Archive for January, 2007

When Kissinger promotes nuclear weapons abolition

Posted on: January 30th, 2007 by Ernie Regehr

In Geneva the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) has begun what some will call yet another year of living pointlessly. For 10 years now, the world’s only multilateral forum dedicated to negotiating disarmament agreements has failed to agree even on what they should talk about, much less actually negotiating.

That doesn’t mean there are any doubts about the urgency of the CD’s nuclear agenda. Indeed, the urgency is growing given that in less than three months the signatory states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet in a Preparatory Committee to begin planning for its 2010 Review Conference, and given that this new review cycle must be regarded as a make or break time for the NPT.

The last Review Conference, in 2005, ended in complete failure and cast a pall over the entire disarmament enterprise. The failure to make any headway in implementing the NPT’s objectives – that is, to bring all states under its discipline and thus require the elimination of all current nuclear arsenals and prevent the spread of weapons – leaves many states increasingly doubtful that the international community is serious about nuclear disarmament and wondering whether they too should prepare to join the expanding nuclear club.

To turn these doubts around means facing some rather serious challenges:

  • In the North Asia region the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests of the DPRK threaten to destabilize the region and to undermine the agreed international objective of nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
  • In the Middle East, Iran’s failure to satisfy the international community that its civilian nuclear programs are not a cover for developing a nucler weapons capability, combined with Israel’s refusal to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections, threatens a cascade of nuclear proliferation and obviously frustrates the international community’s agreed pursuit of the Middle East as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.
  • In South Asia, the unilateral initiative by the United States to accept India as a nuclear weapon state threatens an ongoing nuclear arms race with Pakistan and with China, with severe implications beyond the region, and entrenches a nuclear double standard that threatens all other non-proliferation efforts.
  • The ongoing nuclear modernization programs of the nuclear weapon states, along with stalled efforts to pursue arsenal reductions, exacerbates that double standard and generates further global skepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of the NPT as an instrument for the pursuit of nuclear abolition.
  • The dangers of the unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons are heightened by practices in the United States and Russia that keep nuclear weapons on high alert and available for firing within minutes of an alarm (or false alarm) and by the dangers that insufficiently secured weapons or weapons materials will fall into the hands of non-state groups committed to acts of terror.

The challenges are daunting, but there are signs, or at least slivers, of hope still present. A group of lapsed Cold Warriors, including former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other former custodians of US nuclear expansion and deterrence strategies, has declared the world to be “on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear war” and thus issued a call to “leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.”

Their statement calls for a recommitment to the NPT’s objective of nuclear disarmament and challenges the United States in particular to work toward “a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”[i]

A recent article by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev descries the arrogance of military power and calls for reliance on “dialogue and cooperation rather than force.”[ii]

Another source of continuing hope, or at least a basis for staving off utter despair, is the fact that the core cause for hope is that the core agenda is not in dispute. The stalemate in the CD is not based on any uncertainty about the work that needs to be done – the quarrel is really over priorities. The core disarmament agenda is widely agreed. It was articulated and affirmed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, labeled there as the “13 practical steps.”

And within those steps, even the items for priority action are generally agreed:

  • Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – a Treaty that was negotiated within the CD (its last piece of substantive work) but now awaits ratification by the United States and other key states – would be one of the most effective means of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons capability and of curtailing the growth of arsenals in the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan.
  • Within the CD itself, the most likely route to it resuming its primary function of negotiating disarmament measures would be through a program of work that simultaneously involves negotiations on a treaty to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (the FMCT), formal discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space, and discussion of nuclear disarmament imperatives more broadly, including the formalization of security assurances given by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.[iii]

An early signal toward action on these two fronts would have a salutary effect on the disarmament environment and on the tone of the forthcoming NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

Additional measures to build confidence in a revived nuclear disarmament agenda include:

  • The control and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, facilitated by the immediate removal of such weapons from the soil of non-nuclear-weapon states of NATO; and
  • Further measures to reduce nuclear dangers by taking all weapons of high alert and redoubling efforts to bring all nuclear weapons and materials under effective security protection to prevent them from getting into the hands of non-state groups.

And for those with a surfeit of ambition, it could be turned toward:

  • The commencement of discussions, in the context of requiring Iran to meet its obligations toward the IAEA, of ways and means of pursuing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (in the context of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction); and
  • The continued exploration of placing the weapon sensitive elements of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel – under international controls.

A Canadian agenda for action should grow out of this list of policy imperatives:

  • A clear reaffirmation by the Harper Government of Canada’s long-standing commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, a commitment that is more urgent than ever and eminently achievable;
  • A challenge to the United States and China in particular – the two states at the centre of the CD stalemate – to accept Ambassador Paul Meyer’s formula for moving forward with negotiations on an FMCT and discussions of PAROS, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances;
  • Yet another call to the United States, India and Pakistan in particular to show global leadership by beginning steps toward their respective ratification of the CTBT; and
  • A renewed call to remove all nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states of NATO and to challenge NATO to end its doctrine of nuclear reliance.

[i] The statement, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” was written by Mr. Kissinger along with former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, and was endorsed by a number of former officials and diplomats. It was published in the Washington Post, January 4, 2007.

[ii] Mikhail Gorbachev, “History is not preordained: A new cold war can be averted,” The Guardian, January 18, 2007.

[iii] The formula put forward by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Paul Meyer, “The Conference on Disarmament: Getting Back to Business,” Arms Control Today, December 2006.

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Changing politics re Iran’s nuclear program

Posted on: January 28th, 2007 by Ernie Regehr

The UN Security Council continues to insist that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment activity even though such activity does not violate any provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor is enrichment in itself contrary to safeguards requirements under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is not illegal for Iran to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.

But it is illegal to try to do it in secret – that is, outside of IAEA safeguards arrangements – which is what Iran in fact did for an extended period. The clandestine operation of any civilian nuclear facility, including civilian enrichment, without safeguards is illegal, so when Iran was caught doing just that it obviously raised suspicions that Iran ‘s real interest is in developing the capacity to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Hence, the Security Council made the eminently reasonable decision to require Iran to suspend all enrichment activity until such time as the IAEA has sufficient access to Iranian nuclear facilities to develop full confidence that all clandestine activities have ended and that enrichment is and will remain for civilian purposes only.

Iran has been notorious about dragging its feet on compliance with IAEA requirements, complaining that it is being asked to terminate just the kind of peaceful nuclear activity that is specifically allowed and even promoted under the NPT. In the standoff Iran continues to pursue enrichment and little progress is being made in clearing up outstanding questions related to the earlier secret operations.

In other words, the Security Council strategy – which seeks to isolate Iran by refusing all talks until enrichment is suspended – isn’t working, and calls for a new approach are growing.

Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group recently told a Harvard University conference that the world will finally have to accept Iran’s civilian enrichment program and take a principled position that is consistent with the Treaty – namely, insist on a safeguards arrangement that can verify that Iran never weaponizes its enrichment capability, and promise “all hell – including in an extreme case military action – if that line is crossed.”[i]

A similar approach has been argued here.[ii] If suspension of enrichment was taken off the table and replaced by a requirement that enrichment be confined to research levels until such time as all outstanding IAEA questions are resolved, the international community would be in a position to call Iran’s bluff‚Äîto see whether Iran, with the challenge to its right to enrichment technology removed, would indeed honour its obligation of full disclosure and unfettered IAEA access. Then, future industrial enrichment would be carried out under full IAEA safeguards. At the moment, however, the focus on a suspension of all enrichment activity provides Iran a cover under which it both accelerates enrichment activity and refuses full cooperation with the IAEA – and. as a consequence, frustrates the international community’s right to unambiguous confirmation that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

The current Security Council strategy is driven by the US, but it is increasingly questioned at home. Three contenders to be the Democratic Party’s nominee for president – Hilary Clinton, Bill Richardson, and Barak Obama – have recently called for a new round of intensified diplomacy, including direct talks without preconditions.[iii]

With the IAEA’s Director, Mohamed ElBaradei, calling for the defusing of tension to prepare the way for a political solution, the US/Security Council approach is losing credibility. There is no doubt that American pressure for strengthened economic sanctions against Iran is having an impact, but it is the move toward talks to resolve the crisis, rather than talks as a reward for Iran agreeing to all demands in advance, that is now opening up new possibilities. Last week Iran and the IAEA agreed to “develop an action plan for resolving outstanding issues.”[iv]

One new pledge to talk does not qualify as a major breakthrough, but combined with the growing criticism of the current no negotiations stance from Washington , we may be seeing a new opportunity. It is an opportunity that needs to be developed into a three-pronged approach: a new commitment to talking and sustained diplomacy; recognition that countries like Iran cannot be prevented from developing civilian nuclear technology; and the strengthening of the IAEA, backed by tough international resolve, to give it the technical tools and the political backing it needs to apply the kinds of comprehensive safeguards needed to assure that there is no diversion of civilian technology to weapons purposes.

[i] Gareth Evans, “Hypocrisy, Democracy, War and Peace,” speech to Harvard University Wetherhead Center for International Affairs, June 16, 2007 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4906).

[ii]“Iran: Is it time for a new consensus on uranium enrichment?” March 4/07 (iranisit).

[iii] The Associated Press reports on the Clinton and Richardson comments: “Clinton, Richardson urge Bush administration to continue talking to Iran,” Associated Press, June 27/07 (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/27/america/NA-POL-US-Democrats-Foreign-Policy.php); Barak Obama writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that “our first measure must be sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy – the kind that the Bush administration has been unable and unwilling to use,” Barak Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html).

[iv] ” Iran , IAEA to Discuss Better Nuclear Cooperation,: Global Security Newswire, June 26, 2007 (http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007/6/26/ADE5FA01-715B-4BA6-AE9B-1453E164C409.html).

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Afghanistan: The Unfinished Political Reforms

Posted on: January 14th, 2007 by Ernie Regehr

Any persistent and buoyant insurgency, still an entirely apt description of the Taliban rebellion that Canadians are trying to help quell in southern Afghanistan, must necessarily feed off multiple roots, but the multinational counter-insurgency effort is now increasingly focused on what it regards as the dual taproots of the armed resistance.

The first is the rest and re-supply haven that is available to first-tier or hard-line Taliban combatants and leaders across the border in Pakistan. The second is the ongoing supply of young Afghan men available for hire as second-tier Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan .

In a series of recent encounters with international security analysts, UN officials, and Canadian military and foreign affairs officials, key elements of the political agenda they have in mind when they say that success in Afghanistan will not be achieved by military means alone became more clearly focused.

They all now have Pakistan fully in their sights. Intensified public and quiet diplomacy is now underway to persuade Pakistan to address the border problem and thus to take steps to stop the free movement of insurgents and their supplies between the two countries.[i]

Strategists are also focused increasingly on the second-tier Taliban fighters – young men who do much of the movement’s fighting but who are generally thought not to be driven by the movement’s ideology. Instead, they are part of a broad Pashtun community that is sufficiently disaffected with Kabul to be susceptible to the Taliban’s offers of attractive pay envelopes. The main effort to get these young men to decline further service to the Taliban is therefore a second offensive – this one accelerates reconstruction in accessible areas of the south in an effort to win over villagers who now, in the face of Taliban intimidation and the absence of reliable services from the central government in Kabul, are drawn either to neutrality or to supporting the forces that reject the incompetence, corruption, and political exclusiveness widely associated with Kabul.[ii]

B oth strategies – to cut off the Taliban from their haven in Pakistan and from their foot soldiers in Afghanistan – are necessary, but at least some analysts add that success will remain elusive unless these strategies are accompanied by fundamental changes in the make-up and behavior of the Government in Kabul .

To win the cooperation of Pakistan it will be necessary to demonstrate to Islamabad that the Government in Kabul is not a threat to Pakistan ‘s interests. It will be necessary to demonstrate that a stable Afghanistan government will not be dominated by the pro-India Northern Alliance,[iii] but will include the full participation of the south that is historically more in tune with Pakistan. In further recognition of Pakistan’s interests and in further pursuit of Pakistan’s cooperation, Kabul is also asked to accept the current border and adopt a policy of careful neutrality with regard to both India and Pakistan .[iv]

Canadian military officials as well as UN representatives emphasize that reconstruction with tangible and immediate returns to villages in the south – returns that display the benefits of the central government – can be the only source of real evidence of a serious intention to meet local needs and earn loyalty to the new Afghanistan. And it is only a sense of this durable mutual commitment that will finally discourage young southerners from becoming tier 2 Taliban.

At the same time, however, one does not get the sense from these conversations that there is full recognition that the south is indeed fundamentally suspicious of the central government and that the government itself must take overt steps to convince southerners that it is striving to be representative of and sympathetic to the needs and interests of the people of the south.

If current reconstruction efforts are to have the desired political impact – that is, growing support for the government – Kabul will have to demonstrate that it is not in the hands of the traditional adversaries of the people of the south (i.e. that it is not dominated by the Northern Alliance at the expense of the Pashtun). Only then, say other analysts, will southerners be persuaded that short-term benefits will be converted into a long-term commitment to the well-being of the south. If the south continues to view the regime as untrustworthy and not inclusive, loyalty will not be bought with a few projects delivered by Canadian soldiers.

A government in Kabul that earns the durable confidence of the people of the south is essential to produce a political culture that actively discourages defection to the armed resistance of the Taliban. Barnet Rubin of New York University and the Council on Foreign Relations, a pre-eminent American observer of Afghan affairs, even contemplates inviting the Taliban into the political process: “if, as some sources claim, the Taliban are preparing to drop their maximalist demands and give guarantees against the reestablishment of the al Qaeda bases, the Afghan government could discuss their entry into the political system”[v] – a point the advocates of talking to the Taliban have been making for some time.

There are thus two political transformations in Afghanistan that are essential to undercutting the Taliban military threat and to building Pashtun confidence in the government and national institutions anchored in Kabul: a reorganization and re-orientation of the central government to demonstrate that it is not hostile to the interests of Pakistan, and a political process that is inclusive and serious about forming a government that is ultimately regarded by southerners as their own.


[i]Foreign Minister Peter MacKay told the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (November 22, 2006) that ” President Musharraf’s government can and must do more.” He said that “Canada, along with our allies, continues to encourage Pakistan to step up its efforts to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Specifically, we requested Pakistan’s efforts to seek out and arrest senior Taliban figures inside their country; improve border security; sign, ratify, and implement key United Nations conventions and resolutions against terrorism; legislate and enforce more robust anti-money laundering laws and counter-narcotics training; and work to prevent the exploitation by insurgents of refugee camps inside Pakistan .” In his January 2007 visit to Pakistan Mr. MacKay offered Canadian assistance to Pakistan , including aerial reconnaissance, training of border guards, and the provision of satellite telephones. [Sadaqat Jan, “Canada doesn’t back Pakistan ‘s land mine plan, MacKay says,” Associated Press, January 9, 2007 (www.theglobeandmail.com).

[ii] Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Unterstanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan ,” Orbis, Winter 2007, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (The Foreign Policy Research Institute), pp. 71-89.

[iii] The Karzai’s government is linked to India, according to Pakistan, through strong personal and political ties and Pakistan is concerned that a strategic alliance with India will not only undermine Pakistan’s traditional influence in Afghanistan but will give India a foothold from which to further threaten Pakistan. [“Musharraf’s Taliban Problem,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, September 11, 2006 (http://www.cfr.org/publication/11401/musharrafs_taliban_problem.html).

[iv] Barnet Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan ,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org).

[v] Rubin.

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The physics and politics of missile defence in Europe

Posted on: January 8th, 2007 by Ernie Regehr

Like the proverbial bad dream that it is, missile defence once again has a lot of people losing a lot of sleep. The finger of blame swings naturally to Washington , but this time let’s not overlook Russian President Vladimir Putin. His energetic Russia-as-victim positioning not only tries to return nuclear competition to the core of Russian-US relations, it misses the perfect opportunity to expose the US ballistic missile plan (BMD) for the minor irritant and major fraud that it really is.

The US missile defence system is and will remain powerless to prevent Russia from launching a nuclear attack on the United States if that is what it really wants to do. Indeed, David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that “because the system is vulnerable to decoys, it also wouldn’t stop a missile attack from the Middle East. If Iran or other states in the region develop long-range missiles and deliverable nuclear warheads, they would certainly equip those missiles with countermeasures that could render U.S. defenses ineffective.”[i]

American officials, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have themselves been claiming that the Poland-based GBIs would be ineffective against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), not because they have finally admitted that the system doesn’t work, but because of the physics of missiles and the geography of Poland.[ii]For once they are right.

Even if the system worked as intended, the only Russian ICBMs which the Poland-based GBIs would have a chance of intercepting would be those launched from western or European Russian. The trajectory of west Russian missiles headed for the US would not pass directly over Poland, but close to it, while the trajectory of central and east Russian missiles would be far to the north of Poland and impossible to catch (interceptors have to be directed at a target warhead coming toward them, not one they are trying to overtake).

But if the system was intended to intercept warheads launched from western Russia, the US Arms Control Association confirms, Poland would be a poor location for the GBIs.[iii] Some Russian commentators insist they could work against west Russian launches, but they are tentative at best.[iv] Others say definitely that GBIs in Poland would not have the capacity to reach the Russian warhead flight path in time.[v]The Americans have said that if the focus was Russian ICBMs, England and further west would be a far the better location ( Baffin Island !?).

On the other hand, if the American focus is Iran (remember, we’re still pretending the system actually works), then Poland is a logical location inasmuch as the flight path of an Iranian missile headed for Washington, were such a thing to actually exist, would take it directly over Poland with enough time for the interceptors to be fired into the path of the Iranian warhead (or at least one of the decoys).

In any event, the audience for Mr. Putin’s protestations is his domestic constituency, not the White House. For him to be dismissive of this faux American threat he would have to forgo the opportunity to foster an image of Russian toughness in the face of an irresponsible and reckless US Administration.[vi]

And speaking of President George W. Bush, he is almost too easy a target. But he remains diligent in earning the world’s opprobrium – not so much for his dogged pursuit of missile defence in the face of overwhelming expert testimony that it will never be made effective (that makes it is a colossal waste of money, but given their current war-spending and annual deficits, Americans seem fully inured to waste), but for doing it in a unilateral, arms-control-destroying, and political-cooperation-defying way.

And it is not only Russia to which Mr. Bush gives offence and an excuse to avoid disarmament commitments. The United States says it wants China to agree to negotiate a treaty banning further production of fissile materials, but does Mr. Bush really think he can persuade China to take action to cap its stocks of fissile material through a legally binding treaty if it believes that America is committed to perfecting its strategic first-strike capability and link it to an upscalable missile defence system that could theoretically defang China’s nuclear forces? As long as the US continues to modernize its nuclear forces while pursuing missile defence, China will have little incentive to cooperate.

Had Mr. Bush genuinely wanted a BMD system as a hedge against rogue states far into the future, he would have done long ago what he has now, at the German G8 meeting, agreed to – and that is present missile defence as an instrument of cooperation with Russia, and China , rather than as a tension escalator.[vii] Even supporters of missile defence make this point: “If the President wants to make creating a third missile defense site part of his legacy, he can still contribute – by setting up a formal NATO process to study the idea and give our allies a greater voice in the debate. We should also involve Russia in the discussion, especially as good diplomacy might be able to turn it into a supporter rather than an opponent of the plan.”[viii]

Instead, while Mr. Bush gave Mr. Putin an opportunity to work the polls at home,[ix]he also managed to push nuclear disarmament even further down his To Do list.

While sharing the blame, we should also not forget the Republican Presidential hopefuls who turn out to be almost unanimous in their declared willingness to use nuclear weapons against Iran if it persists in pursuing a nuclear weapon capability.[x]In concert with the Administration in Washington , the Republicans believe that it is possible to threaten states into disarming. All the while, of course, Iran sees that the US does not make the same threat against states that actually do acquire nuclear weapons, e.g. North Korea and India , but reserves its threats for those it accuses of trying.

The lesson is clear, and President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad of Iran has been diligent in learning it. Iran could obviously undercut the US rationale for missile defence in a flash if it would simply agree to full and unfettered cooperation with the IAEA. Of course it doesn’t, and so the cycle of threat and counter-threat is fed, derailing nuclear disarmament and a host of genuine opportunities to pursue real world problems in both the Middle East and Russia .

Putin, Bush, the Republican aspirants to global leadership, and Ahmadinejad are in full cooperation mode to keep threat and counter-threat alive and to position themselves as the heroic defenders of the threatened rights and security of their respective publics.

The late news flash that the US and Russia will now seek to cooperate on missile defence brings to mind the oft-quoted African proverb: be careful when two elephants get together, because whether they decide to fight or make love, a lot of grass is bound to get trampled. It is almost twenty years since the Berlin Wall was dismantled, but with Russia and the US still placing nuclear arsenals at the core of their relationship, whether to balance them or defend against them, a lot of political, economic, and security grass continues to get the life trampled out of it.


[i] David Wright, ” President Putin Needn’t Worry About a U.S. Missile Defense System: It Won’t Work, Says Leading U.S. Science Group ,” June 6/07, Union of Concerned Scientists

(http://www.ucsusa.org/news/commentary/president-putin-neednt-worry-0036.html).

[ii] Donna Miles, “Putin Baffles Gates With Missiles in Eastern Europe ,” American Forces Press Service (http://www.sitemason.com/newspub/dtWzug?id=46198&mode=print).

[iii] William Matthews, “As U.S., Russia Spar Over Missile Defense, Congress Cuts Funding”:”The missiles would, indeed, “be incapable of intercepting Russian missiles aimed at the United States ,” said Boese. “Russian missiles would be fired over the North Pole to reach the United States. Anti-ballistic missiles fired from Poland would be chasing them and could not catch up. Besides, 10 interceptors would be no match for a barrage of Russian missiles.” http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2797079&C=europe

[iv] “Missile defense interceptors in Poland” – “Although it is true that Poland is not exactly on the flight path of Russian missiles, it is close enough to give interceptors deployed there a chance to reach SS-19/UR-100NUTTH ICBMs launched from the Koselsk or Tatishchevo bases. SS-27 Topol-M missiles based in Tatishchevo, as well as SS-25 Topol in Vypolzovo and Teykovo also may be within the interceptors reach.” http://russianforces.org/

[v] Vladimir Belous, The Missile-Defense Flap ,” RIA Novosti, Moscow , April 11, 2007 (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html).”But the snag for the United States is that the strategic missiles deployed in European Russia — mobile and silo-based Topol-M (NATO reporting name SS-27) missiles and Stilet missiles — make too quick a getaway to be intercepted by U.S. anti-missiles. Solid-fueled Topols (SS-25 Sickle) have a launch speed of 5 km/sec, and liquid-fueled Stilets, 4.5 km/sec, compared with the 3.5 km/sec of ground-based interceptors. GBIs cannot catch up with Russian strategic missiles because they are too slow and too far from where the missiles would be launched. And the trick could never be pulled off outside the atmosphere, because Topol and Stilet warheads have even faster speeds there.” http://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Missile_Defense_Flap_999.html

[vi] ABC News, “Leaders spar in war of words over missile defense system at summit”: “Putin rightly understands that the U.S. is weak and discredited around the world, and therefore he can make points on the world stage” (http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=nation_world&id=5373927).

[vii] Jennifer Loven, “Putin tells Bush to put missile shield in Azerbaijan ,” Associated Press, Winnipege Free Press, June 7, 2007(http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/world/story/3983664p-4599862c.html).

[viii] Michael O’Hanlon, “A Defense We Just Don’t Need (Yet),” The New York Times, May 17, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/17/opinion/17ohanlon.html?ex=1337054400&en=e45e98aa13d55c3a&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss).

[ix] Tom Miles, “‚ÄòCold War’ talk sets the scene for polls in Russia ,” 7 June, 2007 (http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=153621&version=1&template_id=46&parent_id=26). Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman at the end of the Cold War, sees a clever game by Putin. “It’s all about psychology. It’s not really serious. It’s not a Cold War, no,” said Gerasimov, who is now retired from government service. “He wants the West to take him seriously.” Putin had an interest in making a fuss over missile defence even if it presented no threat, Gerasimov said. “This helps him to take the position of the defender of Russia , which is a victim of American aggression. If you take into account anti-Americanism all over the world, you can also interpret this as something which plays in Putin’s hands.
“It helps him to stay in power and to increase his power.” Andrei Illarionov, once Putin’s top economic aide, agreed. “Russia is pursuing a deliberate policy aimed at putting a strain on relations with G7,” Interfax quoted him as saying. The outspoken economist said Putin’s strategy was “to provoke (G8 leaders) to make harsh statements or even take steps that could be interpreted as interference in domestic affairs.”
This would allow the Kremlin to “declare the West an enemy and to mobilise the electorate”, he added. – Reuters

[x] William Arkin, “Nuking Iran : The Republican Agenda?” The Washington Post, June 6/07 (http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/06/nuking_iran_the_republican_age_1.html#more).

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Somalia: Is Iraq or Uganda the model?

Posted on: January 5th, 2007 by Ernie Regehr

Iraq and Uganda model the two primary narratives that dominate analysis of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The action to date has removed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from its short-lived control of the national capital, as well as from much of the rest of the country, and replaced it with the, till now, marginalized and ineffective Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The Iraq model for what happens next predominates among observers and is persuasively argued by author and columnist Gwynne Dyer. In this story line, the Ethiopian invasion and defeat of the UIC are the start of a new round of war. As in the American invasion of Iraq (the Iraq analogy is specifically drawn by a UIC official that Dyer quotes), regime destruction has been swift and efficient, but the Islamists, far from being defeated, have only melted away temporarily to regroup and organize for the struggle to come. Thus Dyer concludes: “this is just the start of a long guerilla war that will sap the strength of the Ethiopian army, a Christian-led force backing unpopular warlords in a Muslim country.”[i]

The Uganda model was put forward in the Times of London by Rosemary Righter, citing Tanzania’s 1979 invasion of neighboring Uganda which finally ended the brutal regime of Idi Amin and set the stage for Uganda’s slow and far from easy emergence out of the special hell that was the Uganda of the 1970s. While the Tanzanians were denounced at the time, Righter insists “they deserved praise and so do the Ethiopians.”[ii]

The Iraq analogy definitely has the feel of realism to it, but the fear that Somalia has just been driven to the threshold of another long, drawn-out guerilla war may well be underestimating the potential for the Transitional Federal Government and overestimating the ambitions of the Union of Islamic Courts.

The TFG was formed in October 2004 after a long, difficult, but inclusive negotiating process.[iii] The new Parliament and the new Government it supports could not move to Somalia until mid 2005, and into the capital Mogadishu only now under the wing of the Ethiopian military, but both were and are broadly representative of the country’s clans and also include many of the country’s surfeit of war lords and militia leaders. While the inclusion of war lords is reminiscent of the unholy alliances that the Kharzei Government in Afghanistan has pursued with war lords there, the hard reality of Somalia is that clan-based war lords excluded from the political process have the means of fighting their way back to attention and contention – hence, having them inside the proverbial tent was considered the prudent option.

Similarly, any Government of Somalia that does not have the support or at least toleration of its key neighbors cannot expect a stable future. Indeed, a major challenge in the peace process that established the TFG was to gain the support of Ethiopia to prevent it from acting as external spoiler right from the start. Ultimately, of course, Eritrea will also have to be brought on board (which should be part of the now essential reconciliation process involving its friends in the UIC).

At the same time, it is not necessarily the case that the mainstream of the UIC has ambitions to fight for central power and to convert Somalia into a fundamentalist Islamic state. The local order brought by the Islamic Courts was welcomed by Somalis desperate for some stability, and the UIC’s emergence as a national power also enjoyed wide support. While the US reacted predictably to support the war lords in their failed effort to prevent the rise of the UIC as a national force, Somalia ‘s neighbors have reason to be wary of the UIC.

In particular, the International Crisis Group reports that elements of the UIC have tolerated the use of Somali territory as “a staging ground and a haven for the perpetrators of Al Qaeda bombings against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,” as well as other attacks in Kenya.[iv]In addition, some of the less restrained members of the UIC have also given voice to old Somali irredentist ambitions for a greater Somalia[v] – not a comforting notion to Ethiopia with its large community of Ogaden Somalis.

The hope that Uganda of 1979 will yet be the model for the start of a slow Somali recovery from chaos is based at least partly on the fact that the TGF and UIC both enjoy a kind of legitimacy in Somalia. The TGF emerged out of an extensive and participatory consultative process and has the support of the Africa Union and IGAD. But it certainly lacks the legitimacy and confidence that finally comes only from effectiveness – from delivering the public good of human security. The UIC, on the other hand, has the legitimacy born of effectiveness. It delivered stability and improved security where all others have failed. But as a national force it lacks the legitimacy that must ultimately come from public engagement and approval.

Both have their respective backers internationally, but how much support does each enjoy at home? That is what Amb. Bethwell Kiplagat, the Kenyan diplomat who guided the peace process and the formation of the TFG, calls a theoretical question that can only be answered through elections: “The problem of Somalia can only be solved by the people and not by leaders alone. Let the people decide through free and fair elections which leaders and what government they want.”[vi]

Amb. Kiplagat does not assume that an election will solve all problems. The challenges are enormous and daunting, but elections are a basic source of governmental legitimacy, which in turn is an essential ingredient in the making of a new Somalia.

The European Union’s International Somalia Contact Group has called for a new reconciliation process that involves both the TFG and the UIC,[vii] but the worst case scenario now is that the TGF and UIC will not seek accommodation with each other and that neither will prevail on its own. The presence of Ethiopian forces will not be tolerated indefinitely, and without an alternative international force to provide basic security services, the resulting power vacuum will again be occupied, as it has for the last 15 years, by a potpourri of clan-based war lords whose specialty is primarily the delivery of persistent chaos and insecurity.


[i] Gwynne Dyer, “U.S. prods Ethiopian invasion of Somalia ,” The Record, December 30, 2006.

[ii] Rosemay Righter, “At last, a glimmer of hope for Somalia ,” The Times, January 4, 2007.

[iii] I happened to attend the first session of the new Parliament, held in Nairobi , as a guest of the Kenyan mediator who managed the peace process on behalf of the regional Horn of Africa organization IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

[iv] John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Getting it Wrong in Somalia Again,” the Boston Globe, November 29, 2006.

[v] ” Somalia Conflict Risk Alert,” International Crisis Group, November 27, 2006.

[vi] Bethwell Kiplagat, “Somalis must have the last word on who leads them,” Sunday Nation ( Nairobi, Kenya ), December 20, 2006.

[vii] ” Somalia : EU calls for reconciliation to achieve peace,” IRIN, January 4, 2007.

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