Posts Tagged ‘fighter aircraft’

Worst-case scenarios and the F-35

It’s not surprising that F-35 briefings by officials in the Department of National Defence (DND) point to growing dangers in a threatening world – that’s their job. Nor is it surprising that DND wants the most advanced fighter aircraft money can buy – it’s been that way since the Avro Arrow. Those are  understandable impulses, but how do you convert them into good security policy? At least it’s not too late to ask the question.

Among several interesting findings in the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s report[i] on the likely costs of the F-35 fighter aircraft is the unambiguous statement that, despite the Government’s announcement of the purchase, no contract has been signed, no legal obligation to buy it exists, and no financial penalty or other costs would be incurred if the decision to buy was reversed. There is therefore no reason not to revisit the mission and requirements and to consider other options.

The primary mission set out by the Government is, as it has been since the 1950s, to patrol Canadian airspace so that, together with sea and land forces, security forces can “be aware of anything going on in or approaching [Canadian] territory.” Beyond that, the forces are tasked to deter threats and respond to contingencies, in Canada and North America.

Internationally, the mission is to contribute to international peace and security and the stated requirements are open-ended: “This will require the Canadian Forces to have the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations [the same phrase used by the Liberal Defence Policy statement of 2005],[ii] from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat.”[iii]

And it is in imagining potential combat environments that worst-case thinking is given free rein. Combat scenarios pitch Canadian fighter aircraft against an array of state-of-the-art air defence systems as well as the very latest in fifth generation fighters – Russia’s new version being exhibit number one of the kind of thing Canadian fighters must be prepared to face.^[iv]

To that are added warnings of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The US Air Force says, for example, that “the cruise missile threat to US forces will increase over the next decade. At least nine foreign countries will be involved in LACM production during the next decade, and several of the LACM producers will make their missiles available for export.” Among them are Russia, China, India, and Pakistan^[v] – and so the argument is that they could spread and could potentially be fired from off-shore aircraft at targets in Canada and other theatres of operation, with very sophisticated fighter aircraft a primary defence.

Such scenarios, which officials set out in much greater detail, in turn lead to a list of what DND calls “High Level Mandatory Capabilities,” a series of operational characteristics or capabilities that it says the next fighter aircraft must possess to meet all contingencies. There are at least eleven such features, eight of which, says DND, can be met by “fourth generation aircraft,” like the current CF-18:

• Range: A specific range is not mentioned, but it “must be capable of flying long distances” without air-to-air refuelling;
• Air-to-air refuelling: In-flight refuelling is nevertheless required to extend that range in certain instances;
• Speed: Again, no specifics, except to say that it must be capable of intercepting other fighter and bomber aircraft;
• Endurance: Must be capable of “combat air patrol” within “a range of geographical locations”;
• Deployable: Similarly it must be capable of being deployed globally “in a full range of geographic, environmental, climatic and threat conditions”;
• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: The new fighter is to have “superior” capability in each of these “during and following the deployment of weapons”;
• Weapons: It must be capable of firing a “range of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons in all weather conditions, day and night, in threatening and non-threatening environments”;
• Growth potential: It must be capable of receiving upgrades to enhance operation capabilities, as well as survivability and interoperability.

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But there are three additional characteristics, says DND, which can be met only by fifth generation fighters, i.e. the F-35:

• Survivability: “The aircraft must be capable of defending itself and its crew by employing a range of self-defence technologies and minimizing the risk of detection, engagement and damage in threatening environments” – meaning stealth.
• Interoperability: “The aircraft must be capable of effectively operating in joint (land, sea and aerospace) and combined environments with Canada’s allies.”
• Sensors and Data Fusion: “The aircraft must be capable of accurately detecting, tracking, identifying, prioritizing, engaging and assessing a range of air-to-air and air-to-surface contacts in all weather conditions, day and night, in permissive and non-permissive environments.”

So, there we have the constructed context – an expansive statement of threat and an ambitious definition of requirements. It is the job of security planners to prepare for the unforeseen, but to get a true picture of risk, threat needs to be tempered by probability. And to get a true picture of need, requirements need to be balanced by competing calls on resources.

So, how probable are the threats? What is the likelihood that Canada will or should be drawn into foreign high density combat environments against the most advanced of military capabilities? One way to answer that question is to ask how often that has happened in the past 30 years (during the life of the CF-18s) – and the answer is never. In fact, fighter aircraft are rarely deployed abroad by Canada, not because they haven’t been available, but because fighter aircraft have little utility in expeditionary peace support operations. Indeed, Canada’s CF-18 fighters, have been deployed beyond Canada’s borders on only four occasions: 1) 26 were deployed to the 1991 Gulf War; 18 to the 1999 NATO operations in Serbia/Kosovo; in 1997 six CF-18s did a three-month tour out of Aviano, Italy to conduct air patrols over Bosnia in support of NATO ground forces and to protect airborne warning and control aircraft; and in June 1998 six CF-18s went to Aviano to support peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.^[vi] In none of those instances did they face sophisticated air defence capabilities or fighter aircraft [nor is that the case in Libya today (27 March 2011)].

What is the likelihood of Canada facing attacks in North America by the most advanced military capabilities? It certainly didn’t happened in the past 30 years, and the likelihood of it happening in the foreseeable future is even less – given that those dazzlingly effective fifth generation Russian fighters are now on our side. The primary airborne threat we do face comes largely in the form of small civilian aircraft carrying contraband. In effect, the day-to-day activity of NORAD, the Canada-US organization that monitors the air approaches to Canada, is to lend aid to the civil authorities in their drug interdiction efforts. Similarly, the more extensive operations related to the Olympic and the G8-G20 meetings were also assistance to civil authorities.

What are the opportunity costs of buying aircraft at a minimum of $150 million per copy, plus twice that much to operate them for 30 years?[vii] Prudent security planning ought at least to ask what peacebuilding capabilities and diplomatic resources could be financed, even by the equivalent of the cost difference between fourth generation and fifth generation fighter aircraft.

As argued in this space before,[viii] ongoing monitoring of Canadian airspace is certainly essential, as is the capacity to physically confront and intercept isolated intruders. But a wealth of experience tells us that the threats to and from within our national airspace can be met with a reliable surveillance and modest interception capability.

The current Government’s preference for “fifth generation” capability does not translate automatically into need. Domestic surveillance and air defence notably do not require stealth or other advanced capabilities. Internationally, Canada is in a position to decide what kinds of missions to pursue – indeed it must be highly selective since we obviously can’t do everything. There are many other non-military and military ways for Canada to make significant contributions to international peace and security.

At the very least, we need a thorough debate – and the report of the Parliamentary Budget Office confirms that it’s not too late. 

eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

[i] An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (March 2011).  http://www2.parl.gc.ca/sites/pbo-dpb/index.aspx?Language=E.

[ii] “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence,” Department of National Defence, 2005, p. 26.

[iii] Canada First Defence Strategy, Department of National Defence, Ottawa. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/index-eng.asp.

[iv] Steve Gutterman,“New Russian stealth fighter makes first flight,” Reuters, Moscow, 29 January 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/29/us-russia-fighter-idUSTRE60S0UW20100129.

 [v] “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2009. Available at: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/NASIC2009.pdf.

 [vi] As documented by Dan Middlemiss in “A Military in Support of Canadian Foreign Policy: Some Fundamental Considerations,” Centre For Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/A%20Military%20In%20Support%20of%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy%20-%20Considerations.pdf.

 [vii] An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (March 2011).  http://www2.parl.gc.ca/sites/pbo-dpb/index.aspx?Language=E.

 [viii] http://disarmingconflict.ca/2010/10/14/the-f-35-canada%e2%80%99s-air-defence-needs-compared-with-what/.

The F-35: Canada’s air defence needs, compared with what?

That Canada needs a credible air defence capability is not in dispute; the challenge is to balance that with the other urgent needs on a rather long list. 

Canada needs a fleet of fast, long-range aircraft with a capacity to respond effectively to unidentified and unauthorized intrusions into Canadian airspace. That much seems pretty clear – but need is relative, not absolute.  

Canada also needs icebreakers to patrol the thawing and increasingly commercial Arctic waters. We need large and long-range transport aircraft (that money is already spent), along with well-equipped military and civilian personnel, to respond effectively on short notice to humanitarian and security crises beyond our borders. We need a major boost in Canada’s diplomatic corps to meet the myriad of diplomatic, political, and conflict challenges that a G8/G20 nation and aspirant to the Security Council should bring to the global table. We certainly need a massive increase in foreign assistance – to the tune of another $5 billion each and every year if we are to meet our avowed target of boosting annual official development assistance to the level of .7 per cent of GDP.[i]  

And of course we need to balance the federal budget, pay down the national debt, improve education, meet the voracious and still growing demands for health care, end child poverty, meet global environmental standards, and promote the arts. Furthermore, we need to do it all with some degree of urgency.  

Happily, Canada is also an extraordinarily wealthy country, so we can afford a lot of this – the issue is the political will to set sensible priorities that accord with a commitment to build sustainable conditions of human security at home and abroad.  

The F-35 question in isolation is not really one of affordability – if a thorough and frank national debate were to send 65 stealth, fifth generation, state-of-the-art fighter aircraft to the top of the list of urgent national requirements, we could afford them, even at total capital and operating costs of $15-$30 billion over a span of 30 years.[ii] The real question is, do we need them more than we need everything else on the list? And can we really afford them if that means deferring other urgent requirements?  

The hard part is not identifying needs, it’s obviously setting priorities.  

So the first step needs to be a realistic look at the nature and extent of our air defence needs. Is the F-35 the only way in which those needs can be met? Or are there ways of maintaining sufficient air defence capability at much lower costs – is there a responsible trade-off available that would allow us to reduce the costs of air defence and increase our response to other urgent imperatives?  

Air defence capabilities are not a luxury that we can decide to do without. So just saying a blanket no to fighter aircraft is not a solution. At the same time, we need to remind ourselves that the unidentified and unauthorized intrusions into Canadian airspace – the kinds of events that air defence systems are designed prevent and respond to – have little to do with Russian bombers or conventional national defence. All the media and Ministerial brouhaha over recent flights of Russian bombers in international airspace near Canada, and Canadian F-18 responses, was put in perspective by NORAD’s own insistence that these were routine exercises in which Russians train and NORAD tests response times: “Both Russia and NORAD routinely exercise their capability to operate in the North. These exercises are important to both NORAD and Russia and are not cause for alarm.”[iii]  

Furthermore, joint exercises with the Russians reflect the contemporary reality that they are now our collaborators in air defence operations, not our dreaded adversary. In August, the US, NORAD, and Russia conducted a joint exercise to respond to a staged “hijacking” of a civilian airliner. The exercise was an effort to integrate North American and Russian military and civilian air traffic control agencies to counter air terrorism.[iv]  

The airborne threat we do face comes largely in the form of small civilian aircraft carrying contraband. In effect, the day-to-day activity of NORAD, the Canada-US organization that monitors the air approaches to Canada, is to lend aid to the civil authorities in their drug interdiction efforts. Coastal radars identify aircraft entering Canadian airspace without a filed flight plan, and when necessary aircraft are sent to identify and escort the intruders to an airport or landing strip where civilian authorities can deal with them.  

It is important work that supports the rule of law, the human security of Canadians, and thus ultimately national security – but does it require the kind of fighter aircraft now being promised? Canada does not face imminent or foreseeable threats of hostile, unauthorized, foreign military breaches of Canadian air space. The conclusion to be drawn from that is not that we don’t need air defence, for it is in part effective air defence that dissuades others from trying to breach our borders. But it does put the need for air defence in some useful perspective: ongoing monitoring is absolutely essential; after 9-11 we know that threats can also emerge from within our borders; the capacity to physically confront and intercept intruders must be maintained; but a wealth of experience tells us that the threats to and from within our national airspace can be met with a reliable surveillance and modest interception capability. 

That still leaves the question of Canadian contributions of fighter aircraft capabilities to military operations beyond our borders. Canada has done very little of that in the past, largely because fighter aircraft have little utility in the kinds of expeditionary peace support operations that Canada should be expected to support in the future. Indeed, Canada’s CF-18 fighters, acquired in the early 1980s, have been deployed beyond Canada’s borders on only four occasions: 1) 26 were deployed to the 1991 Gulf War; 18 to the 1999 NATO operations in Serbia/Kosovo; in 1997 six CF-18s did a three-month tour out of Aviano, Italy to conduct air patrols over Bosnia in support of NATO ground forces and to protect airborne warning and control aircraft; and in June 1998 six CF-18s went to Aviano to support peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.[v]  
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Serious voices in the defence policy community are raising questions about the F-35 and whether Canada’s contributions to peace support operations require fighter aircraft.  

Dan Middlemiss of Dalhousie University: …[A]lthough Canada is a member of the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program team, in future operations in support of Canadian foreign policy it will become increasingly difficult to justify the cost of a modest fleet of JSFs for the air force. There would be almost no requirement for such aircraft to support Canadian naval or army deployments on a “stand-alone” basis, and, while they would be useful – and fully interoperable – augmenters to coalition forces, their high acquisition and sustainment costs (which would include the sky-rocketing cost of “subsidies” to attract and retain fighter pilots) might rule them out as cost-effective contributors to Canadian expeditionary operations.” He points to the importance of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and suggests further investigation of unpiloted aircraft for that role. 

Paul Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College says Canada will not be in a position to buy enough of any fighter aircraft to fulfill NORAD, NATO, and expeditionary commitments and thus suggests exploration of alternatives to advanced fighters:  “The most likely avenue of attack from the air on Canada today is not from a lumbering Bear bomber, but rather a small privately owned commercial aircraft.” And for defence against that you need aircraft that can fly “low and slow” – not the métier of supersonic fighters. Mitchell goes on to say: “A turboprop aircraft like Embraer’s “Super Tucano” or Beechcraft’s AT-6B (whose engines are manufactured by Pratt & Whitney Canada in Nova Scotia) would easily fit this bill. At roughly $6-million per copy, we could outfit the air force with 10 times the number of airframes. Furthermore, such aircraft are well suited to support army operations and are cheap to operate and maintain. CF-18s have been noticeably absent in the present conflict in Afghanistan.”[vi] 

Canada needs an ongoing and credible domestic air defence capability, but that doesn’t translate into an urgent need for the one of the most complex, most expensive, yet to be proven, combat aircraft on the planet. At the very least, we should have the benefit of a thorough, informed, and frank national debate, along with a competitive selection process, before any final commitment is made.

 eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

 Notes

[i] The Canadian Council for International Contribution proposes a more realistic in which aid would increase by 14 percent per year until 2020 when the .7 percent target would be reached. “2010/11 Pre-Budget Brief,” October 2009, Canadian Council for International Co-Operation (CCIC). http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2010_11_pre_budget_brief_oct09_e.pdf.

 [ii] US estimates of life-cycle costs per aircraft are at least three times higher than figures use by the Government of Canada in estimating the total program costs. Kenneth Epps, “Why Joint Strike Fighter aircraft? Program costs rise and benefits carry risks,” Ploughshares Briefing 10/3, August 2010. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf103.pdf.

 [iii] “NORAD downplays Russian bomber interception,” CBC News, 25 August 2010.  http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/08/25/cf-18s-russians-airspace.html.

 [iv] Maj. Mike Humphreys, “Vigilant Eagle tests NOARAD, Russian response,” NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, 10 August 2010. http://www.norad.mil/News/2010/081010.html.

 [v] As documented by Dan Middlemiss in “A Military in Support of Canadian Foreign Policy: Some Fundamental Considerations,” Centre For Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/A%20Military%20In%20Support%20of%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy%20-%20Considerations.pdf.

 [vi] Paul T. Mitchell, “How to get more air force for the dollar,” The Ottawa Citizen, 12 October 2010. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=3655573&sponsor=

Canada and the F-35: Industrial Strategy Becomes Defence Policy

Canada’s participation in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in 1997[1] as an aerospace industry initiative and emerged in 2010 as a fully formed air defence policy.

Setting aside for now the yet-to-be-debated question of Canada’s future air surveillance and interception needs and the merits of the F-35 aircraft for meeting those needs, the least persuasive argument in defence of the Government’s non-competitive selection of the F-35 fighter aircraft is the Prime Minister’s claim that the decision was really made in 1997.

That was when Canada put down an initial $10 million (US) to join the “concept demonstration” phase of the JSF program. At the time, critics, including this one, feared that industrial participation in the JSF would turn out to be a de facto defence policy decision to procure whatever aircraft emerged from the JSF venture.

Of course, the assurances at the time were all to the contrary. The Government of the day, and all of them since then, insisted that joining the JSF did not include a commitment by Canada to buy the end product. That was in fact the only credible position available. How could any responsible Government make a procurement commitment at the beginning of a lengthy research and development process in which there could be absolutely no guarantee that the process would in the end produce an aircraft that would 20 years later meet Canada’s particular air defence and surveillance needs? Yet, Prime Minister Harper now says, approvingly, that’s exactly what happened.

At the time, we were assured that the only decision made then was to buy Canadian industrial access to a major US weapons development program. That point was made recently by Alan Williams, the former senior defence procurement official who in 2002 signed the contract for Canada’s (US)$150 million contribution to the next phase of the JSF program, the System Development and Demonstration phase. Writing for the Defence Watch blog of David Pugliese, Mr. Williams said that “at no time did we commit to buying these aircraft. We entered the program with one main purpose; namely, to provide Canadian companies with an opportunity to compete for contracts in this multi-billion-dollar venture.”[2]

The Prime Minister attacked the messenger:  “In terms of the individual that you’re talking about,” Mr. Harper said in Winnipeg last week, “his advice was very different at the time that he was actually paid to give it.”[3] In fact, Mr. Williams’ consistent position is on record. In 2001 he appeared before the House of Commons Defence Committee with the then Defence Minister, Art Eggleton, to say: “We have not made any decision about the future aircraft we’ll use, and were we to participate [in the System Development and Demonstration phase], it would be with the objective of getting valuable access to wide-ranging studies that otherwise we would not be party to, and also allowing our industry to participate.”

So, the decision to join the JSF was really driven by two considerations – access to the US military aircraft development and production market for Canadian industry, and access to US research and development findings that would keep Canadian defence planners abreast of emerging aircraft technologies in anticipation of replacing the F-18, Canada’s current jet fighter.

Mr. Williams repeated the point in 2003 when he again testified at the Defence Committee: “The primary benefits for Canada of participating in JSF include providing Canadian industry with access to the largest U.S. defence program in the history of the Department of Defense, providing DND with access to the full range of technical data flowing from the JSF program, reducing the purchase price of the JSF should Canada elect to buy this aircraft, and finally, providing the Government of Canada with royalties from the sale of the joint strike fighter aircraft to non-partner nations” (emphasis added). He didn’t say Canada was therefore committed to buying the JSF; instead he made it clear that no decision on purchase had been made.[4]

The present Defence Minister, Peter MacKay, recently reinforced the understanding that Canada was under no commitment or obligation to buy the F-35. On May 27 he was asked for clarification by the NDP Defence Critic, Jack Harris, during a session of the Standing Committee on Defence:  “Mr. Chair, did I take the minister’s earlier comments in my last round of questions to mean that the government has already decided to purchase planes from the joint strike group fighter program?” And Mr. MacKay replied: 

“Mr. Chair, the hon. member is mistaken. None whatsoever….The joint strike fighter is one of the two aircraft, and there may be others. But I think those are the two main contenders that we are looking at.”[5] In other words, the Minister of Defence insisted even this year that alternatives to the F-35 were under active consideration.

But just last week in Winnipeg, Prime Minister Harper told an industry audience in Winnipeg that because the Canadian Government had already paid $150 million into the Joint Strike Fighter program, to help Canadian firms get development contracts for it, it would make no sense to consider any other aircraft: “Why would you now consider buying anything else.”[6] 

So now the Prime Minister insists that we have to accept the 1997 decision – which was not about buying an aircraft for the Canadian Forces but was about buying access for Canadian industry to a forthcoming US procurement program – as the final decision on a new fighter aircraft selection for Canada 20 years later. An industrial commitment made in 1997, a decade and a half before anyone had any idea what kind of aircraft would come out of the process, is now to be taken as an unshakable commitment to accept whatever that R and D process produced – a multinational process over which Canada, as a junior among junior partners, had no real influence.
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In other words, an industrial strategy decision in 1997 is now to be taken as a firm defence policy decision in 2010.

eregehr@uwaterloo.ca

Notes

“Government of Canada Invests in R&D Technology for Joint Strike Fighter Program, 2 September 2008.” Government of Canada News Centre. http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do;jsessionid=ac1b105330d514fd77ad446b41fd90d7edcb1f04e3ec.e38RbhaLb3qNe38TaxuMa3qOay0?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=7&nid=417259&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2002&crtr.kw=joint%2Bstrike%2Bfighter&crtr.dyStrtVl=1&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2010&crtr.dyndVl=23

For a broader view of the JSF and F-35 program, including costs, see: Kenneth Epps, “Why Joint Strike Fighter aircraft? Program costs rise and benefits carry risks,” Ploughshares Briefing 10/3, August 2010. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf103.pdf.

[2] Alan Williams, “Open Competition Needed For Canada’s New Fighter Aircraft Procurement Says Former Senior Procurement Official,” in David Pugliese’s Defence Watch. July 27, 2010. http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2010/07/27/open-competition-needed-for-canada-s-new-fighter-aircraft-procurement-says-former-senior-procurement-official.aspx.

[3]  “F-35 fighter strategy tug-of-war,” Politics and the Nation, Vancouver Sun Blog (7 October 2010). http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/politics/archive/2010/10/07/f-35-fighter-strategy-tug-of-war.aspx

[4] “F-35 fighter strategy tug-of-war,” Politics and the Nation, Vancouver Sun Blog (7 October 2010). http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/politics/archive/2010/10/07/f-35-fighter-strategy-tug-of-war.aspx

[5] May 27, 2010. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&DocId=4559699#Int-3187519.

[6] Paul Turenne, “PM defends F-35 purchase,” Winnipeg Sun, 7 October 2010. http://www.winnipegsun.com/news/canada/2010/10/07/15623516.html#/news/winnipeg/2010/10/07/pf-15620691.html.