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Archive for November, 2006

Afghanistan: It’s not about NATO

Posted on: November 29th, 2006 by Ernie Regehr

Somewhere on the road to Kandahar it has apparently been revealed to NATO that its future is inextricably linked to success or failure in Afghanistan – begging the question of whose definition of success applies.[i]

If NATO’s political and military leaders choose to characterize their alliance as so fragile and wanting in purpose that its fate is now in the hands of peasant fighters in Afghanistan – even though NATO accounts for two-thirds of all global military spending and even more of its military capacity[ii] – that’s up to them, but perhaps it’s time to get a grip.

Contrary to current rhetoric, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on which Canada serves in Afghanistan is not a “NATO mission.” Indeed, the American led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) force, still present and active in Afghanistan , is arguably much closer to being a NATO mission. The OEF force was mounted in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US , based on the UN Charter’s self-defence provision (Article 51), and NATO in turn invoked its Article V on grounds that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on them all.

ISAF is something entirely different, and it is definitely not meant to be the NATO alliance in self-defence mode. Established by the Security Council at the request of the 2001 Bonn Conference and the interim government it created, ISAF has the specific task of assisting the Afghan government in maintaining security – i.e. to provide for the safety and protection of the people of Afghanistan, as well as the UN and other agencies working there.[iii]

It was initially managed by the UK, and rotated to Italy and Germany until August 2003 when NATO took over.[iv] When ISAF was under UK command it was not regarded as a “UK operation” and now that it is under NATO command it is not a “NATO operation” – in both cases it was and is an international force, mandated by the UN, that involves troops from countries within and beyond NATO (of 37 troop contributing countries, 11 are from non-NATO countries).

The foreign troops of ISAF are not there under NATO Article V obligations of mutual defence, which means that the obligation on NATO countries to contribute to ISAF is no greater than the obligation on any other country.

The problem with the repeated insistence that ISAF is a NATO operation on which the future of NATO depends is that the focus inevitably becomes the interests and well-being of NATO rather than the interests and well-being of the people of Afghanistan – and to equate the two is the worst form of Western hubris and triumphalism.

In fact, it is NATO’s self-definition of success – that is, the military defeat of the opponents of the Government of Afghanistan and ISAF – that now drives the push to concentrate combat forces in the south and to bolster the firepower of those forces with more tanks and tracked armored vehicles[v] and more of the air strikes that inevitably produce civilian casualties.

NATO planners and strategists, unfortunately, are unlikely to follow the advice that the Washington Post says has found its way into the draft of a new US Army/Marine Corps Field Manual on counterinsurgency: “The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot bullets. The more force you use, the less effective you are.”[vi]

While NATO steers ISAF increasingly towards shooting more bullets to militarily defeat the insurgency, that insurgency in fact grows. At the Latvian NATO summit, there was even pressure to pull ISAF contingents away from important security patrols in some of the relatively stable regions of the north, risking the subsequent spread of the insurgency to the communities that would be then left exposed.

UK journalist Kate Clark, in a new television documentary and a related account in the New Statesman, emphasizes the risk. Many of the grievances that fuel the insurgency in the south, she reports, are also present in the north. She quotes a northern Afghan aid worker as saying: “If we had a resistance movement to join, there’d be an insurgency here as well.”[vii]

The International Crisis Group elaborates on the grievances behind the insurgency in the south: notably, p olitical disenfranchisement which favors one group over others and excludes others; resource conflicts, particularly over land and water; corruption; lack of economic opportunities; and abuse by local and international security forces.[viii]

In other words, the insurgents which are routinely referred to as “the Taliban” are driven less by irrational fanaticism than by very basic and familiar complaints. And they are grievances that are all amenable to being addressed through negotiation, political inclusion, and changed governmental and ISAF practices.

But as long as the grievances are ignored in the hope that NATO will be able to claim success in militarily defeating the aggrieved, many Afghans will continue to transfer their allegiance away from a Government and international security assistance force that have not lived up to expectations and toward the very groups the international forces are fighting.

ISAF’s focus, at NATO’s urging, on expanding and trying to redeploy military forces, rather than on radically expanding attention to real grievances (through economic initiatives, improved social services like health care and education, and attention to corruption and to human rights violations by security forces), appears to have a lot more to do with NATO’s perceived need for a military success to cement its future than it does with the needs of Afghans.

What’s at stake is the future of Afghanistan. It’s not about NATO.


[i]“All NATO’s members need to bear the brunt,” The Globe and Mail, lead editorial, November 29, 2006. On the same day, the paper’s columnist, Jeffrey Simpson, argued that “NATO’s very survival hinges on the Afghan mission.”

[ii]Military Balance, 2006(The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK) shows 2004 military spending for NATO to be $707 billion out of a world total of $1,119 billion (US dollars), p. 403.

[iii]Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).

[iv]See UN Secretary-General’s report A/60/224-S/2005/525, para. 68.

[v][v]David Pugliese, “Armoured vehicles headed to Afghanistan ,” CanWest News Service, November 25, 2006 (http://www.canada.com/components /print.aspx?id=1cef8bf3-18b2-4f06-b1f9-5031e1dba…).

[vi]T.X. Hammes, “The Way to Win a Guerilla War,” Washington Post, November 26, 2006 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/24/AR200611……).

[vii]Kate Clark, “The real Afghan war,” The New Statesman, November 27, 2006.

[viii]“Countering Afghanistan ‘s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 123, November 2, 2006 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4485&1=1).

Ballistic missile tests in south Asia

Posted on: November 20th, 2006 by Ernie Regehr

India and Pakistan have in recent days both carried out tests of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.[1] The tests are in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172.

Following the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan, an indignant Security Council reflected the global mood when it unanimously passed Resolution 1172 (June 6, 1998) condemning the tests, demanding “that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests” and called upon “India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons [emphasis added] and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”

The resolution also “requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution.” The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Security Council on the matter, and it would be correct to conclude that no implementation steps have been taken.

Coincidentally, while the Indians and Pakistanis were testing their ballistic missiles in definace of the Security Council, the US Senate voted to support proposals by the Bush Administration to enter into civilian nuclear cooperation arrangements with India – arrangements that accept and actually welcome India as a de facto nuclear weapons state, facilitate the further production within India of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and ignore India’s refusal to sign, much less ratify, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In contrast, Washington and the Security Council have been following Iran ‘s civilian uranium enrichment program with unwavering vigilance. While India’s actual acquisition of nuclear weapons has the White House in search of ways to accommodate it, Iran ‘s uncertain and future pursuit of a weapons capability is met with a full-court press of diplomacy and Pentagon planning for pre-emptive attack. It would be wrong to treat Iran’s uranium enrichment capability as fully benign, but it is also worth remembering that to date there is no conclusive evidence that a nuclear weapons program is Iran ‘s real goal.[2]

What drives Washington these days is selective non-proliferation – the issue isn’t the spread of nuclear weapons, but who is getting them. In the hands of the friends of the United States, and currently Israel, India, and Pakistan all fit into that category, nuclear weapons are not seen as a danger. Not all agree, however – notably, Hans Blix and his commission on weapons of mass destruction urge the world to hold fast to non-proliferation principles and “reject the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy.”[3] (p. 60)


[1] Archana Mishra, “India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile,” The Associated Press, Nov. 19, 2006 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/19/AR2006111900156].

[2] Seymour M. Hersh, “Is a damaged Administration less likely6 to attack Iran , or more?, New Yorker, Nov. 27, 2006 [http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061127fa_fact].

[3] Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm . http://www.wmdcommission.org (p. 60).

Revisiting the “third way” in Afghanistan

Posted on: November 3rd, 2006 by Ernie Regehr

The “third way” posting on Afghanistan (October 17) describes the polarized debate on the question of Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan:

“The Prime Minister leads the charge for staying the course. Canada is at war, he says, and we don’t cut and run – we will stay in this war until the job is done. NDP Leader Jack Layton leads the call for withdrawal. It is the wrong mission for Canada; it is a war with unclear objectives and it can’t be won.”

The posting goes on to look at some recent proposals and arguments that point to a third option or approach:

“So here are the main elements of an emerging third option: pull out of the south; redeploy to the north in support of training and provincial reconstruction teams; substantially increase non-military aid; review the strategy, objectives, and tactics used by the NATO-led ISAF; and re-open the political process in pursuit of a more inclusive and representative political order for the entire country.”

Since then, an October 27 letter sent out by Mr. Layton elaborates a position for the NDP that looks a lot like the “third way”:

  • “Give notice that Canada will withdraw from the search-and-kill combat mission in Kandahar.”
  • “Work with NATO partners, the Afghan government, and other affected parties to find a political solution through capacity building and a comprehensive peace process.
  • “Focus Canada’s role in Afghanistan on humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development, with appropriate security measures.”

A focus on humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and development, assisted by appropriate security is elaborated in a recent press kit prepared by Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (available along with other excellent resources at www.w4wafghan.ca ), a Calgary-based NGO that has been working with Afghan women since 1996:

“Afghanistan needs an international security force, adhering to internationally recognized human rights standards, for a period of at least ten years. This force should have the following main objectives:

  • To provide security and stability for all Afghans;
  • To facilitate safe provision of basic services such as education, clean water, and healthcare;
  • To create an environment where Afghans can take on reconstruction and development activities on their own terms; and,
  • To ensure the security needs of women and girls are met, which include protection from sexual violence, trafficking, rape, and other security threats commonly face by Afghan women.”

New Action to Control the Arms Trade

Posted on: November 1st, 2006 by Ernie Regehr

When the Colombian Air Force begins later this month accepting delivery of a fleet of new Super Tucano aircraft intended to help it prosecute counter-insurgency operations in its decades-long civil war, Colombia will in effect be importing engines from Canada, machine guns from Belgium, rangefinders from the United States, avionics from Israel, radios from Germany, ejection seats from the United Kingdom, and any number of other components and sub-systems from other countries.

None of these countries allows such exports without a permit, but not one of them has authorized the exports to Colombia. That’s because, before going to Colombia, all of the components first go to Brazil where they are assembled to become the Super Tucano – and from they are shipped to Colombia subject only to Brazil’s export control system.

Welcome to the global arms factory, the loophole-ridden international arms production and marketing system. But there are signs of change. A new initiative and landmark resolution launched at the United Nations this fall aims to finally bring the arms trade under some measure of control.

Military export controls are designed to prevent exports that could destabilize regions, exacerbate wars, contribute to human rights violations, or otherwise undermine international security and the safety of people. Canada’s policy, limits direct military sales to countries like Colombia – that is, to countries in conflict and where there is a risk that the arms will be used in gros and systematic human rights violations.

But there is no effort to exercise control over the final destination of indirect sales. So Canada authorizes exports of engines to the country where the aircraft are being assembled, but makes no judgment about where the engine is sent to actually be used military purposes.

That would be a defensible arrangement if there were universal or global standards for exports and if Canada was confident that Brazil, in the case of the Super Tucano, would apply the same control standards as Canada when it makes decisions about export permits. But there is no uniform international standard, and the situation is thus made to order for regulation shopping – looking for countries with the least stringent export controls as locations to assembly weapons systems that can then be sold throughout the world with minimal restrictions.

The new UN initiative builds on a major international civil society effort that has been ongoing for more than a decade to develop legally-binding international standards to regulate arms transfers. A General Assembly resolution acknowledges that “the absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms is a contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism,” and that the absence of common standards therefore “undermines peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development.”[i]

Canada cosponsored the resolution and Canada’s Ambassador to the Geneva-based UN Conference on Disarmament, also emphasized that “a comprehensive, legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty could provide important international and human security benefits, notably by curtailing the irresponsible trade in all types of conventional arms.”[ii]

A key principle to be imbedded into the Treaty is that states are culpable if they knowingly assist other states in the commission of an illegal act – for example, if a state knowingly provides military equipment when it is reasonable to expect that it will be used to violate human rights then the supplier is also guilty of violating human rights law.[iii]

States advocating new efforts at arms trade restraint met earlier this year in Kenya and articulated a set of global standards by which exporting states acknowledge their obligation to prevent exports if there is a reasonable risk that the commodities in question will be used to commit grave or persistent violations of human rights or fundamental freedoms, grave breaches of international humanitarian law, acts of genocide, or crimes against humanity. They agreed that exports should also not contravene bilateral or multilateral commitments on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, or support or encourage terrorist acts or the commission of organized or violent crimes.[iv]

The pursuit of common standards has the potential for introducing a significant measure of restraint into the arms trade, but it must also be said that effective and durable restraint will also require significant and enduring reductions in demand, including more effective conflict resolution diplomacy in chronic war situations like the one in Colombia, mutual security arrangements within regions and sub-regions, as well as region wide import bans like the small arms ban in West Africa.

An Arms Trade Treaty will still rely on national decision-making that is still subject to all the conflicting pressures that complicate the setting of national priorities – notably the conflict between export promotion and arms control objectives. But a Treaty would necessarily include mechanisms for greater transparency and accountability, as well as prior peer reviews and consultations in instances of contested export proposals.

In the case of the Super Tucano sale to Colombia, the suppliers of major components would still not have final authority, on their own, over the export permit decisions, but they would be consulted and would participate in a more collective decision-making process.

This fall’s resolution directs the Secretary-General to survey and report on the views of member states on such an instrument, and establishes the experts group that is to report to the 2008 session of the General Assembly.

[i] Resolution A/C.1/61/L.55, October 12, 2006.

[ii] Paul Meyer, “The Need for an Arms Trade Treaty,” Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, August 10, 2006.

[iii] Emanuela Gillard, What Is Legal? What Is Illegal? Limitations on Transfers of Small Arms under International Law (Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, Cambridge; paper is available at http://www.armstradetreaty.com/att/what.is.legal.what.is.illegal.pdf), p. 4.

[iv] The non-paper was submitted as a Working Paper, submitted by Kenya to the Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, June 26-July 7, 2006, A/Conf.192/2006/RC/WP.2, (http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/rc.wp.2%20(E).doc).