Posts Tagged ‘Iran’

In his press conference statement at the conclusion of the Muskoka G8 meeting, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated mater-of-factly, but wrongly, that Iran has “chosen to acquire [nuclear] weapons to threaten its neighbours.[i]

Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor the UN Security Council claims that Iran has made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Nor did the G8 itself make that claim in its Muskoka communiqué.

It is a distinction worth emphasizing. Iran is in serious violation of its transparency and accountability obligations toward the IAEA. It is in violation of the UN Security Council’s directive that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. But neither the IAEA nor the UN has said directly that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.

There is evidence that points disturbingly to the possibility that Iran is pursuing a weapons capability, rather than a weapon itself, but that is still a matter of suspicion, not knowledge. What both the IAEA and the UN say is that in all of Iran’s known nuclear activity it can be confirmed that there has been no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. The problem is that Iran has not been transparent enough to allow IAEA inspectors to go beyond officially declared sites to confirm that there are no longer any clandestine nuclear programs in place.

Both the IAEA and the Security Council therefore call on Iran to meet its transparency obligations, including implementation of the IAEA “Additional Protocol” which provides for a much more extensive inspection operation. The call to suspend uranium enrichment is a call for a temporary suspension as a confidence building measure – it is not a requirement that Iran permanently forego uranium because it is acknowledge that enrichment itself is not a violation of either IAEA safeguards or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran, like other states in the NPT, has the acknowledged right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment, but in the context of openness and verifiability of its entire nuclear program.

Iran’s current enrichment is taking place under the watchful eye of the IAEA. But the IAEA lists a number of other actions taken and not taken by Iran that fall short of its transparency obligations and in some cases point toward possible military interest or involvement.

So all the international statements are careful to make the distinction – they do not say Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon; they say instead that Iran is not sufficiently open to confirm conclusively that it is not.

Hence the most recent UN Security Council resolution calls for transparency and the “clarification” of particular activities in order “to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme.”[ii]

The most recent IAEA report puts it this way: “While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”[iii]

The G8 Communiqué itself does not claim or charge that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability.[iv] In paragraphs 32 and 33 of the communiqué, G8 leaders voice high concern about Iran’s lack of transparency and then “call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.[v]

It is the formulation that the Prime Minister should follow in his public statements on Iran.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Prime Minister Stephen Harper, speaking at his closing press conference of the G8, 26 June 2010, said the leaders “…discussed a further range of global challenges: nuclear proliferation, Iran, the implementation of sanctions foreseen by UN Resolution 1929…. The Governments of Iran and North Korea have chosen to acquire weapons to threaten their neighbors. The world must see to it that what they spend on these weapons will not be the only costs that they incur.”http://www.cbc.ca/video/#/Embedded-Only/News/G8-G20_Video/ID=1530937893.

[ii] Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on 9 June 2010. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement.

[iii] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General (International Atomic Energy Agency: GOV/2010/28), 31 May 2010.  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-28.pdf

[iv]G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010 http://www.cbc.ca/politics/insidepolitics/2010/06/2010-g8-communique-released.html.

[v] G8 MUSKOKA DECLARATION: RECOVERY AND NEW BEGINNINGS, Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010.

Para 32. “The adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1929 reflects the concerns of the international community on the Iranian nuclear issue, and we call on all states to implement it fully. While recognizing Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, we note that this right comes with international obligations that all states, including Iran, must comply with.  We are profoundly concerned by Iran’s continued lack of transparency regarding its nuclear activities and its stated intention to continue and expand enriching uranium, including to nearly 20 percent, contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. We call upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and implement relevant resolutions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Our goal is to persuade Iran’s leaders to engage in a transparent dialogue about its nuclear activities and to meet Iran’s international obligations. We strongly support the ongoing efforts in this regard by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative, and we welcome their commitment to the resolution of all outstanding issues through negotiation. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in this regard, including those made recently by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor.”

Para 33. “Recalling the concerns we expressed at the 2009 L’Aquila Summit, we urge the Government of Iran to respect the rule of law and freedom of expression, as outlined in the international treaties to which Iran is a party.”

The just concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference not only avoided the disaster of the 2005 Conference, it managed a major achievement – agreement to finally act on a 1995 promise to pursue the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Much of the disarmament language in the agreed final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is familiar and aspirational – pledging to “achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but on at least one topic the States Parties to the Treaty got down to some specifics.

The action plan for “the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction” is the signal achievement of the 2010 Review Conference. And that is good news for those with a primary focus on disarmament by nuclear weapon states.

In 1995, when the NPT was transformed into a permanent Treaty, the Middle East was a central point of contention. Arab States were unprepared to commit to permanently disavowing nuclear weapons  when one State in their midst, Israel, was not Party to the Treaty, would not make the same commitment, would not deny that it was in possession of nuclear weapons, and would not open all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To bridge that commitment gap, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation put forward a resolution, agreed to by all Parties to the Treaty, in support of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.

Article VII of the Treaty provides for the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones, and in 1995 it was clear that the Treaty would not become permanent without the promise of action on such a zone in the Middle East. And the promise states made was pretty straightforward. The States Parties “noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,” by which they meant Israel (which has pursued unsafeguarded nuclear programs since the 1950s), and called on all states in the region “to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The nuclear weapon states promised to “exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”[i]

The actions taken since then to fulfill those promises have also been straightforward – that is to say, straightforward avoidance of action.

So now, in 2010, the NPT States made another set of promises – with two core elements:[ii]

First, they promise to convene a conference in 2012, “to be attended by all States of the Middle East.” As of now, Israel says it will not attend.[iii] The conference is to be convened by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East (the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation). In addition, the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant international organizations are tasked to prepare appropriate background documentation.

Second, the UN Secretary-General and the 1995 co-sponsors, in consultation with the States of the region, are to appoint a “Facilitator” with the general mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution, to support the preparations for the 2012 conference, to carry out post-conference follow-on activities, and then to report to the 2015 Review Conference.

This time the consequences of inaction will go beyond a simple delay. Even another five years of broken promises will end credible hope of effective nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the Middle East. Iran’s determined pursuit of technologies with weapons applications could by then have made the leap to the weapons themselves, and that, along with Israel’s undeclared arsenal, would trigger a potential proliferation stampede in the region – initially focused on civilian programs, but ones that privilege weapons related technologies and create the capacity to move to the weapons themselves on relatively short notice.

And the consequences would extend far beyond that region, effectively halting action, and much of the rhetoric, in support of zero nuclear weapons in the rest of the nuclear-armed world.

So, the action proposed for the Middle East must be understood as a core disarmament action. The failure to act on the new promise would persuasively add to the suspicion that the nuclear non-proliferation system is simply not up to the challenge of dealing with deep-seated proliferation threats. In other words, if Iran, Israel, and North Korea are not dealt with effectively, and if the other two states with nuclear weapon that are outside the Treaty, India and Pakistan, are not drawn into the disarmament and non-proliferation system, then much of the political constituency in support of disarmament in the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, particularly the US and Russia, can be expected to steadily abandon its support for major cuts and progress toward the agreed goal of zero.

There is obviously no short route to a Middle East that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, but the pursuit of that goal is integral to pursuing disarmament in all its dimensions. The decision of NPT States to give it some serious attention is an important development.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The full resolution is available on the Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html.

[ii] The final document as approved ( NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

[iii] Amy Teibel, “Israel rejects UN call to come clean on nuclear program,” The Globe and Mail, 30 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/israel-rejects-un-call-to-come-clean-on-nuclear-program/article1585886/.

The fuel swap proposal put forward jointly by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran will likely turn out to be much less consequential than either its critics or supporters contend.

The proposal to exchange Iranian enriched uranium for reactor fuel certainly does not have the potential “to settle an ongoing dispute over Iran’s enrichment program,” as the Organization of the Islamic Conference characterized it,[i] but neither will failure to implement it irredeemably damage the international community’s already troubled nonproliferation diplomacy with regard to Iran. The proposal has been met with less enthusiasm than its authors hoped, but the US Administration did not reject it as categorically as some reports have suggested.[ii]

As the critics have pointed out, the Turkey/Brazil version of the fuel swap loses one important dimension of the IAEA proposal of October 2009. The new version no longer removes the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium for storage outside the country, simply because Iran is enriching uranium, even to 20 percent, at too fast a rate. That means the fuel swap at the level proposed is no longer a defence against breakout – that is, it could not ensure that Iran will not be able to accumulate enough enriched uranium to further enrich it to weapons grade to build at least one warhead, should it decide to pull out of the NPT and do so. As Jeffrey Lewis put it, now “Iran can enrich uranium quicker than [the international community] can arrange for it to be sent out of the country.”[iii]

But that’s not a reason not to accept the fuel swap for what it is – a modest gesture of cooperation between Iran and the international community, in which Iran gets fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Call it a goodwill humanitarian gesture inasmuch as it would facilitate continued production of medical isotopes.

But the fuel swap proposal doesn’t begin to address the Iran “problem.” At best the swap could improve the political climate within which real problem solving is pursued – no small thing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called it a good proposal that could be “a precursor to full-scope negotiations with world powers.”[iv]

Remember what the Iran problem is that requires those negotiations. It is a rather long list of outstanding issues and unanswered questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the course of trying to bring Iran back, following the 2003 discovery of its clandestine nuclear program, into full compliance with its disclosure and safeguards obligations. The most recent IAEA report (18 February 2010), issued under the guidance of the new Director General, Yukiya Amano, identifies the issues that need clarification and resolution, including:[v]

1. Operations at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Nantaz are now under IAEA safeguards, but “additional measures need to be put in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear materials at [the plant].”

2. The IAEA is able to confirm that reprocessing and related activities are not taking place at identified facilities, but without the benefit of inspection measures under the Additional Protocol the Agency is not able to confirm that there are no such activities at other, undisclosed, sites in Iran.

3. The IAEA’s request for access to Iran’s heavy water production plant continues to be rejected.

4. Iran has suspended implementation of a modified Code 3.1 provision of the Safeguards agreement by which Iran is required to provide to the Agency design information for any new facility as soon as there is a decision to construct such a facility. The IAEA says Iran cannot unilaterally suspend implementation of the Code 3.1 provision, and also says Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which is not following that provision.

5. The IAEA has an outstanding request for further information on “pyroprocessing R&D activities” at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory.”

6. The IAEA also has an outstanding request for access to additional locations, including those engaged in “manufacturing centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium mining and milling.”

7. The IAEA has additional outstanding requests related to further clarification of activities with possible military dimensions (see Note).[vi]

Of course, the merits of these issues or requirements are disputed by Iran; but the point is that these are outstanding issues that merit attention and mutual resolution.

Unfortunately, the bulk of public and diplomatic attention has been on the Security Council demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Essentially, such a suspension would be no more helpful in addressing the list of outstanding issues than would the fuel swap – each would help to build confidence, to be sure, but neither would directly address the questions and requirements identified by the IAEA.

Uranium enrichment, which is now carried out under the watchful eye of the IAEA, is, as Iran repeatedly and correctly notes, a perfectly legal activity. Suspension of safeguarded enrichment will do nothing to help the IAEA discover any clandestine enrichment. Again, Jeffrey Lewis makes the point succinctly: “…the problem isnot Iran’s enrichment at Natanz, not even to 20 percent. The problem is Iran’s history of clandestine enrichment. Iran wants to change the narrative to focus on the West’s objection to its arguably legitimate activities. Why we keep helping them do that is beyond me.”

To become reasonably and reliably assured that Iran is no longer operating undeclared nuclear programs requires a fully applied Additional Protocol. To be reasonably assured that Iran is not pursuing military applications (i.e. the bomb) for its fuel cycle activity, requires not only the Additional Protocol but also that the IAEA’s outstanding issues and questions be resolved. Suspending enrichment advances neither of those requirements.

In the meantime, the US response to the Turkey/Brazil/Iran proposal has actually been rather measured:[vii]

-the White House response did not reject the deal, instead it said the transfer of LEU off of Iranian soil would be a positive step, if…;

-it then raised concern about Iran’s intention to continue enriching to 20 percent (the possibly significant point here being that the comment wasn’t about enrichment period);

-the White House statement complained about the Turkey/Brazil/Iran declaration being “vague” about Iran’s willingness to address outstanding issues (the three-state declaration did refer to the fuel exchange as “a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations” – which certainly seems rather “vague”); and

-the US then referred to continuing efforts to get Iran to comply with its obligations (such obligations being attention to the IAEA’s long list of unresolved issues).

The fuel swap, as proposed in October and now, was never intended as an alternative to addressing the outstanding issues at the IAEA. Again, the best that can be said of a fuel swap is that it could help create a climate conducive to progress on those outstanding items. More likely, the fuel swap will have little impact – which is why not only the US, but also Russia and China are considering a new round of sanctions.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the proposed sanctions will be any more effective than the fuel swap in creating a climate for constructive attention to the outstanding IAEA issues,[viii] although the Arms Control Association does point out that Iran’s willingness to enter into a joint proposal with Turkey and Brazil can be seen in part as the result of the pressure brought by Russian and Chinese support for a tougher line on Iran at the Security Council.[ix]

One important step toward more constructive attention to the Iran issue would be to recognize it as a “problem” rather than a “crisis.” “Somehow,” Mr. ElBaradei said last September, “many people are talking about how Iran’s nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world… In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped. Yes, there’s concern about Iran’s future intentions and Iran needs to be more transparent with the IAEA and the international community … But the idea that we’ll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn’t supported by the facts as we have seen them so far.”[x] It’s a matter of persistent diplomacy and pressure that gathers growing support, not crisis management that alienates potential supporters.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “OIC backs Iran nuclear declaration,” Press TV, 20 May 2010. http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=127095&sectionid=351020104.

[ii] Paul Koring, “Iran drives wedge into UN Security Council,” The Globe and Mail , 17 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/iran-drives-wedge-into-un-security-council/article1572359/.

[iii] Jeffrey Lewis, “Zombie Fuel Swap, Back from Dead, Again,” Arms Control Wonk, 17 May 2010.http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2731/zombie-fuel-swap-back-from-the-dead-again.

[iv] “El Baradei: Iran nuclear swap ‘a good agreement’,” International News 24/7. 21 May 2010.http://www.france24.com/en/20100518-iran-nuclear-agreement-turkey-el-baradei-interview–sanctions.

[v] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions…in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010).  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf.

[vi] -alleged studies relating to warhead development; acquisition of a document regarding uranium metal; R&D activities of military related institutes and companies; production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies in the defence industry; activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the green salt project”; clarification as to whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes, and whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; clarification on whether the engineering design and computer modeling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment; the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons.

[vii] Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Iran, 17 May 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-iran

[viii] Robert Burns, “UN sanctions unlikely to stop Iran,” Associate Press, 20 May 2010.http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ibaOsIYbmjGtQ_VvMBzKEYKdeSMQD9FQ5EL80.

[ix] Peter Crail, “Iran-Turkey-Brazil Fuel Deal Has Potential if Iran Provides Follow-Up Steps,” ACA Issue Brief – Volume 1, Number 5, May 17, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/IranTurkeyBrazilFuelDeal.

[x] “U.N. Official: Iran Nuke Program ‘Hyped’,” Associated Press, 2 September 2010.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/02/world/main5281632.shtml.

With the international community’s nuclear stand-off with Iran intensifying, a new report on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament calls for a redefinition of the fundamentals of the dispute.

Bringing Iran into full accord with the global nonproliferation regime will require “acceptance by the international community of the reality of Iran’s enrichment program…in exchange for acceptance by Iran of a very intrusive inspections and verification regime.”[i] It is the formula put forward by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in its final report, a formula long advocated in this space,[ii] and it helpfully redefines the Iran confrontation to centre it around the core condition for all successful nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament measures – namely, a high degree of transparency to build confidence in the international community’s capacity to verify implementation of commitments made.

Iran has made the essential commitment – that is, an unqualified commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and to welcome the international community’s verification of compliance with that commitment. It did so by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian leaders have regularly repeated that commitment, the Supreme leader even issuing a fatwa against nuclear weapons.[iii] Iran has never promised, and no law requires it, not to enrich uranium.[iv] Enriching uranium to produce reactor fuel is not the problem that needs to be solved in the long run; the problem is to ensure that all enrichment is carried out under the full inspection of the IAEA – and today that is happening with regard to all known enrichment.

Of course, it wouldn’t be Iran if it was that simple.[v]

While Iran’s declared enrichment is now fully under IAEA inspections, the IAEA does not have sufficient access to Iran to develop confidence that that there is no undeclared enrichment. Iran’s belated disclosure in 2009 of the construction of an unreported enrichment facility did nothing to bolster that confidence. Thus Iran’s true act of defiance is not its continuing enrichment but is its refusal to heed the transparency demands of the IAEA: Resolution GOV/2006/14  (4 February 2006) calls on Iran to “implement transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.”[vi]

A potential, and partial, step out of the current impasse was proposed late last year by the IAEA[vii] and discussed here November 30.[viii] It would have seen Iran ship its LEU (low enriched uranium) out of the country for further refining into fuel for its medical research reactor and of course allow Iran to import the fuel. This would have implicitly recognized the legitimacy of Iranian enrichment activity, but also would have removed stocks of LEU from the country and thus prevented a breakout scenario in which Iran could withdraw from the NPT, expel IAEA inspectors, and then use its LEU stocks to produce highly enriched, or weapons grade, uranium.[ix]

It looked for a time as if Iran would accept this arrangement, but Tehran then demanded that the exchange take place within the country and that only about a quarter of its LEU be shipped out initially. Iran in effect, and somewhat understandably, said the international community would also have to build some confidence with Iran because of the latter’s fear that after if it shipped most of its LEU out of the country, it might not receive the promised fuel in return. So Iran proposed that there be an exchange inside Iran – linking the shipment out of LEU to the shipment in of reactor fuel.

Now Iran has given the international community, represented by the negotiating group of the P5 plus one – that is, the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany – until the end of January to accept its counter-offer.[x] Iran is demanding a staged removal of its LEU from Iran, with clear guarantees that it will receive the imported fuel. As a consequence Iran would retain a small stockpile of LEU in the country and thus the breakout potential would remain.[xi] In the long this is a scenario that the international community will almost certainly have to accept – Iran will not be prevented from stockpiling what it can legally make, and in the long run it is only continuous inspection and decisive and broadly supported international reaction to any breakout that will be available to the international community.

That is why the international community is now advised by the ICNND to focus on transparency and full disclosure.

This also seems the time for the international community to raise another proposal – not only that Iran abide by the Additional Protocol (a supplemental agreement with the IAEA on enhanced inspections) and the enhanced transparency measures required by the IAEA, but also that it enter discussions toward internationalizing or multilateralizing Iran’s enrichment program through the acceptance of international involvement in its uranium enrichment program. Both of these proposed conditions were also part of the ICNND report.

Iran has given the P5 plus one a deadline for responding to its modified proposal – but don’t expect anything conclusive to happen any time soon.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-Chairs (2009). WWW.ICNND.ORG.

[ii] For example: “Reversing the diplomatic trajectory on Iran” (30 November 2009); “‘Coming Clean’ – where the pressure on Iran belongs” 1 October 2009); “A welcome US shift on Iran” 14 April 2009).http://www.cigionline.org/publications/blogs/disarmingconflict.

[iii] “The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the Fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who took office just recently, in his inaugural address reiterated that his government is against weapons of mass destruction and will only pursue nuclear activities in the peaceful domain. The leadership of Iran has pledged at the highest level that Iran will remain a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT and has placed the entire scope of its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and additional protocol, in addition to undertaking voluntary transparency measures with the agency that have even gone beyond the requirements of the agency’s safeguard system.” “Iran, holder of peaceful nuclear fuel cycle technology,” 8 December 2005. http://mathaba.net/0_index.shtml?x=302258.

[iv] Both the IAEA [GOV/2006/14  (4 February 2006)] and the UN Security Council [Resolution 1737 (27 December 2006)] require Iran to “suspend” its enrichment activity as a “confidence-building measure” – recognizing the in the long run Iran will be enriching uranium.

[v] Just on the matter of fatwas, the presence of multiple and apparently dueling fatwas on the question of nuclear weapons adds confusion. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a prominent opposition cleric, was reported in October 2009 as having also issued fatwa against nuclear weapons: “In light of the scope of death and destruction they bring, and in light of the fact that such weapons cannot be used solely against an army of aggression but will invariably sacrifice the lives of innocent people, even if these innocent lives are those of future generations nuclear weapons are not permitted according to reason or Sharia. Anyway, humanity, particularly Muslims who follow the Sharia of the Seal of Prophets, and the Prophet, Praise be Upon Him, must take the lead in banning legally and practically all such weapons for all countries and in soliciting the help of respectable and dependable international organizations in guaranteeing such ban.” (emphasis in original)

http://niacblog.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/ayatollah-montazeri-issues-fatwa-against-nuclear-weapons/. But the UK Telegraph reported in 2006: “In yet another sign of Teheran’s stiffening resolve on the nuclear issue, influential Muslim clerics have for the first time questioned the theocracy’s traditional stance that Sharia law forbade the use of nuclear weapons. One senior mullah has now said it is “only natural” to have nuclear bombs as a “countermeasure” against other nuclear powers, thought to be a reference to America and Israel. The pronouncement is particularly worrying because it has come from Mohsen Gharavian, a disciple of the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely regarded as the cleric closest to Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” Colin Freeman and Philip Sherwell, “Iranian fatwa approves use of nuclear weapons.” The Telegraph, 19 February 2006.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1510900/Iranian-fatwa-approves-use-of-nuclear-weapons.html.

[vi] IAEA Board Resolution GOV/2006/14  (4 February 2006).http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.

[vii]IAEA Draft Agreement Circulated at Nuclear Fuel Talks, 21 October 2009.http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/talksiran211009.html.

[viii] http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2009/11/reversing-diplomatic-trajectory-iran

[ix] Of course, if Iran were to be pursuing such an option it would more likely do it in clandestine facilities – and while the IAEA can confirm that no nuclear materials have gone missing, it can’t absolutely guarantee that there aren’t clandestine facilities using undeclared nuclear materials.

[x] “Iran demands West accept counter plan on  nuclear program, CNN.Com. 02 January 2010.http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/02/iran.nuclear/.

[xi] The 1,100 kgs of low enriched that would remain in Iran after an initial transfer out of 400 kgs could produce enough high enriched uranium to make at least one crude first generation bomb. See: R. Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser, “Statement on Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon and the significance of the 19 February 2009 IAEA report on Iran’s uranium enrichment program,” Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2 March 2009. http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2009aglaser_iran.pdf.

Iran’s announcement of another 10 uranium enrichment plants[i] is sufficiently out there to be neither very alarming nor of much predictive value in considering the long-term development of Iran’s nuclear programs.

While not exactly alarming, the move is depressingly indicative of a failing process and as such seems to be lifting the spirits of the hardliners, whether they be in Tehran or Washington. The Wall Street Journal sounded almost gleeful in raising the spectre of “500,000 Iranian centrifuges.”[ii] Seizing it as one more opportunity to invoke the need for “punitive sanctions or military strikes” as the only credible options for resolving the dispute, the WSJ insists it is only the US and the Europeans that need to share its view.

Russia and China may not enter the political calculus of the WSJ, but they do figure rather prominently in the remarkable level of agreement the international community reached in its most recent call on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, ratify the Additional Protocol to strengthen its IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards agreements, and to confirm that it has no other undeclared nuclear facilities.[iii] The West, Russia, China, and the outgoing IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei acted in concert, but there is no chance that this unanimity will translate into either the collective punitive sanctions or support for the military strikes that the WSJ wants. We can only hope that the world will be saved from yet another reckless military adventure, if not by good sense then at least by a host of conflicting interests.

When Iran was first found (in 2003) to be pursuing an undeclared nuclear program in violation of its safeguards and NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) commitments, there was no direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program – nor has direct evidence of one emerged since then. Iran’s actions have certainly raised many legitimate suspicions inasmuch as its pursuit of civilian technology, namely enrichment, is doggedly focused on the production of reactor fuel which is not yet needed but which gives Iran access to the option of pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran’s strategy is now routinely understood to be the “Japan option” – that is, the pursuit of civilian technology that creates competence in weapons-related technologies and creates the opportunity for fairly rapid break-out, in pursuit of a weapon when a hard decision to that end is taken.

In response to Iran’s protestations that its pursuit of weapons-relevant technology is rooted in a commitment to peaceful purposes, the rest of the world has in effect said, “OK, but do something to make us believe. We need to see you act in ways to restore confidence that your declared peaceful intentions are genuine.” And the particular action proposed, or demanded, by the international community was and is suspension of uranium enrichment. The demand includes the explicit acknowledgment that Iran has the right, under Article IV of the NPT, to enrich uranium for peaceful or civilian purposes, and thus suspension is to be a temporary interruption, with the clear implication that enrichment could resume once Iran had dealt satisfactorily with all the questions raised by the IAEA – questions about those activities which suggest an explicit interest in weapons technology.

The point is that suspension of enrichment is to be a goodwill gesture, it is not the solution. Iran has, and by all accounts will retain, the capacity to enrich – and with that it will ultimately acquire the capacity to build a bomb. But the capacity to build one and actually building one are not the same thing. Preventing that capacity from being acted upon is where the line finally has to be drawn and where the international community’s efforts and safeguards must ultimately be focused. That means unfettered monitoring – access to all declared and suspected facilities whenever international inspectors want that access. That in turn means Iran ratifying and acting on the Additional Protocol – the legal instrument that provides such access.

Confidence building measures are good, and Iran is obliged to restore the confidence that was shattered when its clandestine program was discovered. The fact that Iran has a plausible explanation for its clandestine actions – namely, that it was prevented from openly acquiring legitimate technology on the open market by those out to frustrate Iran’s development and its revolutionary regime – does not detract from the fact that clandestine activity was in violation of firm commitments made.

A more recent confidence building proposal has been for Iran to ship its LEU (low enriched uranium) out of the country for further refining into fuel rods for its medical research reactor. It looked for a time as if Iran would accept this. After all, exchanging Iranian LEU on the international market for manufactured fuel would clearly signal acceptance of Iranian enrichment. But in its last move, Iran demanded that the exchange take place within the country. That is, Iran in effect, and somewhat understandably, said the international community would also have to build some confidence with Iran because of the latter’s fear that after it shipped the LEU out of the country, it might not receive the promised fuel in return. So Iran proposed that there be an exchange inside Iran – linking the shipment out of LEU to the shipment in of reactor fuel. The West took this as a refusal and so a new resolution was drafted.

But confidence building measures are gestures, not solutions. The solution is to continuously verify that Iran’s nuclear activity is not diverted to military purposes. There is no once-and-for-all solution. It is a day-to-day requirement in the same way that a bank’s stores of cash must be verified on an all day every day, 24-7, basis.

Iran is not about to build 10 uranium enrichment plants. Of that the international community can be quite confident. But Iran’s announcement of such a plan certainly confirms that the diplomatic effort is once again on a starkly negative trajectory. So now it’s back to the diplomats to once again try to reverse that trajectory. Talk of “punitive sanctions or military strikes” will be increasingly tempting, but it is a temptation that will be resisted by those serious about a constructive outcome.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Daniel Dombey and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Iran’s nuclear move puzzles west,” Financial Times, 29 November 2009.  http://www.iranian.com/main/news/2009/11/29/iran-s-nuclear-move-puzzles-west.

[ii] Opinion page, 30 November 2009.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574565802447685802.html#printMode.

[iii] IAEA Resolution on Iran, GOV/2009/82, 27 November 2009.http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf.

One welcome result of the discovery that Iran has been secretly building another uranium enrichment plant has been to refocus diplomacy more on demands for transparency, and less on the hitherto favored but largely ineffective demand that enrichment be suspended.

Today’s talks in Geneva between Iran and the P5[i] plus Germany, hosted by the European Union, appear to have been a relatively positive start to a new focus on diplomacy. They produced a commitment to talk again and, notably, a confirmation from Iran that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be given access to the newly disclosed enrichment site.[ii]

How soon and how much access (e.g. in addition to entering the site, access to personnel, blueprints, supplier invoices, and so on) are important details yet to come, but this attention to openness and transparency is where the emphasis needs to be.

The formal UN Security Council demand is on Iran[iii] to suspend all proliferation sensitive activity, notably uranium enrichment, and to comply with IAEA requests for information and access related to verifying such suspension. The Security Council has also emphasized transparency through its calls on Iran to ratify the Agency’s Additional Protocol, a supplement to safeguard agreements granting much more extensive and effective access to nuclear facilities. But the Council’s political energy has been heavily focused on suspending enrichment.

The problem with that obsession with ending Iran’s enrichment activity is twofold. In the first place, if it is done under safeguards, which it now is, it is a perfectly legal activity. Second, getting Iran to suspend its enrichment program without getting the kind of broad access offered by the Additional Protocol would end up being a pyrrhic victory – it would temporarily pause an activity that is already subject to IAEA inspection (and thus ongoing confirmation that it is not linked to a weapons program) but would do nothing to improve the IAEA’s capacity to confirm that there are no further unreported, or clandestine, nuclear programs underway.

So now the focus is turning to transparency. The Washington Post’s report on today’s (October 1) meeting says the six countries (P5 plus Germany) told Iran that a generous incentive was on the table “if Iran would open its nuclear program to inspection”[iv] – there was no reference to suspending enrichment.

In US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s appearance on CBS last Sunday she reasserted Iran’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear development that is appropriately safeguarded and did not refer to the call for a suspension of uranium enrichment.[v] The Obama Administrations shift to transparency was discussed in this space last April,[vi] noting an Administration Official’s comment that, “frankly, what’s most valuable to us now is having real freedom for the inspectors to pursue their suspicions around the country.”[vii]

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) reports on Iran[viii] have repeatedly confirmed that none of Iran’s declared nuclear activity and no declared nuclear materials have been diverted to military purposes. The problem is in developing confidence that there is no undeclared, or clandestine, nuclear weapons program – and the development of such confidence depends on significant increases in Iranian transparency.

In other words, if Iran is going to “come clean,” as President Obama put it,[ix] on all of its nuclear activity, it will have to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol. Indeed, as noted before, the Additional Protocol should be compulsory for all states,[x] but at a minimum the Security Council should make the Additional Protocol one of its chief demands on Iran.[xi] Before the current stalemate, Iran did allow inspections in line with the terms of the Additional Protocol (even though it did not ratify it), but “since early 2006,” the IAEA’s 2007 report notes, “the [IAEA] has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear program is diminishing.” [xii]

That is not a good thing. In the meantime analysts are increasingly acknowledging that a full suspension of enrichment will be all but impossible to achieve.

Professor Peter Jones, an Iran and Middle East expert at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, wrote in the Globe and Mail this week that it is “difficult to see how a complete cessation of enrichment can be achieved – Iran has simply gone too far for that.” He suggests that an acceptable compromise would be to allow a small and fully inspected research-scale enrichment facility.[xiii]

Over at ArmsControlWonk.Com, an extraordinarily helpful nonproliferation blog, there is a similar recognition that “suspension is not the answer.” One idea explored there is the multilateralization of uranium enrichment in Iran.[xiv] A multilateral enrichment facility on Iranian soil that would fully engage Iranian engineers and scientists would also have the effect of keeping them away from covert endeavors. To have international personnel working alongside Iranians, supported by an intrusive inspection regime, would be “the best way to prevent Iran from getting a bomb.”

News out of Geneva that Iran is prepared to send its enriched uranium to Russia for the production of fuel for the small Iranian reactor that produces medical isotopes is a further indication that stopping uranium enrichment in Iran is no longer the objective of the international community. Sending its enriched uranium out of the country, all monitored by the IAEA, obviously means, of course, that it will not be stored for some possible future plan to enrich it further to weapons grade.[xv]

Ambiguity and secrecy are both fundamentally inimical to nuclear nonproliferation, but both have been two constants in Iran’s nuclear programs to date. Moving from ambiguity to certainty – to transparency and demonstrable confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are pursued exclusively for non-weapons purposes – will obviously require major changes on the part of Iran. But it will also require the P5 and the UN Security Council to get focused on the core requirement of transparency and to move beyond the enrichment suspension deadlock. There is now evidence that is beginning to happen.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The five permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, UK, and US.

[ii] Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, “Iran Agrees to More Nuclear Talks with US and Allies,” New York Times, 2 October 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html.

[iii] S/RES/1737, 23 December 2006.http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement.

[iv] Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, “US, Iran Hold Bilateral Talks,” Thye Washington Post, 1 October 2009.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/01/AR2009100101294.html.

[v] “Face the Nation” (CBS), 27 September 2009.

http://news.google.ca/news?hl=en&source=hp&q=Iran+nuclear&rlz=1R2ADBF_enCA332&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=yUfBSo6MCpXh8Qbohc2pAQ&sa=X&oi=news_group&ct=title&resnum=1.

[vi] “A Welcome Shift on Iran,” 14 April 2009.  http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2009/4/welcome-us-shift-iran.

[vii] David E. Sanger, “US May Drop Key Condition for Talks With Iran,” The New York Times, 14 April 2009.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14diplo.html.

[viii] Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 February 2009, International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2009/8).http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-8.pdf.

[ix] “Obama Demands That Iran ‘Come Clean’ on Nuclear Work, 28 September 2009, Global Security Newswire. http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090928_9676.php.

[x] For example, Canada urged the 2005 NPT Review Conference to make “the Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, …the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1” for fulfilling “the obligations of that section of the Treaty.” Canadian statement to the 2004 NPT PrepCom on “Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty Relating to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones Issues” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/2004nptcluster2-en.asp).

[xi] UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) “calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocal,” but does not demand it in the same way that it demands that Iran suspend proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment. (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement)

[xii] Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 15 November 2007, International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2007/58).http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf.

[xiii] Peter Jones, “Dealing with Iran will require diplomacy with a hard edge,” The Globe and Mail, 30 September 2009. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/dealing-with-iran-will-require-diplomacy-with-a-hard-edge/article1304592/.

[xiv] Geoffrey Forden, “Paradox: Now is the Time to Deal,” 25 September 2009. http://armscontrolwonk.com.

[xv] Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, “Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia,” New York Times, 2 October 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html?ref=world.