Posted on: January 31st, 2024 by Ernie Regehr
This was the theme of a one-day conference at Massey College, University of Toronto (November 30, 2023). Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Professor Emerita at Western University and Senior Fellow of Massey College, opened the conference with the question: “how can we engage Russia in the shared pursuit of pan-Arctic security, stability, and cooperation, while still holding it to account for its egregious violation of international law in invading Ukraine?”
The security panel, chaired by Ernie Regehr, explored prospects and possibilities for “military cooperation in a Divided Arctic.” The Chair’s introduction follows:
It is safe to say that seven of the Arctic states are in broad agreement that there cannot be business-as-usual with Russia in the north as long as its assault on Ukraine continues. At the same time, there is recognition that a posture of strict non-engagement can also have troubling ramifications—especially given that Russia makes up half or more of the Arctic’s geography, demography, economy, and, of course, military infrastructure.
One global objective for which the potential consequences of non-engagement loom large is the urgent need to more effectively address the climate crisis, noting especially the rapid environmental and climate changes being experienced in the Arctic. That sense of urgency led a scholar with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs to write in the 2022 Arctic Yearbook that “we need Russia’s partnership for saving the future” (1). While offering that controversial assessment, he still insisted that Russia’s explicit violations of the UN Charter and international law mean “there cannot be a return to business as usual,” but he was driven to ask whether the planet has the time to wait for a future and more compatible Russia.
Provocative military operations on both sides of the Arctic divide certainly risk further heightening regional tensions – for example, the Pentagon’s demonstration on Norway’s Arctic Andoya Island that it could launch an air-to-surface cruise missile from a C-130 transport aircraft (2), and Russia’s test launch of a Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile from within Norway’s EEZ (3). The American commander of the test launch from the C-130 explained, “we are intentionally trying to be provocative without being escalatory” (4), and it can be assumed that the Russian Tsirkon launch involved a similar rationale—without either side offering any explanation of how deliberate provocation could avoid increasing tension.
Intensified military operations pose serious risks of military close calls, misunderstandings, and the classic security dilemma that sees security enhancement measures on one side produce reciprocal escalations on the other, leaving both less secure. The specific consequences may be unpredictable, but the overall results are inevitable. Such risks necessarily prompt questions of whether security and stability can be served when all security discussions or engagement with Russia in the Arctic are deferred until after the war on Ukraine has ended.
Governor General Mary Simon raised essentially that question by challenging all Arctic states “to figure out how you can continue working together when a terrible war is going on [which is] contradictory to the rules-based international order” (5).
The commander of the US Coast Guard in Alaska has suggested that some level of engagement is prudent. He put it like this: “You have to be able to speak to your neighbor, your next-door neighbor. You don’t have to be best friends with them, but you’ve got to be able to speak with them for shared interests across what is the natural physical border directly with Russia here in Alaska” (6).
Read the full Conference Report here.
Notes
(1) Michael Paul, “Russia’s war and the prospects for Arctic States’ cooperation,” Arctic Yearbook 2022. https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/2C_AY2022_Paul.pdf.
(2) John Vandiver, “‘Unconventional’ delivery of US airpower in Arctic tailored to serve notice to Russia,” Stars and Stripes, 09 November 2022. https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2022-11-09/red-dragon-missile-norway-russia-7986361.html
(3) Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s new hypersonic Tsirkon missile was fired from Norwegian sector of Barents Sea,” The Barents Observer, 23 February 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com.
(4) John Vandiver, 09 November 2022.
(5) “Climate change, Indigenous issues transcend boundaries with Russia says Governor General,” APTN National News, Canadian Press, 28 February 2023. https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/climate-change-indigenous-issues-transcend-boundaries-with-russia-says-governor-general.
(6) Yereth Rosen, “Despite Russia’s post-invasion isolation, some narrow openings for Arctic cooperation remain,” Arctic Today, 05 April 2023. https://www.arctictoday.com/despite-russias-post-invasion-isolation-some-narrow-openings-for-arctic-cooperation-remain.
Posted on: July 29th, 2021 by Ernie Regehr
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