Nuclear Disarmament

Nobel Laureate Al Gore suggested to delegates to the UN climate change conference in Bali this week that they ought to emulate the play-making finesse of Bobby Hull or Wayne Gretzky – recalling Hull’s famous line: “I don’t pass the puck to where they are – I pass the puck to where they’re going to be.” Well, said Gore, “Over the next two years the United States is going to be somewhere it is not now. You must anticipate that.”

It is an obviously hopeful thought and is relevant to any number of US policy envelopes – not least nuclear disarmament. But is it as realistic as it is desirable? Can we count on the Democrats to take America, and therefore all of us, at least a bit closer to that better disarmament place the world deserves?

On the assumption that Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have the best chances of winning the Democratic Party nomination, and that with either of the them the Democrats stand a solid chance of regaining the White House, it’s worth taking a (very) brief look at their respective positions on four key issues – overall nuclear weapons reductions, management of the current inventory (RRW), a nuclear test ban (CTBT), and a ban on further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (FissBan). A survey last summer by the Council for a Livable World is one good source for each of the candidates’ respective positions.[i]

Reductions

Democrats generally have aligned themselves[ii]with the by now well-known appeal by Henry Kissinger, and three others, for US leadership in taking the world “to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”[iii]

Clinton advocates substantial reductions in the arsenals of all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and calls for an increase in nuclear warning time to reduce dangers of accidental or unauthorized launch.

Obama similarly calls for reductions. Speaking to DePaul University in Chicago, he rejected unilateral disarmament and pledged to “retain a strong nuclear deterrent,” but promised to stay with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “on the long road towards eliminating nuclear weapons.”[iv] He calls for a reduced role for nuclear weapons and for a scaling back from “outdated postures” of the Cold War.

RRW and Threat Reduction

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program of the Bush Administration has become controversial inasmuch it has shifted the focus from one of assuring the reliability of current warheads to the design and building of new warheads. That in turn generates new interest in testing in the US (hence the opposition in some quarters to the CTBT), which in turn threatens to embolden other nuclear weapon states to rebuild, refine, and test their own warhead inventories.[v]

Clinton has been critical of the RRW and says there is a need for a “considered assessment of what we need these weapons for or what the impact of building them would be on our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.” She places high emphasis on the threat of nuclear terrorism, calling it “one of the greatest national security threats the United States faces today.” She has made this one of her top priorities in the Senate with actions that include support for redirecting funds from missile defence to Cooperative Threat Reduction and the introduction of a Bill (the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act) that would commit the US to working internationally to “establish and implement a stringent standard for nuclear safety at all facilities worldwide that hold weapons or weapons-usable fissile material.”

Obama’s position on RRW is similar: “Before we consider developing new nuclear weapons we must consider what the role of these weapons should be.” He says the RRW program undermines US leadership in de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. To maintain deterrence, he says, the US doesn’t need a new generation of warheads. He also emphasizes the need to secure all nuclear materials and bombs to prevent terrorist access to them. “As president, I will lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years.” The Lugar-Obama initiative is designed to “help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world.”

CTBT

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a priority for both candidates.

Clinton pledges to pursue bi-partisan support for the CTBT and regards its ratification as an early priority. She also promises to maintain the testing moratorium in the meantime and charges that the Bush Administration’s policy on RRW and its refusal to ratify the CTBT have undermined US security. Obama also promises to make CTBT ratification a priority. In the meantime he says the US should pay its full share of the costs of the CTBT Organization, which is not now the case.

FissBan

The long-time objective of ending production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes is currently stymied, as it has been for a decade, in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Both Clinton and Obama call for negotiations toward a verifiable ban (the latter being a significant switch from the Bush policy which says that verification would not be possible).

It is of course far from certain that the Democrats will recapture the White House at the end of 2008. Furthermore, the gap between campaign rhetoric and administration action is as wide in the US as anywhere. But, even so, there is still plenty of reason to believe that almost any one of the Democratic contenders would improve on the attitude and energy that the US now brings to the nuclear disarmament table.

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[i] Council for a Livable World, 2008 Presidential Candidates’ Responses to Seven Key National Security Questions, August 16, 2007 (http://www.clw.org/assets/pdfs/2008_presidential_candidates_questionnaire_responses.pdf).

[ii] Zachary Hosford, “News Analysis: The 2008 Presidential Primaries and Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, December 2007 (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/NewsAnalysis.asp).

[iii] By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn.”A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, January 4, 2007; Page A15. Available at (http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54).

[iv] Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Highlights His War Opposition,” The New York Times, October 2, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/us/politics/02cnd-obama.html?adxnnl=1&ref=politics&adxnnlx=1197663073-rNS8Vbu34qn7a69asqr6JA).

[v] Robert W. Nelson, “If it Ain’t Broke: The Already Reliable U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today, April 2006 (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/reliablefeature.asp).

The US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programs (NIE)[i] should decisively rob Washington hawks of any credible rationale for attacking Iran. What the NIE did not do, however, is explain or expose the surfeit of nuclear ambiguities that remain in Iran and that could be widely replicated in the event of the global surge in nuclear power development, dubbed the nuclear renaissance, that some are predicting.

More remarkable than the conclusion that Iran ended its nuclear weapons program four years ago is the NIE’s judgment that “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.” That’s not an insight that depends on a global spy network; in fact, the most interesting thing about it is what the NIE left out – namely, that the same conclusion must be reached about a large and growing number of other states.

That is a genuinely worrisome reality because none of those potential nuclear states will be prevented from pursuing nuclear weapons by international efforts to deny them the requisite knowledge, which is what President Bush still keeps describing as the objective with regard to Iran.[ii] In fact, the only way to keep a broad swath of industrializing states from exercising a nuclear weapons option is to build an international security environment that persuades each of them to consistently make the political calculation that their national interests are best advanced by foregoing nuclear weapons.

Creating that kind of nuclear unfriendly environment requires at least two key elements. First, it needs a strict set of non-proliferation rules supported by a reliable system for monitoring national compliance and which imposes an unacceptably high price on any state that violates non-proliferation rules. Second, it requires a global political climate that is both responsive to the security needs of particular states and regions and rejects nuclear weapons as instruments of either prestige or strategic influence – evidence of the latter would be some serious action by the current nuclear weapon states to finally meet their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Anyone who has observed nuclear disarmament diplomacy in general, and the UN Conference on Disarmament in particular, knows how far we currently are from fulfilling the second requirement. But the NIE report highlights the first requirement, for clear and enforceable non-proliferation rules, with another rather obvious point about Iran that has a much broader application. If Iran were to decide to produce weapons-usable highly enriched uranium, says the report, it “probably would use covert facilities, rather than its declared nuclear sites.” In other words, as Iran’s extensive clandestine activities prior to 2003 also demonstrate, a reliable inspections regime capable of unearthing secret operations will be essential to meeting the coming challenges.

Building such a regime is the immediate responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its last report on Iran[iii] notes some genuine progress in clearing up questions about Iran’s pre 2003 clandestine activity, but it still renders the unequivocal judgment that, given Iran’s gingerly cooperation, “the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” The IAEA is in a position to confirm that all of Iran’s declared activity, including uranium enrichment, is accounted for and not being diverted for weapons purposes, but preventing clandestine programs, in Iran or any of other country with relevant technical capabilities is another matter.

That means that the real Iran problem is not its declared and inspected uranium enrichment program, rather it is that, “since early 2006, the [IAEA] has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.” This is therefore not the time for the international community, including the UN Security Council, to ease the pressure on Iran,[iv] but the ongoing pressure needs to be focused directly on overall transparency, not on monitored enrichment.

The international community cannot yet be confident that Iran is and will be a reliable custodian of nuclear technology, so the number one task now is to give the IAEA the political, legal, and technical resources needed to render confident judgments about Iran and all other nascent nuclear states.

As the NIE notes, one key resource is the Additional Protocol, special provisions that states are encouraged to add to their IAEA safeguards agreements to facilitate more intrusive inspections. It should be compulsory, as Canada and other states have been arguing for some time,[v] and the Security Council should make it an immediate requirement for Iran.[vi]

Not only is confidence in the lawfulness of Iran’s programs at stake, but so too is confidence that the predicted nuclear renaissance will not overwhelm international monitoring capacity.

The focus on transparency and inspections, however, should not be taken to imply indifference to Iran’s enrichment of uranium. Currently Iran is in early and still experimental stages of producing reactor grade fuel, but the technology it is refining is also capable of producing weapons grade material. The international community, therefore, has an obvious and urgent interest in restricting national enrichment programs and other weapons sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. But such restrictions will not be achieved through an Iran only policy. Selective non-proliferation strategies are inappropriate in principle and do not work in practice.

The objective must be, and is already under thorough study at the IAEA and elsewhere, an international regime that takes the weapons sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle out of the hands of individual states and puts them under international control. That is ultimately the only way to ensure that any civilian nuclear renaissance does not proliferate the technology for building nuclear weapons.

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[i] “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, November 2007 (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf).

[ii]In response to the NIE report on Iran, Mr. Bush told a press conference: “Look, Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous, and Iran will be dangerous if they have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.” Whitehous transcript, December 4, 2007 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071204-4.html).

[iii]“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA, Report by the Director General, November 15, 2007,GOV/2007/58 (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf).

[iv]IAEA INFCIRC/711, August 27, 2007 which describes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA for a program of work to address and resolve the all outstanding issues between them and thus outlines “the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf).

[v]For example, Canada urged the 2005 NPT Review Conference tomake “theAdditional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1” for fulfilling “the obligations of that section of the Treaty.” Canadian statement to the 2004 NPT PrepCom on “Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty Relating to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones Issues” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/2004nptcluster2-en.asp).

[vi] UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) “calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocal,” but does not demand it in the same way that it demands that Iran suspend proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment. (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement)

Rumors of an American war on Iran continue unabated,[i] even while any case for such a war grows progressively weaker, and as a result US Vice President Dick Cheney has been making what is for him a familiar move.

Mr. Cheney is reportedly putting pressure on intelligence analysts to modify their reporting on Iran’s nuclear program to better serve the attack scenarios of Administration hawks. The refusal by some in the intelligence community to sign on to a national intelligence assessment claiming an imminent Iranian nuclear weapons capacity has held up a key intelligence report, and it may also have contributed to the removal of John Negroponte as director of national intelligence.[ii]

Obviously the international community, including Iran’s neighbors, still harbors a deep concern about Iran’s nuclear intentions, but the urgency of that concern is clearly mitigated by the conclusion of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran is now providing sufficient reporting, as well as allowing sufficient access by IAEA inspectors, to enable the IAEA “to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.”[iii]

That assurance doesn’t address the possibility of undeclared or clandestine programs, but here too the IAEA is making progress on a work plan[iv] that was put in place in August to resolve all the outstanding verification issues by April 2008, with a progress report due from the IAEA Director General to the IAEA Board next week.

The Bush Administration has thus been increasingly de-linking its war plans from Iran’s nuclear program, focusing instead on Iran’s alleged support for groups fighting the Americans in Iraq, a move that is making others in the Security Council more reluctant to pursue aggressive sanctions for fear of conflating the two issues (nuclear and Iraq).[v]

That reluctance is reinforced by the inescapable ambiguity of the one major Iranian nuclear controversy that remains, And it is an ambiguity that will remain even after a satisfactory completion of the Iran/IAEA work plan – namely, the uncertain legality of Iran’s ongoing enrichment of uranium.

Iran’s uranium enrichment program is no longer clandestine, it is open to inspection and verification, and it is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its related verification requirements, but it does violate UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of December 23, 2006,[vi] which requires, among other things, the suspension of “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.”

Suspension is not itself the ultimate objective of the Security Council and Iran rightly argues that it has a right to pursue any nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The suspension demand is put forward as a confidence-showing measure – that is, through the suspension Iran would demonstrate its goodwill and willingness to help the IAEA establish that there are no ongoing clandestine nuclear programs in Iran and that all declared programs are for peaceful purposes.

While the Security Council agreed on the demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment, the international community broadly and the six states[vii] giving leadership on the Iran issues in particular are not of a single mind on what the ultimate objective should be. President George Bush is unequivocal: “Listen, the first thing that has to happen diplomatically for anything to be effective is that we all agree on the goal. And we’ve agreed on the goal, and that is the Iranians should not have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear weapon.”[viii]

But the American attempt to deny Iran the knowledge or even the capacity to build a nuclear weapon, rather than to ensure its full compliance with the inspections regime to confirm that Iran is not actually building a nuclear weapon, makes it easy for Iran to claim that its rights under the NPT are being violated. President Bush in the meantime repeatedly conflates the “knowledge” needed to build a nuclear weapon with the possession of one: “If you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”[ix]

In fact, there is no reasonable prospect over the long term of preventing Iran from gaining such knowledge, and there are indications that Washington’s European and Security Council partners in dealing with Iran may now be moving on to focus on the real issue – preventing Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon through a meticulously applied inspections program, rather than trying to restrict the knowledge.

That change was implied earlier this fall when the Security Council refused to authorize more sanctions in the face of Iran’s continuing uranium enrichment. Instead, the European focus was on monitoring progress in Iranian cooperation with the IAEA on clearing up questions related to its past clandestine work.[x] If the IAEA report due next week is positive and shows Iran to be genuinely cooperating on the core issue of full transparency, the uranium enrichment issue will continue to decline in importance as long as the IAEA is given access to inspect the process and confirm that it is producing only low enriched uranium for civilian reactors, and not high enriched uranium suitable for weapons production.

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[i] See “War With Iran?” in this space (warwithi). Time Magazine’s October 26, 2007 issue declared, “Iran War Drumbeat Grows Louder” (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1676826,00.html).

[ii] Gareth Porter, “Cheney Tried to Stifle Dissent in Iran NIE,” Interpress Service, November 9, 2007 (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39978).

[iii] Statement by IAYA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to the 62 ^nd Regular Session of the UN General Assembly, October 29, 2007 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n018.html).

[iv] The work plan is available at the IAEA website (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf), and Sharon Squassoni of the Carnegie Endowment has provided a graphic depiction of the timeline for resolving outstanding issues that grew out of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19553&prog=zgp&proj=znpp).

[v] Robin Wright, “Divisions in Europe May Thwart U.S. Objectives on Iran,” Washington Post, October 18, 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101702211.html).

[vi] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement.

[vii] The Permanent Five of the Security Council plus Germany.

[viii] President George W. Bush, “Iran’s Nuclear Activities,”The White House, Washington, DC, April 28, 2006 (http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/65479.htm).

[ix] Paul Koring, Bush steps up rhetoric on Iran: Warns of possible ‘World War III’, The Globe and Mail, October 18, 2007 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20071018.BUSH18/TPStory/TPInternational/America/).

[x] Sophie Walker, “World powers push ahead with Iran sanctions,” Reuters, November 2, 2007 (http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-11-02T203718Z_01_L30131658_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-IRAN-NUCLEAR-COL.XML).

Warnings of the disaster that would come of an American attack on Iran are plentiful, increasingly urgent, and persuasive[i] – but it is not at all clear that they are working on the one vote that matters. The NewsHour on PBS television ran a short feature on the growing irrelevance of George Bush, but on security matters he’s still very much in charge, and when it comes to Iran he still likes to say that all options remain on the table.

Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, Pentagon planners and presidential advisors seem to have an inexplicable capacity to infuse their attack scenarios with an irrepressible optimism. In their computerized simulations, otherwise intractable problems, like Iran’s nuclear programs, are swept aside like so much hi tech chaff once the missiles start flying. The Christian Science Monitor recently observed that “perhaps the most egregious error policy planners make is their assumption that once wars are started, their outcome is predictable.”[ii]

It is true that some outcomes are predictable enough. No one could have doubted that the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq would lead to the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Nor could anyone doubt that if the United States attacked Iran it could manage to destroy, at least for a time, its nuclear programs, set its economic infrastructure back a generation, or overthrow its government. Regime destruction can be accomplished with dispatch – but after that all bets are off.

Paul Rogers of the University of Bradford has offered a careful and cautious account[iii] of the consequences of a concentrated air attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities and defence infrastructure. He rules out a ground offensive and a regime overthrow by the United states as unfeasible given American commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He says “an air attack would involve the systematic destruction of research, development, support and training centres for nuclear and missile programmes and the killing of as many technically competent people as possible.” In addition, the attack would “involve comprehensive destruction of Iranian air defence capabilities and attacks designed to pre-empt Iranian retaliation. This would require destruction of Iranian Revolutionary Guard facilities close to Iraq and of regular or irregular naval forces that could disrupt Gulf oil transit routes.”

Civilian and military casualties would be difficult to monitor, but would be in the many thousands, given that much of the technical infrastructure in support of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs is located in urban areas.

After the attack, he says, “Iran would have many methods of responding in the months and years that followed.” He includes disruption of Gulf oil supplies and support for insurgents and anti-Israel forces in the region. Rather than end Iranian nuclear programs, an attack would ignite Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. Iran would emerge united and determined to build a bomb and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That would presumably occasion further attacks and propel long-term and widening confrontation in the region.

After that come the unpredictable consequences, including the environmental impact of exploding nuclear facilities – at this point with limited quantities of nuclear materials present – and various political fallout possibilities. President Bush and his army of upbeat advisors and analysts obviously did not anticipate that their 2003 attack on Iraq would be a major boon to Iran. But, says the former Ambassador and current Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control, Peter W. Galbraith, “of all the unintended consequences of the Iraq war, Iran’s strategic victory is the most far-reaching.”[iv] Similar unintended consequences would also ensue from an attack on Iran.

Mr. Bush seems rather more aware of folly when the issue is the military action of others. It is almost touching to hear his kindly reprimand of Turkey for having the temerity to threaten attacks on northern Iraq in an effort to deny rebel Turkish Kurds sanctuary there. “There is a lot of dialogue going on,” he explained to reporters at the White House, “and that is positive.”[v]

To measure his own actions he uses a different calculus. There may, after all, be a lot of dialogue going on with Iran as well, but in this case he finds nothing positive in it. Talking to Iran, whether it is the Russians or the International Atomic Energy Agency, only emboldens it in its wicked ways.

Left to his own devices, and bolstered by the authors of triumphalist attack scenarios, President Bush is eminently capable of crowning his disastrous presidency with another military misadventure – this time in Iran. In other words, he shouldn’t be left to his own devices.

The Parliament of Canada would perform a worthy service in support of international stability through a unanimous and two-fold call: for the United States to unequivocally reject military action against Iran and for Iran to unambiguously resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA and provide it ongoing and unencumbered access to all Iranian nuclear facilities and programs.

As an emergency statement onIranby a group of concerned Canadians puts it, “an aerial assault on Iran would be an environmental and human catastrophe that our already damaged world cannot afford.”[vi]

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[i] Dan Plesch and Martin Butcher, “Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East,” The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, September 2007 (http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/IranStudy082807a.pdf).

Barnett Rubin, “Thesis on Policy toward Iran,” Informed Comment: Global Affairs, September 5, 2007 (http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/theses-on-policy-toward-iran.html).

Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?” The New Yorker, April 17, 2007 (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/17/060417fa_fact).

[ii] Walter Rodgers, “The folly of war with Iran,” The Christian Science Monitor,” October 16, 2007 ()

[iii] Paul Rogers, Iran: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper, Oxford Research Group, February 2006 (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/IranConsequences.pdf), 16 pp.

[iv]Peter W. Galbraith, “The Victor?,” The New York Review of Books, October 11, 2007 Volume 54, Number 15 (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20651).

[v]By Paula Wolfson, “Bush Urges Turkey to Refrain From Cross-Border Operations in Iraq,” Voice of America, October 17, 2007 (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-17-voa49.cfm).

[vi] From an “emergency statement” of concerned Canadians. The statement remains open for signature through Jillian Skeet of Vancouver who can be reached at jillianskeet@telus.net.

Some 80 percent of Americans think that nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous place. Only 10 percent think the world is safer because of nuclear weapons. But when the same Americans were asked how they felt about their own country’s nuclear weapons, 47 percent said they made them feel safer and 32 percent said they made them feel less safe.

That is just one of the revealing findings of an extraordinary survey of six states (five NATO states: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and United States; plus Israel) conducted by Angus Reid Strategies on behalf of The Simons Foundation of Vancouver.[i]

Israel is where this nuclear ambivalence is most pronounced. There 87 percent say nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous place, but at the same time 73 percent say they would feel safer knowing that Israel has nuclear weapons.[ii]

It is tempting to call these contradictory views, but of course it is logically possible to believe that nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous and that the world would be better off without them, but then still believe that as long as any state has them, one’s own state should too. That at least seems to be the logic followed by people in states with nuclear weapons, which in turn may go some way to explaining why it is so difficult to advance nuclear disarmament even though that is what the world overwhelmingly wants.

In Britain and France respondents also said that nukes make the world more dangerous (73 percent and 77 percent respectively), but in their own case they felt safer knowing their country had them (in Britain 46 percent felt safer compared to 37 percent who felt less safe; in France 48 percent felt safer while only 24 percent felt less safe).

In states that do not possess nuclear weapons of their own (German and Italy[iii]), respondents also felt overwhelmingly that nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous (92 percent and 90 percent respectively), but they also said they felt safer knowing that their own country does not possess nuclear weapons (60 percent and 45 percent respectively). In each case a smaller minority felt that the absence of nuclear weapons rendered them less safe (21 percent and 34 percent respectively).

In countries without nuclear weapons, people find all nuclear weapons threatening; in countries with nuclear weapons, people find all nuclear weapons threatening but their own.

But that only confirms the basic truth that the overwhelming majority of people, in states with nuclear weapons as well as in states without them, think the world is made more dangerous by nuclear weapons and that such weapons should be eliminated. When the survey respondents were asked whether they would favour “eliminating all nuclear weapons in the world through an enforceable agreement,” huge majorities in all the countries surveyed answered in the affirmative – Britain, 85 percent; France, 87; Italy, 95; Germany 95; United States, 84; and Israel, 78 percent.

It is interesting that this strong support for a treaty or agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons is maintained by respondents who at the same time have a rather dim view of the effectiveness of the current and central nuclear disarmament treaty, namely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which, by virtue of Article VI, requires all states to disarm (though without setting a timetable). Americans are least persuaded of the effectiveness of the NPT (only 16 percent thought it to be effective). In Germany, which registered the highest confidence in the effectiveness of the NPT (38 percent), more respondents still regard the NPT as ineffective (42 percent). In Israel 63 percent regard the NPT as ineffective while only 18 percent regard it as effective.

Even so, support for a new international agreement is strong across the board and reflected in the responses to a question regarding appropriate national policy goals. Here respondents showed strong combined preference for policies aimed at reducing and eliminating arsenals (Britain, 91 percent; France, 84; Italy, 93; Germany, 96; United States, 82; and Israel, 74 percent). In each case there was greater support for elimination than simply reductions, except in France and Israel where there is stronger support for reductions than elimination.

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President of The Simons Foundation, said the survey results come at a critical point of mounting nuclear tensions and growing interest in nuclear technology. She notes that even though respondents in nuclear weapon states regarded nuclear weapons as a source of protection from aggression, the overwhelming weight of opinion in all the countries surveyed, including in the nuclear weapon states, supports nuclear disarmament.

It is a revealing survey that highlights both the challenges and possibilities for nuclear disarmament and touches on a range of additional issues, including nuclear testing, diversion to non-state groups, moral attitudes, and views on nuclear use.

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[i] The full report is available at The Simons Foundation website (www.thesimonsfoundation.ca) or the Angus Reid Strategies website (www.angusreidstrategies.com/global).

[ii] While Israel is widely understood to have several dozen nuclear weapons, it maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” by which it refuses to publicly confirm that it has a nuclear arsenal.

[iii] German and Italy actually have US/NATO weapons on their soil, but are not themselves states in “possession” of nuclear weapons, nor do their governments have control over those weapons – the Simons/Angus Reid survey also surveyed public attitudes toward this practice.

While American news media and University Presidents were trying to decide whether Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be best characterized as the devil incarnate, a petty dictator, or just plain mad, he managed to deliver himself of at least one truth during his New York visit – “the nuclear bomb is of no use,” he said. Whether Iran will honor that truth is of course another matter.

When Ahmadinejad was asked on 60 minutes for a firm answer to the question of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb, his first response was to equivocate: “Well, you have to appreciate we don’t need a nuclear bomb What needs do we have for a bomb?” Then when pressed for a firm answer, he said: “It is a firm ‘No.’ I’m going to be much firmer now, in political relations right now, the nuclear bomb is of no use; if it was useful it would have prevented the downfall of the Soviet Union; if it was useful it would resolved the problem the Americans have in Iraq. The time of the bomb is passed.”[i]

Nuclear diehards, in places like Washington, Beijing, and Delhi, among others, may beg to differ, but world opinion and witnesses from Henry Kissinger[ii] to the Dalai Lama know that Ahmadinejad is right on that particular score – indeed, Ronald Reagan made the same point, describing nuclear weapons as “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.”[iii]

Ahmadinejad may have something else in common with Reagan – that is, a public disavowal of nuclear weapons is not necessarily what guides his country’s action. By now a reasonable interpretation of Iran’s nuclear programs is that it is intent on using the pursuit of civilian nuclear power to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or option, as distinct from an actual weapon. And there is little doubt that Iran will eventually attain that capability. But there is a genuine difference between “capability” and “possession” – Japan being the best example of a country with the capability together with a firm policy not to convert that capability into a weapon. It is at this line of distinction that the international community and the non-proliferation regime do and must make their stand.

One can understand the desire to prevent any regime linked to the kind of world view offered by Ahmadinejad in New York, even if the tone was somewhat muted, from getting near any kind of advanced nuclear technology. But non-proliferation is a rules based endeavor and it is to our collective benefit if Iran develops its nuclear fuel cycle technologies[iv] within the non-proliferation regime and under the watchful eye of IAEA safeguards (essentially the current situation, once the IAEA’s outstanding issues are all dealt with) rather than have it withdraw from the NPT and resume its clandestine activities.

The Bush Administration has been trying to draw the line before capability, and that would be a far superior approach were it not pursued as an Iran-specific strategy – or an enemies-only approach. Nuclear non-proliferation would be genuinely aided by universal restrictions on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, but that will be possible only if the rules apply equally to all and reactor fuel production is brought under multilateral control that guarantees all states in good standing within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) equal access.

Furthermore, limiting Iran’s pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle technology, and the implicit weapons capability that goes along with it, will by definition have to be regional. Indeed, that has been the focus of multilateral nonproliferation efforts, especially since 1995 when NPT states defined the collective objective of establishing the Middle East as a nuclear weapon free zone in the context of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

A nuclear armed Iran can and must be averted, but it will require the even-handed application of multilaterally agreed non-proliferation principles and won’t be achieved through narrowly-targeted, Iran-specific prohibitions.

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[i]“Ahmadinejad: Iran Not Walking Toward War; Iranian Leader Tells Scott Pelley His Country Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons,” 60 Minutes, CBS News, September 23, 2007 (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/20/60minutes/main3282230.shtml).

[ii]George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free Of Nuclear Weapons,” TheWall Street Journal, January 4, 2007 (http://psaonline.org/downloads/nuclear.pdf).

[iii] Quoted by Kissinger, et al above.

[iv] Technologies with immediate civilian but also potential weapons applications.

On August 3, 2007 the United States and India set out the details of their proposed Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy. This “123 agreement”[i] would bring significantly more of India’s civilian nuclear facilities under an international inspections regime, but it also in effect calls for the international community to embrace India as a de facto nuclear weapon state without requiring in return that India accept even the most basic disarmament obligations of nuclear weapon states. In the process, rather than bringing constraints to India’s nuclear weapons activities, the proposed deal would actually facilitate a significant expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal.

Despite the new agreement between the US Administration and India, it remains a proposed deal which will take effect only if it receives the unanimous approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG – of which Canada is a member)[ii] and after India negotiates appropriate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). NSG approval would mean specifically that civilian nuclear cooperation with India would be exempted from the current provision that, with the exception of the five nuclear weapon state (NWS) signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),[iii] civilian nuclear cooperation is acceptable only with countries under full-scope safeguards. Full-scope safeguards in turn mean that all of a particular country’s nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA inspections.

In other words, India would then have the same access to nuclear materials for civilian systems as do NWS, but India is not a party to the NPT and thus is not directly bound by the Treaty’s Article VI disarmament provisions, nor is it bound by the significant additional obligations that the NWS agreed to in the context of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.[iv] Without requiring India to formally assume any of the disarmament obligations of the NWS, and without receiving any concrete undertakings from India regarding a permanent halt to nuclear testing and the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, the US-India deal as it now stands imposes severe costs on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and should not receive the approval of the NSG (because the NSG operates by consensus, a Canadian vote against the ccurrent deal would ensure that).

This is not an argument for the status quo. Under current arrangements nuclear cooperation with India is eschewed in favour of regular entreaties (including through UN Security Council Resolution 1172) for it to end all its nuclear weapons programs, place all its remaining nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards, and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Under these arrangements India has with impunity tested nuclear weapons, refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and thus ensures that it will not enter into force,[v] continues to produce fissile materials for weapons purposes, and gradually builds up its inventory of nuclear warheads.

Clearly, some change is needed. The prospects for Indian (or Pakistani or Israeli) disarmament outside of the context of general nuclear disarmament and significantly altered regional security conditions are not promising, to put it mildly, and without some internationally agreed changes, India will continue to expand its arsenal and there will be inevitable erosion from the current consensus against civilian nuclear cooperation. Already Russia has signaled a move toward large-scale nuclear cooperation,[vi] Australia has said it will sell uranium to India,[vii] and the French are in talks toward a deal similar to the US-India deal.[viii] If civilian nuclear cooperation with India (and ultimately with Pakistan and Israel) is inevitable, it should at a minimum be through a multilateral, coordinated policy that gains concrete disarmament commitments from these three de facto nuclear weapon states that are outside the NPT.

The outlines of a compromise policy have gradually emerged out of the debate over the US-India deal. In exchange for recognizing the reality of India’s situation as a de facto nuclear weapon state, including a nuclear arsenal in accord with India’s minimum deterrence doctrine, the international community would no longer demand immediate nuclear disarmament as a condition of civilian nuclear cooperation but would require, a) a moratorium on nuclear testing and ratification of the CTBT to facilitate its entry into force in accordance with the unanimous view expressed in 1995 and 2000 by all signatories to the NPT, including all the NWS, and b) it would require assurances that civilian nuclear cooperation will not facilitate expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

The 123 agreement fails to meet the terms of such a compromise.

In the first instance, civilian nuclear cooperation is not made contingent on a halt to testing. In the event of another Indian test, US legislation authorizing the deal currently would prohibit continued US nuclear cooperation (for example the supply of reactor fuel), but in a slightly bizarre move, in the 123 agreement the US promises that it would advocate on behalf of India to assure it of continuing nuclear supplies from other sources even while it bans such supplies from the US.[ix]

Secondly, the deal facilitates the expansion of India’s ongoing production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Without an Indian moratorium on the production of such materials (all five NWS currently adhere to such a moratorium), its access to foreign uranium for its civilian programs would allow it to use all its domestic uranium for an expanded weapons program.

If, as seems inevitable, India is now to be treated as if it were a nuclear weapon state, India needs to be moved to accept that new status within the context of a series of clear and binding disarmament obligations by making civilian nuclear cooperation with India contingent on at least the following undertakings:

• A declaration by India that it regards Article VI of the NPT as the expression of a global norm requiring the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that it regards itself and other non-signatories to the NPT as legally bound by that norm;
• An immediate moratorium on nuclear testing along with an undertaking to work with Pakistanso that both sign and ratify the CTBT within a reasonable timeframe; and
• A moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and an undertaking to support the immediate commencement of negotiations toward a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

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[i] Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act requires that any nuclear cooperation between the United States and any other country be defined through an agreement submitted to the President that sets out the “terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation.” Section 123 of the act also outlines some essential elements of those terms and conditions that must be included in the agreement. The text of the AEA is available at http://epw.senate.gov/atomic54.pdf.

[ii] The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a 45 nation group of suppliers that sets guidelines for trade in nuclear materials.

[iii] China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

[iv] India’s approach toward disarmament obligations agreed to by NWS is explored in a forthcoming Ploughshare Working Paper, “India and the disarmament obligations of nuclear weapon states.”

[v] CTBT requires ratification by all states with nuclear programs or capabilities before it can enter into force.

[vi] Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia vows strong support in NSG,” The Hindu, August 15, 2007 (http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/15/stories/2007081561711600.htm).

[vii] “Australia will sell uranium to India,” The Times of Indiam August 16, 2007 (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Australia_will_sell_uranium_to_India/rssarticleshow/2283648.cms).

[viii] “France and India in nuclear deal,” BBC news, February 20, 2006 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4731244.stm); “France and India hold nuclear cooperation talks,” Energy Daily, New Delhi, July 30, 2007 (http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/France_And_India_Hold_Nuclear_Cooperation_Talks_999.html).

[ix] The 123 agreement says (Article 5.6.b.iv: “If a disruption of fuel supplies [from the US] to India occurs [say, in the aftermath of an Indian test], the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm

A central feature of the 50 ^th anniversary of the first Pugwash Conference, commemorated with an international experts’ workshop (July 5-7) on “revitalizing nuclear disarmament” at the site of the first conference in 1957, was a ceremony to present the medal for the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize to the Pugwash Peace Exchange.

The Pugwash Peace Exchange is a national Canadian initiative emerging out of the community of Pugwash, with Senator Romeo Dallaire as patron, to build an “interpretive, education and research facility, based on the history and work of the Pugwash Conferences,” and it is this centre that will house the medal. It had been at the London, England home of the late Joseph Rotblat, a participant in the first Pugwash conference organized by the Canadian industrialist Cyrus Eaton to bridge the Cold War divide through a meeting of world scientists and experts, especially from the Soviet Union and the United States. It was Rotblat’s wish that the medal go to the birthplace of the Pugwash movement.

The 22 participants of that first Pugwash meeting, which spawned the international and ongoing “Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,” were responding to the manifesto issued two years earlier by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein. Troubled by the toxic mixture of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and escalating East-West suspicion and enmity, Russell and Einstein wrote:

“Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but, as human beings, we have to remember that, if the issues between East and West are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether Communist or anti-Communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether White or Black, then these issues must not be decided by war. We should wish this to be understood, both in the East and in the West.

“There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

At the 50 ^th Anniversary conference, we of course heard that the “risk of universal death” is in fact hugely expanded from what it was in 1957. While nuclear arsenals have been reduced from their peak in the 1980s, they are still much larger than they were when Russell and Einstein issued their warning in1955 and those weapons still have the capacity to effectively annihilate human society. As they did in 1957, the Pugwash experts set out an agenda for nuclear disarmament that is achievable and most certainly urgent:

“This sober, inescapable truth continues to haunt the international community,” the 2007 conference declared.” Every minute of every day, more than 26000 nuclear weapons – many thousands of then on hair-trigger alert – are poised to bring monumental destruction if they are ever used.”

So now two Nobel Peace Prizes reside in Canada – the first, is housed at the Department of Foreign Affairs in the building bearing the recipient’s name, Lester B. Pearson (he, of course, received it for his visionary work in proposing the United Nations Emergency Force which as able to keep the peace and allow the belligerents in the 1956 Suez crisis to withdraw).

These two Nobel Prizes don’t only honor past achievements; they point to future responsibility for both war prevention and nuclear disarmament. And Canadians should accept the medals on our soil as challenges to this country in particular. A country of extraordinary privilege and capacity, we have a particular obligation to advance policy and global consensus toward the objectives the Nobel Peace Prizes honor.

Foreign Minister Peter Mackay spoke at the anniversary event in Pugwash, recommitting Canada to the disarmament enterprise. In particular he explicitly supported the “13 practical steps” toward nuclear disarmament that were universally agreed in the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and which summarize the essential global nuclear disarmament agenda. The Bush Administration has since specifically repudiated the 13 steps, so to have the current Canadian government specifically hold them up as critically important is a welcome gesture (more on moving from gestures to concrete action to come in future postings).

The peacekeeping Nobel Prize is certainly a reminder of the need for renewed leadership in the pursuit of alternative means of settling disputes. In fact, while the Russell-Einstein manifesto is a profoundly moving and persuasive warning of the dangers of nuclear weapons, the challenge that Russel and Einstein and their nine co-signatories set before governments went well beyond nuclear disarmament:

“In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we urge the governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them.”

Two Nobel Peace Prizes and two extraordinary challenges.

This year’s Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference has confirmed two central realities: First, if the ailing NPT is to fulfill its foundational role in advancing global security it must be solidly balanced on its three equal pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses. Second, the international community is now well beyond simply debating a range of disarmament and nonproliferation options; rather, it is looking for meaningful implementation of an already agreed agenda.

While all states are equally bound by all Articles of the Treaty, there are really four categories of states in the nonproliferation regime; and each category faces particular implementation roles and challenges.

The biggest category, of course, is non-nuclear weapon states, and in exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons, they have received the legally-binding promise of disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, and they are to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But that access requires that they continuously verify their non-weapons status through safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Many have yet to fulfill their obligations (and, of course, Iran and DPRK are in much more serious violation of their safeguards and NPT obligations). Furthermore, about three dozen of these states are in possession of nuclear power technology and thus must sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before it can enter into force. (Of the NNWS on the Annex II list, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, and Colombia have signed but not ratified the CTBT; the DPRK, which has withdrawn from the NPT but now is on track to return to it, has not yet signed the CTBT).

Nuclear Weapons States, the second category, are under legal obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. At the 2000 Review Conference they renewed their commitment to achieving that goal, although they are not bound by a specific deadline. In the meantime nuclear weapon states are obliged to fulfill specific commitments that they have themselves made. I won’t go through the list, but irreversible and verifiable cuts to arsenals are at the core. Failure to meet these obligations constitutes noncompliance just as certainly as do failures by non-nuclear weapon states to meet all their safeguard requirements.

In the third category are India, Israel, and Pakistan – de facto nuclear weapons states but not signatories to the NPT. That does not mean they escape all disarmament obligations. They are bound by the NPT norm of nuclear disarmament, and as members of the CD (Conference on Disarmament) they are obligated to pursue in good faith the agreed objectives of that body: including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, legally-binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, and a fissile materials cutoff Treaty. The CD also negotiated the test-ban Treaty and all three, as states with nuclear technology, must ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force (only Israel has signed the CTBT, and none of the three has ratified it). Both are also in direct violation of SC Res 1172 which unambiguously calls on them to end their nuclear weapons programs.

The fourth category is non-nuclear weapons states within NATO – a group that obviously includes Canada. They find themselves in a stark contradiction – affirming within NATO that nuclear forces are essential to alliance security, while at the same time affirming within the NPT that nuclear disarmament is essential to global security. It is a contradiction that must be resolved in favour of the latter commitment.

So, what priorities should Canada pursue within this broad and essentially agreed disarmament agenda?

To continue to set the right course, each new Canadian Government should, as a matter of course and at the highest level, reaffirm Canada ‘s fundamental commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. With that unwavering goal always at the core of its efforts, Canada should continue to actively promote the early implementation of the broad nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda, referred to above and rooted in the NPT and its 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, giving priority to particular issues that it is in a good position to influence. There will necessarily be some shifts in priorities according to changing circumstances, but currently at least four of the issues deserve the focused attention of Canada.

First among these is attention to the disarmament machinery. Nuclear disarmament depends first and foremost on the political will of states to simply do it, but the institutional mechanisms through which they pursue that fundamental and urgent agenda are critically important. The continuing dysfunction in the CD suggests it is once again time for Canada, along with like-minded states, to explore having the First Committee of the UN General Assembly form ad hoc committees to take up the four-fold agenda that lies dormant at the CD – that is, the non-weaponization of space, negative security assurances, the fissile materials cut-off Treaty, and new approaches to nuclear disarmament broadly.

In the context of the NPT, Canada should continue to press for a more effective governance structure involving annual decision-making meetings, the ability to respond to particular crises (such as the declaration of a State party’s intent to withdraw), and a permanent bureau or secretariat for the Treaty. In that context, Canada has made, and should continue to make, a point of promoting transparency through regular reporting by states on their compliance efforts and fuller NGO participation in the Treaty review process.

Second, the conflict regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment program raises important issues about the spread of weapons sensitive civilian technologies‚Äîto which all states in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations are now legally entitled. It is in the interests of nuclear disarmament that access to these technologies be severely restricted and placed under international control through nondiscriminatory multilateral fuel supply arrangements. Canada , as a state with high levels of competence in relevant technologies, should take an active role in investigating and promoting international fuel cycle control mechanisms.

Third, the US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal has led to proposals to exempt India from key guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Canadian technology and interests are directly engaged. Canada must be at the fore of international efforts to bring India, Israel, and Pakistan under the rules and discipline of the nuclear nonproliferation system. In particular, and at a minimum, Canada should insist that the Nuclear Suppliers Group require that India ratify the test-ban Treaty and abide by a verifiable freeze on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes before any modification of civilian cooperation guidelines is considered.

Finally, Canada cannot avoid promoting within NATO a resolution of the NATO/NPT contradiction in favour of the NPT disarmament commitment.

No statement or commentary about this NPT PrepCom, which runs through to May 11, begins without a reminder that the NPT is in serious trouble. And so it is.

And therein lies a disturbing irony. While the reasons behind the trouble are well-known – indeed, they can be summed up in a series of place names: Washington, Delhi, Tehran, London, Pyongyang, and many more – the nuclear disarmament agenda is actually very detailed, well-known, and very widely agreed. And it is also very stalled.

The agreed disarmament agenda

Of course, it is in those details where the devil will hold sway in the next two weeks, but, for the record, let’s at least acknowledge that at the general level, the nuclear disarmament agenda enjoys broad global support and the priorities that should engage Canada also seem clear.

That broad support is owed to the fact that the agenda has been painstakingly (or at least painfully) constructed through the consensus decision-making processes of the NPT review conferences, and the results are set out in the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 conferences. The agenda is confirmed and elaborated in the Blix Commission report[i] and it can be viewed as working toward three fundamental objectives: 1) preventing the use of existing arsenals, 2) preventing the expansion or enhancement of existing arsenals and making progress toward their elimination, and 3) preventing horizontal proliferation.

1. Preventing use

a) Abolition is the agreed aim, because the only way to finally prevent the use of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them.

b) Negative security assurances are commitments by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) party to the NPT – and what is now required is that such assurances be made legally binding.

c) To prevent accidental use, the US and Russia are required to de-alert (eliminate the possibility of them being launched within minutes of a warning – a warning that could turn out to be false).

2. Preventing and reversing vertical proliferation

a) Ratification of the already negotiated Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to prohibit any further testing of nuclear warheads.

b) Preventing the expansion of stockpiles of fissile materials for weapons purposes requires the negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) and preventing the use of existing stockpiles for weapons by progressively placing them under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

c) Make all nuclear weapon reductions irreversible and verifiable.

d) Promote transparency and accountability by regular reporting to NPT meetings or conferences on progress made in implementing the disarmament agenda.

3. Preventing and reversing horizontal proliferation

a) Make the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements, which allows for more intrusive and effective inspections, the minimum standard for national safeguard agreements with the IAEA.

b) Deal with the legacy of the unrestrained Cold War nuclear arms race through the global partnership to control and clean-up nuclear materials, especially in the former Soviet Union.

c) Maintain effective export controls over nuclear materials.

d) Explore means of exercising international and non-discriminatory control over the proliferation sensitive elements in the manufacture of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors.

There is much more that needs doing, but these elements at least have met virtually universal support, in principle.

Priorities for Canada

Canada must obviously be active in pursuing implementation of all those elements of the global disarmament agenda, but it is also important give priority to particular issues that it is in a good position to influence.

The basic commitment to abolition is central. In 1999, through the official response to a report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Government of Canada declared that “Canada ‘s objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.”[ii] This position has been held through successive changes in Government and enjoys support across the political spectrum. Each new Canadian Government should, as a matter of course and at the highest level, reaffirm Canada ‘s fundamental commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

From time to time there will necessarily be some shifts in priorities according to changing circumstances, but currently at least four of issues deserve the focused attention of Canada.

1. The disarmament machinery: Nuclear disarmament depends first and foremost on the political will of states to simply do it, but the institutional mechanisms through which they pursue that fundamental and urgent agenda are critically important. The mechanisms can themselves become obstacles to effective progress, and it is clear that in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the NPT Review Process there are institutional arrangements and practices that serve to impede the disarmament progress. These impediments require urgent attention and Canada , having developed significant proposals to address the “institutional deficit” within the disarmament system, is well placed to work with likeminded states to press for constructive change.

2. The internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: The conflict regarding Iran ‘s uranium enrichment program raises important issues about the spread of sensitive civilian technologies – to which all states in compliance with non-proliferation obligations are legally entitled – that have immediate relevance for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is in the interests of nuclear disarmament that these technologies be severely restricted, but such restrictions must obviously be nondiscriminatory. Canada should take an active role in investigating and promoting international mechanisms toward that end.

3. Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines for civilian nuclear cooperation with de facto nuclear weapon states: The US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal has led to proposals to exempt India from the current guidelines of the NSG, and Canadian technology and interests are directly engaged. Canada must be at the fore of international efforts to universalize the NPT and to bring India, Israel, and Pakistan under the rules and discipline of the nuclear nonproliferation system, ensuring that nonproliferation objectives are not only uncompromised but strengthened through any NSG action to modify its guidelines.

4. Resolving the NATO/NPT contradiction: As a NATO country Canada is juggling two conflicting commitments. Through NATO Canada insists that nuclear weapons are essential to its security and are thus to be retained for the foreseeable future; through the NPT and related disarmament forums Canada promotes the elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. This conflict must be resolved in favour of the second commitment.

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[i] Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm. http://www.wmdcommission.org.

[ii] Government of Canada. 1999. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: Advancing Canadian objectives. Government statement. April.