Archive for May, 2010

Towards action on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Posted on: May 31st, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

The just concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference not only avoided the disaster of the 2005 Conference, it managed a major achievement – agreement to finally act on a 1995 promise to pursue the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Much of the disarmament language in the agreed final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is familiar and aspirational – pledging to “achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but on at least one topic the States Parties to the Treaty got down to some specifics.

The action plan for “the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction” is the signal achievement of the 2010 Review Conference. And that is good news for those with a primary focus on disarmament by nuclear weapon states.

In 1995, when the NPT was transformed into a permanent Treaty, the Middle East was a central point of contention. Arab States were unprepared to commit to permanently disavowing nuclear weapons  when one State in their midst, Israel, was not Party to the Treaty, would not make the same commitment, would not deny that it was in possession of nuclear weapons, and would not open all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To bridge that commitment gap, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation put forward a resolution, agreed to by all Parties to the Treaty, in support of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.

Article VII of the Treaty provides for the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones, and in 1995 it was clear that the Treaty would not become permanent without the promise of action on such a zone in the Middle East. And the promise states made was pretty straightforward. The States Parties “noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,” by which they meant Israel (which has pursued unsafeguarded nuclear programs since the 1950s), and called on all states in the region “to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The nuclear weapon states promised to “exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”[i]

The actions taken since then to fulfill those promises have also been straightforward – that is to say, straightforward avoidance of action.

So now, in 2010, the NPT States made another set of promises – with two core elements:[ii]

First, they promise to convene a conference in 2012, “to be attended by all States of the Middle East.” As of now, Israel says it will not attend.[iii] The conference is to be convened by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East (the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation). In addition, the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant international organizations are tasked to prepare appropriate background documentation.

Second, the UN Secretary-General and the 1995 co-sponsors, in consultation with the States of the region, are to appoint a “Facilitator” with the general mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution, to support the preparations for the 2012 conference, to carry out post-conference follow-on activities, and then to report to the 2015 Review Conference.

This time the consequences of inaction will go beyond a simple delay. Even another five years of broken promises will end credible hope of effective nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the Middle East. Iran’s determined pursuit of technologies with weapons applications could by then have made the leap to the weapons themselves, and that, along with Israel’s undeclared arsenal, would trigger a potential proliferation stampede in the region – initially focused on civilian programs, but ones that privilege weapons related technologies and create the capacity to move to the weapons themselves on relatively short notice.

And the consequences would extend far beyond that region, effectively halting action, and much of the rhetoric, in support of zero nuclear weapons in the rest of the nuclear-armed world.

So, the action proposed for the Middle East must be understood as a core disarmament action. The failure to act on the new promise would persuasively add to the suspicion that the nuclear non-proliferation system is simply not up to the challenge of dealing with deep-seated proliferation threats. In other words, if Iran, Israel, and North Korea are not dealt with effectively, and if the other two states with nuclear weapon that are outside the Treaty, India and Pakistan, are not drawn into the disarmament and non-proliferation system, then much of the political constituency in support of disarmament in the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, particularly the US and Russia, can be expected to steadily abandon its support for major cuts and progress toward the agreed goal of zero.

There is obviously no short route to a Middle East that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, but the pursuit of that goal is integral to pursuing disarmament in all its dimensions. The decision of NPT States to give it some serious attention is an important development.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] The full resolution is available on the Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html.

[ii] The final document as approved ( NPT/Conf.2010/L.2) is available from Reaching Critical Will at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf.

[iii] Amy Teibel, “Israel rejects UN call to come clean on nuclear program,” The Globe and Mail, 30 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/israel-rejects-un-call-to-come-clean-on-nuclear-program/article1585886/.

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The Iran fuel swap: a (very) modest proposal

Posted on: May 22nd, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

The fuel swap proposal put forward jointly by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran will likely turn out to be much less consequential than either its critics or supporters contend.

The proposal to exchange Iranian enriched uranium for reactor fuel certainly does not have the potential “to settle an ongoing dispute over Iran’s enrichment program,” as the Organization of the Islamic Conference characterized it,[i] but neither will failure to implement it irredeemably damage the international community’s already troubled nonproliferation diplomacy with regard to Iran. The proposal has been met with less enthusiasm than its authors hoped, but the US Administration did not reject it as categorically as some reports have suggested.[ii]

As the critics have pointed out, the Turkey/Brazil version of the fuel swap loses one important dimension of the IAEA proposal of October 2009. The new version no longer removes the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium for storage outside the country, simply because Iran is enriching uranium, even to 20 percent, at too fast a rate. That means the fuel swap at the level proposed is no longer a defence against breakout – that is, it could not ensure that Iran will not be able to accumulate enough enriched uranium to further enrich it to weapons grade to build at least one warhead, should it decide to pull out of the NPT and do so. As Jeffrey Lewis put it, now “Iran can enrich uranium quicker than [the international community] can arrange for it to be sent out of the country.”[iii]

But that’s not a reason not to accept the fuel swap for what it is – a modest gesture of cooperation between Iran and the international community, in which Iran gets fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Call it a goodwill humanitarian gesture inasmuch as it would facilitate continued production of medical isotopes.

But the fuel swap proposal doesn’t begin to address the Iran “problem.” At best the swap could improve the political climate within which real problem solving is pursued – no small thing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called it a good proposal that could be “a precursor to full-scope negotiations with world powers.”[iv]

Remember what the Iran problem is that requires those negotiations. It is a rather long list of outstanding issues and unanswered questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the course of trying to bring Iran back, following the 2003 discovery of its clandestine nuclear program, into full compliance with its disclosure and safeguards obligations. The most recent IAEA report (18 February 2010), issued under the guidance of the new Director General, Yukiya Amano, identifies the issues that need clarification and resolution, including:[v]

1. Operations at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Nantaz are now under IAEA safeguards, but “additional measures need to be put in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear materials at [the plant].”

2. The IAEA is able to confirm that reprocessing and related activities are not taking place at identified facilities, but without the benefit of inspection measures under the Additional Protocol the Agency is not able to confirm that there are no such activities at other, undisclosed, sites in Iran.

3. The IAEA’s request for access to Iran’s heavy water production plant continues to be rejected.

4. Iran has suspended implementation of a modified Code 3.1 provision of the Safeguards agreement by which Iran is required to provide to the Agency design information for any new facility as soon as there is a decision to construct such a facility. The IAEA says Iran cannot unilaterally suspend implementation of the Code 3.1 provision, and also says Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which is not following that provision.

5. The IAEA has an outstanding request for further information on “pyroprocessing R&D activities” at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory.”

6. The IAEA also has an outstanding request for access to additional locations, including those engaged in “manufacturing centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium mining and milling.”

7. The IAEA has additional outstanding requests related to further clarification of activities with possible military dimensions (see Note).[vi]

Of course, the merits of these issues or requirements are disputed by Iran; but the point is that these are outstanding issues that merit attention and mutual resolution.

Unfortunately, the bulk of public and diplomatic attention has been on the Security Council demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Essentially, such a suspension would be no more helpful in addressing the list of outstanding issues than would the fuel swap – each would help to build confidence, to be sure, but neither would directly address the questions and requirements identified by the IAEA.

Uranium enrichment, which is now carried out under the watchful eye of the IAEA, is, as Iran repeatedly and correctly notes, a perfectly legal activity. Suspension of safeguarded enrichment will do nothing to help the IAEA discover any clandestine enrichment. Again, Jeffrey Lewis makes the point succinctly: “…the problem isnot Iran’s enrichment at Natanz, not even to 20 percent. The problem is Iran’s history of clandestine enrichment. Iran wants to change the narrative to focus on the West’s objection to its arguably legitimate activities. Why we keep helping them do that is beyond me.”

To become reasonably and reliably assured that Iran is no longer operating undeclared nuclear programs requires a fully applied Additional Protocol. To be reasonably assured that Iran is not pursuing military applications (i.e. the bomb) for its fuel cycle activity, requires not only the Additional Protocol but also that the IAEA’s outstanding issues and questions be resolved. Suspending enrichment advances neither of those requirements.

In the meantime, the US response to the Turkey/Brazil/Iran proposal has actually been rather measured:[vii]

-the White House response did not reject the deal, instead it said the transfer of LEU off of Iranian soil would be a positive step, if…;

-it then raised concern about Iran’s intention to continue enriching to 20 percent (the possibly significant point here being that the comment wasn’t about enrichment period);

-the White House statement complained about the Turkey/Brazil/Iran declaration being “vague” about Iran’s willingness to address outstanding issues (the three-state declaration did refer to the fuel exchange as “a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations” – which certainly seems rather “vague”); and

-the US then referred to continuing efforts to get Iran to comply with its obligations (such obligations being attention to the IAEA’s long list of unresolved issues).

The fuel swap, as proposed in October and now, was never intended as an alternative to addressing the outstanding issues at the IAEA. Again, the best that can be said of a fuel swap is that it could help create a climate conducive to progress on those outstanding items. More likely, the fuel swap will have little impact – which is why not only the US, but also Russia and China are considering a new round of sanctions.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the proposed sanctions will be any more effective than the fuel swap in creating a climate for constructive attention to the outstanding IAEA issues,[viii] although the Arms Control Association does point out that Iran’s willingness to enter into a joint proposal with Turkey and Brazil can be seen in part as the result of the pressure brought by Russian and Chinese support for a tougher line on Iran at the Security Council.[ix]

One important step toward more constructive attention to the Iran issue would be to recognize it as a “problem” rather than a “crisis.” “Somehow,” Mr. ElBaradei said last September, “many people are talking about how Iran’s nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world… In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped. Yes, there’s concern about Iran’s future intentions and Iran needs to be more transparent with the IAEA and the international community … But the idea that we’ll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn’t supported by the facts as we have seen them so far.”[x] It’s a matter of persistent diplomacy and pressure that gathers growing support, not crisis management that alienates potential supporters.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “OIC backs Iran nuclear declaration,” Press TV, 20 May 2010. http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=127095&sectionid=351020104.

[ii] Paul Koring, “Iran drives wedge into UN Security Council,” The Globe and Mail , 17 May 2010.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/iran-drives-wedge-into-un-security-council/article1572359/.

[iii] Jeffrey Lewis, “Zombie Fuel Swap, Back from Dead, Again,” Arms Control Wonk, 17 May 2010.http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2731/zombie-fuel-swap-back-from-the-dead-again.

[iv] “El Baradei: Iran nuclear swap ‘a good agreement’,” International News 24/7. 21 May 2010.http://www.france24.com/en/20100518-iran-nuclear-agreement-turkey-el-baradei-interview–sanctions.

[v] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions…in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency (GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010).  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf.

[vi] -alleged studies relating to warhead development; acquisition of a document regarding uranium metal; R&D activities of military related institutes and companies; production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies in the defence industry; activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the green salt project”; clarification as to whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes, and whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; clarification on whether the engineering design and computer modeling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment; the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons.

[vii] Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Iran, 17 May 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-iran

[viii] Robert Burns, “UN sanctions unlikely to stop Iran,” Associate Press, 20 May 2010.http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ibaOsIYbmjGtQ_VvMBzKEYKdeSMQD9FQ5EL80.

[ix] Peter Crail, “Iran-Turkey-Brazil Fuel Deal Has Potential if Iran Provides Follow-Up Steps,” ACA Issue Brief – Volume 1, Number 5, May 17, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/IranTurkeyBrazilFuelDeal.

[x] “U.N. Official: Iran Nuke Program ‘Hyped’,” Associated Press, 2 September 2010.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/02/world/main5281632.shtml.

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Canada addresses disarmament at the NPT

Posted on: May 11th, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

After omitting any reference to disarmament in the Foreign Affairs Minister’s opening statement to the current NPT Review Conference, Canada’s statement to the Conference’s disarmament committee (Main Committee I) addresses the key themes.

The disarmament statement was presented by Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, Marius Grinius, to Main Committee I of the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 7.[i]

As noted in the May 4 posting here,[ii] Canada’s formal policy commitment to the key and urgent elements of the disarmament agenda was not put in doubt by the Minister’s speech, but it did leave considerable doubt as to the level of enthusiasm with which the current Canadian political leadership is willing to push it. This latter doubt is not erased by the Ambassador’s speech, but the statement certainly offers a mostly-welcome reassurance of continuity in Canada’s formal policy commitments.

The opening sentence identifies Canada with broad articulations in the international community regarding the pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.” The second sentence addresses the central issue of balance which was absent from the Minister’s speech, by affirming the growing interdependence of the “three pillars” of the NPT – peaceful uses, disarmament, nonproliferation.

Welcoming the US/Russia achievement of a “New START” agreement, as well as the US Nuclear Posture Review and the results of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Canadian statement expresses the hope that “these recent achievements [will] breed further success as transparent nuclear disarmament actions by all nuclear weapon states are necessary in order to further commitments made under Article VI of the Treaty.”

The Ambassador indicated that Canada has been active in encouraging hold-out states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and made a strong appeal for action on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Echoing his speech at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), in which he suggested that alternative means will have to be found if the CD remains in its current state of deadlock and inaction,[iii] Amb. Grinius pointed out that “the CD no longer holds a monopoly on disarmament negotiations.” He suggested alternative avenues can be found and suggested that Canada “will help foster…political will” toward those ends.

The statement said that action on key issues on the agenda (CTBT, FMCT, others of the “13 practical disarmament steps” approved in 2000) “are within our grasp,” and commended proposal put forward by Australia and Japan,[iv] and the New Agenda Coalition.[v]

Canada’s disarmament commitments, the statement noted, are “carried out with careful consideration of our membership in NATO.” This is another example of political continuity in Canadian policy and another kind of familiar nuclear balance – a balance which, when it gets down to it, tips in favor of “common [NATO] positions on such issues as Alliance nuclear posture and sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the Strategic Concept Review.” As a result, the Ambassador notes that “Canada will actively engage in those discussions mindful of our collective security requirements and the long-term goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.” The collective security caveat is neither new nor entirely welcome; all the more reason to press for genuine changes in the current NATO review of its Strategic Concept.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] Available to the Reaching Critical Website:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/7May_Canada.pdf.

[ii] http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/5/canada%E2%80%99s-opening-statement-npt-promoting-nonproliferation-while-ignoring-disarmament

[iii] Discussed here: http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/4/canada-proposes-action-cd%E2%80%99s-agenda-%E2%80%93-outside-cd.

[iv] “New package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/Conf.2010/WP.9, 24 March 2010. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9.

[v] “Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition,” NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8, 23 March 2010.http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8.

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Canada’s opening statement at NPT: promoting nonproliferation while ignoring disarmament

Posted on: May 4th, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

Canada has managed the extraordinary feat of presenting its opening statement to the NPT Review Conference without any substantive reference to “disarmament” – one of the three foundational pillars of the Treaty.

Actually, the statement by Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon did make one, and only one, mention of disarmament – a reference to the DPRK’s “complete disregard for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.”

It is fair to describe Canada’s opening speech to the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as extraordinary in the sense of it being starkly out of the ordinary – out of sync with the focus and urgency with which other speeches of the opening day (May 3) spoke of disarmament and of the opportunities now before the international community.

For example, the European Union Statement[i] began by pointing out that the NPT is “based on the three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Canada’s 10 paragraph speech devoted 3 paragraphs to pillar one (nonproliferation), one paragraph to pillar three (peaceful uses), and none to pillar two (disarmament). There was one paragraph on North Korea, two on Iran, one on universality (urging the three states outside of the Treaty – India, Israel, and Pakistan – to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, but linking that to the resolution of regional security issues). There was one paragraph on Canada’s important NPT institutional reform proposals, and a final paragraph noting that this is a time of challenge and opportunity. To Mr. Cannon’s credit he added a spoken phrase, not included in the written and distributed document, linking challenge and opportunity to “support of the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

But on the substance of disarmament there was nothing.

The European Union welcomed the new US/Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and called for “its swift ratification.” The EU also “encouraged both States concerned to work towards new agreements for further, comprehensive reductions of their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic weapons.”

The Indonesian Foreign Minister spoke on behalf of NAM states and called for “full implementation of the Treaty in a balanced [all three pillars] manner.” The Minister acknowledged the new START agreement but said that the obligations of nuclear weapon states under the NPT required further “reductions applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability at a significantly faster pace.”

The Dutch Foreign Minister raised the issue of US nuclear weapons in Europe and said “American sub strategic nuclear arms in Europe are going to be subject of arms reduction talks between the United States and Russia.[ii] Nonproliferation and disarmament,” he said, “are mutually reinforcing.”

Brazil’s Minister of External Relations said that “Brazil is convinced that the best guarantee for non-proliferation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As long as some states possess nuclear arms, other states will be tempted to acquire or develop them. We may deplore this perverse logic, but we cannot deny it.”

Ireland, through its Foreign Minister, addressed the urgency of nuclear disarmament: “The horrors which nuclear weaponry can unleash on mankind and on the planet we inhabit defy description. In addition to death and destruction on a massive scale, the environmental costs are profound and long-lasting. Scientists tell us about the effects on the Earth’s stratosphere of the detonation of nuclear weapons. A ‘nuclear winter’ caused by sunlight being blocked out for months or even years is a nightmare scenario which we must all work to prevent.”

Then he made the key point that perfectly illustrates the failure of vision on the part of the Canadian political leadership: “Selective approaches which stress the urgency of non-proliferation while downplaying the need for progress in relation to disarmament serve merely to weaken the Treaty. The NPT’s enduring role as the foundation of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime requires that it be implemented inall its aspects.”

All of these and other speeches also spoke urgently about nonproliferation, in much the same vein as Canada, but what they managed to convey was the importance of balance – that disarmament and nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing; that the retention of nuclear weapons by some is not irrelevant to efforts of others to acquire them.

To be fair to Canada, the opening statement to the Review Conference is only a brief summary statement. Officials will make additional statements of substance as the three pillars are addressed in greater detail. Canada has submitted a report[iii] to the Review Conference on its actions in support of implementing the NPT, which includes an extensive account of Canada’s support for Article VI (the disarmament Article) and the 13 practical disarmament steps agreed to in 2000. So Canada’s policy commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons is not in doubt, and it is confirmed, as the Canadian report points out, by virtue of Canada’s co-sponsorship of, and vote in favour of, the General Assembly resolution on “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 64/47).

What is in considerable doubt is the level of enthusiasm within the political leadership of the current Government of Canada for any determined push on nuclear weapons states to accelerate their implementation of the disarmament pillar, while also pressing, of course, for strict implementation of the nonproliferation pillar.

Unfortunately, the statement by Foreign Minister Cannon continues the Harper Government’s unsoiled record of silence in the public and political arenas on the subject of nuclear disarmament. If the objective was to sorely annoy non-nuclear-weapon states in the non-aligned movement, whose support is absolutely essential to any strong action on nonproliferation, then this must be judged a successful speech.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] All statements are available on the UN’s Website at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/ and the Website of the NGO Reaching Critical Will at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements.html.

[ii] The Minister failed to note, unfortunately, that on April 22 his own Parliament passed a resolution (tabled by the Socialist and Green Parties) requesting the Netherlands government to inform the US that the Netherlands does not regard the presence of American nuclear weapons as essential to the protection of Europe and regards the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons as desirable. Information provided by email by Socialist Party Researcher Karel Koster.

[iii] “Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons,” Report submitted by Canada, 18 March 2010 (NPT/Conf.2010/9). http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/279/58/PDF/N1027958.pdf?OpenElement.

The report includes, in an Annex, the summary of the Project Ploughshares report on NPT Reporting: “Transparency and Accountability.” The full report on reporting is available at  http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Abolish/NPTreporting02-09.pdf.

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US Disclosure of Operational Warhead Totals

Posted on: May 4th, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

“This disclosure is a monumental step toward greater nuclear transparency that breaks with outdated Cold War nuclear secrecy and will put significant pressure on other weapon states to reciprocate.” Hans M. Kristensen (Federation of American Scientists)

As noted here yesterday,[i] based on a New York Times report, the US Government has issued a fact sheet disclosing for the first time the number of warheads in its stockpile – a total of 5,113 strategic and non-strategic warheads.[ii] The disclosure and its implications are thoroughly examined by Hans Kristensen on the Federation of American Scientists site,[iii] showing, among other things, just how close FAS and NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) estimates have been to the official numbers.

The following table summarizes current estimates of total (22,500) nuclear warheads – go to FAS, NDRC, and the DOD Fact Sheet for the numbers and explanations by the officials and experts.

Warhead

Categories

US

Russia

China

France

UK

India

Israel

Pakistan

N. Korea

Operational

(Strategic)

1,968

2,600

180

300

160

80

80

90

<10

Operational

(non-strategic)

500

2,050

Non-deployed 2,641 4,450 60
Total

Stockpile

5,113

9,000

240

300

160

80

80

90

<10

Awaiting

Dismantlement

4,500

3,000

Total

Warheads

9.613

12,000

240

300

160

80

80

90

<10

The DOD fact sheet also provides an interesting schedule of warhead dismantlements by th Department of Energy from 1994 to 2009. The average rate is of about 550 warheads dismantled per year, although the rate in recent years is well down from that of the mid-1990s

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes


[i] “The Global Nuclear Arsenal and the NPT Conference,” DisarmingConflict, 3 May 2010.http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/5/global-nuclear-arsenal-and-npt-conference.

[ii] Available at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf

[iii] Hans M. Kristensen, “United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” 3 May 2010.http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/stockpilenumber.php.

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The Global Nuclear Arsenal and the NPT conference

Posted on: May 3rd, 2010 by Ernie Regehr

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference opened in New York today – a good occasion to recall the size of the nuclear arsenal that the Treaty promises, through Article VI and earlier Review Conferences, to eliminate.

The short answer to the question of how many nuclear warheads actually exist is that it’s a secret. But it’s not really a very well-kept secret – the number is about 22,500, give or take a few hundred (any one of which, if detonated over a major population centre, could alone produce deaths in the millions).

We owe much of the fact that the global nuclear arsenal is a largely open secret to the careful and long-term monitoring work of the US based Natural Resources Defense Council[i] and the Federation of American Scientists,[ii] and to the researchers Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Their work is published regularly on their organizational websites, as well as in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists[iii] and theYearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.[iv]

Current numbers can be found in three recent reports:[v] Russia, 12,000; US, 9,500; France, 300; China, 240; UK, 185; Pakistan, 90; Israel, 80; India, 80; North Korea, 10. All are estimates, but based on public disclosures at various times and calculations of production (and dismantlement) rates linked to fissile material inventories, relevant facilities, and so on.

Russian and American nuclear warheads need to be divided into several sub-categories: deployed strategic (US 2,000; Russia 2,600); strategic warheads in stockpiles and available for deployment (US 2,500; Russia 4,600); awaiting dismantlement (US 4,500; Russia 3,000); non-strategic warheads deployed and available for deployment (US 500; Russia 2,000).

In a May 2 posting, Kristensen refers to a new US fact sheet which says US deployed strategic warheads are now down to 1,968, indicating significant progress toward reaching the limits set out in the New START agreement.[vi]

The US will lift part of the veil of secrecy today, according to a New York Times report,[vii] releasing “long-classified statistics about the total size of America’s nuclear arsenal.” If that comes to pass it will be a significant development on the transparency and accountability front.

Non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT have been calling for that kind of reporting since 2000 when a formal reporting provision was included in list of key and practical disarmament steps. The Americans have offered more transparency than other nuclear weapon states, but they have yet to lift the veil of basic secrecy – we’ll say whether that changes today.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] http://www.nrdc.org/

[ii] http://www.fas.org/

[iii] www.thebulletin.org

[iv] http://books.sipri.org/index_html?c_category_id=1

[v] Status of World Nuclear Forces 2010, Federation of American Scientists. May 3, 2010.http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html

The US Nuclear Arsenal, 2009, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2009.http://www.thebulletin.org/files/065002008.pdf.

Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010.http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/4337066824700113/fulltext.pdf.

[vi] “United States Moves Rapidly Toward New START Warhead Limit,” 2 May 2010.http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/downloading.php#more-3065.

[vii] David E. Sanger, “U.S. Releasing Nuclear Data on Its Arsenal,” New York Times, 2 May 2010.http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/world/03weapons.html.

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