Arms Trade

In contrast to the United States, Canada largely manages to avoid exporting major Canadian military commodities directly to countries at war.[i]

A recent report out of the US[ii] shows the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program to have entered into arms sales agreements in 2006 and 2007 with 20 out of the 27 countries then at war.[iii] The Pentagon sold to 74 percent of the countries then at war, and 30 percent of all its sales ($11.2 billion out of $37.2 billion in sales over those two years) went to where the wars were.

The most recent Canadian figures (based on deliveries, not sales agreements) are for 2005, released a year ago when the Department of Foreign Affairs put out a report on exports to non-US customers for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005[iv] (Canada reports on its military exports to all destinations except the United States).

For those three years Canada sold to 11 of the 28 countries that were at war according to the Ploughshares annual Armed Conflicts Report. So Canada delivered military commodities to 40 percent of countries in conflict – less than the 74 percent supplied by the US, but still a significant number. However, seven of those countries received less than $100,000 worth of such commodities (and the remaining four countries were quite modest customers as well).

That’s where the Canadian record differs markedly from that of the US. Total Canadian sales (to non-US customers) for 2003 through 2005 reached $1.69 billion, of which $13.6 million went to countries in conflict – in other words, less than 1 percent of Canadian military exports went to countries in conflict during those three years (compared with the 30 percent of Pentagon sales that went to countries in conflict in 2006 and 2007). And, as a proportion of total Canadian military exports (including sales to the US), the proportion going to countries in conflict would be less that 1/2 of 1 percent (of course, if the US were included as a country in conflict, re its forces in Iraq, then more than half of all Canadian exports should be reported as going to countries at war).

One Canadian political leader who certainly deserves some of the credit for those low military sales to countries in conflict is Lloyd Axworthy. He obviously wasn’t responsible for military export permit decisions during 2003-2005, but in June 1996 as Minister of Foreign Affairs he issued instructions that the permit approval process pay more rigorous attention to security issues and to threats of hostilities in recipient countries.[v] The result has been a discernable decline in sales to countries experiencing civil conflict or internal war.

In 1996, for example, Canadian military goods went to 14 out of 34 countries at war (41 percent and about the same proportion as in 2005). But the volume of sales to areas of conflict was higher, with $18.6 million out of $504 million (or 3.5 percent of non-US sales) going to countries at war. That still leaves a relatively small proportion, compared with US sales, going to countries at war, but by the 2003-2005 period the proportion of direct sales to countries at war had declined by about 70 percent since the Axworthy directive.[vi]

Reports for Canadian military exports in 2006 and 2007 are long overdue, and when they do finally come out one thing to watch for will be whether the Harper Government has continued the practice of avoiding direct sales to countries at war.

One thing the above figures do not capture are indirect sales – that is the sale of Canadian-built major components and subsystems to industrialized countries, especially the United States, where they are incorporated into weapons that may then be shipped to countries at war.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] For a detailed review of Canadian policy and military exports for the most recent years for twhich data is available see the Ploughshares report, “On the Record: An audit of Canada’s report on military exports, 2003-05,” by Kenneth Epps and Kyle Gossen, January 2009. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Control/Audit2003-05MilitaryExports.pdf.
[ii] William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Weapons at War 2008,” New America Foundation, December 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/u_s_weapons_war_2008_0.
[iii] The countries at war are drawn from the annual Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report (http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePage.html).
[iv] Report on Exports of Military Goods From Canada, 2003-2005, (Export Controls Division, Export and Import Controls Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2007) http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/miliexport07-en.asp.
[v] “Annual Report on Canada’s Military Goods Exports Tabled in Parliament Today, Press Release No. 205, December 11, 1997, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/PublicationContentOnly.asp?publication_id=376245&Language=E&MODE=CONTENTONLY&Local=False).
[vi] The figures for 1995 are similar to 1996, with non-US exports going to 36 percent of countries in conflict, and about 2 percent of total non-US sales going to countries in conflict. That result needs an asterisk inasmuch as these figures do not include sales to the UK even though it was listed as a country in conflict due to the Northern Ireland conflict – if those sales were included, then 7 percent of non-US sales would be shown as going to countries in armed conflict.

As work finally gets underway at the UN on a treaty to govern international arms transfers, Amnesty International’s call for an arms embargo on all parties to the Gaza conflict points to principles and processes by which such a treaty will have to be implemented.

The pursuit of an effective arms trade treaty deserves to be revisited,[i] given that this is the week negotiations finally begin. On January 23rd the newly-established United Nations open-ended working group on arms transfers[ii] will meet to organize a series of one-week negotiating sessions focused on producing a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.”

The intended treaty is to be based, as the mandating resolution puts it,[iii] on “the principles of the Charter of the UN and other existing obligations.” And the relevance of those principles and obligations to arms transfers is summarized by the International Law Commission in its articulation of the basic principle that “a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”[iv]

In the context of the proposed arms trade treaty, the act of aiding or assisting “another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act” involves providing weapons to another state when there is a known and credible risk that those weapons will be used by the recipient state in the commission of a wrongful act.

Canadian military export regulations embody the same principle, namely that arms are not to be provided to any States “whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.”[v] In other words, arms should not be provided if there is a credible risk that they might be used against civilians, and the onus is on the exporter to demonstrate that there is no serious risk.

The effective monitoring and application of that principle through a treaty requires several kinds of detailed information. There is a requirement for information to confirm instances of the use of imported arms for unlawful purposes. There is also a requirement for full disclosure of the sources or suppliers of the particular arms that were used for unlawful purposes. And then there is especially a requirement for detailed advance information on intended transfers along with credible evidence that there is no significant risk that the proposed recipient will use them for unlawful purposes.

Amnesty International, publicly calling for that principle to be honoured in the context of the Gaza conflict, sets out its charge of instances of actions that violate either the UN Charter or international humanitarian law (and calls for a full investigation of these instances):

“Israeli forces have carried out air strikes (bombardments with F16 fighter jets and missile strikes with Apache and similar helicopters and unmanned drones), artillery shelling (with MRLS – multi rockets launch system) and shelling from tanks and gunboats off Gaza’s coast) and other attacks which are directed at civilians or civilian buildings, or are indiscriminate or disproportionate, and have already killed hundreds of unarmed civilians and injured thousands in Gaza, including more than 150 children since 27 December 2008.”

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have fired indiscriminate rockets into southern Israel, which have killed three Israeli civilians and injured scores of others since 27 December 2008.”

Amnesty then goes on to preliminarily point to the foreign sources of such weapons:

“Since 2001, the USA has been by far the major supplier of conventional arms to Israel based on the value of export deliveries of all conventional arms including government to government as well as private commercial sales….Other major arms exporting states such as Germany, France and the UK have exported far less to Israel but nevertheless significant amounts. As a result of political pressure in some European Union countries concerned about the ongoing conflict in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, states such as Germany and the UK have tended to reduce their exports of conventional arms overall. Nonetheless export data show that such states have exported infantry weapons, military vehicles and components for arms sent to Israel. Other significant suppliers of military equipment to Israel since 2001 have been Spain, the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Canada, Slovenia, Australia, Romania, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzogovina. The Netherlands has been a major transit country for military equipment sent to Israel.”

The US Congressional Research Service, in its most recent military exports report, shows Israel’s imports from all sources to be $5.8 billion (US dollars) for the four years 2004-2007, with $5.7 billion of that coming from the US.[vi]

Amnesty also lists Canada as a significant supplier and a report from Ken Epps, who manages the Project Ploughshares Military Industry Database, shows Canadian military exports to Israel of $9.7 million (Canadian dollars) for the years 2000-2005. These figures are based on Government of Canada reports which, while showing broad categories of goods, do not list specific items. The two primary categories of exports to Israel (about two-thirds) are ‘armoured buses & ambulances” and “electronic equipment.” That level of information does not allow any clear assessment of whether any Canadian-origin equipment might have been used for unlawful purposes, indicating in turn that for an arms trade treaty to be effectively monitored and implemented countries like Canada will have to provide more details on the specifics of military goods exported.

Amnesty also reports on possible sources of military equipment used by Hamas:

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have smuggled small arms, light weapons, rockets and rocket components into Gaza, using tunnels from Egypt into Gaza; this weaponry has been acquired from clandestine sources. “Katyusha” rockets are originally Russian-made, but those being used by Palestinian fighters are unlikely to have been acquired directly from Russia.”

Assuming that further investigation would confirm that imported weapons were used unlawfully and that the United States provided those weapons (in the case of Israel), it would then be necessary to make a judgement as to whether the United States, when supplying those arms, should have known that the weapons supplied were likely to be unlawfully used. For that to be the case it would likely be necessary to demonstrate a pre-existing pattern of unlawful uses of arms by Israel.[vii]

The formal operation of the arms trade treaty will have to go beyond relying on such non-governmental organizations to raise instances of possible noncompliance. Instead, key provisions of the arms trade treaty will have to include clear transparency standards that ensure the disclosure of sufficient information, as well as appropriate consultation, investigation, and adjudication mechanisms.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] See the posting in this space of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

[ii] The working group was established by a UN General Assembly vote on December 24/08 (Resolution A/Res/63/240, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/485/19/PDF/N0848519.pdf?OpenElement).

[iii] Operational Paragraph 5, A/Res/63/240.

[iv] Article 16 of the ILC Articles which were commended by the General Assembly, A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. Amnesty International, “Israel-Gaza: Call for an Arms Embargo,” 12 January 2009 (press release).

[v] Report on Export of Military Goods From Canada, 2003-2005, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007. http://www.international.gc.ca/eicb/military/miliexport07-en.asp.

[vi] Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, CRS Report for Congress (Order Code RL34723), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 23 October 2008, pp. 53-54, http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34723.pdf.

[vii] Posting of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

This being February, Canadians have once again been treated to the annual paean to the Avro Arrow. It is a memorial that leaves a question: Why has the Avro Jetliner never received the same attention?

A CBC web report had some Canadians in “mourning” this week over the demise of the Avro Arrow fifty years ago.[i] The Toronto Star had an A.V. Roe company worker who worked on the Arrow in the 1950s “gazing in adoration” at a replica of the experimental but highly advanced fighter aircraft now on display at the new Canadian Air and Space Museum.[ii]

The Ottawa Citizen carried an interesting and informative survey of Canadian aviation history which characterized the Avro Arrow episode as a “tragedy.”[iii] The Avro Jetliner made it into the story, but its demise is recorded only as a “disappointment.” Both planes represented advances in aviation that were unmatched at the time, both showed the extraordinary acumen of Canadian industry, and both were cancelled by government order and destroyed.

The Avro Arrow story is well known. A Canadian designed fighter aircraft, the Avro Arrow was tested and refined over a number of years, at great and growing expense. It could fly at almost twice the speed of sound, at very high altitudes and in all weather, and was highly maneuverable – ideal for intercepting Soviet bombers in Canada’s north.

On February 20, 1959 it was abruptly cancelled and all of the test planes destroyed and cut into pieces. Thousands of workers were laid off. Costs had been escalating and it was clear that it would be far too expensive to put into production if it had to rely on Canadian orders alone. The United States, the most likely customer, was not about to buy a centre piece of its military arsenal, an advanced fighter aircraft, from Canada and thus, the argument in Washington went, make its national security vulnerable to imports.

The story of the Avro Jetliner follows the same basic plotline.[iv]

The Avro Jetliner was not the first civilian passenger jet to fly; the British Comet beat it by two weeks in 1949. But it was the Avro Jetliner that set the standard. Designed to carry up to 40 passengers, it took its first flight on August 10, 1949. It continued to be tested and refined and by 1950 it had reached a speed of 500 miles per hour and an altitude of more than 39,000 feet.

The single Jetliner flew for seven years – used in various roles, including as a VIP transport and an aerial photo platform, it carried the world’s first jet airmail from Toronto to New York. It caught the attention of Howard Hughes who wanted to start a US production line under license and deliver the plane to his TWA airline.

On December 10, 1956 the Jetliner was abruptly cancelled and cut into pieces, with only the cockpit left intact.

Like the Arrow, the Jetliner involves a complicated story behind the simple facts. It was in particular a victim of the Korean War, during which all Canadian aircraft production facilities were pressed into service turning out aircraft for the war effort. The same pressure is also what prevented Howard Hughes from putting it into production in the US. In Canada the government decided to focus on producing the CF100 fighter aircraft.

A question endures. Why does December 10, 1956 not enjoy the same infamy as February 20, 1959?

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Emily Chung, “Remembering the death of the Avro Arrow,” 20 February 2009.

http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/02/20/f-avro-arrow.html.

[ii] Jason Miller, “Avro Arrow to spread wings in new museum,” 21 February 2009.

http://www.thestar.com/News/GTA/article/591011.

[iii] Peter Pigott, “How 100 years of flight transformed a nation,” 23 February 2009.

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/years+flight+transformed+nation/1319042/story.html.

[iv] Websites the tell the story include:

Avroland – http://www.avroland.ca/al-c102.html

Arrow Recovery Canada – http://www.avroarrow.org/Jetliner/JetlinerIntro.html

Wikipedia — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avro_Canada_Jetliner.

By testimony of the Department of National Defence (DND), Canada has taken significant care in the transfer of 2,500 C7 automatic rifles from the Canadian Forces to the Afghan National Army. At the same time, a new US study shows that the security system into which those rifles have now gone is seriously deficient in its ability to ensure that guns intended for the Afghan Army will not join the millions of other weapons that get diverted to illicit users and uses.

The Canadian weapons were provided a year ago under a program of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A).[i] The CSTC-A focuses on the training and development of Afghan security forces and one objective has been to switch Afghanistan from the 7.62 calibre AK-47 to 5.56 calibre automatic weapons, the NATO standard.

The US has transferred over 242,000 small arms and light weapons (SALW) under the program to the Afghan forces (army and police) – in addition to machine guns they include grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. Other countries have provided another 135,000 weapons, of which 2,500 are the Canadian C7 automatic rifles or machine guns.

An investigation by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO)[ii] concludes that the program has failed to meet basic inventory control standards in the supply of these weapons – both because the US forces failed to monitor weapons effectively during the transfers, and because there continued to be a serious risk of theft and loss once the Afghan forces took custody of the weapons. Mark Sedra of the Centre for International Governance Innovation has written extensively about small arms circulation in Afghanistan and the importance of developing a reliable procurement process.[iii]

Whatever the merits of delivering still more arms to a country already awash with as many as 10 million small arms,[iv] the transfers raise important questions about the process by which weapons are delivered to Afghan security forces, and about the capacity of Afghan forces to prevent them leaking away to illicit users.

The Canadian process is considered below, but first a brief look at the GAO report.[v] More than a third of the weapons supplied by the US were not effectively accounted for even by the US at the time of the transfer. Of 242,000 weapons transferred, serial numbers were not recorded for 46,000. Another 41,000, for which serial numbers were recorded, were not registered or documented in any way when they were transferred to Afghan forces and there is no way of knowing where they are now (p. 14).

Furthermore, the GAO says, “CSTC-A did not record the serial numbers for the weapons it received from international donors and stored in the central depots in Kabul for eventual distribution to the [Afghan security forces]” – this did not include the Canadian rifles which were transferred directly to Afghan National Army (ANA) units. The CSTC-A “could not verify the delivery and subsequent control of weapons in Afghanistan” (p. 15). Weapons received from international donors at Kabul’s International Airport were, without documentation, loaded into the custody of the ANA “for unescorted transport from the airport to the central depots in Kabul.” As the GAO report puts it, rather mildly given the evidence, the “CSTC-A had limited ability to ensure that weapons were not lost or stolen in transit to the depots.” (p. 16)

Canada, according to DND’s own account in written response to a series of questions,[vi] put in place a much more effective process for managing the initial transfer to the ANA of the 2,500 C7s.

Issues of diversion are not directly addressed in Canadian export control laws, but the Export and Import Permits Act [Section 7.1.(a)] does require that the transfer not compromise “the safety or interests of the [recipient] State.” If the weapons were transferred into a system of obviously lax inventory control, where there would be a high likelihood that many of those weapons would get diverted to illicit users and uses, it could certainly be taken as a violation of export regulations.

In addition, Canada has signed on to the 2001 UN Program of Action on small arms, an international political agreement which calls on armed forces and other bodies authorized to possess small arms to “establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons.” Such standards and procedures are to include “appropriate location for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanction in the event of thefts or loss.”[vii]

The Canadian C7s appear not to have gone through the central depot in Kabul where much of the control failed. Indeed, the transfer process itself seems to have largely followed the UN protocol and involved, as DND says, “a number of strict measures, including the marking of weapons, the establishment of a register of weapons, and the appropriate training of Afghan forces.”

The DND spokesperson explains further that

“the transfer of weapons is done on an incremental basis, prior to each kandak (unit) resuming operations after a two-month training period. This allows JTF-Afghanistan[viii] to mentor and train Afghans on the usage and maintenance of the weapon, as well as on storage procedures (weapons and ammunition), control measures (weapons and ammunition), human rights, second and third line maintenance, and developing trainers. All recipients also undergo basic security screening.

“Weapons are maintained under control of JTF-Afghanistan until the Commander is satisfied that the necessary control mechanisms are in place. Once the transfer has occurred, the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) works to ensure that the Afghan National Army (ANA) enforce the standards that were taught to them.

“To facilitate training, mentoring and monitoring, weapons are slowly integrated as they are issued to one kandak (unit) at a time. For each block of donations, the Commander of the OMLT submits a detailed written report to Commander JTF-Afghanistan stating whether or not the recipients meet the stated requirements.”

While independent verification of these processes is not possible, DND’s account indicates a significant measure of care to prevent diversion of these weapons to unauthorized users and to promote responsible use – unlike the process followed by the CSTC-A.

There is a separate concern regarding the capacity of the ANA to continue to maintain control of the weapons once they have been transferred into the custody of Afghan security forces.

The CSTC-A has itself been lax in assessing the “equipment accountability capabilities” of the Afghan Forces (p. 19). Even so, the GAO reports that CSTC-A contractors “have documented significant weaknesses in the capacity of [Afghan forces] to safeguard and account for weapons. As a result, the weapons CSTC-A has provided are at serious risk of theft or loss.” The significance for Canada obviously is that despite its training and mentoring provisions, the risks of diversion remain considerable due to the overall level of accountability within Afghan forces – recognizing that control standards within the Afghan Army are reported to be much better than within the Afghan National Police.

A third issue in any transfer is the need to prevent the diversion of the AK-47s which the new guns replace. The danger of the old AK-47s drifting into the small arms supermarket that flourishes in Afghanistan is particularly real. There have even been reports of warlords linked to the pro-Government Northern Alliance selling some of their current surpluses to the Taliban.[ix]

The 2001 UN small arms Program of Action that Canada signed on to includes a provision that whenever new arms are provided, suppliers have an obligation to ensure that the old arms which become surplus are responsibly disposed of, “preferably through destruction.”[x] In this case the weapons which the C7s replace have not been declared as surplus by the ANA and thus will not be destroyed. Rather, they will stay in the ANA inventory – not a reassuring disposal plan.

DND’s response to a question about the ultimate disposal of any weapons replaced by the C7s implies that Canada also has no serious capacity, or intention, to assess the Afghan forces’ ability to maintain control over the weapons. DND explains that “the AK-47s that the ANA were originally issued are the property of the Government of Afghanistan through their various line Ministries (Defence, Interior, etc…).” Hence, “the AK-47 rifles replaced by Canadian participation in the NATO 5.56 program (the C7 donation) are retained by the ANA and warehoused. The C7 donation is not a ‘one for one’ exchange.”

The failure to either assure the destruction of any weapons replaced by the C7s, or to verify the ANA’s effective inventory control over them, must be taken as a failure to fulfill the full intent of the Program of Action.

Of course, the US failure is much more egregious – tens of thousands of weapons unaccounted for, no confidence that the weapons that actually reached the ANA and ANP are neither diverted nor used for unlawful purposes, and no attempt made to destroy or control the arms replaced by the CSTC-A program of conversion to NATO calibre weapons. The GAO reports that CSTC-A is in the process of introducing improved monitoring, but the GAO also reports that the CSTC-A “noted it did not have sufficient staff or mentors to conduct the monitoring envisioned” (p. 25).

International forces in Afghanistan, and particularly weapons suppliers, should at a minimum make sure that transfers are taken as an occasion to actually implement the practices and procedures for effective small arms and light weapons inventory control prescribed in the UN Program of Action that all of them have adopted. That program includes commitments to assist states seeking to develop the necessary infrastructure and overall capacity for full compliance, and thus Canada should surely commit to assisting Afghanistan, not only in the management of the weapons received from Canada, but in the responsible management and use of all of the weapons held by Afghan security forces.

Whatever the true number and legal status of most of the millions of small arms in Afghanistan, they not only deny peace for now, they threaten to defer it for a long time to come. Any supplier that decides to add still more weapons to that super-saturated small arms environment had better be in a strong and confident position to ensure that none of those arms will be diverted to exacerbate the extraordinary challenge that the small arms already there present to a country not short on challenges.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The CSTC-A works with the Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force to train and develop Afghan security forces in order to “achieve security and stability in Afghanistan.” http://www.cstc-a.com/Mission.html.

[ii] Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces. GAO (GAO-09-267), January 2009. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09267.pdf.

[iii] Sedra, Mark. 2008. “Small arms and security sector reform.” Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament and security in post-ar society. Routledge, pp. 158-180.

[iv] The call for arms control: voices from Afghanistan. Oxfam Briefing Note, January 2006. Available at Oxfam, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_afghanistan.pdf,

or through the Council of Foreign Relations,

http://www.cfr.org/project/1294/council_special_report_on_small_arms_and_light_weapons.html

[v] Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces. GAO (GAO-09-267), January 2009. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09267.pdf.

[vi] See Regehr, Ernie. 2009. Canada’s Automatic Weapons Gift to Afghanistan: Were Canadian Military Export Regulations Followed? Ploughshares Briefing 09-2, February. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf092.pdf.

[vii] “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2001, UN Document A/CONF.192/15, Section II, Para 18

(http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html).

[viii] The Canadian Joint Task Force Afghanistan.

[ix] Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, IWPR staff reporter in Mazar-e-Sharif , “The Northern Alliance may supply arms to Taliban, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 12, 2006 (http://www.rawa.org/arm-taliban.htm).

[x] “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2001, UN Document A/CONF.192/15, Section II, Para 18

(http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html).

Some critics of Israel’s military action in Gaza charge that its extensive use of American-origin weapons violates US arms transfer laws. Whatever the merits of that particular charge, it is the type of issue that an arms trade treaty would regularly be called on to settle.

The proposed arms trade treaty (ATT), on which negotiations are about to begin at the UN,[i] is intended to ensure that international arms transfers are guided by obligations of States under the UN Charter and international law more broadly. The NGO Steering Committee that promotes an ATT articulates a foundational principle built on key elements of international law with direct relevance for arms transfers: “States shall not authorize international transfers of arms or ammunition where they will be used or are likely to be used for violations of international law, including: breaches of the UN Charter and customary law rules relating to the use of force; gross violations of international human rights law; serious violations of international humanitarian law; acts of genocide or crimes against humanity.”[ii]

The national arms transfer regulations of many countries already reflect that basic principle, as does the US Arms Export Control Act[iii] which provides that “Defense articles and defense services” can be provided to another country “solely for internal security (including for antiterrorism and nonproliferation purposes), for legitimate self-defense,” and to assist the recipient country’s participation in UN operations and related actions.[iv]

The US Foreign Assistance Act provides that, “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-nationally recognized human rights.” [v]

In the course of current Israeli attacks in Gaza, as well as previous Israeli military operations in Palestine and Lebanon, commentators[vi] and critics have argued that Israel’s actions violate self-defence and international humanitarian law requirements and thus its use of US-origin weapons violates American export conditions. Canadian foreign affairs analyst Eric Margolis says “Israel’s use of American weapons against Gaza violates the U.S. Arms Export Control and Foreign Assistance Acts.”[vii] William Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation and an expert on US arms transfers, wrote in 2002, for example that, “the use of U.S. weapons in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian authority appears to be a clear violation of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act prohibiting U.S. weapons from being used for non-defensive purposes.”[viii] In an extensive 2008 report Hartung documents Israeli use of US-supplied cluster bombs in Lebanon, also in possible violation of US export laws.[ix]

In 2007 US State Department officials sent a preliminary report to Congress citing “likely violations” of US-Israeli arms transfer agreements linked to Israel’s use of cluster bombs among villages in the 2006 attacks on Lebanon.[x]

Other reports from human rights organizations and the US State Department cite similar violations of international obligations – for example, the latter’s report on Israel for 2001 accused the Israeli Defense Force of “excessive use of force” and of deliberate attacks on Palestinian civilian institutions and civilian areas.[xi] A 2008 UN report refers to Israel’s failure to meet the obligations under international law of an occupying power.[xii]

Israel makes the opposite claims. In the case of cluster bombs in Lebanon, Israel says civilians were not targeted and were warned by leaflets dropped from aircraft in advance of any attacks. Israel describes its military actions in Gaza as entirely about self-defense – to halt rocket attacks on Israeli civilians and to prevent other kinds of terror attacks on Israel. Civilian casualties occur, they point out, not because of direct attacks, but as a consequence of direct attacks on legitimate targets that are in close proximity to civilians.

Current commentary and analysis cover the full range of interpretations, from Frank Gaffney’s insistence that “by any reasonable definition, Israel’s operations in Gaza are defensive,”[xiii] to Robert Fisk’s descriptions of specific attacks as “war crimes.”[xiv]

The legal questions at the heart of this heated debate centre on interpretations of basic, but not necessarily precise, concepts such as legitimacy and proportionality, self-defense and aggression, the thresholds that define “gross” violations of human rights or “deliberate” attacks on civilians, the definition of “excessive” use of force, and the severity and frequency of alleged violations of internationally recognized humanitarian law and human rights standards.

These are questions that are necessarily politicized and are unlikely, to understate the point, to yield to consensus in the context of current Israeli action in Gaza – the United States certainly will not charge Israel with violating US arms export conditions. But, difficult as such questions are, the proposed ATT will necessarily and regularly force them onto the public agenda. In fact, had such a treaty been in place now, it would at least have offered procedures and mechanism for examining possible infractions of international law, including the culpability of the supplier when arms are supplied to a State in which it could be reasonably predicted that those arms would be used unlawfully (possible US culpability is also relevant for Canada inasmuch as there are Canadian-built components in many US weapons systems).

A detailed and useful report on implementing an ATT, prepared by the UK NGO Saferworld,[xv] makes it clear that under any foreseeable arms trade treaty, arms transfer decisions will remain national. Even though the focus is international law, an arms trade treaty is unlikely to submit national export decisions to international adjudication.

Furthermore, compliance with such a treaty will be pursued largely through political and diplomatic dialogue, debate, and censure. Authoritative external legal judgments on compliance or noncompliance will not be the norm. Instead, treaty provisions for enhanced transparency and reporting, for consultation and mechanisms for raising formal complaints, and for monitoring transfers and weapons use will be put in place to generate close public scrutiny and thus create strong political incentives to comply.

Gradually, and with obvious difficulty, international consensus will have to build on the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate transfers.

For now, a definitive answer on the legality or legitimacy of arms transfers destined to be used in operations like the action in Gaza will continue to elude consensus in the international community. But the fact that the role of arms suppliers is being raised, including the clandestine deliveries to Hamas, reinforces the importance of establishing a treaty which can provide institutional mechanisms through which to help determine facts, facilitate the debate, and thereby hold arms suppliers and recipients more accountable.

Notes

[i] The General Assembly, First Committee, resolution established an “open-ended working group” to pursue a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” based on the principles of the UN Charter and other existing international obligations – available at Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/res/L39.pdf

[ii] Compilation of Global Principles for Arms Transfers, the NGO Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, Amnest International, 2006, available at: http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/documents/Global_Principles_for_Arms_Transfers_2007.pdf. [iii] Sec. 502.Utilization of Defense Articles and Services. TITLE 22, CHAPTER 39, SUBCHAPTER I, §2754 Purposes for which military sales or leases by the United States are authorized; http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002754—-000-.html.

[iv] US export laws are compared to proposed global arms transfer principles in greater detail in: Rachel Stohl, US Small Arms and Global Transfer Principles (Annex B), Ploughshares Working Paper 06-1, 2006.

[v] Sec. 502B, (US) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), p. 230, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf.

[vi] Joe Parko, “Israel is illegally using U.S. weapons in its attack on Gaza,” OpEdNews.com, 28 December 2008, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Israel-is-illegally-using-by-Joe-Parko-081228-823.html.

[vii] Eric Margolis, “Israel Strikes at Obama,” 4 January 2009, Toronto Sun, http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/eric_margolis/2009/01/04/7912556-sun.html.

[viii] William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Arms Transafer and Security Assistace to Israel,” Arms Trade Resource Center, 6 May 2002, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/israel050602.html.

[ix] William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Weapons at War: Beyond the Bush Legacy,” December 2008, New America Foundation, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/u_s_weapons_war_2008_0.

[x] “Israel may have broken US arms export laws: official,” Muzi.Com, 29 January 2007, http://lateline.muzi.net/news/ll/english/10034372.shtml?cc=35606.

[xi] “Israel and the occupied territories: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001,” Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 4, 2002, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8262.htm.

[xii] “Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967,” report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, General Assembly, 25 August 2008.

[xiii] Frank Gaffney, “Defensive action,” Commentary, The Washington Times, 6 January 2009, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/06/defensive-action/.

[xiv] Robert Fisk, “Why do they hate the West so much, we will ask,” The Independent, 7 January 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-do-they-hate-the-west-so-much-we-will-ask-1230046.html.

[xv] Making it work: Monitoring and verifying implementation of an Arms Trade Treaty, Saferworld, May 2008, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/312/making_it_work.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

It took only one paragraph in the President’s Abu Dhabi speech, the only major foreign policy speech of his Middle East tour, to display the bankruptcy of the Bush non-proliferation strategy. Opening with the familiar evils of terrorism, he quickly turned to Iran. Besides deploring its support for terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Palestine, he repeated the other familiar charge that Iran “defies the United Nations and destabilizes the region by refusing to be open and transparent about its nuclear programs and ambitions.”

And the remedy? “The United States,” he explained, “is strengthening our longstanding security commitments with our friends in the Gulf — and rallying friends around the world to confront this danger before it is too late.”(1) And since “weapon” is the primary word for strength and security in the Bush lexicon, he came prepared with a $20 billion arms deal.

It’s not as if this kind of deal is anything new for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors. In the last eight years, as in the decade before that, Saudi Arabia has, by a large margin, been the world’s leading weapons importer – averaging almost $6 billion per year since 1999.(2) Other Gulf States, notably the three visited by the president, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, are of course much smaller but also well within the top 20 weapons recipients.

The US, of course, is not the only arms supplier to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Fully two-thirds of their acquisitions come from Europe, and we can be sure that the new $20 billion American deal will be more than matched by other eager suppliers.

There is only one problem. The radical militarization of regional security arrangements is not a deterrent to nuclear proliferation, but is in fact its chief driver. States are not threatened into disarmament, nor will Iran be.

For the moment Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear technology for civilian energy production, but it has made a point of using that drive to acquire dual use technologies – technologies like uranium enrichment that can also be used to build weapons – precisely to keep its options open in the face of what it perceives as growing regional threats.

Iran, in other words, is following the Japan model, gradually, but inevitably, developing the knowledge and skills needed to build nuclear weapons. And the only way to persuade Iran, again much like Japan, not to weaponize its nuclear technology will be to persuade it that it lives in a safe neighborhood. But the strategy that Mr. Bush paraded around the Gulf is designed to do the opposite – to persuade Iran it lives in a hostile neighborhood – and the result will be heightened proliferation pressures in Iran.

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia’s massive and still expanding military is not only a threat to Iran – it is a threat to the House of Saud itself. King Abdullah heads a calcified monarchy whose management of an oil-rich economy consists largely of ignoring crisis-level unemployment while brandishing the world’s most ostentatious displays of private wealth – all that in a region saddled with chronic and multilayered conflict, deeply rooted underdevelopment, and broad swaths of debilitating poverty.

As a result, the King and his extended family remain vulnerable to any internal opposition that stands a chance of winning the support of lavishly funded armed forces. Of course, the Royals have not survived this long by ignoring the obvious. The King has in fact taken care to employ divide and rule tactics to create a splintered military, tactics that have included building up the Saudi Arabia National Guard as a tribal force to protect the Royal family from both internal rebellion and the regular Saudi Army.(3) And Canada, by the way, has been a faithful supplier of armored vehicles to that same National Guard for more than a decade.(4)

Terrorism has many and complex roots, but one thing is clear, the Bush-Saudi formula – the unrestrained arming of a “Muslim” oligarchy that hordes what should be public resource wealth and that stays in power by overtly catering to the interests of the “Christian” West – is an al Qaeda recruiter’s dream. Thus, not only has there been an increase in terror attacks within Saudi Arabia, but, as attacks in the US, Europe, Indonesia and well beyond obviously demonstrate, Saudi terror recruits and their international partners now criss-cross the globe.

The threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is intensified by a heightened threat environment, and the threat of global terrorism is unfortunately bolstered by the West’s deepening alliance with Middle East regimes that brazenly defy the rights and well-being of the people they rule. President Bush’s aggressive arming and public coddling of King Abdullah last week made the world more dangerous, on both counts.

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1. “President Bush Discusses Importance of Freedom in the Middle East,” Emirates Palace Hotel,
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 13, 2008),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080113-1.html.

2. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (Document RL34187), September 26, 2007.

3. GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sang.htm; Mark Silverberg, “Bush’a Folly,” The International Analyst Network, January 16, http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=1605.

4. See, December 23, 2007 posting: “Why is Canada Arming the House of Saud” ( whyiscan).

Canada is helping to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) to become a disciplined security force that has the capacity to support Afghan stability and protect the people of Afghanistan. The political context in Afghanistan is still such that it remains rather a long way from reaching that goal, but it is important to prepare security forces for that day, and that takes disciplined skills training, the development of a culture of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and appropriate equipment.

If even a small part of that equipment is to come from Canada it needs to be vetted through the meticulous application of export controls consistent with Canadian policy and international standards. Before we can know whether that responsibility has been met in the transfer of automatic rifles to Afghanistan, answers to several questions are needed.

1. Does the transfer conform to the requirement, in Canadian legislation, that the export of automatic firearms is prohibited to states not on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)?

The Export and Import Permits Act is clear that automatic rifles (which are prohibited firearms under subsection 84.1 of the Criminal Code) may be exported only to countries on the AFCCL.[i] For a country to be added to the list it must have “an intergovernmental defence, research, development and production arrangement” with Canada.[ii]

There is no apparent provision in the Act to exempt direct Government-to-Government transfer. Indeed, when Canada transferred surplus C-5 fighter aircraft to Botswana, it had to be added to the AFCCL before the deal could go through because the C-5s were equipped with automatic weapons (20 mm cannons)[iii] – of course, just what might be involved in a Canada-Botswana “defence, research, development and production arrangement” is another matter.

Foreign Affairs officials have so far not responded to inquiries about how the AFCCL requirement functions in the case of the automatic firearms transferred to Afghanistan – since Afghanistan is certainly not on the AFCCL.

2. What provisions have been made to ensure that the C-7s will be under effective inventory control in Afghanistan and that diversion will be prevented?

Very few illegal guns start out that way. Guns legally transferred to places where inventory control is weak, and all reports about the current Afghan National Army suggest that the description applies, invariably end up being diverted in large numbers to unauthorized users or into a black market. A September 2006 report from the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction “charged that the Department of Defense transferred hundreds of thousands of pistols, assault rifles and machine guns to Iraqi security forces without recording serial numbers or establishing any other mechanism for accountability.”[iv]

Similarly, many of the arms supplied to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan before and during the early stages of the war launched against Afghanistan in 2001 have made their way into the hands of armed militias and individuals. Indeed, according to Oxfam International there could be as many as10 million small arms circulating in Afghanistan, a country of 23 million people.[v]Whatever the true number, the legal status of most of these weapons is at best ambiguous and illegal armed groups are a threat to constitutional authority throughout the country. Any supplier that decides to add still more weapons to that super-saturated small arms environment had better be in a strong and confident position to ensure that none of them are diverted to exacerbate the extraordinary challenge that small arms already present to a country not short on challenges.

3. Has Canada entered into a formal and verifiable agreement with Afghanistan to require that the arms which the C-7 are replacing will be destroyed and prevented from cascading down to illicit users?

Even more difficult than assuring ongoing ANA control over the new C-7s will be preventing the AK-47s which the C-7s replace from drifting into the small arms supermarket that flourishes in Afghanistan. There have even been reports of warlords linked to the Northern Alliance selling some of their current surpluses to the Taliban.[vi] The urgent objective is now to collect those widely circulating weapons, not to add to their number.

In the 2001 UN Small Arms Program of Action, Canada signed on to a political commitment to ensure that whenever new arms are provided, there is an obligation to ensure that the old arms which become surplus are responsibly disposed of, “preferably through destruction.”[vii] Of course, 2500 new weapons is a small number in the Afghanistan scheme of things, but the principle is fundamental and the Department of National Defence needs to explain the arrangements it has made to prevent cascading.[viii]

4. What assessment has the Department of Foreign Affairs made to ensure that the transfer conforms to its human rights guideline for arms transfers?

The current guideline does not prohibit the sale of weapons to states of significant human rights violations; rather it is designed to prevent such transfers if there is a significant risk that the particular weapons involved will be used against civilians. On the surface at least, that would seem to be a serious risk in this instance.

Automatic weapons are obviously designed to be used against people, and human rights organizations report abuses by Afghan security forces. Since the rifles are going to the ANA Brigade that Canada supports, we have to assume that any misuse issues will be addressed. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to understand how Foreign Affairs has assessed the risk.

5. How has Foreign Affairs dealt with the Canadian policy guideline against the supply of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict or where such conflict is imminent?

Obviously, Canada is directly engaged in the Afghan conflict, and thus it would be rather strange for Canada to prohibit arms transfers to the Armed Forces of the very state for which we are providing security assistance. On the other hand, we do need to hear from Foreign Affairs how it understands the relevance of this particular arms transfer principle. The proposed international arms trade treaty states this principles in slightly different terms – as a prohibition on arms transfers that risk undermining the national and regional security situation.[ix] Here too it would be useful for Foreign Affairs to explain the relevance of this particular guideline.[x] Is it irrelevant only in this case, or has there been a policy shift which regards the guideline more broadly irrelevant?

6. Is Ottawa hoping that the donation of 2500 C-7s will be followed-up by sales of much larger quantities of these Canadian-built weapons?

Not all agree that the introduction of C-7s into the ANA is wise. David Pugliese’s Ottawa Citizen Blog helpfully elaborates on the arguments.[xi]ANA soldiers are accustomed to AK-47s, they are the weapons of choice of the region, they are reportedly easy to use and require less maintenance and cleaning to keep them reliable in the dust and sand of Afghanistan. The C-7s, on the other hand, require much more extensive care and maintenance for them to work effectively. Why, in a projected Army of 50-70,000, introduce 2500 guns that require special training and different ammunition from the primary weapon, the AK-47?

Or does DND know something we don’t, namely that these 2500 C-7s are seedlings that are expected to sprout into much larger shipments for sale and profit?

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[i] Import Export Permits Act, Section 7.(2):

“The Minister may not issue a permit under subsection (1) to export any thing referred to in any of paragraphs 4.1( a) to ( c) [prohibited weapons], or any component or part of such a thing, that is included in an Export Control List unless

( a) the export is to a country included in an Automatic Firearms Country Control List; and

( b) the prohibited weapon or component or part thereof is exported to the government of, or a consignee authorized by the government of, that country.”

http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/E-19///en?noCookie

[ii] Section 4.1 of the Act (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/E-19///en?noCookie).

[iii] Ken Epps, “The Automatic Firearms Country Control List and Canada’s firearms exports,” The Ploughshares Monitor, Spring 2006, volume 27, no. 1 (http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monm06c.pdf).

[iv] Susan Waltz, ” US Policy on Small Arms Transfers:

A Human Rights Perspective,”Working Paper no. 43, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 13 October 2007(http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working/2007/43-waltz-2007_rev.pdf).

[v] Available at Oxfam,http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_afghanistan.pdf,

or through the Council of Foreign Relations,

http://www.cfr.org/project/1294/council_special_report_on_small_arms_and_light_weapons.html

[vi] Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, IWPR staff reporter in Mazar-e-Sharif , “The Northern Alliance may supply arms to Taliban, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 12, 2006 (http://www.rawa.org/arm-taliban.htm).

[vii] “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2001, UN Document A/CONF.192/15 ,Section II, Para 18

(http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html).

[viii] Afghanistan: Where the rule by the gun continues, IRIN, the humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34289&Country=Yes).

[ix] Elaborated in Ernie Regehr, Canadaand the Arms Trade Treaty, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (Vol. 64, No. 6), http://www.igloo.org/ciia/Publications/behindth

[x] The current guideline promises to “closely control” exports to countries “that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities.” Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2003-2005(www.exportcontrols.gc.ca).

[xi] David Pugliese, “Is Giving C-7s to the Afghan National Army the Right Move?” Defence Watch(OttawaCitizen.Com),http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2008/01/03/is-giving-c-7s-to-the-afghan-national-army-the-right-move.aspx.

Canada’s provision of helicopters to Pakistan’s military deserves the same kind of scrutiny that is finally raising serious questions in Washington[i] about the utility of showering President (and former General) Pervez Musharraf with cash and weapons to prosecute the “war on terror.”

At least some US experts on South Asian political and military affairs were pointing out well before the assassination of Benazir Bhuto that Islamabad sees its strategic interests running more toward fomenting terrorism than fighting it. In its conflict with India, a country that far outstrips it in military, economic, and diplomatic power, Pakistan depends on the asymmetric tactic of inducing militant insurgents to disrupt Kashmir. As for Afghanistan, Christine Fair of the US Institute for Peace[ii] points out that Pakistan sees it more as a client state than a neighbor and thus shows little interest in promoting its stability, especially in support of a factional government whose sympathies lean more toward New Delhi than Islamabad.

Doug Saunders of the Globe and Mail sums up the Pakistan card that the west has been playing: “For seven years, Western governments have been making an expensive bet: that by an alliance with Pakistan’s military dictatorship, we can make Afghanistan more stable and peaceful, reduce international terrorism and, eventually, have a Pakistani leader who is not an unelected general. Canada spends $50-million a year on aid, much of it intended to achieve this goal. The U.S. spends 20 times more. And NATO is betting much of its Afghan mission on it.”[iii]

Since 2001 US military aid to Pakistan has exceeded $10 billion, much of it unaccounted for and intended as a general reimbursement for Pakistan’s hoped for anti-terror initiatives, with some of it used, as the New York Times reports, to buy refurbished Cobra attack helicopters.”[iv] But, along with the Cobras, in 2004 and 2005 there were shipments of $240 million[v] worth of Canadian-built Bell 412 utility helicopters:[vi]

Though built in Canada, the 26 helicopters were shipped as part of the US military sales program – initially provided under a US financed lease arrangement, but then handed over to the Pakistan military in late 2007.[vii] The helicopters are defined as civilian in Canada, but in Pakistan they are specifically earmarked for “war on terror” activity – at a November 2007 handover ceremony, the Pakistan Director General of Army Aviation, Major General Syed Taqi Naseer Rizvi said he hoped the Bell 412s “would go a long way in fortifying the country’s capability to effectively combat the menace of terrorism.”[viii] (The company prefers to highlight the humanitarian role of the Bell 412s, which, following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake was substantial – “In the 45 days following the earthquake, the 16 Pakistani Army 412s flew 4,580 missions, an average of 102 missions per day. They logged 2,743 hours and were credited with rescuing 54,960 people. The Pakistani Army 412s were supported by the nine-member Bell Team located in Pakistan.”)[ix]

Canada currently prohibits the shipment of any military equipment to Pakistan – a policy in place since Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests.[x] However, the helicopters get through to the Pakistan military because they are designated civilian and thus are not on the Export Control List and do not require an export permit. The most recent Foreign Affairs report on military exports explains that “civilian goods and technology that are not covered by any group in the Export Control List are not normally subject to export controls, even if they are intended for sale to a military end user” – adding, disingenuously at best, that “these are items such as fuel and food.”[xi] The report is silent on the helicopters.

Exporting utility helicopters to the Pakistan military is an explicit but unexamined foreign policy statement by Canada. Having absolved itself of the responsibility to grant or withhold an export permit for these helicopters, Ottawa abdicates its responsibility to carefully assess the wisdom of relying on Pakistan to militarily defeat insurgents, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Seven years into Washington’s “war on terror,” insurgents in both countries have proven themselves not to be amenable to military defeat. President Musharraf, at the same time, finds this less alarming than might be expected and is certainly a less than enthusiastic ally in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. Like its Afghanistan policy, Ottawa’s Pakistan policy requires some careful assessment – an assessment that should have preceded the shipment of helicopters.

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[i] “Between Cheney and a hard place: America wants its counter-terrorism money’s-worth from Pakistan,”The Economist, March 1, 2007 (http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8776347).

CNN, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, November 6, 2007 (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0711/06/acd.02.html): Joe Johns, CNN Congressional Correspondent: “Ever since the horror and shock of 9/11, some say the U.S. war on terror has meant a blank check for Pakistan. Since 2001, the United States has kicked in $10.5 billion in funding to Pakistan. In fact, it’s probably more. Some of the money is off the books because it’s called covert spending. Experts claim U.S. officials have no idea what the money is really buying.”

[ii] Christine Fair, a specialist in South Asian political and military affairs at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute for Peace (October 2006, PBS programs on the “Return of the Taliban.”)http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/fair.html.

[iii] Doug Saunders “Back off, but don’t walk away,”Globe and Mail, December 29, 2007 (http://ago.mobile.globeandmail.com/generated/archive/RTGAM/html/20071228/wessay_saunders29.html.

[iv] By David Rohde, Carlotta Gall, Eric Schmitt And David E. Sanger, “U.S. Officials See Waste in Billions Sent to Pakistan,” The New York Times, December 24, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/world/asia/24military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print).

[v] Ken Epps, Statistics Canada search, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag.

[vi] Ken Epps, “Canadian helicopters to Pakistan armed forces,” The Ploughshares Monitor, Summer 2004 (Vol. 25, No. 2) (http://ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monj04f.htm).

[vii] “As part of a 235-million dollar project, Pakistan leased the Bell-412 helicopters from the US, which provided the resources and manpower training to run them, the US embassy said.” (“US gives 30 copters to Pakistan,” Agence France-Presse. Islamabad, October 23, 2007,http://www.newagebd.com/2007/oct/23/inat.html.)

[viii] “US gives 30 copters to Pakistan,” Agence France-Presse. Islamabad, October 23, 2007,http://www.newagebd.com/2007/oct/23/inat.html.

[ix] From a Bell Helicopter press release, January 23, 2006,

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?prod=66040&session=dae.32119770.1199017253.9Xi4x38AAAEAADsRbe0AAAAU&modele=jdc_1.)

[x] Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2003-2005, Export Controls Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, p. 2 (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/military-reports-en.asp).

[xi] Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2003-2005, Export Controls Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, p. 2 (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/military-reports-en.asp).

According to the just-released Foreign Affairs report on Canadian military exports (2003 through 2005),[i] Canada shipped $214 million worth of Canadian-built armored vehicles to Saudi Arabia in 2004. Indeed, Saudi Arabia was a consistent and prominent customer of Canadian-built armored vehicles for the better part of a decade, until 2005 when deliveries dropped sharply.

In the social order of our partner in arms the ordeal of the rape victim fits a pattern. The US State Department, for example, describes Saudi Arabia as engaging in Tier 3 human trafficking, the category reserved for the most serious violators under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. But as Human Rights Watch points out, the US “administration has consistently waived sanctions against Saudi Arabia that are supposed to be triggered by that designation, arguing that a full waiver needs to be given to allow military sales to Saudi Arabia ‚Äòto advance the goals of the Global War on Terror and U.S. commercial interests.'”[ii] The Canadian-built armored vehicles go to Saudi Arabia via the US foreign military sales program.

Amnesty International elaborated, in its 2006 report, on the human rights abuses of the Saudi regime:

“The government continued with reform initiatives but these had little impact in improving human rights. There were new violations linked to the “war on terror” and further clashes between security forces and members of armed groups. Scores of people suspected of belonging to or supporting such armed groups were reported to have been arrested but the authorities did not divulge their identities or other information about them, and it was unclear whether any were charged and brought to trial. Peaceful critics of the government were subjected to prolonged detention without charge or trial. There were allegations of torture, and floggings continued to be imposed by the courts. Violence against women was prevalent and migrant workers suffered discrimination and abuse. At least 39 people were executed.[iii]

Canadian export regulations – or regulations proposed for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the feasibility of which is to be investigated by a UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2008[iv]- do not prohibit military exports to serious human rights violator countries, unless there is a risk that the particular equipment being shipped will be used against civilians.[v] The NGO-developed draft ATT articulates the same broadly accepted principle of arms transfer restraint, saying military commodities should not go to states in which it is reasonable to expect they will be used in serious human rights abuses.[vi]

Any reliable assessment of the likelihood of a particular piece of military equipment being directly used by the recipient state in human rights abuses obviously requires some knowledge to the recipient’s record or habit in that regard. The Canadian armored vehicles have been going to the Saudi National Guard and GlobalSecurity.Org fills in some background:

“Saudi Arabia really has two different armies. The Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) is not like the US National Guard. It is a tribal force forged out of those tribal elements loyal to the Saud Family. The SANG’s mission is to protect the royal family from internal rebellion and the other Saudi Army, should the need arise. It is also a counterbalance within the royal family to Sudairi control over the regular armed forces. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) contains the “official” Saudi Army (Royal Saudi Land Forces). Its mission is to protect the country from external threats, and to serve as a balance against SANG, should the royal family decide to eliminate some clan hostile to the King’s rule.”

“After the war [Desert Storm] ended, it was reported that an enlargement of the national guard to eleven or twelve active brigades was contemplated. In addition, the Commando APCs were to be replaced by more than 1,000 eight-wheeled light armored vehicles (LAVs) manufactured by General Motors in Canada [now General Dynamics]. The LAVs were to be mounted with a variety of armaments, such as 25mm guns, kinetic energy guns, and TOW missile launchers.”[vii]

The 2004 report by the US State Department, the peak year of these Canadian armored vehicle shipments to the Saudis, specifically points to the human rights abuses of the Security Forces of Saudi Arabia, including the National Guard:

“Members of the security forces committed human rights abuses. The Government continued to commit abuses against members of the Shi’a Muslim minority. Government security forces reportedly arrested Shi’a based on scant suspicion, held them in custody for lengthy periods, and then released them without explanation. The Government’s human rights record remained poor overall with continuing serious problems, despite some progress. Citizens did not have the right to change their government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and prisoners, arbitrarily arrest, and hold persons in incommunicado detention.”[viii]

As already noted, Canadian policy is against military sales to locations where there is a risk that the particular commodity will be used against civilians. Independent human rights organizations and the US State department all confirm that the Saudi recipient of the Canadian LAVs is routinely engaged in human rights abuses. So why have successive governments allowed Canadian armored vehicles to be shipped to Saudi Arabia? Presumably Ottawa argues that the armored vehicles are not specifically part of Saudi Arabia’s abuse apparatus. But both Canadian policy and emerging arms transfer principles put the onus on Foreign Affairs to make a detailed and credible public case for why large volumes of armored vehicle shipments to the Saudi National Guard are not a human rights threat in a country where rape victims must receive the pardon of the supreme ruler.

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[i] See the CBC report with Ken Epps of Project Ploughshares (“Arms exports reached record levels in 2003: report,” December 21, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/12/21/arms-exports.html?ref=rss). The report is available online: Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2003-2005, Export Controls Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/military-reports-en.asp).

[ii] ” Is There a Human Rights Double Standard? US Policy Toward Saudi Arabia, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan,” Testimony by Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch Washington advocacy director to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight(June 14, 2007). http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/14/usint16481.htm

[iii]Amnesty International Report 2007 on Saudi Arabia, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/middle-east-and-north-africa/west-gulf/saudi-arabia.

[iv] Ernie Regehr, “Canada and the Arms Trade Treaty,” Behind The Headlines (Volume 64, No. 6), Canadian Institute of International Affairs and The Centre for International Governance Innovation (http://www.igloo.org/ciia/Publications/behindth).

[v] The current Canadian guideline says “Canada closely controls the export of military goods and technology to countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.” Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2003-2005, Export Controls Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/military-reports-en.asp).

[vi] A draft Treaty, prepared in consultation with international law experts at Cambridge University, UK, makes the similar point this way:”A Contracting Party shall not authorise international transfers of arms in circumstances in which it has knowledge or ought reasonably to have knowledge that transfers of arms of the kind under consideration are likely to be used in the commission of serious violations of human rights.” The full draft is available athttp://www.armstradetreaty.com/att/att.framework.pdf

[vii]GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sang.htm.

[viii]US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights (2004)

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41731.htm.

A year ago states decided, through a UN General Assembly resolution, to pursue”a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.”[i] At the same time they asked the Secretary-General to survey states for their views on the feasibility of such an Arms Trade Treaty.

The Secretary-General has now reported. The response rate was unusually high, more than 90 countries (153 voted for the resolution), and more than 90 percent of those argued that the feasibility of a treaty is evidenced by the variety of initiatives and voluntary arrangements that already exist at sectoral, multilateral, regional and sub-regional levels. Transparency was identified as essential to making control measures effective and states are looking to the forthcoming study by a Group of Governmental Experts (which will report in the autumn of 2008) to explore, among other issues, reporting procedures, related measures to verify compliance, and assistance to states in building national capacity to manage transfer controls.

It is clear that an Arms Trade Treaty will include mandatory disclosure of exports and imports to an international registry of transfers – similar to the current UN Register of Conventional Arms,[ii]except that the expected register will not be voluntary and will include all conventional arms, including small arms. In effect, under a Treaty each state party will become accountable to all others, with opportunities for all parties to the treaty to challenge each other on particular transfers deemed not to be in compliance.

Canada’s annual report on the Export of Military Goods, introduced in 1991, goes some way toward meeting likely transparency requirements – although, current reporting is certainly not a model of timeliness, the last report having been released in late 2003 reporting on 2002 exports.[iii]The report, when it is available, is extensive compared to the national reports of many countries (notwithstanding its major gap in excluding exports to the US – which is another story for another time). However, a major objective of the Treaty will be to prevent arms sales when there is a risk that they will be used in the violation of human rights, but any reliable assessment of such a risk requires considerable detail on the particular commodities sold and on the likely user – information that is not available under current reporting.

For example, the report on 2002 lists the sale of a surveillance camera system to Colombia (for $600,000) but offers no details of the context in which it is to be used and by whom. Thus there is no basis for assessing the level of risk that it will contribute to human rights violations. Aircraft have a variety of roles and functions, and since Canada is a supplier of aircraft and of components for foreign aircraft manufactures, assessments of their likely impact on human rights requires clear information on the kind of aircraft involved and their users and likely uses. The sale of $30 million in helicopters and aircraft parts to Saudi Arabia, along with $20 million in armoured vehicles, is reported without details about the end-user – but even without that, these sales, part of a series of multiyear contracts, ought to be setting off alarm bells on multiple levels.

Canada’s response to the Secretary-General’s survey[iv]affirms the centrality of transparency: “We believe that an Arms Trade Treaty will provide a transparent framework of universally applicable standards for States to follow” (para 2). Furthermore, “Canada supports inclusion of a requirement that States share information relating to the transfers that they approve or reject. A mechanism will be needed to ensure that this information is made available to all States” (para 18).

The government’s recognition of the centrality of transparency to accountability and restraint is welcome. That in turn will require the addition of considerable detail to Canadian reporting and, especially, a measure of timeliness. Reporting four years after the fact, the current pattern, may be of interest to historians but is of little use to arms controllers. Under an Arms Trade Treaty timely reporting will be the central means by which national decision-making on military exports can be shaped and constrained by agreed standards, peer scrutiny, and legal challenges – all measures to help make international human security the essential test of responsible military exports.

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[i] United Nations General Assembly.2006b. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/61/89, December 18.Available athttp://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/499/77/PDF/N0649977.pdf?OpenElement.

See the Nov 1/06 posting here (newactio).

[ii] http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html

[iii] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 2003. Export of Military Goods from Canada: Annual Report 2002, December. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/military/miliexport02-en.asp.

[iv] Canada’s views on ATT, Submitted Autumn ’07:

http://disarmament.un.org/UNODA_Web_Docs/CAB/ATT/Canada.pdf