Archive for March, 2009

Obama’s new plan for Afghanistan

Posted on: March 29th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

Can the Taliban become allies in the campaign against al Qaeda?

The Globe and Mail began its main story on President Barack Obama’s new approach to Afghanistan[i] by reporting that the President is “vowing to ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat’ the Taliban and al Qaeda.” In fact, the President pointedly did not promise to “defeat” the Taliban – and therein lies a key feature of the American policy shift.

President Obama[ii] did promise an increase in American forces to “take the fight to the Taliban in the south and east,” but the objective is not defined as “defeating” the Taliban; rather, the objective as defined by the White Paper of the President’s Interagency Policy Group (IPG)[iii] is to “secure Afghanistan’s south and east against the return of al Qaeda.”

The President’s speech included seven references to the Taliban, compared with 24 to al Qaeda. He certainly emphasized the need to ensure that the Afghan Government does not “fall to the Taliban,” because it would mean a return to “brutal governance” and, notably, that such a return would be accompanied by al Qaeda and would thus “allow al Qaeda to go unchallenged.” But preventing a Taliban controlled government in Kabul is not the same as defeating the Taliban.

The fight against the Taliban is consistently put in the context of denying al Qaeda and other extremists a haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan. But the promise of “defeat” is reserved for al Qaeda – along with pledges to “root out” and “target” it, and calling it “a cancer” in the region.

The message on the Taliban was significantly more nuanced – prevent its ascendance to national rule but at the same time open up new avenues to reconciliation with those elements outside of what he described as the core or extreme leadership that is linked to or sympathetic to al Qaeda.

Indeed, the Obama administration is essentially getting around to seeing mainstream Afghan and Pakistani Talibs as essential allies in the effort to defeat al Qaeda. The key to this shift are the Pashtun fighters that eschew the al Qaeda rhetoric and ideology and are instead driven by economic and social grievances against the Karzai Government, in the case of the Afghans, and are committed to resisting the foreign forces that they see as keeping their community from exercising its rightful role at the national level.

The Interagency Policy Group’s White Paper puts it this way: “While Mullah Omar and the Taliban’s hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution.”

Acceptance of the existing constitution is the current mantra on reconciliation, but sooner or later it is likely that there will have to be some acknowledgement that Pashtun grievances are linked to their sense that the current constitution is not the product of a fully inclusive process – meaning that full acceptance of the current constitution is unlikely to survive as a condition for talks and reconciliatrion.

In the meantime, the IPG White Paper calls for the creation of provincial offices to develop reconciliation efforts in support of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, “targeting mid-to-low level insurgents…[and] explor[ing] ways to rehabilitate captured insurgents drawing on lessons learned from similar programs in Iraq and other countries.”

What that describes, of course, is a basic amnesty program. Amnesty has been and is being tried, but not with great success. So when President Hamid Karzai welcomed Obama’s new approach, he also called for the UN to review its terrorist list and remove Taliban leaders not overtly linked to al Qaeda. It is a move that signals his recognition that the amnesty strategy is inadequate and that the Taliban leadership must also be brought into a peace process. Aljazeera quotes him as saying that such a move “would help create ‘the right environment’ for a peace process.” [iv]

The implication is that the war against the Taliban, which is in reality, or is at least perceived as, a war against the Pashtun community,[v] must give way, not only to amnesty offers to individual fighters, but to negotiations with key Pashtun and Taliban leadership that could be amenable to exploring new power-sharing arrangements within the context of constitutional governance and which would give the Pashtun community an appropriate stake (not control) in the central government.

The IPG emphasizes that even the more limited reconciliation process it advocates “must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights” – in other words, reconciliation (whether as amnesty or in a more comprehensive peace process) cannot mean acquiescence to the governance style and human rights violations of the Taliban of the 1990s.

Preventing a return to Taliban rule is not incompatible with exploring ways of bringing the Pashtun community and Afghan Taliban into the Afghan mainstream. That is an objective not specifically included in the plan President Obama outlined on Friday, but the President’s new approach could end up being a significant step in that direction.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] Paul Koring and Campbell Clark, “Obama unveils more robust Afghan strategy,” Globe and Mail, 28 March 2009. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090327.wafghan27/BNStory/International.
[ii] President Obama’s Remarks on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 27 March 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama-text.html.
[iii] White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy towrd Afghanistan and Pakistan, 27 March 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27text-whitepaper.html?ref=politics.
[iv] “Karzai welcomes new US strategy,” Aljazeera.Net, 28 March 2009. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/03/200932810106388317.html.
[v] Gwynne Dyer, “Obama needs to end America’s anti-Pashtun war,” 17 March 2009, Straight.Com. http://www.straight.com/print/206467#.

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Canada’s unseemly take on de-alerting

Posted on: March 26th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

Some 2,000 of the world’s 25,000 nuclear warheads are on constant high alert on missiles that could be launched within minutes of an order to do so. Most governments and security experts have come to the conclusion that these missiles should be “de-alerted.” Why is Canada reluctant?

During the 2008 US election campaign, Candidate Barack Obama was unequivocal. “Keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment’s notice,” he said, “is a dangerous relic of the Cold War. Such policies increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation.” He promised to “work with Russia in a mutual and verifiable manner to increase warning and decision time prior to the launch of nuclear weapons.”[i]

The New York Times yesterday urged the President to “unilaterally” take all US nuclear weapons off “hair-trigger alert.”[ii]

“Hair trigger” is not a technical term, but it does describe a dangerous reality. Bruce Blair, a foremost US expert on missile launch procedures, having been a U.S. Air Force nuclear launch officer, refers to the “launch-ready alert” status of hundreds of missiles carrying thousands of warheads – all in a state of readiness that would allow them to be “launched within a very few moments” of a decision to do so.[iii]

While some currently serving military leaders in the US[iv] are publicly resisting any effort toward across-the-board downgrades in alert status, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, along with other eminent and former Cold War security leaders in the United States, has called on Washington to “take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today’s environment.”[v]

The danger is rooted in a “launch on warning” policy and capability. Because both the US and Russia fear that the other side could launch a pre-emptive strike to destroy all their missiles in their silos, they have made it known that they won’t leave the missiles in their silos in the event of an expected attack. They are fully prepared (that is, the systems are physically capable and they are politically willing) to launch their weapons out of their silos within minutes of a warning of a possible incoming attack.

All of this would have to happen in a matter of 10 to 15 minutes – when satellite sensors warn of an attack, already several minutes after a launch, the signal must be assessed, the information forwarded to the President, advice given, and a decision made whether or not to fire a retaliatory response. Depending on the launch site and target, a missile from Russia would be at the American target in less than 30 minutes.

If the decision was to retaliate, then the launch order would be given and the missiles fired – and once fired, there is no calling them back. If a minute later, the warning turned out to be mistaken, nuclear war would nevertheless have been launched, for the Russians would then detect an attack and launch their own retaliatory strike and the cataclysm beyond imagining would be our collective fate.

And false warnings do occur. In a widely reported 1995 incident, the Russian detection system mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a US nuclear armed missile launched from a US submarine in the North Atlantic, heading for Russia. So convinced were the Russians that they were under attack, the warning was sent up the chain of command to the Russian President and the “nuclear briefcase” that contains the codes and retaliatory options was opened and ready for the President’s go ahead – mercifully, it was finally determined that the warning was a false alarm.[vi]

All 187 signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Canada, were sufficiently convinced in 2000 of the dangers in such a scenario that they collectively called for “concrete measures” to “reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons,”[vii] so that it would be impossible to launch a missile within that timeline and before absolute confirmation of attack.

In 2007 and 2008 the UN General Assembly passed resolutions specifically focused on de-alerting, calling for “further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.”[viii] Only three states – France, the UK, and the US – voted against it. Canada abstained.

Why the Government of Canada has chosen this moment of growing global momentum in support of de-alerting to withhold its support is far from clear. Declaring support for de-alerting in principle, Canada refused to support the de-alerting resolution because, it explained, of a need to “balance our disarmament objectives with our security obligations.”[ix]

For the 141 States that supported the resolution, security is the whole point of de-alerting. It is the current “launch-ready alert” status of these weapons that undermines global security, obviously because it opens up the possibility of a nuclear cataclysm triggered by a false alarm.

In explaining its action, Canada went on to say that it could not support the de-alerting resolution because “deterrence remains an important element of international security, and a fundamental component of the defence strategy of NATO.” As former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador and Senator, Douglas Roche, points out, however, “some of the most important non-nuclear NATO states (Germany, Norway, Italy, Spain) voted yes.”[x] Apparently they don’t regard it as inconsistent with deterrence. And, of course, it is clear that Henry Kissinger doesn’t think that de-alerting is somehow antithetical to deterrence. (The primary point about deterrence is that it is not threatened because even in the event of a pre-emptive strike against land-based missiles, both the US and Russia would have plenty of retaliatory capacity remaining on board submarines. Of course, the most pertinent point about deterrence is that when it has manifestly failed and a nuclear attack is definitely on its way, just what is the point – humanly, politically, morally – of adding to the catastrophe with a retaliatory strike?)

Canada did support a general resolution on nuclear disarmament which called for “the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status on nuclear weapons systems,”[xi] because this resolution adds the phrase, “in ways that promote international stability and security.” But a number of Canada’s NATO allies rightly conclude that “promoting international stability and security” is exactly what de-alerting does.

On the same day that the New York Times called for immediate de-alerting, a large international group of non-governmental organizations wrote a letter to the American and Russian leadership, warning that “it is unrealistic to assume that nuclear deterrence will work perfectly forever. With the passage of time, the use of nuclear weaponry, due to madness, malice, miscalculation, or malfunction becomes an inevitability. Thus it is imperative that as a first step towards reducing and eliminating the immense danger these weapons pose to all nations and peoples, that the US and Russia agree to remove their nuclear weapons from high-alert status.”[xii]

In the midst of this groundswell of global support for prudent and long overdue measures to prevent the accidental triggering of nuclear holocaust, Canada’s reluctance is unlikely to be decisive, but it is surely unseemly.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] “Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Nominee Barack Obama, 24 September 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/20080924_ACT_PresidentialQA_Obama_Sept08.pdf.
[ii] “Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms,” Editorial, New York Times, 25 March 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/opinion/25wed1.html.
[iii] Bruce G. Blair, “A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces.” World Security Institute, 13 October 2007. Available at the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (http://lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm).
[iv] Elaine Mr. Grossman, “Top US General Spurns Obama Pledge to Reduce Nuclear Alert Posture,” Global Security Newswire, 27 February 2009. http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090227_8682.php.
[v] Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn. 2008. Toward a Nuclear-Free World. Wall Street Journal, January 15. http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.
[vi] Steven Starr, “High-alert nuclear weapons: the forgotten danger,” Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter. Issue 36, Autumn 2008 (e-mail distribution).
[vii] Steps 9.d of the practical steps agreed to at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 2000. Final Document. 24 May. http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Events/Npt/NPT_Conferences/npt2000_final_doc.pdf.
[viii] “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems,” UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/63/41. 12 January 2009. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/473/25/PDF/N0847325.pdf?OpenElement.
[ix] Ottawa’s reservations were set out in its 2008 “explanation of vote” statement in the First Committee regarding its abstention on the resolution “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems” (A/C.1/63/L.5 and A/Res/63/41). http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/EOV/CanadaL5.pdf.
[x] Douglas Roche and Jim Wurst. “Canada and Nuclear Disarmament Analysis of Canada’s Votes in the U.N. Disarmament Committee 2007. A Paper Prepared for an Expert Seminar, “Restoring Canada’s Nuclear Disarmament Policies,” held in Ottawa, 3-4 February 2008. http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/2007_Canada_FC_votes.pdf.
[xi] “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/63/73. 2 December 2008.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/475/17/PDF/N0847517.pdf?OpenElement.
[xii] “Letter by Organizations Worldwide to Obama, Medvedev, Putin, Biden, Lavrov and Clinton on Operating Status of Nuclear Weapon Systems,” 25 March 2009 (email distribution).

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Fuelling Wars? Military Exports to Countries in Armed Conflict

Posted on: March 15th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

In contrast to the United States, Canada largely manages to avoid exporting major Canadian military commodities directly to countries at war.[i]

A recent report out of the US[ii] shows the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program to have entered into arms sales agreements in 2006 and 2007 with 20 out of the 27 countries then at war.[iii] The Pentagon sold to 74 percent of the countries then at war, and 30 percent of all its sales ($11.2 billion out of $37.2 billion in sales over those two years) went to where the wars were.

The most recent Canadian figures (based on deliveries, not sales agreements) are for 2005, released a year ago when the Department of Foreign Affairs put out a report on exports to non-US customers for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005[iv] (Canada reports on its military exports to all destinations except the United States).

For those three years Canada sold to 11 of the 28 countries that were at war according to the Ploughshares annual Armed Conflicts Report. So Canada delivered military commodities to 40 percent of countries in conflict – less than the 74 percent supplied by the US, but still a significant number. However, seven of those countries received less than $100,000 worth of such commodities (and the remaining four countries were quite modest customers as well).

That’s where the Canadian record differs markedly from that of the US. Total Canadian sales (to non-US customers) for 2003 through 2005 reached $1.69 billion, of which $13.6 million went to countries in conflict – in other words, less than 1 percent of Canadian military exports went to countries in conflict during those three years (compared with the 30 percent of Pentagon sales that went to countries in conflict in 2006 and 2007). And, as a proportion of total Canadian military exports (including sales to the US), the proportion going to countries in conflict would be less that 1/2 of 1 percent (of course, if the US were included as a country in conflict, re its forces in Iraq, then more than half of all Canadian exports should be reported as going to countries at war).

One Canadian political leader who certainly deserves some of the credit for those low military sales to countries in conflict is Lloyd Axworthy. He obviously wasn’t responsible for military export permit decisions during 2003-2005, but in June 1996 as Minister of Foreign Affairs he issued instructions that the permit approval process pay more rigorous attention to security issues and to threats of hostilities in recipient countries.[v] The result has been a discernable decline in sales to countries experiencing civil conflict or internal war.

In 1996, for example, Canadian military goods went to 14 out of 34 countries at war (41 percent and about the same proportion as in 2005). But the volume of sales to areas of conflict was higher, with $18.6 million out of $504 million (or 3.5 percent of non-US sales) going to countries at war. That still leaves a relatively small proportion, compared with US sales, going to countries at war, but by the 2003-2005 period the proportion of direct sales to countries at war had declined by about 70 percent since the Axworthy directive.[vi]

Reports for Canadian military exports in 2006 and 2007 are long overdue, and when they do finally come out one thing to watch for will be whether the Harper Government has continued the practice of avoiding direct sales to countries at war.

One thing the above figures do not capture are indirect sales – that is the sale of Canadian-built major components and subsystems to industrialized countries, especially the United States, where they are incorporated into weapons that may then be shipped to countries at war.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] For a detailed review of Canadian policy and military exports for the most recent years for twhich data is available see the Ploughshares report, “On the Record: An audit of Canada’s report on military exports, 2003-05,” by Kenneth Epps and Kyle Gossen, January 2009. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Control/Audit2003-05MilitaryExports.pdf.
[ii] William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “US Weapons at War 2008,” New America Foundation, December 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/u_s_weapons_war_2008_0.
[iii] The countries at war are drawn from the annual Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report (http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePage.html).
[iv] Report on Exports of Military Goods From Canada, 2003-2005, (Export Controls Division, Export and Import Controls Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2007) http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/miliexport07-en.asp.
[v] “Annual Report on Canada’s Military Goods Exports Tabled in Parliament Today, Press Release No. 205, December 11, 1997, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/PublicationContentOnly.asp?publication_id=376245&Language=E&MODE=CONTENTONLY&Local=False).
[vi] The figures for 1995 are similar to 1996, with non-US exports going to 36 percent of countries in conflict, and about 2 percent of total non-US sales going to countries in conflict. That result needs an asterisk inasmuch as these figures do not include sales to the UK even though it was listed as a country in conflict due to the Northern Ireland conflict – if those sales were included, then 7 percent of non-US sales would be shown as going to countries in armed conflict.

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The strengthening Nuclear Abolition Imperative

Posted on: March 12th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

The international security community is undergoing a remarkable shift in professional judgment on the merits and possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon took up that theme with a new directness when he told a New York audience of academics and diplomats in October 2008 that “a world free of nuclear weapons would be a global public good of the highest order.” He spoke of a nuclear “taboo,” recalled that the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly was a call for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, challenged nuclear weapon states to meet their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and urged them to finally negotiate a global convention prohibiting all nuclear weapons.

In many ways more noteworthy was the statement in January 2007 (followed up in 2008) by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Shultz 2007), joined by three other senior American leaders in diplomacy and security affairs, to “endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.” Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in turn endorsed their commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons: “It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security.” Although he did not name NATO, Gorbachev directly contradicted its claims with the further assertion that “in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious.”

A group of recently retired British generals has also rejected the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons as “completely useless as a deterrent to the threats and scale of violence we currently, or are likely to, face.” The UK is in fact already engaged in examining the verification mechanisms needed to support the reliable elimination of nuclear weapons and Prime Minister Gordon Brown has promised UK leadership in an “international campaign to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons” (Brown, 2008). And in February the UK Foreign Secretary set out a six-point plan to rid the world of nuclear weapons (Guardian 2009).

Despite NATO’s formal doctrine that nuclear weapons are “essential” to “preserve peace,” most of its member states are non-nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT and thus have already disavowed nuclear weapons for themselves. They still, according to current strategy, formally seek cover under Washington’s nuclear umbrella, but now even the US is led by an Administration committed, as the Obama White House website puts it, to pursuing the “goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” Indeed, the Obama Administration is preparing for talks to extend or replace the 1991 US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December. Reports suggest that “President Obama will convene the most ambitious arms reduction talks with Russia for a generation, aiming to verifiably slash each country’s stockpile of nuclear weapons by 80 per cent” (Reid 2009).

Political and military figures in Germany, including former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the United Kingdom, including three former Foreign Secretaries, Norway, Italy, and others, have all called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. So too has a former NATO Secretary-General, George Robertson, along with groups of Nobel Laureates and security and foreign policy professionals from many countries.

A recent global appeal, under the banner of Global Zero, supported by The Simons Foundation of Canada, declares that “to protect our children, our grandchildren and our civilization from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, we must eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. We therefore commit to working for a legally binding verifiable agreement, including all nations, to eliminate nuclear weapons by a date certain.” This is not only the sentiment of traditional disarmament advocates; rather it is the initiative of Richard Burt, chief arms negotiator for the first President Bush. He is joined by a diverse group, including, US SenatorChuck Hagel, former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, former US President Jimmy Carter, US author and academic Jonathan Schell, former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and dozens of others. A significant added feature of the Global Zero appeal is its call for a strict and accountable timeline.

Publics around the world, long alert to the nuclear danger, are by all accounts eager to support efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. A survey of 21 key states found that 76 per cent of people questioned favour a global agreement that “all countries with nuclear weapons would be required to eliminate them according to a timetable,” while “all other countries would be required not to develop them” (World Public Opinion.Org 2008). Public support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is higher than the global average in China, France, the UK, and the US, but lower than average in Russia and India (although still 69 per cent and 62 per cent respectively). In Pakistan support is only at 46 per cent, but even there more favour total nuclear disarmament than oppose it (World Public Opinion.Org 2008).

This global nuclear weapons taboo is buttressed by an international movement that involves national and municipal governments and a global civil society that includes nongovernmental organizations, faith communities, professional and service groups, researchers, and academics. Mayors for Peace, led by the Mayor of Hiroshima, has mobilized the leaders of 2,635 cities in 134 countries and regions around the world to endorse a campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2020.

It is a community that shares the inescapable conviction that the almost limitless destructive power of nuclear weapons can never be a source of human safety or the foundation for durable peace.

Recent statements and declarations in support of the abolition of nuclear weapons (a sampling, rather than an exhaustive list):

Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General. 2008. The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Address to the East-West Institute, October 24.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=351.

Beckett, Margaret. 2007. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Speech to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington. June 25.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1004&&prog=zgp&proj=znpp&zoom_highlight=Margaret+Beckett.

Bramall, Field Marshal Lord, General Lord Ramsbotham and General Sir Hugh Beach. 2009. UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent. The Times, January 16.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5525682.ece.

D’Alema, Massimo, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi, and Francesco Calogero. 2008. For a Nuclear Free World. July 2008. http://2020visioncampaign.org/pages/446.

Global Zero Declaration. 2008. http://www.globalzero.org/.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. 2007. The Nuclear Threat. Wall Street Journal, January 31.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.html.

Hurd, Douglas, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson. 2008. Stop worrying and learn to ditch the bomb. The Times, June 30.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece.

Kroto. Sir Harold. 2009. Open Letter to the President of the United States of America Barack Obama. International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (signed by 12 additional Nobel Laureates). January 20.

http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/OpenLetterPresidentObama.pdf.

Schmidt, Helmut, Richard von Weizsacker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 2009. Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view. International Herald Tribune, January 9.

http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=19226604.

Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn. 2007. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Wall Street Journal, January 4.

http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item_print.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54.

———. 2008. Toward a Nuclear-Free World. Wall Street Journal, January 15.

http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

Store, Jonas Gahr. 2008. Envisioning a World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Foreign Minister of Norway, June 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/Store.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2009. Lifting the nuclear shadow: Creating the conditions for abolishing nuclear weapons. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-paper/.

The Whitehouse Website. 2009. The Agenda: Foreign Policy.http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

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Afghanistan: Still Confusing NATO and ISAF

Posted on: March 12th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

Defining the security assistance force in Afghanistan as a “NATO” mission misrepresents NATO’s role and has unwelcome implications for how security operations are conducted.

In an op-ed in today’s Globe and Mail, retired General Lewis Mackenzie,[i] among the best known of Canadian Peacekeeping commanders, referred to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as “NATO’s,” implying it somehow belongs to NATO or is mandated by NATO, and insisted that NATO member countries have “obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents.” His main point was to complain that most NATO members were unwilling to “honor” those obligations.

ISAF is not in fact a “NATO mission.” The American led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) force, still present and active there, is arguably much closer to being a NATO mission. Mounted in response to the 9-11 attacks, the US claimed the right to self-defence under the UN Charter (Article 51) when it attacked Afghanistan in response and NATO in turn invoked its Article V on grounds that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on them all. The US was not particularly looking for NATO back-up at the time, but some members, including Canada, provided military support to the OEF operation.

ISAF was and remains an entirely different operation with a different purpose. It was authorized by the Security Council (Res 1386) at the request of the 2001 Bonn Conference and given the specific task of assisting the Afghan government in maintaining security, initially only in Kabul and environs. The foreign troops of ISAF, including Canadians, are thus there at the request of the Security Council; they are not there under NATO Article V, and NATO members certainly do not, as Gen. Mackenzie claims, have “obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat Afghan insurgents.”

The obligations on NATO members are the same as those of any UN member – to consider how best to respond to the Security Council request. ISAF command was initially with the UK and then rotated to others, including Turkey and Germany, until August 2003 when NATO took over that role (currently more than a third of countries contributing troops to ISAF are non-NATO – although a large majority of actual troops come from NATO members).

ISAF was not a “UK mission” when it served in the command role, and it did not become a “NATO mission” when NATO took over.

In 2003 the Security Council “Authorize[d]expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.”

One problem with describing ISAF as NATO’s mission is that it encourages the redefinition of the ISAF mandate to fit a NATO model. The Security Council defines the mandate as helping the Afghan government to maintain security so that the Government, the UN and other civilians can do their work, “in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts,” to implement the Bonn agreement. But Gen. Mackenzie defines the mission as putting “adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents.”

It is widely recognized that the insurgency will not end through military defeat of the insurgents. Indeed, security assistance to enable Afghan and UN authorities and NGOs to carry out the myriad of programs and measures needed to end the insurgency and thus establish some measure of peace now entails a broad range of military, diplomatic/reconciliation, humanitarian, and reconstruction/development activities. Countries in ISAF have a duty to pursue all those measures, not just put “boots on the ground.”

Another problem with reinventing ISAF as a NATO mission is that the focus inevitably turns to the interests and well-being of NATO rather than the interests and well-being of the people of Afghanistan – and only a serious excess of hubris could suggest those interests are one and the same.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] “Has Uncle Sam run out of patience,” The Globe and Mail, 3 February 2009,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090202.wcoafghan03/BNStory/specialComment/home.

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Canada-India nuclear cooperation a few steps closer

Posted on: March 12th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

Canada’s failure to push for key non-proliferation conditions in its moves toward resuming civilian nuclear cooperation with India aided the undermining of global standards, but it’s not too late for some corrective measures.

Bruce Cheadle of the Canadian Press reported over the weekend that International Trade Minister Stockwell Day has just wrapped up his four-day trade mission to India and the two countries are very close to a formal deal on nuclear transfers.

The report includes a good account of the non-proliferation worries and reservations linked to such a deal — sections excerpted below (for the full article go to note[i] for the link). Following the excerpts is an elaboration of four key non-proliferation measures that should be part of any civilian nuclear deal with India.[ii]

OTTAWA — The Conservative government has tarnished Canada’s long-standing stature as a non-proliferation advocate in its pursuit of the rich commercial possibilities of nuclear trade, say critics.

“Given that Canada is going to pursue nuclear co-operation with India — and that’s now inevitable — there are some very basic non-proliferation conditions that I think should still be put on those arrangements,” Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares said Friday.

Mr. Day, who served as public safety minister in the Conservative government until Oct. 30, said he put “safety and security first” in the trade negotiations. But activists argue that no matter what safeguards Canada puts in place, civilian nuclear aid to India, by definition, frees up domestic Indian capacity for its military program.

“That’s the battle that we lost when the (Nuclear Suppliers Group) agreed to the exemption,” said Mr. Regehr, echoing sentiments expressed by governments from New Zealand to Sweden. ”And it’s a very serious loss.”

Mr. Regehr would like to see a written commitment that India won’t test another nuclear bomb, verifiable limits on India stockpiling uranium and airtight, forward-looking bans on enrichment technology transfers [elaborated below].

“There’s no implication that Canada’s uranium would go to the weapons program,” said the non-proliferation expert. “It would go only to safe-guarded facilities. But there’s nobody monitoring where the domestic (Indian uranium) goes.”

Under the international moratorium, India had to choose between feeding civilian energy or military programs. “Now it’s in a position to do both without restraint,” said Mr. Regehr.

“Canada has abdicated its historic leadership role in the establishment and maintenance of the global nuclear non-proliferation norm,” Douglas Shaw, an international affairs expert at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., said in an e-mail.

“As the first state to choose not to build an independent nuclear arsenal, Canada’s behaviour plays an essential role in defining this standard of globally responsible sovereignty.” Shaw maintained that any India-Canada deal on peaceful nuclear co-operation erodes “both Canada’s global leadership role and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

Mr. Regehr said he can’t fault the Conservatives for looking out for Canada’s commercial interests. “I don’t blame Canada for, in the end, going with the consensus that emerged at the Nuclear Supplier Group,” he said. “I think where Canada was a huge disappointment is that it withdrew itself entirely from the debate . . . . It communicated volumes to other states: Here we have a staunch non-proliferation advocate being quiet on the question.”

Mr. Day doesn’t dispute that Canada’s low-profile support of the NSG decision was internationally significant.

The conditions that Canada should put on civilian nuclear trade with India are at least fourfold:

The first is the very basic expectation that India will not test another nuclear device and that if it does all cooperation will cease.

In a political pledge linked to the NSG action, India said it remained committed to “a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,” but it refused all efforts to make a permanent end to testing part of the deal. And given India’s clear commitment to continued nuclear warhead production, internal Indian demands for more testing could at some point become irresistible. US legislation requires any American nuclear cooperation to be halted in the event of another Indian test. Other suppliers were also adamant on the point, and Canada should certainly write into any nuclear cooperation agreement that a test would end it.

Indeed, we should go further and join other states in mounting renewed pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – it is India’s refusal to do so that is one of the central obstacles to the Treaty’s entry into force, a treaty that is repeatedly declared by the international community as one of the most urgently required measures to prevent further vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation.

Second, suppliers are rightly wary of supplying India with uranium at levels that would permit stockpiling. If India is able to build up a large reserve of imported fuel for its civilian reactors it would in effect build up immunity to any sanctions that would almost certainly follow another weapons test. With a large stockpile of fuel at hand, India could be emboldened to ignore the wrath of the international community and conduct further tests in support of its still growing weapons arsenal.

A third caution raised by suppliers is that nuclear cooperation not include the supply of nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology – technologies that can be used to produce fuel for civilian reactors and nuclear weapons alike. US domestic law prohibits the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to any state outside the NPT and the nuclear suppliers group is considering making a similar restriction part of its own supplier guidelines – a condition that Canada supports.

Fourth, it must be remembered that the new willingness to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with India was ostensibly designed to win nonproliferation gains. India was to be brought into the nonproliferation club. As it turned out, India managed to avoid any new and binding commitments, but it did make a number of important and welcome political commitments.

Besides agreeing to continue its testing moratorium and to separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs, placing the former under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, India promised, among other things, to adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, allowing more intrusive inspections of civilian nuclear facilities, to support negotiations toward a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, and to support the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the negotiation of a convention toward that end. These are political commitments, and while India rejected all efforts to make the NSG waiver conditional on any of them, paragraph 3 of the NSG decision nevertheless insists that it is “based on” these and other commitments.

The question now is, what will Canada and the international community do to monitor the extent to which India actually makes good on its solemn promises. It is now the responsibility of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and any states entering into new civilian nuclear cooperation arrangements with India to ensure – logically through an annual review – that India acts on those commitments in support of global nonproliferation efforts.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] January 23, 2009 at 5:06 PM EST, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090123.wcanind0123/EmailBNStory/International/.

[ii] They were set out in this space on November 18, 2008 (https://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/conditioni) and in Embassy, January 7, 2009 (http://www.embassymag.ca/page/printpage/regehr-1-7-2009).N

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Negotiating the Arms Trade Treaty, and learning from Gaza

Posted on: March 12th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

As work finally gets underway at the UN on a treaty to govern international arms transfers, Amnesty International’s call for an arms embargo on all parties to the Gaza conflict points to principles and processes by which such a treaty will have to be implemented.

The pursuit of an effective arms trade treaty deserves to be revisited,[i] given that this is the week negotiations finally begin. On January 23rd the newly-established United Nations open-ended working group on arms transfers[ii] will meet to organize a series of one-week negotiating sessions focused on producing a “legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.”

The intended treaty is to be based, as the mandating resolution puts it,[iii] on “the principles of the Charter of the UN and other existing obligations.” And the relevance of those principles and obligations to arms transfers is summarized by the International Law Commission in its articulation of the basic principle that “a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”[iv]

In the context of the proposed arms trade treaty, the act of aiding or assisting “another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act” involves providing weapons to another state when there is a known and credible risk that those weapons will be used by the recipient state in the commission of a wrongful act.

Canadian military export regulations embody the same principle, namely that arms are not to be provided to any States “whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.”[v] In other words, arms should not be provided if there is a credible risk that they might be used against civilians, and the onus is on the exporter to demonstrate that there is no serious risk.

The effective monitoring and application of that principle through a treaty requires several kinds of detailed information. There is a requirement for information to confirm instances of the use of imported arms for unlawful purposes. There is also a requirement for full disclosure of the sources or suppliers of the particular arms that were used for unlawful purposes. And then there is especially a requirement for detailed advance information on intended transfers along with credible evidence that there is no significant risk that the proposed recipient will use them for unlawful purposes.

Amnesty International, publicly calling for that principle to be honoured in the context of the Gaza conflict, sets out its charge of instances of actions that violate either the UN Charter or international humanitarian law (and calls for a full investigation of these instances):

“Israeli forces have carried out air strikes (bombardments with F16 fighter jets and missile strikes with Apache and similar helicopters and unmanned drones), artillery shelling (with MRLS – multi rockets launch system) and shelling from tanks and gunboats off Gaza’s coast) and other attacks which are directed at civilians or civilian buildings, or are indiscriminate or disproportionate, and have already killed hundreds of unarmed civilians and injured thousands in Gaza, including more than 150 children since 27 December 2008.”

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have fired indiscriminate rockets into southern Israel, which have killed three Israeli civilians and injured scores of others since 27 December 2008.”

Amnesty then goes on to preliminarily point to the foreign sources of such weapons:

“Since 2001, the USA has been by far the major supplier of conventional arms to Israel based on the value of export deliveries of all conventional arms including government to government as well as private commercial sales….Other major arms exporting states such as Germany, France and the UK have exported far less to Israel but nevertheless significant amounts. As a result of political pressure in some European Union countries concerned about the ongoing conflict in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, states such as Germany and the UK have tended to reduce their exports of conventional arms overall. Nonetheless export data show that such states have exported infantry weapons, military vehicles and components for arms sent to Israel. Other significant suppliers of military equipment to Israel since 2001 have been Spain, the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Canada, Slovenia, Australia, Romania, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzogovina. The Netherlands has been a major transit country for military equipment sent to Israel.”

The US Congressional Research Service, in its most recent military exports report, shows Israel’s imports from all sources to be $5.8 billion (US dollars) for the four years 2004-2007, with $5.7 billion of that coming from the US.[vi]

Amnesty also lists Canada as a significant supplier and a report from Ken Epps, who manages the Project Ploughshares Military Industry Database, shows Canadian military exports to Israel of $9.7 million (Canadian dollars) for the years 2000-2005. These figures are based on Government of Canada reports which, while showing broad categories of goods, do not list specific items. The two primary categories of exports to Israel (about two-thirds) are ‘armoured buses & ambulances” and “electronic equipment.” That level of information does not allow any clear assessment of whether any Canadian-origin equipment might have been used for unlawful purposes, indicating in turn that for an arms trade treaty to be effectively monitored and implemented countries like Canada will have to provide more details on the specifics of military goods exported.

Amnesty also reports on possible sources of military equipment used by Hamas:

“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have smuggled small arms, light weapons, rockets and rocket components into Gaza, using tunnels from Egypt into Gaza; this weaponry has been acquired from clandestine sources. “Katyusha” rockets are originally Russian-made, but those being used by Palestinian fighters are unlikely to have been acquired directly from Russia.”

Assuming that further investigation would confirm that imported weapons were used unlawfully and that the United States provided those weapons (in the case of Israel), it would then be necessary to make a judgement as to whether the United States, when supplying those arms, should have known that the weapons supplied were likely to be unlawfully used. For that to be the case it would likely be necessary to demonstrate a pre-existing pattern of unlawful uses of arms by Israel.[vii]

The formal operation of the arms trade treaty will have to go beyond relying on such non-governmental organizations to raise instances of possible noncompliance. Instead, key provisions of the arms trade treaty will have to include clear transparency standards that ensure the disclosure of sufficient information, as well as appropriate consultation, investigation, and adjudication mechanisms.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes

[i] See the posting in this space of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

[ii] The working group was established by a UN General Assembly vote on December 24/08 (Resolution A/Res/63/240, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/485/19/PDF/N0848519.pdf?OpenElement).

[iii] Operational Paragraph 5, A/Res/63/240.

[iv] Article 16 of the ILC Articles which were commended by the General Assembly, A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. Amnesty International, “Israel-Gaza: Call for an Arms Embargo,” 12 January 2009 (press release).

[v] Report on Export of Military Goods From Canada, 2003-2005, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007. http://www.international.gc.ca/eicb/military/miliexport07-en.asp.

[vi] Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, CRS Report for Congress (Order Code RL34723), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 23 October 2008, pp. 53-54, http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34723.pdf.

[vii] Posting of 9 January 2009, http://disarmingconflict.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-in-gaza-and-arms-trade-treaty.html.

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When Bears Fly

Posted on: March 6th, 2009 by Ernie Regehr

Whatever the real point of Ottawa’s mini-tiff with Moscow last week, one can’t help but conclude that Ottawa will regularly be turning to the Russian Bear to help get Canadians bullish on a new fleet of fighter aircraft.

The last time Canada went shopping for fighter aircraft it settled on the CF-18 from McDonald Douglas of the US in the largest single military purchase in Canadian history. The Air Force is now gearing up to replace the CF-18s, and given a price tag that could go to $10 billion, the new fighter aircraft could once again be the largest single Canadian military purchase ever.

Russia’s Bears – long-range, four-engine, propeller driven aircraft built to deliver nuclear weapons to North America – were bolstered by the generally threatening ambience of the Cold War to figure prominently in the rationale for acquiring the CF-18 fighter/interceptor. The Cold War is no more, but the Bears are still with us and they remain ready and willing to serve as the theatrical foil to Ottawa’s manufactured bravado about defending our sovereignty.

“We will defend our airspace,” said Prime Minister Harper, noting his “deep concern” about the “increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and into our airspace.”[i] Not content this time with conventional political hyperbole, the Prime Minister elaborated: “We also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations to defend our continental airspace, and we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.”[ii]

Of course the Russian bombers specifically did not enter Canadian airspace – indeed, they never have. There was no “intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.” They did what they have done for decades and that is fly in international airspace near Canadian and American airspace to train their pilots and test North American reactions; and the Canadians and Americans, grateful for the opportunity to test their own reaction times and routines, dutifully “scramble” their fighter aircraft and go out to greet the Russians.[iii]

For the Russians the point presumably is to continue to announce themselves as a continuing presence on the global stage. For Canada the point is certainly to keep a prudent eye on events near our borders, but when a routine event is elevated into an international incident the point is also to announce a continuing requirement for fighter aircraft and to lay the political foundation for the announcement of a brand new fleet.

The Government has set 2012 as roughly the date for a decision on the CF-18 replacement, although the basic intention was signaled a decade ago when Canada began its participation, initially in the Concept Development Phase, in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter program (JSF).

The aircraft in question in the JSF program – a consortium of nine countries[iv] – is the F-35 from the Lockheed-Martin company in the US, a new design not yet in production. There will be other aircraft in the running, but given Canada’s investment of more than $150 million in its development phase,[v] the F-35 will be a chief contender. The JSF is described in Canadian background notes as “the biggest and most expensive combat aircraft project in history.[vi]

Ottawa’s currently stated requirement is for 65 aircraft; this is down from an earlier ask of 80 (indeed, as the estimated costs rise the number required tends to decline).[vii] Current estimates have hit on about $50 million per aircraft, but some analysts think that number could yet double, depending on the overall production run. The additional program costs – namely, training, infrastructure, follow-on development, and so on – could double that figure and bring the overall bill into the $10 billion range.

Of course, part of the calculation is that both participation in the JSF development program and the purchase of the F-35 will yield major benefits to Canadian industry.[viii] The Government press release said the participation gave Canada “access to up to $8 billion in industrial participation opportunities.”[ix] Like the cost of the aircraft itself, estimates of the industrial benefits also enjoy a measure of inflation. To date, the development phase is reported to have yielded $212 million in contracts for more than 70 Canadian companies, and a more recent statement of potential sales claims $9 billion by 2035.[x]

Any decision on new fighter aircraft will obviously have to be preceded by a thoroughgoing public debate on the need.

The primary role for Canadian fighter interceptors is obviously to patrol approaches to Canadian airspace, but the question begging to be asked is just how many and what kind of aircraft does that really take. The Russian Bears are real, of course, but they are a real symbol of a threat – the real nuclear threat to North America obviously comes from intercontinental ballistic missiles, against which there is no defence possible or contemplated.

The more serious air threat that Canadian interceptors must address is not a military threat but a law enforcement threat in the form of small aircraft that illegally intrude into Canadian airspace and territory, most often laden with illegal drugs. Are large, state-of-the-art, fighter aircraft the best means of tracking the piper cubs of drug runners?

New fighter aircraft would also be available to support Canadian participation in overseas military missions – but here too there is an obvious question about the relevance of fighter aircraft in peace support operations.

eregehr@ploughshares.ca

Notes
[i] David Ljunggren, “Russian bomber neared Canada before Obama visit,” Reuters, 27 February 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE51Q2W220090227?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
[ii] “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iii] The only real dispute was whether Russia told Canada, as it routinely does, about the flight in advance. The Russian Embassy in Ottawa said “the adjacent countries were informed of the flight in good time,” but Ottawa said it was not informed. “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html?ref=rss.
[iv] In addition to the US and Canada, coalition members are the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Australia.
[v] “Canada’s military eyeing futuristic fighter jets,” Canwest News Service. 26 june 2007. http://www.canada.com/topics/technology/story.html?id=7a365ab7-22b5-4d06-9de7-7a6177af4b62.
[vi] Michel Rossignol, “The Joint Strike Fighter Project,” 19 February 2003, Library of Parliament. Government of Canada. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0207-e.pdf.
[vii] David Pugliese, “Canada Weighs Fighter Options,” DefenseNews, 14 July 2008. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3637165.
[viii] “US, Canada sign agreement on Joint Strike Fighter.” US DOD News Release No. 060-02, 07 February 02. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3232.
[ix] “Canada’s New Government Signs on to Phase III of Joint Strike Fighter Program….” Industry Canada, 12 December 2006. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/02150.html.
[x] Allison Lampert, “Joint Strike Fighter program boosts aerospace industry,” 02 August 08, Canwest New Service. http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html?id=659a65d6-2ae0-48e3-99d8-4aab98a5d103.

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