to the Kremlin’s designation of NATO as its “number one threat,” but very few news stories acknowledged the new doctrine’s statement of Russian openness to cooperation on missile defence. Arctic missile defence installations may not figure prominently in the current deep strains in NATO/Russian relations, but East/West relations are unlikely to reach any sustainable equilibrium without some resolution of the missile defence question generally, so any opening on that front deserves attention.

 Continue reading at The Simons Foundation.